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International Social Work
http://isw.sagepub.com/content/52/3/327
The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/0020872808102067
2009 52: 327International Social Work
Martin Javier Zurita Paucar
Rodas, Juan Manuel Raunelli Sander, Juan Gabriel Adanaque
Zapata and
Nancy Claiborne, Junqing Liu, Henry Vandenburgh, Jan Hagen,
Armando Mera
interorganizational relationships
Northern Peruvian non-governmental organizations : Patterns of
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International Social Work 52(3): 327–341
i s w
Sage Publications: Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore
and Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/0020872808102067
Key words interorganizational relationships non-governmental
organizations
organizational environment Peru
Northern Peruvian non-governmental
organizations
Patterns of interorganizational relationships
Nancy Claiborne, Junqing Liu, Henry Vandenburgh, Jan
Hagen, Armando Mera Rodas, Juan Manuel Raunelli
Sander, Juan Gabriel Adanaque Zapata and Martin
Javier Zurita Paucar

The purpose of this exploratory study is to understand
relationship
patterns among selected northern Peruvian non-governmental
organi-
zations (NGOs), other regional NGOs, the national government
and
international NGOs. The findings of this pilot study are
expected to
locate Peruvian NGOs within patterns laid down by
globalization; cri-
tique ways in which NGOs are utilized to promote false
stability, and
enhance NGO functioning and capacity building; identify areas
for
NGO staff development and training; directly contribute to
social work
organizational practice development and further collaborative
research
initiatives.
Collaboration and partnership among NGOs
Over the past 60 years, many NGOs have learned to use
collabora-
tion for capacity building, that is, improving an organization’s
ability
to promote better services and increase service access to
consumers,
which can be achieved through a process of enhancing staff
skills with
access to knowledge and training, developing organizational
structures

328 International Social Work volume 52(3)
and systems, including enhancing management systems,
development,
improving process and procedures and managing
interorganizational
relationships (Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2006; Tallberg,
2002).
An NGO’s success in building greater capacity improves its
ability to
obtain resources, manage environmental and internal influences
for
resource allocation and deliver services (Barrett et al., 2005;
Kenny,
2005; Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2006).
DeGraaf (1986) notes that effective NGOs tend to use
collaboration
as opposed to using outside experts. Campfens (1996) also
emphasizes
partnerships as key to local capacity building. Uvin et al. (2000)
stress
the need for NGOs to expand their capacity by, among other
things,
influencing other organizations through collaboration and
partnerships.
Larence (2001) identifies an NGO’s assets as partly consisting
of its
networks, or linkages, with other organizations, its potential
collabora-
tion partners.

A key set of relationships is that between more macro (e.g.
interna-
tional NGO headquarters, national government, national NGOs)
and
more micro organizations. While these relationships have the
potential
to be asymmetrical, workable macro–micro relationships exist
between
local NGOs, their international counterparts, their host nations
and local
governments (Brinkerhoff, 1999; Snavely and Tracy, 2002) and
other,
larger-scale NGOs (Brown and Moore, 2001). However, an
exces-
sive amount of interorganizational linkage and dependency is
likely to
reduce autonomy (Silberberg, 1998), also essential for
organizational
effectiveness.
Methods
We examined six NGOs in the northern coastal region of Peru,
prima-
rily a rural region, that have primary missions of sustainable
develop-
ment and commitment to providing social welfare services to
local
communities (Midgley, 1996) in order to explore the following
research
questions:
What are the linkages and relationship patterns among NGOs
operating in the same local geographic region?
What are the linkages and relationship patterns among NGOs
operating in Peru?

What are the linkages and relationship patterns between NGOs
and
their international stakeholders?
What are the linkages and relationship patterns between NGOs
and
both the local and national government agencies?
1.
2.
3.
4.
Claiborne et al.: Northern Peruvian NGOs 329
In what ways do NGOs’ internal governance structures affect
their
interorganizational relationships with other NGOs, with interna-
tional stakeholders and with government agencies?
The study was conducted during the period of June and July
2006.
Three NGOs were located in the city of Chiclayo, a major
metropolitan
area, and three located in Piura, a more rural location. The
major foci
of the participating NGOs were economic development of home
crafts,

water rights coordination, health services provision, sustainable
farm-
ing and marketing, micro enterprise, and providing consultation
and
educational programs to communities and public schools.
A multiple-case study, mixed-methods approach was used. Data
were collected from key administrative informants (N = 9),
using semi-
structured interviews (Yin, 2003). The interview guide was
based on
the Marguerite Casey Foundation Capacity Assessment Tool
Web
Version, a derivative product of the Capacity Assessment Grid
cre-
ated by McKinsey and Company for Venture Philanthropy
Partners
( Marguerite Casey Foundation, 2006). The interview guide was
orga-
nized by the following categories:
NGO operational and financial structure (internal governance,
scope of services, employees and consumers, annual budget,
sources and revenue streams);
relationships with other NGOs (local, regional, national,
interna-
tional) focusing on type of contact, shared operations, coopera-
tive activities, resource relationship, perception of and impact
of
collaboration; and
organizational capacity including questions of leadership,
adapt-
ability (internal and external communication and monitoring),
management and staff (composition, goals/objectives, skills and
relationships), financial operations (planning, budgeting,
monitor-

ing and development) and technology (electronic
communication
systems).
Case study narratives for each NGO were analyzed through
induc-
tive and iterative processes. Although this approach offers an
in-depth
look at six NGOs in northern, coastal Peru, the findings are
limited to
those NGOs and are not highly generalizable. Additional study
limi-
tations include possible response bias based on the small
number of
NGOs studied in this convenience sample, possible social
desirability
bias, where respondents try to present the best face possible and
the
5.
1.
2.
3.
possibility of emergent issues now or in the future, such as

changes in
funding, which may make results not generalizable over time.
Each interview with an NGO executive director and key staff
was
conducted by two of the US investigators and one of the
Peruvian
investigators. Interviews were captured by handwritten notes
and tape
recordings that were transcribed and translated into English by
an expe-
rienced bilingual translator. The notes and transcriptions were
then
analyzed utilizing the NVIVO qualitative analysis software.
Two inves-
tigation team members analyzed individual case study narratives
and
identified themes and patterns that were compared across cases,
pro-
ducing a cross-case synthesis. Findings were reviewed by all
members
of the team to ensure agreement as well as cultural accuracy.
Findings
Context of the NGOs
Environment All six of the NGOs studied have offices located
in their
respective cities. However, half the NGOs served people in the
city and
half served people living in the surrounding rural areas. Those
serv-
ing rural populations agree that developing a trusting
relationship with
local communities was difficult due to past histories of
exploitation

from ‘outsiders’. Respondents describe a trust-building process
taking
between about six months and one year before actual economic
devel-
opment activities can proceed.
Organizational structure All of the NGOs have a similar
organiza-
tional structure, consisting of a board of directors, an executive
direc-
tor, a few project managers, a small number of full-time line
staff, and
contracted staff who provide programming. The board of
directors
averages five members, each of whom brings specific expertise
to the
organization. They provide direction by developing strategic
and opera-
tional plans, identifying revenue sources and directly
controlling bud-
getary decisions. Another four roles for boards of directors
identified
by scholars as best practices were not suggested by our
interviewees in
this study: policy formation, program monitoring, board
development
and dispute resolution (Miller-Millesen, 2003).
According to resource dependency theory, when an NGO’s
resources
are mainly developed from outside, a board of directors is more
likely
to engage in boundary spanning functions (representing and
linking the
NGO to powerful external constituents) than daily operational
internal

monitoring (Miller-Millesen, 2003). This was true in our cases,
in that
the executive director usually provides management oversight
and
budget allocation.
Agency theory suggests that one way to solve conflicts of
interest
between managers and stakeholders is to keep the control of
decision-
making apart from the implementation of decisions, that is, to
set up
an independent board (Miller-Millesen, 2003). From our
interviews,
the executive director’s management tasks typically include
program
planning, outcome identification and measurement, staff
supervision,
fiscal systems implementation, and written and verbal
communications
to stakeholders. Some NGOs were an exception, however, in
that the
executive director is also an equal decision-maker with the
board.
The majority of the NGOs use a few project coordinators,
account-

able directly to the executive director and supervising frontline
staff.
These project coordinators are responsible for ensuring projects
are
progressing, problem-solving with staff and assessing resources
neces-
sary for intervention tasks. Line staff are responsible for
successfully
implementing services and interventions.
One NGO’s organizational structure deviated from this model,
in
that it is part of the local university and direct oversight is
structured
through a university vice-president and an executive board. The
presi-
dent of the executive board is also the NGO’s executive
director. With
the exception of the executive director, staff here are unpaid.
Service
delivery is provided by volunteer professors and students.
There is no common approach for responding to grant
announcements.
One organization describes a matrix system in which different
individ-
uals come together to write a given grant, based on staff
knowledge,
skills and grant particulars. Another organization describes a
planning
committee responsible for submitting grants. The executive
director is
responsible for writing grants in the remaining NGOs surveyed.
Volunteers are a key component of many NGOs. Because the
unem-

ployment rate is high in Peru, many fresh graduates undertake
volun-
teering to improve future career potential by garnering
experience and
contacts for future employment (Handy and Srinivasan, 2005).
Where
they help compose the NGOs’ workforces, the volunteers tend
to be
very vocal. The NGOs thus employ volunteers not only to save
costs
but also to establish legitimacy with the community, because
these vol-
unteers both serve as a conduit to the community and can also
represent
the community’s voice to the executive director and board of
directors.
Establishing a common agenda between the community and the
NGO
is a process that needs to be actively cultivated, according to
respon-
dents (Silberberg, 1998).
Leadership The executive directors are well educated, holding
master’s-level degrees, usually in engineering, agriculture or
business
administration. All have held management positions previously
and
have had four or more years’ experience as top administrators.

Most
describe their organizational structure and leadership style as
being
hierarchical.
All identify management by goals and objectives as a core
approach,
a part of normal strategic planning (Herman and Renz, 1999). A
major
cause for the adoption of this style is identified as having
occurred a
few years previously when international NGOs demanded
program
evaluation, especially measurable outcome information.
However, all
directors described staff as providing input for decision-making,
with
the executive director making final decisions. Both the
executive direc-
tor and the staff are highly involved in decision-making on
program-
ming issues. This is a limited shared leadership model (Saidel
and
Harlan, 1998).
Supervising staff is described as frequent, usually daily, with
written
reports required weekly. Some administrators describe a hands-
on
approach involved in traveling to new site projects monthly to
assess
progress and problem-solve barriers to success. A few interview
con-
sumers to assess staff’s job performance and the quality of
services
delivered. These appraisal processes may lead to the

improvement of
program performance (Herman and Renz, 1999).
Finance The main financial supports for the local NGOs come
from
international NGOs. These typically use a grant mechanism to
award
these funds. The Peruvian national government also uses a grant
mecha-
nism for passing through some funding from international
sources (e.g.
USAID) to NGOs. Funding sources are multiple; often between
five
and 10 international sources can be identified for each NGO.
A major concern is that these NGOs face decreases in funding
due to
the changing commitments of the international NGOs and other
interna-
tional entities. For example, USAID is shifting its priorities for
funding
to incentives for growing alternative crops (actually for
discouraging
cocaine production). Relying on the international sector for
funding
makes these NGOs financially vulnerable to the precipitous
withdrawal
of funding if an international NGO’s policies change. However,
this
risk may be lessened by a strategy of utilizing multiple
international
funding sources (Miller-Millesen, 2003).
A few NGOs provide direct services to consumers who pay a
fee.
Some NGOs share a percentage of the profits from sales of

products
developed in partnerships with organizations they coach on
economic
development. Reimbursement generated from consumers who
buy
products appears to be only a small percentage of these NGOs’
operat-
ing revenues, however. The amount of this earned revenue is
positively
associated with the age of the NGO, the number of staff
employed and
its budget size (Massarsky and Beinhacker, 2002). (On average,
the
Peruvian NGOs in this study have existed for less than 15 years;
by
contrast, the tenure of conventional employers is less than 10
years.
The average NGO budget was less than $1m per year.)
A few NGOs are supported by subsidies from local government
or
the university. The majority of these organizations receive some
grant
awards from local government agencies and national NGOs.
Surprisingly, individual donor or gifts programs were not
identi-

fied by any NGOs as a source of revenue. NGOs in Peru do not
enjoy
exemption from taxes for operations or sales; clearly, this
increases
their financial burden and decreases incentives for establishing
a suc-
cessful gifts program. Donors are likewise not given incentives
because
they do not receive tax deductions.
All of the studied NGOs have internal financial accountability
sys-
tems established and external professional companies perform
annual
audits.
NGO relationships
Linkage to government These Peruvian NGOs’ relationships
with
government are positive but distant. According to Young’s
(2000) clas-
sification of the types of NGO relationship with governments,
Peruvian
NGOs’ relationships with their government are more
supplemen-
tary and complementary than adversarial. Supplementary
relationship
means that NGOs finance and deliver public services left
unsatisfied
and unfinanced by the government; in a complementary
relationship,
NGOs deliver public goods left unsatisfied but financed by the
govern-
ment. NGOs advocacy of public policy or governmental
responsibility
is an example of adversarial operations. Peruvian NGOs are

licensed
by the Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional (APCI –
Peru
Agency of International Cooperation) and must follow rules
prescribed
for them. They are taxed and audited by this government agency
annu-
ally. NGOs are relied on to provide services that the
government does
not provide, or that can better be coordinated locally through
NGOs,
examples of supplementarity.
Since the government plays a more minimalist role than it
would
in a more economically developed country, these factors make
NGOs
desirable, especially if they do not promise to energize political
move-
ments, which would be an example of adversarial relations.
Normally,
they do not, because the typically top–down administrative
structures
of the NGOs make it likely that control over activities remains
central-
ized, rational and conventional in nature, even when the local
popular

voice on day-to-day operations is encouraged, either from
volunteers or
clients.
In the case of local coordination, government contract awards
are
issued to support services that NGOs provide, an example of
comple-
mentarity. (NGOs were the mechanism for privatizing some
services
during the 1990s.) For the most part, then, the government
provides
little support and exerts weak direct control over the NGOs’
activities.
Respondents cited Peru’s poor economic conditions as having a
large
impact on NGOs, with government policies having little impact.
Linkage to regional and national NGOs Four of the NGOs
studied
have close ties to regional or national NGOs, which also have
strong
linkages to international NGOs. The relationship between the
national
and local NGOs are usually alliances based on membership and
an iden-
tified mission. The national organization usually provides
legitimacy
and networking opportunities for all member NGOs, service
delivery
model information, general funding information and research.
Linkages
among local NGOs appear to be closer, but informal for the
most part,
having network purposes only (Claiborne and Lawson, 2005). In
some

areas, the local NGOs meet monthly to discuss local
development.
Many administrators indicated that they frequently communicate
with
each other between meetings.
Collaborative activities such as partnered service delivery, joint
grant
writing and coalition building for advocacy and influencing
govern-
ment policy decisions were not identified as activities pursued
by either
the local network groups or the national NGOs
Linkage to international NGOs There is a great deal of
interaction
with international NGOs. These relationships have allowed the
NGOs
to expand their services, obtain training, receive consultations
that
enhance technical expertise and management capability, and
strengthen
funding acquisition activities. The main portion of revenue for
the
majority of the local NGOs studied derives from international
funding
sources. In addition, international NGOs provide expertise and
training
in micro enterprise, and economic and community development.
One
impact of international relationships is help in rationalizing
manage-
ment, that is, making it more like modern international
management
techniques. International NGOs provide consultation for
measuring out-

comes and, as stakeholders, demand demonstrable results in
achieving
promised outcomes. These potential impetuses for collaboration
produce legitimacy, stability and efficiency in Peruvian NGOs.
How-
ever, there is concern that financial support from international
NGOs
may be decreasing or being directed to other programs, having a
nega-
tive impact on the NGOs’ financial stability and the equal
partnership
in decision-making (Ashman, 2001).
Collaboration Collaboration is the ability of NGOs to create
mutually
beneficial relationships that share resources for greater
efficiency and
expanded service delivery among other local and national
entities and
NGOs. Historically, as one administrator stated, competition for
scarce
resources is a barrier to collaboration, but some progress has
occurred
during the past five years. Currently, collaboration among
NGOs takes
the form of sharing information and occasionally partnering on
a proj-

ect. According to Claiborne and Lawson’s typology of the
phases of
collaboration, these forms are beginning stages of such
collaboration
(Claiborne and Lawson, 2005). On the one hand, collaborating
with
other NGOs is perceived as an advantage in that it can increase
the like-
lihood of realizing individual NGO goals, as well as provide
economies
of scale. On the other hand, collaboration activity at local or
national
level is typically weak.
The low level of collaboration among local or national NGOs
can
be understood in terms of the lack of contingencies of
collaboration.
Oliver identified six contingencies of collaboration formation:
neces-
sity, asymmetry (control over organizations), reciprocity,
efficiency,
legitimacy and stability (Oliver, 1990). Four factors denoting a
low
level of collaboration were found from our interviews, that is,
weak-
nesses in efficiency, reciprocity, legitimacy and stability
contingencies.
Oliver defines efficiency contingency as the organizations’
efforts to
improve their input and output ratios. These NGOs do not
consider
such efficiency in providing services because there is little
competition
in garnering service consumers. In Peru, the need for services
surpasses

the amount of services NGOs can provide (Living in Peru,
2006). NGOs
are more focused on independently extending their services over
large
geographic areas or within densely populated areas. Typical
examples
are agricultural development across a province, economic
development
in a metropolitan area or providing health services in a city
center.
The great demand for these services thus provides NGOs with
little
incentive to form relationships with other NGOs for developing
reci-
procity as well as servicing delivery efficiency. Oliver defines
reciproc-
ity as organizations entering into a resource exchange that is to
their
mutual benefit and one that overcomes competition in an
environment
of scarcity. Competition among local or national NGOs for
scarce
resources outweighs the reciprocity of collaboration. Most of
the
NGOs studied frequently seek to access the same funding
sources. The

competition over funding makes NGOs less likely to see the
need for
reciprocity and collaboration. Faced with the constraints on
funding
munificence, NGOs strategically maintain small full-time work
forces
because Peru labor laws make it difficult to lay workers off.
Therefore,
NGOs rely on contracted labor to perform program
implementation and
servicing.
Legitimacy contingency is evident in that NGOs are challenged
to
provide funders and government with documentation that is
divergent,
not easily obtained under time constraints and imposes
operational bur-
dens. Oliver defines legitimacy as institutional environments
imposing
justifications of activities. But collaboration has also created
adminis-
trative burdens and issues of distribution of power. Most often
cited is
the idea of multiple levels of control requiring individualized
reports.
The reports discussed are details of funds received and invested
made
to the APCI licensing government agency or to the university’s
auditors
(annually); program outcomes and financial accountability
reports to
government, national and international funding entities (due per
grant/
contract award specifications); and the individual NGO program
and

financial reports generated for their board of directors (weekly
and/or
monthly).
Some NGOs are not able to produce evidence of success for
their
funders during the initial community relationship building
period, which
can last for an extended period of time. The accountability
requirement
posed by donors conflicts with the principles of collaboration,
includ-
ing equal partnership, bringing in local NGOs’ agenda and
resources of
local development and viewing them as leaders in developing
their own
country (Ashman, 2001).
These administrators live in an environment of somewhat
volatile
daily operations and find it difficult to engage in strategic
planning
efforts that could result in formal coalitions and collaboration
entities.
Stability is the ability of an organization to deal with
uncertainty and
achieve reliable patterns for resource exchange. Instability in
Peru is
a factor that makes collaboration difficult. One area of
instability is
the heavy reliance on one revenue stream, mainly international
NGOs.
Thus, these NGOs would find it difficult to survive if the
international
NGOs were to change their priorities for funding. Another area
is

the different sectors of Peruvian people who remain culturally
segre-
gated, with intergroup dynamics making collaboration difficult.
Stable
relationships are therefore difficult to achieve between local or
national
NGOs (Oliver, 1990).
Conclusion
Survival is a major issue for Peruvian NGOs and globalization
has
brought Peruvian communities into the world’s competition for
obtaining international NGOs’ support and resources. Although
approximately 22 percent of Peruvian nonprofit income comes
from
international NGOs and donors (Management Systems
International,
2000: 1–87), the organizations studied mainly rely on financial
sup-
port from international sources, including international NGOs.
This
support can be quixotic, depending upon the varying agendas of
dis-
tant funding organizations. All of the organizations have close
com-
munication ties to regional or international NGOs, but the

amount
of concrete support varies between organizations and over time.
The
subsequent impact of local NGOs on communities is strongly
linked
to the fluctuation in global priorities of international NGOs,
which
call the shots for their local subsidiaries. Additional revenue is
from
membership fees and services (usually realized as a percentage
of
product sales or fees for services). Such additional revenue
streams
are inconsiderable in that over half of Peru’s population in 2004
was
reported as poor and about 20 percent being extremely poor,
with
rural areas having significantly higher poverty levels (World
Bank,
2006: 146–736). Although the cities have drawn much of the
rural
population away from the rural areas (as agriculture has become
rationalized and gone to larger, factory-like farmsteads as
opposed to
small-holdings), much of the polity is still rural. Peruvian rural
civil
society, in so far as it depends on NGOs, is thus characterized
by
resource instability and fragmentation.
The decline of central government and lack of intermediary
associ-
ations have generally left Peruvian civil society without an
effective
voice in national policy and with only weak capabilities to hold
the

government accountable. A consequence of the minimalist state
has
thus been the lack of infrastructure and political access. At the
same
time, mechanisms are not in place to support improvement in
these
areas. Requests for support fall on deaf ears. Frequently,
politics in
Peru operates as a short-term populist pork-barrel, with some
immedi-
ate payouts for popular votes but few long-term infrastructural
improve-
ments. Political access is limited because the mechanisms for
long-term
interest articulation for the great bulk of people and popular
interests do
not exist. People currently settle instead for short-term benefits
as part
of the programs of typically populist presidents who seem to
have no
intention of allowing long-term access to power (Kay, 1982).
Much of the state activity in Peru is currently controlled by the
cen-
tral government, including the activity of regional and local
entities.
This is partly due to the fact that the central government

provides the
bulk of revenues through which local governments operate, but
also
due to a recent tradition of central control and inflexibility in
the politi-
cal culture of Peru. The current period reflects the consequences
of the
post-Fujimori period, where the state is smaller, more
centralized and
more subject to direct executive control. This type of political
structure
tends to favor a minimal state in which the military is
emphasized, and
Peru is no exception. It has a standing military of around
100,000, pro-
portionally more than that of the USA currently. It is common
to see
federal police officers, for example, on patrol inside the city
and town
limits, a function that in many other countries is usually
allocated to
local jurisdictions. The state has far fewer functions supporting
its puta-
tive social mission outside the provision of general education,
some
(not universal) healthcare, the military and police, and the basic
regu-
latory structure for business. Due to the fact that the state (in its
most
basic form) survives from the period of exporting natural and
agricul-
tural products to a world market, an economic reality that still
persists,
it exemplifies a polity that has returned to neo-liberal
compradorism,1
in other words, a system whose primary role is to facilitate the

export of
natural resources and agricultural products. This focused
centralization
juxtaposed with a weakened civil society has resulted in a
government
that only marginally supports social democratic-type services,
abdicat-
ing this undertaking to NGOs.
Primary concern for these NGOs’ ability to advance their
organi-
zational mission and enhance service delivery is their reliance
on a
single revenue sector (international NGOs), low administrative
costs
(fewer opportunities to reduce expenditures without having an
impact
on the service provision), low operating margins (net income
percent-
age of revenues) and inadequate equity balances (assets minus
liabili-
ties). Organizations that lack flexibility in these key operational
areas
are assumed to be more vulnerable than organizations with
flexibil-
ity. Such financial vulnerability makes it unlikely that these
NGOs
can withstand financial upsets. A critical examination of each
NGO’s
financial condition would evaluate the long-term fiscal stability
and
assess if the organization can withstand financial changes,
especially
in funding sources. Selecting financial solutions should be
performed
in tandem with identifying mission-oriented objectives and

programs,
thus ensuring the financial resources are in accordance with the
organization’s mission.
Communication liaison with other local NGOs is evident,
especially
at the level of frontline workers, but little has occurred in terms
of joint
projects or programs between organizations. Such
underdeveloped
collaboration may seriously limit the ability of these NGOs to
realize
greater efficiency and the expanded service delivery that occurs
from
sharing resources among other local and national entities and
NGOs.
Collaboration among NGOs becomes especially important in
this envi-
ronment where resources are scarce and the government is
marginally
engaged. Planning for program expansion and a complementary
full-
time, stable workforce should be integrated into the strategy for
devel-
oping revenue diversification.
However, these NGOs will need to be mindful that such

capacity
building places pressures on leadership and management
systems and
styles. Four of the NGOs’ boards of directors may need to
change
their role from direct operational involvement to a focus on
revenue
stream enhancement. To address the country barriers, the
NGOs’
top leadership will need to engage in organizational advocacy
with
membership organizations and all levels of government.
Executive
directors may find their leadership style challenged by
increased
numbers of stakeholders (including workers) demanding greater
input in programming, and organizational policies and
procedures
decisions. Ultimately, the environmental issues facing these
NGOs
cannot be resolved by the individualized, informal networking
of the
present. Traditional avenues of coalition building among NGOs
and
communities may not be acceptable in Peru due to significant
ethnic,
social and political barriers. One avenue that may be feasible is
col-
laboration building among similar NGOs within and across
regions.
Currently programming and training collaboration occurs on a
small
scale. The next step of collaboration building among NGOs
could be
around grant writing, programming, and negotiations with local
and

regional governments.
Acknowledgment
The authors would like to thank Blanca Ramos, PhD, for forging
the
partnership between Universidad Católica Santo Toribio de
Mogrovejo,
Chiclayo, Peru; Universidad Nacional de Peru, Pirua, Peru; and
the
School of Social Welfare, University at Albany, State
University of
New York.
Note
A comprador bourgeoisie denotes a class that exists in
developing countries that acts
in its own economic interests, often sacrificing national
interests and the interests of
its country’s average citizens. Compradores essentially
facilitate the transfer of wealth
offshore to neo-colonialist nations.
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Nancy Claiborne, to whom correspondence should be addressed,
is Associate
Professor at the School of Social Welfare, University of Albany,
State University of
New York, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12222, USA.

[email: [email protected]]
Junqing Liu is a doctoral candidate at the School of Social
Welfare, University of
Albany, at the same address.
Henry Vandenburgh is Associate Professor of Sociology at
Bridgewater State
College, 131 Summer St, Bridgewater MA 02325, USA.
Jan Hagen is Professor at the School of Social Welfare,
University of Albany, at
the same address as the first author.
Armando Mera Rodas is Associate Professor of Community
Services at the Uni-
versidad Católica Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo, Av
Panamericana Norte 855,
Chiclayo, Peru.
Juan Manuel Raunelli Sander is Associate Professor of
Economics at the
Universidad Católica Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo, at the same
address.
Juan Gabriel Adanaque Zapata is Dean of the School of
Agronomy at the
Universidad Nacional de Peru Campus Universitario, Urb.
Miraflores s/n, Castilla-
Piura Apartado Postal 295, Piura, Peru.
Martin Javier Zurita Paucar is Instructor of Education, also at
the Universidad
Nacional de Peru, Piura, at the same address.

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