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Intel® TXT
                           The Front Door of Trusted Computing....




© 2008 Intel Corporation
Outlines
     Introduction to Intel® TXT Technology
     Why it matters?
     Bad & Good List
     Architectural Enhancements
     How it works?
     Control Points
     LCP Protection
     Use Models
     Benefits
     Meeting the requirements
     Conclusion
     References


                     Intel ® TXT
2       6 Mar 2012
                          Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Introduction

     Intel®
           TXT(Trusted eXecution Technology) Code
     named as LaGrande.

     Provides Hardware-based Security enhancing the
     level of security (more useful for Business PCs)

     Integrates
               new security features and capabilities
     into the processor, chipset and other platform
     components




                    Intel ® TXT
3      6 Mar 2012
                         Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Why it matters?
       Mechanism of Malwares may vary but they all seek to:
        1.   Corrupt Systems
        2.   Disrupt Business
        3.   Steal Data
        4.   Seize control of Platforms


       Traditional approaches by anti-viruses is to look for
        “known-bad” elements.

       Intel® TXT provides “known good-focused” approach,
        that checks for malicious software before they are even
        launched.



                           Intel ® TXT
4            6 Mar 2012
                                Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Move from bad list to good list

         VMM V20
         VMM V4
      VMM V8
       Hacked_V1
      VMM V4          VMM V1
   VMM V3
      Corrupted_V2
    Hacked_V1         VMM V2
   VMM V4OS3
   Corrupted_V2         OS1
 Hacked_V1 OS4
        OS3             OS2
Corrupted_V2
        OS4
     OS3
      OS4




    Bad list         Good list
    Reactive         Proactive




                       Intel ® TXT
5       6 Mar 2012
                            Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Good List Requirements

                    Accurate                          Strict control
Identity           identity of                      enables switch to
 Check              software                            good list

                                                            Enforce the
                                         Control             list policy



                          Must provide ability to validate list
                              integrity at time of policy
    Integrity                        enforcement
     Check                Management of list must provide
                         for multiple users and assurance of
                                     list integrity

                   Intel ® TXT
6     6 Mar 2012
                        Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Architectural Enhancements
         A number of system components’ functionalities as well as
        architecture is enhanced:
       Processor:
        Provides for simultaneous support of the standard partition &
        one or more protected partitions.

       Chipset:
        Provides protected channels to graphics h/w and i/o devices on
        behalf of the protected partitions. Also provides interfaces to the
        TPM.

       Keyboard & Mouse:
        Support encryption of keyboard and mouse input using a
        cryptographic key that is shared between the input device and
        the input manager for protected execution domain.
                                                            (contd..)
                        Intel ® TXT
7         6 Mar 2012
                             Front Door of Trusted Computing …
   Graphics:
        Provides protected pathway between an application or
        software agent and the output display context(such as
        window object)



       TPM(Trusted Platform Module):
        Hardware-based mechanism that stores cryptographic keys
        and other data related to Intel® TXT within the platform,
        also provides hardware support for the attestation process to
        confirm the successful invocation of the Intel TXT
        environment.




                      Intel ® TXT
8        6 Mar 2012
                           Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Internal Components of a TPM




                   Intel ® TXT
9     6 Mar 2012
                        Front Door of Trusted Computing …
How does it works?




                  Intel ® TXT
10   6 Mar 2012
                       Front Door of Trusted Computing …
How does it works? (contd..)
    Creates a Measured Launch Environment(MLE) that enables
     accurate comparison of all critical elements of launch
     environment against known-good source.

    Creates a cryptographically unique identifier for each
     approved launch-enabled component, and then provides
     hardware-based enforcement mechanisms to block the
     launch of code that does not match approved code.

    Intel TXT provides:
     •   Verified Launch (MLE)
     •   Launch Control Policy (LCP)
     •   Secret Protection
     •   Attestation



                       Intel ® TXT
11       6 Mar 2012
                            Front Door of Trusted Computing …
How does it works? (contd..)




                  Intel ® TXT
12   6 Mar 2012
                       Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Control Points
                                                  Load SINIT and MLE into memory
      
                                                 Invoke GETSEC [SENTER]
Memory
                                                 Establish special environment
     MLE       
                                                 Load SINIT into ACEA
     MLE       
     MLE                                         Validate SINIT digital signature
               
                                       a            a Store SINIT identity in TPM
                       CPU              a
     SINIT                                        SINIT measures MLE in memory
     ACM               ACEA
                       SINIT                         a Store MLE identity in TPM
                      ACM




                           Intel ® TXT
13        6 Mar 2012
                                 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Control Points
                                                  Load SINIT and MLE into memory
      
                                                 Invoke GETSEC [SENTER]
Memory
                                                 Establish special environment
     MLE       
                                                 Load SINIT into ACEA
     MLE       
     MLE                                         Validate SINIT digital signature
               
                                       a            a Store SINIT identity in TPM
                       CPU              a
     SINIT                                        SINIT measures MLE in memory
     ACM               ACEA
                       SINIT                         a Store MLE identity in TPM
                      ACM
                                                   SINIT loads LCP
             
      LCP                                         SINIT passes control to known MLE
     VMM1
     VMM2


                           Intel ® TXT
14        6 Mar 2012
                                 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
LCP Protection




                  Intel ® TXT
15   6 Mar 2012
                       Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Intel ® TXT
16   6 Mar 2012
                       Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Ensures Safe Migration between
 Hosts through Trustable Pools




                  Intel ® TXT
17   6 Mar 2012
                       Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Benefits of Intel® TXT

  Increased   user          confidence             in      their   computing
     environment

  More protection from malicious software

  Improved        protection           of      corporate           information
     assets

  Better   confidentiality and integrity of sensitive
     information


                   Intel ® TXT
18    6 Mar 2012
                        Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Meeting The Requirements

                                               Software stack identity
                  Identity                     provided by SENTER
                                               measurement




                                              Control of software stack
                                              provided by authenticated code
                  Control                     enforcing a launch control policy
                                              set for the specific platform




                                               Integrity of the launch control
                  Integrity                    policy guaranteed by hash and
                                               TPM controls



                   Intel ® TXT
19   6 Mar 2012
                        Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Safer Computing
   with Intel technologies
                                                                  Future Technologies
 Protection Capabilities




                                                         Intel® Trusted Execution Technology

                                                    Intel® Virtualization Technology

                                             Intel® Active Management Technology

                                           Execute Disable

                                        TPM (Trusted Platform Module)

                                Smart Card

                           Software-Only
                                                                                       Time
                                           Advancing Platform Protections

                                           Intel ® TXT
20                         6 Mar 2012
                                                Front Door of Trusted Computing …
Conclusion

 With Intel® TXT enabled solutions we can:

  Address     the increasing and evolving security
     threats across physical and virtual infrastructure.

  Facilitate compliance with government and industry
     regulations and data protection standards.

  Reduce          malware-related support and remediation
     costs.



                      Intel ® TXT
21    6 Mar 2012
                           Front Door of Trusted Computing …
References
    Software Development Guide, Intel® TXT, pdf format, March
     2011
    White Paper, Intel® TXT Software, pdf format
    Technology Overview, Intel® TXT, pdf format
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Execution_Technology
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsjXjDksU
    http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/data-
     security/security-overview-general-technology.html
    http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-
     technology/trusted-execution-technology/trusted-execution-
     technology-overview.html
    http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-
     technology/trusted-execution-technology/malware-reduction-
     general-technology.html


                   Intel ® TXT
22    6 Mar 2012
                        Front Door of Trusted Computing …
23   16 Oct 2008   Front Door of Trusted Computing
Intel Trusted eXecution Technology

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Intel Trusted eXecution Technology

  • 1. Intel® TXT The Front Door of Trusted Computing.... © 2008 Intel Corporation
  • 2. Outlines  Introduction to Intel® TXT Technology  Why it matters?  Bad & Good List  Architectural Enhancements  How it works?  Control Points  LCP Protection  Use Models  Benefits  Meeting the requirements  Conclusion  References Intel ® TXT 2 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 3. Introduction  Intel® TXT(Trusted eXecution Technology) Code named as LaGrande.  Provides Hardware-based Security enhancing the level of security (more useful for Business PCs)  Integrates new security features and capabilities into the processor, chipset and other platform components Intel ® TXT 3 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 4. Why it matters?  Mechanism of Malwares may vary but they all seek to: 1. Corrupt Systems 2. Disrupt Business 3. Steal Data 4. Seize control of Platforms  Traditional approaches by anti-viruses is to look for “known-bad” elements.  Intel® TXT provides “known good-focused” approach, that checks for malicious software before they are even launched. Intel ® TXT 4 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 5. Move from bad list to good list VMM V20 VMM V4 VMM V8 Hacked_V1 VMM V4 VMM V1 VMM V3 Corrupted_V2 Hacked_V1 VMM V2 VMM V4OS3 Corrupted_V2 OS1 Hacked_V1 OS4 OS3 OS2 Corrupted_V2 OS4 OS3 OS4 Bad list Good list Reactive Proactive Intel ® TXT 5 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 6. Good List Requirements Accurate Strict control Identity identity of enables switch to Check software good list Enforce the Control list policy Must provide ability to validate list integrity at time of policy Integrity enforcement Check Management of list must provide for multiple users and assurance of list integrity Intel ® TXT 6 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 7. Architectural Enhancements A number of system components’ functionalities as well as architecture is enhanced:  Processor: Provides for simultaneous support of the standard partition & one or more protected partitions.  Chipset: Provides protected channels to graphics h/w and i/o devices on behalf of the protected partitions. Also provides interfaces to the TPM.  Keyboard & Mouse: Support encryption of keyboard and mouse input using a cryptographic key that is shared between the input device and the input manager for protected execution domain. (contd..) Intel ® TXT 7 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 8. Graphics: Provides protected pathway between an application or software agent and the output display context(such as window object)  TPM(Trusted Platform Module): Hardware-based mechanism that stores cryptographic keys and other data related to Intel® TXT within the platform, also provides hardware support for the attestation process to confirm the successful invocation of the Intel TXT environment. Intel ® TXT 8 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 9. Internal Components of a TPM Intel ® TXT 9 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 10. How does it works? Intel ® TXT 10 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 11. How does it works? (contd..)  Creates a Measured Launch Environment(MLE) that enables accurate comparison of all critical elements of launch environment against known-good source.  Creates a cryptographically unique identifier for each approved launch-enabled component, and then provides hardware-based enforcement mechanisms to block the launch of code that does not match approved code.  Intel TXT provides: • Verified Launch (MLE) • Launch Control Policy (LCP) • Secret Protection • Attestation Intel ® TXT 11 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 12. How does it works? (contd..) Intel ® TXT 12 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 13. Control Points  Load SINIT and MLE into memory    Invoke GETSEC [SENTER] Memory   Establish special environment MLE    Load SINIT into ACEA MLE  MLE   Validate SINIT digital signature  a a Store SINIT identity in TPM CPU a SINIT  SINIT measures MLE in memory ACM ACEA SINIT a Store MLE identity in TPM  ACM Intel ® TXT 13 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 14. Control Points  Load SINIT and MLE into memory    Invoke GETSEC [SENTER] Memory   Establish special environment MLE    Load SINIT into ACEA MLE  MLE   Validate SINIT digital signature  a a Store SINIT identity in TPM CPU a SINIT  SINIT measures MLE in memory ACM ACEA SINIT a Store MLE identity in TPM  ACM  SINIT loads LCP  LCP  SINIT passes control to known MLE VMM1 VMM2 Intel ® TXT 14 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 15. LCP Protection Intel ® TXT 15 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 16. Intel ® TXT 16 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 17. Ensures Safe Migration between Hosts through Trustable Pools Intel ® TXT 17 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 18. Benefits of Intel® TXT  Increased user confidence in their computing environment  More protection from malicious software  Improved protection of corporate information assets  Better confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information Intel ® TXT 18 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 19. Meeting The Requirements Software stack identity Identity provided by SENTER measurement Control of software stack provided by authenticated code Control enforcing a launch control policy set for the specific platform Integrity of the launch control Integrity policy guaranteed by hash and TPM controls Intel ® TXT 19 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 20. Safer Computing with Intel technologies Future Technologies Protection Capabilities Intel® Trusted Execution Technology Intel® Virtualization Technology Intel® Active Management Technology Execute Disable TPM (Trusted Platform Module) Smart Card Software-Only Time Advancing Platform Protections Intel ® TXT 20 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 21. Conclusion With Intel® TXT enabled solutions we can:  Address the increasing and evolving security threats across physical and virtual infrastructure.  Facilitate compliance with government and industry regulations and data protection standards.  Reduce malware-related support and remediation costs. Intel ® TXT 21 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 22. References  Software Development Guide, Intel® TXT, pdf format, March 2011  White Paper, Intel® TXT Software, pdf format  Technology Overview, Intel® TXT, pdf format  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Execution_Technology  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsjXjDksU  http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/data- security/security-overview-general-technology.html  http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and- technology/trusted-execution-technology/trusted-execution- technology-overview.html  http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and- technology/trusted-execution-technology/malware-reduction- general-technology.html Intel ® TXT 22 6 Mar 2012 Front Door of Trusted Computing …
  • 23. 23 16 Oct 2008 Front Door of Trusted Computing