While policy study of smart city developments is gaining traction, it falls short of understanding and explaining knowledge transfers across national borders and cities. This article investigates how transboundary learning occurs through the initiation and development of a regional smart cities network: the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN). The article conducts an in-depth case study from data collected through key informant interviews and document analysis. Spearheaded by Singapore in 2017, ASCN is seen as a soft power extension for Singapore, a branding tool for ASEAN, and a symbiotic platform between the private sector and governments in the region. Most transboundary knowledge transfers within the ASCN are voluntary transfers of policy ideas. Effective branding, demand for knowledge, availability of alternative funding options, enthusiasm from the private actors, and heightened interest from other major economies are highlighted as facilitators of knowledge transfer. However, the complexity of governance structures, lack of political will and resources, limited policy capacity, and lack of explicit operational and regulatory mechanisms hinder transboundary learning. The article concludes that transboundary learning should go beyond exchanges of ideas and recommends promoting facilitators of knowledge transfer, building local policy capacity, encouraging collaborative policy transfer, and transiting from an information-sharing platform to tool/instrument-based transfer.
The governance of the risks of ridesharing in southeast asiaAraz Taeihagh
Smart and sustainable cities rely on innovative technologies to cater to the needs of their constituents. One such need is for sustainable transport. Ridesharing is one of the ways through which sustainable transport can be deployed in smart cities. Ridesharing entered Southeast Asia in 2013, changing the nature of transportation in the region. As with other disruptive innovations, the introduction of ridesharing comes with risks particularly to employment relations, data privacy, road congestion, and distribution of liability. Regulators across various countries have applied different strategies to govern these risks. We present a case study of five Southeast Asian countries, namely Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and examine how government authorities in these countries have governed the risks of ridesharing. Smart cities can effectively provide the sustainable transport needs of their constituents by taking a consistent and unified regulatory approach with new technologies and cooperating with regulators across different jurisdictions. Stakeholders should also be involved in the regulatory process to increase the acceptance of new technologies for transport. Smart cities can also deploy regulatory sandboxes and take a proactive governance approach to encourage the development of these new technologies and at the same time control their undesirable risks.
Experiments on Crowdsourcing Policy Assessment - Oxford IPP 2014Araz Taeihagh
Can non-experts Crowds perform as well as experts in the assessment of policy measures? To what degree does geographical location relevant to the policy context alter the performance of non-experts in the assessment of policy measures? This research in progress seeks to answer these questions by outlining experiments designed to replicate expert policy assessments with non-expert Crowds. We use a set of ninety-eight policy measures previously evaluated by experts, as our control condition, and conduct the experiments using two discrete sets of non-expert Crowds recruited from a Virtual Labor Market (VLM). We vary the composition of our non-expert Crowds along two conditions; participants recruited from a geographical location relevant to the policy context, and participants recruited at-large. In each case we recruit a sample of 100 participants for each Crowd. Each experiment is then repeated at the VLM with completely new participants in each group to assess the reliability of our results. We will present results on the performance of all four groups of non-experts jointly and severally in comparison to the expert assessments, and discuss the ramifications of our findings for the use of non-expert Crowds and VLM’s for policy design. Our experimental design applies climate change adaptation policy measures.
Development as Freedom in a Digital Age Soren Gigler
Under what conditions can new technologies enhance the well-being of poor communities? The study designs an alternative evaluation framework (AEF) that applies Amartya Sen’s capability approach to the study of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in order to place people’s well-being, rather than technology, at the center of the study. The AEF develops an impact chain that examines the mechanisms by which access to, and meaningful use of, ICTs can enhance people’s “informational capabilities” and improve people’s human and social capabilities. This approach thus uses people’s individual and collective capabilities, rather than measures of access or use, as its principal evaluative space. Based on empirical evidence from indigenous communities’ use of new technologies in rural Bolivia, the study concludes that enhancing poor people’s informational capabilities is the most critical factor determining the impact of ICTs on their well-being. Improved informational capabilities, like literacy, do enhance the human capabilities of poor and marginalized peoples to make strategic life choices and achieve the lifestyle they value. Evaluating the impact of ICTs in terms of capabilities thus reveals no direct relationship between improved access to, and use of, ICTs and enhanced well-being; ICTs lead to improvements in people’s lives only when informational capabilities are transformed into expanded human and social capabilities in the economic, political, social, organizational, and cultural dimensions of their lives. The study concludes that intermediaries are bound to play a central, even fundamental, role in this process. They help poor communities to enact and appropriate ICTs to their local socio-cultural context so that their use becomes meaningful for people’s daily lives, enhances their informational capabilities, and ultimately improves their human and social capabilities.
From the ideal to the real: Top 20 lessons learned from scaling up innovation...Soren Gigler
Top 20 lessons learned on scaling up innovations from the Open Data Initiative at the World Bank. The Open Data Initiative has transformed the way the World Bank shares and publishes its data enabling users to have free, open and easy access to data instead of a previously mostly proprietary data policy.
How did such a radical change come about? How was it possible that our early very modest endeavors to implement innovations in governance could be scaled up and be replicated across so many different areas at the Bank? How could a vibrant community of innovators from within and outside the Bank come together share experiences, learn from each other and, most important, help to make an important institutional change -- launch an Open Data initiative and empower citizens to provide direct feedback on development programs?
"Understanding Broadband from the Outside" - ARNIC Seminar April1 08ARNIC
"Understanding Broadband from the Outside"
Ricardo Ramírez
Freelance researcher and consultant, adjunct professor at the University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada
http://arnic.info/ramirezseminar.php
The governance of the risks of ridesharing in southeast asiaAraz Taeihagh
Smart and sustainable cities rely on innovative technologies to cater to the needs of their constituents. One such need is for sustainable transport. Ridesharing is one of the ways through which sustainable transport can be deployed in smart cities. Ridesharing entered Southeast Asia in 2013, changing the nature of transportation in the region. As with other disruptive innovations, the introduction of ridesharing comes with risks particularly to employment relations, data privacy, road congestion, and distribution of liability. Regulators across various countries have applied different strategies to govern these risks. We present a case study of five Southeast Asian countries, namely Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and examine how government authorities in these countries have governed the risks of ridesharing. Smart cities can effectively provide the sustainable transport needs of their constituents by taking a consistent and unified regulatory approach with new technologies and cooperating with regulators across different jurisdictions. Stakeholders should also be involved in the regulatory process to increase the acceptance of new technologies for transport. Smart cities can also deploy regulatory sandboxes and take a proactive governance approach to encourage the development of these new technologies and at the same time control their undesirable risks.
Experiments on Crowdsourcing Policy Assessment - Oxford IPP 2014Araz Taeihagh
Can non-experts Crowds perform as well as experts in the assessment of policy measures? To what degree does geographical location relevant to the policy context alter the performance of non-experts in the assessment of policy measures? This research in progress seeks to answer these questions by outlining experiments designed to replicate expert policy assessments with non-expert Crowds. We use a set of ninety-eight policy measures previously evaluated by experts, as our control condition, and conduct the experiments using two discrete sets of non-expert Crowds recruited from a Virtual Labor Market (VLM). We vary the composition of our non-expert Crowds along two conditions; participants recruited from a geographical location relevant to the policy context, and participants recruited at-large. In each case we recruit a sample of 100 participants for each Crowd. Each experiment is then repeated at the VLM with completely new participants in each group to assess the reliability of our results. We will present results on the performance of all four groups of non-experts jointly and severally in comparison to the expert assessments, and discuss the ramifications of our findings for the use of non-expert Crowds and VLM’s for policy design. Our experimental design applies climate change adaptation policy measures.
Development as Freedom in a Digital Age Soren Gigler
Under what conditions can new technologies enhance the well-being of poor communities? The study designs an alternative evaluation framework (AEF) that applies Amartya Sen’s capability approach to the study of information and communications technologies (ICTs) in order to place people’s well-being, rather than technology, at the center of the study. The AEF develops an impact chain that examines the mechanisms by which access to, and meaningful use of, ICTs can enhance people’s “informational capabilities” and improve people’s human and social capabilities. This approach thus uses people’s individual and collective capabilities, rather than measures of access or use, as its principal evaluative space. Based on empirical evidence from indigenous communities’ use of new technologies in rural Bolivia, the study concludes that enhancing poor people’s informational capabilities is the most critical factor determining the impact of ICTs on their well-being. Improved informational capabilities, like literacy, do enhance the human capabilities of poor and marginalized peoples to make strategic life choices and achieve the lifestyle they value. Evaluating the impact of ICTs in terms of capabilities thus reveals no direct relationship between improved access to, and use of, ICTs and enhanced well-being; ICTs lead to improvements in people’s lives only when informational capabilities are transformed into expanded human and social capabilities in the economic, political, social, organizational, and cultural dimensions of their lives. The study concludes that intermediaries are bound to play a central, even fundamental, role in this process. They help poor communities to enact and appropriate ICTs to their local socio-cultural context so that their use becomes meaningful for people’s daily lives, enhances their informational capabilities, and ultimately improves their human and social capabilities.
From the ideal to the real: Top 20 lessons learned from scaling up innovation...Soren Gigler
Top 20 lessons learned on scaling up innovations from the Open Data Initiative at the World Bank. The Open Data Initiative has transformed the way the World Bank shares and publishes its data enabling users to have free, open and easy access to data instead of a previously mostly proprietary data policy.
How did such a radical change come about? How was it possible that our early very modest endeavors to implement innovations in governance could be scaled up and be replicated across so many different areas at the Bank? How could a vibrant community of innovators from within and outside the Bank come together share experiences, learn from each other and, most important, help to make an important institutional change -- launch an Open Data initiative and empower citizens to provide direct feedback on development programs?
"Understanding Broadband from the Outside" - ARNIC Seminar April1 08ARNIC
"Understanding Broadband from the Outside"
Ricardo Ramírez
Freelance researcher and consultant, adjunct professor at the University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada
http://arnic.info/ramirezseminar.php
La World Wide Web Foundation creó un “índice de la web”, que intenta medir el crecimiento, utilidad e impacto de internet en las personas y los países. El estudio se desarrolló en 61 países, incorporando indicadores referidos a políticas, economía e impacto social de la web, como también conectividad e infraestructura.
Enhancing transparency and accountability mechanisms that directly empower citizens to better participate in decision-making processes of government and international donors is an imperative to achieving better and more sustainable development results on the ground. This paper analyzes the emerging Open Development Paradigm and investigates to what extent such a new approach towards citizen-centered development can make development programs more effective, responsive and inclusive. It provides concrete case studies of open governance programs that enhance the transparency and accountability of development agencies and foster the collaboration among all development actors in order to achieve better development outcomes and enhance the well-being of the poor.
Knowledge generation and dissemination in CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on...CIFOR-ICRAF
This presentation by Maria Brockhaus answers the following key questions concerning the GCS study:
What makes knowledge generation and uptake successful?
What are some of the barriers to sharing knowledge?
How well do we know what other people need to know?
What are some of the tools we can use to listen and design more effective knowledge products and pathways?
Andrew Chadwick and Simon Collister (2014) "Boundary-Drawing Power and the Re...andrewchadwick
Slides for a presentation to the American Political Science Association Political Communication Section Annual Preconference, 2014, George Washington University, Washington DC, August 2014.
Download the published paper at http://j.mp/IJOC-Snowden-2
The Rockefeller Foundation and the Pratt Center for Community Development have coalesced around a transit solution called Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)—a high-performance system that combines the permanence, speed, and reliability of rail, with the flexibility of buses, at a fraction of the cost of a subway system. In the Foundation and Pratt’s report, Mobility and Equity for New York’s Transit-Starved Neighborhoods: The Case for Full-Featured Bus Rapid Transit, BRT is discussed as an affordable, reliable, and practical way of getting outer borough residents from point A to point B.
Authoritative and Volunteered Geographical Information in a Developing Countr...rsmahabir
Abstract: With volunteered geographic information (VGI) platforms such as OpenStreetMap (OSM) becoming increasingly popular, we are faced with the challenge of assessing the quality of their content, in order to better understand its place relative to the authoritative content of more traditional sources. Until now, studies have focused primarily on developed countries, showing that VGI content can match or even surpass the quality of authoritative sources, with very few studies in developing countries. In this paper, we compare the quality of authoritative (data from the Regional Center for Mapping of Resources for Development (RCMRD)) and non-authoritative (data from OSM and Google’s Map Maker) road data in conjunction with population data in and around Nairobi, Kenya. Results show variability in coverage between all of these datasets. RCMRD provided the most complete, albeit less current, coverage when taking into account the entire study area, while OSM and Map Maker showed a degradation of coverage as one moves from central Nairobi towards rural areas. Furthermore, OSM had higher content density in large slums, surpassing the authoritative datasets at these locations, while Map Maker showed better coverage in rural housing areas. These results suggest a greater need for a more inclusive approach using VGI to supplement gaps in authoritative data in developing nations.
This academic study on the status quo and future of strategic communication and public relations is based on responses from 1,046 communication professionals working in different types of organizations (25.6% in Canada and 74.4% in the United States). The sample achieved a fairly balanced gender split (47.7% men and 52.1% women) for accurate comparisons. The average age of participants was 41.2 years.
This newest edition of the NACM is part of the Global Communication Monitor series and joins existing studies in Europe (ECM 2020), Latin America (LCM 2020-2021) and Asia-Pacific (APCM 2020-20201) to explore diverse topics, including COVID-19 and communication professionals’ responses, ethical challenges and resources for communication professionals, cybersecurity and communications, gender equality in the profession, strategic issues and communication channels, competency development, salaries, and characteristics of excellent communication departments.
Highlight results include:
• Seven out of 10 professionals were satisfied with their organization’s communication and management during the COVID-19 pandemic, although the satisfaction level significantly decreased as the scope of the leadership responsibility decreases.
• Professionals in the U.S. were significantly more likely than their Canadian counterparts to report ethical challenges, and most ethical concerns are related to social media strategies.
• More than half of professionals confirmed their organization had been a victim of cyberattack or data theft.
• Nearly half (49.5%) of surveyed women acknowledged the impact of the glass ceiling in leadership advancement.
• While building and maintaining trust remains as the top strategic issue for the communication profession, tackling diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) presents a pressing need.
• Professionals recognize the need to improve competencies, especially in data, technology, and management.
The study has been organized by The Plank Center for Leadership in Public Relations - see www.plankcenter.ua.edu for more details.
V Międzynarodowa Konferencja Naukowa Nauka o informacji (informacja naukowa) w okresie zmian Innowacyjne usługi informacyjne. Wydział Dziennikarstwa, Informacji i Bibliologii Katedra Informatologii, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warszawa, 15 – 16 maja 2017
Library services are indispensable in the data-dependent process of ‘policy formulation’ as Governments embark on unique approaches to service delivery for national development. This paper treats the triad of ‘modern library’, ‘policy formulation’ and ‘transformation agenda’ in a conceptual construct. It addresses the trio in relation to required library services for effective policy formulation process and a result-oriented transformation agenda, with recommendations and strategies for implementation.
La World Wide Web Foundation creó un “índice de la web”, que intenta medir el crecimiento, utilidad e impacto de internet en las personas y los países. El estudio se desarrolló en 61 países, incorporando indicadores referidos a políticas, economía e impacto social de la web, como también conectividad e infraestructura.
Enhancing transparency and accountability mechanisms that directly empower citizens to better participate in decision-making processes of government and international donors is an imperative to achieving better and more sustainable development results on the ground. This paper analyzes the emerging Open Development Paradigm and investigates to what extent such a new approach towards citizen-centered development can make development programs more effective, responsive and inclusive. It provides concrete case studies of open governance programs that enhance the transparency and accountability of development agencies and foster the collaboration among all development actors in order to achieve better development outcomes and enhance the well-being of the poor.
Knowledge generation and dissemination in CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on...CIFOR-ICRAF
This presentation by Maria Brockhaus answers the following key questions concerning the GCS study:
What makes knowledge generation and uptake successful?
What are some of the barriers to sharing knowledge?
How well do we know what other people need to know?
What are some of the tools we can use to listen and design more effective knowledge products and pathways?
Andrew Chadwick and Simon Collister (2014) "Boundary-Drawing Power and the Re...andrewchadwick
Slides for a presentation to the American Political Science Association Political Communication Section Annual Preconference, 2014, George Washington University, Washington DC, August 2014.
Download the published paper at http://j.mp/IJOC-Snowden-2
The Rockefeller Foundation and the Pratt Center for Community Development have coalesced around a transit solution called Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)—a high-performance system that combines the permanence, speed, and reliability of rail, with the flexibility of buses, at a fraction of the cost of a subway system. In the Foundation and Pratt’s report, Mobility and Equity for New York’s Transit-Starved Neighborhoods: The Case for Full-Featured Bus Rapid Transit, BRT is discussed as an affordable, reliable, and practical way of getting outer borough residents from point A to point B.
Authoritative and Volunteered Geographical Information in a Developing Countr...rsmahabir
Abstract: With volunteered geographic information (VGI) platforms such as OpenStreetMap (OSM) becoming increasingly popular, we are faced with the challenge of assessing the quality of their content, in order to better understand its place relative to the authoritative content of more traditional sources. Until now, studies have focused primarily on developed countries, showing that VGI content can match or even surpass the quality of authoritative sources, with very few studies in developing countries. In this paper, we compare the quality of authoritative (data from the Regional Center for Mapping of Resources for Development (RCMRD)) and non-authoritative (data from OSM and Google’s Map Maker) road data in conjunction with population data in and around Nairobi, Kenya. Results show variability in coverage between all of these datasets. RCMRD provided the most complete, albeit less current, coverage when taking into account the entire study area, while OSM and Map Maker showed a degradation of coverage as one moves from central Nairobi towards rural areas. Furthermore, OSM had higher content density in large slums, surpassing the authoritative datasets at these locations, while Map Maker showed better coverage in rural housing areas. These results suggest a greater need for a more inclusive approach using VGI to supplement gaps in authoritative data in developing nations.
This academic study on the status quo and future of strategic communication and public relations is based on responses from 1,046 communication professionals working in different types of organizations (25.6% in Canada and 74.4% in the United States). The sample achieved a fairly balanced gender split (47.7% men and 52.1% women) for accurate comparisons. The average age of participants was 41.2 years.
This newest edition of the NACM is part of the Global Communication Monitor series and joins existing studies in Europe (ECM 2020), Latin America (LCM 2020-2021) and Asia-Pacific (APCM 2020-20201) to explore diverse topics, including COVID-19 and communication professionals’ responses, ethical challenges and resources for communication professionals, cybersecurity and communications, gender equality in the profession, strategic issues and communication channels, competency development, salaries, and characteristics of excellent communication departments.
Highlight results include:
• Seven out of 10 professionals were satisfied with their organization’s communication and management during the COVID-19 pandemic, although the satisfaction level significantly decreased as the scope of the leadership responsibility decreases.
• Professionals in the U.S. were significantly more likely than their Canadian counterparts to report ethical challenges, and most ethical concerns are related to social media strategies.
• More than half of professionals confirmed their organization had been a victim of cyberattack or data theft.
• Nearly half (49.5%) of surveyed women acknowledged the impact of the glass ceiling in leadership advancement.
• While building and maintaining trust remains as the top strategic issue for the communication profession, tackling diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) presents a pressing need.
• Professionals recognize the need to improve competencies, especially in data, technology, and management.
The study has been organized by The Plank Center for Leadership in Public Relations - see www.plankcenter.ua.edu for more details.
V Międzynarodowa Konferencja Naukowa Nauka o informacji (informacja naukowa) w okresie zmian Innowacyjne usługi informacyjne. Wydział Dziennikarstwa, Informacji i Bibliologii Katedra Informatologii, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warszawa, 15 – 16 maja 2017
Library services are indispensable in the data-dependent process of ‘policy formulation’ as Governments embark on unique approaches to service delivery for national development. This paper treats the triad of ‘modern library’, ‘policy formulation’ and ‘transformation agenda’ in a conceptual construct. It addresses the trio in relation to required library services for effective policy formulation process and a result-oriented transformation agenda, with recommendations and strategies for implementation.
Intermodal Transport Data Sharing Programme (Sep 2021)FairTechInstitute
This was a year-long project conducted in Hong Kong to support evidence-based policymaking, supporting good data governance, green smart cities, and strong data security and protection. The project developed a Proof-of-Concept to demonstrate a trusted data sharing mechanism - Data Trust 1.0 - could be implemented to allow transport operators and service providers to share limited amounts of data for the purposes of limited-scope, mode-specific research e.g. research which asks "how many people cycle to work between 8-9am?"
While this research was conducted for transport operators, the Data Trust 1.0 model is applicable across all sectors. Funding was provided by the Hong Kong Innovation and Technology Commission, and supported generously by sponsors Daimler, MTR, Thales, and Via.
Social Remittances: an alternative approach to development cooperationGeoCommunity
Jana Hasalová: Social Remittances:an alternative approach to development cooperation (paper), Študentská vedecká konferencia Prírodovedeckej fakulty Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave,
27th April 2011
A ceLTIc project webinar. The ceLTIc project shows how to enable LTI (Learning Tools Interoperability) connectors to build a flexible infrastructure.This session will discuss how the JISC-funded ceLTIc:sharing project is evaluating the use of LTI to provide a shared service for institutions interested in evaluating WebPA. It will include a demonstration of linking to the tool from Blackboard Learn 9 and Moodle, as well as how the outcomes service along with the unofficial memberships and setting extensions are being used to enhance this integration in a VLE-independent way.
Jisc conference 2012
This paper is a report on the recent special session of papers presented at the Regional Studies Association (RSA) Annual Conference in Dublin, entitled ‘Beyond Smart & Data-Driven City-Regions: Rethinking Stakeholder-Helixes Strategies’. The session was a collaboration between the Urban Transformations ESRC programme at the University of Oxford and the Future Cities Catapult.
The urban development of learning is a key goal of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). However, the
drive to achieve urban learning requires several key points. Citizenship and
cooperation are associated with developing the city of learning. This research
studies the relationship between citizenship and cooperation in driving the
learning city. The study uses the methodology of the structure-equation model
(SEM) to study citizenship relationships. Cooperation and learning cities are
based on civic data analysis of 500 samples. The result showed that the two
observed variables were public participation and The four observed variables
are: policy collaboration's positive effect on cooperation; citizen-subjectivity,
citizen-intersubjectivity, citizen-sub politics, and citizen-globality's positive
effect on citizenship; Furthermore, the six observed variables are: inclusive
learning in the education system; revitalized learning in families and
communities; effective learning for and in the workplace; expanded use of
modern learning technologies; improved learning quality; and a vibrant
culture of lifelong learning. In part of the regression between latent variables,
we found that cooperation has a positive effect on learning cities (b=0.882),
and citizenship has a positive effect on learning cities (b=0.056) and
cooperation (b=0.217).
Insight Report - Public Policy and Innovation Economic Analysis: Hong Kong 20...Good City Foundation
The Insight Report "Public Policy and Innovation Economic Analysis: Hong Kong 2030+, Industry 4.0 and District Improvement in Tai Po" is produced by the Social Enterprise Summit supported by the Good City Foundation, RE-LOOK and multiple other local key stakeholders in Tai Po District in Hong Kong to provide an overall scanning of political socio-economic status of Tai Po District, to proxy the readiness of development of the Northern Metropolis, in junction of the Re-Industrialisation Development Strategy, as part of the Hong Kong 2030+ long-term development strategy.
What factors drive policy transfer in smart city developmentAraz Taeihagh
Abstract
Smart city initiatives are viewed as an input to existing urban systems to solve various problems faced by modern cities. Making cities smarter implies not only technological innovation and deployment, but also having smart people and effective policies. Cities can acquire knowledge and incorporate governance lessons from other jurisdictions to develop smart city initiatives that are unique to the local contexts. We conducted two rounds of surveys involving 23 experts on an e-Delphi platform to consolidate their opinion on factors that facilitate policy transfer among smart cities. Findings show a consensus on the importance of six factors: having a policy entrepreneur; financial instruments; cities’ enthusiasm for policy learning; capacity building; explicit regulatory mechanisms; and policy adaptation to local contexts. Correspondingly, three policy recommendations were drawn. Formalizing collaborative mechanisms and joint partnerships between cities, setting up regional or international networks of smart cities, and establishing smart city repositories to collect useful case studies for urban planning and governance lessons will accelerate policy transfer for smart city development. This study sheds light on effective ways policymakers can foster policy learning and transfer, especially when a jurisdiction's capacity is insufficient to deal with the uncertainties and challenges ahead.
Sustainable governance in smart cities and use of supervised learning based o...IJECEIAES
Evaluation is an analytical and organized process to figure out the present positive influences, favourable future prospects, existing shortcomings and ulterior complexities of any plan, program, practice or a policy. Evaluation of policy is an essential and vital process required to measure the performance or progression of the scheme. The main purpose of policy evaluation is to empower various stakeholders and enhance their socio-economic environment. A large number of policies or schemes in different areas are launched by government in view of citizen welfare. Although, the governmental policies intend to better shape up the life quality of people but may also impact their every day’s life. A latest governmental scheme Saubhagya launched by Indian government in 2017 has been selected for evaluation by applying opinion mining techniques. The data set of public opinion associated with this scheme has been captured by Twitter. The primary intent is to offer opinion mining as a smart city technology that harness the user-generated big data and analyse it to offer a sustainable governance model.
Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching th...OECD Governance
This highlights document covers the main findings and proposals from the Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave report. Public authorities from all levels of government increasingly turn to Citizens' Assemblies, Juries, Panels and other representative deliberative processes to tackle complex policy problems ranging from climate change to infrastructure investment decisions. Based on the analysis of close to 300 representative deliberative practices, the report explores trends in such processes, identifies different models, and analyses the trade-offs among different design choices as well as the benefits and limits of public deliberation. It also explores the reasons and routes for embedding deliberative activities into public institutions to give citizens a more permanent and meaningful role in shaping the policies affecting their lives.
Political (In)Stability and Public Policy Transplantation: a Macedonian Casejpsjournal1
In recent years, a set of new post-empiricist advances to public policy, drawing on discursive analyses and
participatory, deliberative practices, have come to challenge the leading technocratic, empiricist models in
policy analyses. According to Pessali, the transplantation of public policies is an influential instrument in
the hands of economic development – important as it may be, transplantation may not be inevitably
successful, therefore not always looked for. There are good economic reasons to consider the practice of
grafting in public policy transplants, i.e., consideration for the specific cities of existing local institutions
and how they may interact with a set of predominant policy requirements and guidelines. By taking into
account Pessali's alternative method that institutionalizes some sort of cooperation between policy makers
and stakeholders, in contrast with some other common variants of the policy transplantation method, we
discuss an architecture for public policy inputs in a country context, which may help to avoid some of the
underlying risks of standard transplantation architectures. The article concludes that the “transplantation
metaphor” can be a powerful tool in organizing our thoughts and framing our decisions, which can lead to
better use of it for the purposes of public policy design in societies only in cases of political stability.
Similar to How transboundary learning occurs: Case Study of the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) (20)
Unmasking deepfakes: A systematic review of deepfake detection and generation...Araz Taeihagh
Due to the fast spread of data through digital media, individuals and societies must assess the reliability of information. Deepfakes are not a novel idea but they are now a widespread phenomenon. The impact of deepfakes and disinformation can range from infuriating individuals to affecting and misleading entire societies and even nations. There are several ways to detect and generate deepfakes online. By conducting a systematic literature analysis, in this study we explore automatic key detection and generation methods, frameworks, algorithms, and tools for identifying deepfakes (audio, images, and videos), and how these approaches can be employed within different situations to counter the spread of deepfakes and the generation of disinformation. Moreover, we explore state-of-the-art frameworks related to deepfakes to understand how emerging machine learning and deep learning approaches affect online disinformation. We also highlight practical challenges and trends in implementing policies to counter deepfakes. Finally, we provide policy recommendations based on analyzing how emerging artificial intelligence (AI) techniques can be employed to detect and generate deepfakes online. This study benefits the community and readers by providing a better understanding of recent developments in deepfake detection and generation frameworks. The study also sheds a light on the potential of AI in relation to deepfakes.
A governance perspective on user acceptance of autonomous systems in SingaporeAraz Taeihagh
Autonomous systems that operate without human intervention by utilising artificial intelligence are a significant feature of the fourth industrial revolution. Various autonomous systems, such as driverless cars, unmanned drones and robots, are being tested in ongoing trials and have even been adopted in some countries. While there has been a discussion of the benefits and risks of specific autonomous systems, more needs to be known about user acceptance of these systems. The reactions of the public, especially regarding novel technologies, can help policymakers better understand people's perspectives and needs, and involve them in decision-making for governance and regulation of autonomous systems. This study has examined the factors that influence the acceptance of autonomous systems by the public in Singapore, which is a forerunner in the adoption of autonomous systems. The Unified Technology Adoption and Use Theory (UTAUT) is modified by introducing the role of government and perceived risk in using the systems. Using structural equation modelling to analyse data from an online survey (n = 500) in Singapore, we find that performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and trust in government to govern autonomous systems significantly and positively impact the behavioural intention to use autonomous systems. Perceived risk has a negative relationship with user acceptance of autonomous systems. This study contributes to the literature by identifying latent variables that affect behavioural intention to use autonomous systems, especially by introducing the factor of trust in government to manage risks from the use of these systems and filling the gap by studying the entire domain of autonomous systems instead of a narrow focus on one application. The findings will enable policymakers to understand the perceptions of the public in regard to adoption and regulation, and designers and manufacturers to improve user experience.
The soft underbelly of complexity science adoption in policymakingAraz Taeihagh
The deepening integration of social-technical systems creates immensely complex environments, creating increasingly uncertain and unpredictable circumstances. Given this context, policymakers have been encouraged to draw on complexity science-informed approaches in policymaking to help grapple with and manage the mounting complexity of the world. For nearly eighty years, complexity-informed approaches have been promising to change how our complex systems are understood and managed, ultimately assisting in better policymaking. Despite the potential of complexity science, in practice, its use often remains limited to a few specialised domains and has not become part and parcel of the mainstream policy debate. To understand why this might be the case, we question why complexity science remains nascent and not integrated into the core of policymaking. Specifically, we ask what the non-technical challenges and barriers are preventing the adoption of complexity science into policymaking. To address this question, we conducted an extensive literature review. We collected the scattered fragments of text that discussed the non-technical challenges related to the use of complexity science in policymaking and stitched these fragments into a structured framework by synthesising our findings. Our framework consists of three thematic groupings of the non-technical challenges: (a) management, cost, and adoption challenges; (b) limited trust, communication, and acceptance; and (c) ethical barriers. For each broad challenge identified, we propose a mitigation strategy to facilitate the adoption of complexity science into policymaking. We conclude with a call for action to integrate complexity science into policymaking further.
Development of New Generation of Artificial Intelligence in ChinaAraz Taeihagh
How did China become one of the leaders in AI development, and will China prevail in the ongoing AI race with the US? Existing studies have focused on the Chinese central government’s role in promoting AI. Notwithstanding the importance of the central government, a significant portion of the responsibility for AI development falls on local governments’ shoulders. Local governments have diverging interests, capacities and, therefore, approaches to promoting AI. This poses an important question: How do local governments respond to the central government’s policies on emerging technologies, such as AI? This article answers this question by examining the convergence or divergence of central and local priorities related to AI development by analysing the central and local AI policy documents and the provincial variations by focusing on the diffusion of the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (NGAIDP) in China. Using a unique dataset of China’s provincial AI-related policies that cite the NGAIDP, the nature of diffusion of the NGAIDP is examined by conducting content analysis and fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This study highlights the important role of local governments in China’s AI development and emphasises examining policy diffusion as a political process.
Governing disruptive technologies for inclusive development in citiesAraz Taeihagh
Abstract
Cities are increasingly adopting advanced technologies to address complex challenges. Applying technologies such as information and communication technology, artificial intelligence, big data analytics, and autonomous systems in cities' design, planning, and management can cause disruptive changes in their social, economic, and environmental composition. Through a systematic literature review, this research develops a conceptual model linking (1) the dominant city labels relating to tech-driven urban development, (2) the characteristics and applications of disruptive technologies, and (3) the current understanding of inclusive urban development. We extend the discussion by identifying and incorporating the motivations behind adopting disruptive technologies and the challenges they present to inclusive development. We find that inclusive development in tech-driven cities can be realised if governments develop suitable adaptive regulatory frameworks for involving technology companies, build policy capacity, and adopt more adaptive models of governance. We also stress the importance of acknowledging the influence of digital literacy and smart citizenship, and exploring other dimensions of inclusivity, for governing disruptive technologies in inclusive smart cities.
Why and how is the power of big teach increasing?Araz Taeihagh
Abstract: The growing digitalization of our society has led to a meteoric rise of large technology companies (Big Tech), which have amassed tremendous wealth and influence through their ownership of digital infrastructure and platforms. The recent launch of ChatGPT and the rapid popularization of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) act as a focusing event to further accelerate the concentration of power in the hands of the Big Tech. By using Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, this article investigates how Big Tech utilize their technological monopoly and political influence to reshape the policy landscape and establish themselves as key actors in the policy process. It explores the implications of the rise of Big Tech for policy theory in two ways. First, it develops the Big Tech-centric technology stream, highlighting the differing motivations and activities from the traditional innovation-centric technology stream. Second, it underscores the universality of Big Tech exerting ubiquitous influence within and across streams, to primarily serve their self-interests rather than promote innovation. Our findings emphasize the need for a more critical exploration of policy role of Big Tech to ensure balanced and effective policy outcomes in the age of AI.
Keywords: generative AI, governance, artificial intelligence, big tech, multiple streams framework
Sustainable energy adoption in poor rural areasAraz Taeihagh
Abstract
A growing body of literature recognises the role of local participation by end users in the successful implementation of sustainable development projects. Such community-based initiatives are widely assumed to be beneficial in providing additional savings, increasing knowledge and skills, and improving social cohesion. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence regarding the success (or failure) of such projects, as well as a lack of formal impact assessment methodologies that can be used to assess their effectiveness in meeting the needs of communities. Using a case study approach, we investigate the effectiveness of community-based energy projects in regard to achieving long-term renewable energy technology (RET) adoption in energy-poor island communities in the Philippines. This paper provides an alternative analytical framework for assessing the impact of community-based energy projects by defining RET adoption as a continuous and relational process that co-evolves and co-produces over time, highlighting the role of social capital in the long-term RET adoption process. In addition, by using the Social Impact Assessment methodology, we study off-grid, disaster-vulnerable and energy-poor communities in the Philippines and we assess community renewable energy (RE) projects implemented in those communities. We analyse the nature of participation in the RET adoption process, the social relations and interactions formed between and among the different stakeholders, and the characteristics, patterns and challenges of the adoption process.
Highlights
• Community-based approaches aid state-led renewable energy in off-grid areas.
• Social capital in communities addresses immediate energy needs in affected areas.
• Change Mapping in Social Impact Assessment shows community-based RE project impacts.
• Long-term renewable energy adoption involves co-evolving hardware, software, orgware.
• Successful adoption relies on communal mechanisms to sustain renewable energy systems.
Smart cities as spatial manifestations of 21st century capitalismAraz Taeihagh
Globally, smart cities attract billions of dollars in investment annually, with related market opportunities forecast to grow year-on-year. The enormous resources poured into their development consist of financial capital, but also natural, human and social resources converted into infrastructure and real estate. The latter act as physical capital storage and sites for the creation of digital products and services expected to generate the highest value added. Smart cities serve as temporary spatial fixes until new and better investments opportunities emerge. Drawing from a comprehensive range of publications on capitalism, this article analyzes smart city developments as typifier of 21st century capital accumulation where the financialization of various capitals is the overarching driver and ecological overshoot and socio-economic undershoot are the main negative consequences. It closely examines six spatial manifestations of the smart city – science parks and smart campuses; innovation districts; smart neighborhoods; city-wide and city-regional smart initiatives; urban platforms; and alternative smart city spaces – as receptacles for the conversion of various capitals. It also considers the influence of different national regimes and institutional contexts on smart city developments. This is used, in the final part, to open a discussion about opportunities to temper the excesses of 21st century capitalism.
Highlights
• Recent academic literature on modern capitalism and smart city development are brought together
• Different interpretations and denominations of 21th century capitalism are mapped and synthesized into an overview box
• Six spatial manifestations of the smart city are identified and thoroughly described, with their major institutions, actors and resources
• Five different types of capital (natural, human, social, physical and financial) are mapped, along with an analysis of how further financialization affects conversion processes between them
• Options to mitigate exclusionary tendencies of capitalism in the digital age are explored, based on the varieties of capitalism literature
Digital Ethics for Biometric Applications in a Smart CityAraz Taeihagh
From border control using fingerprints to law enforcement with video surveillance to self-activating devices via voice identification, biometric data is used in many applications in the contemporary context of a Smart City. Biometric data consists of human characteristics that can identify one person from others. Given the advent of big data and the ability to collect large amounts of data about people, data sources ranging from fingerprints to typing patterns can build an identifying profile of a person. In this article, we examine different types of biometric data used in a smart city based on a framework that differentiates between profile initialization and identification processes. Then, we discuss digital ethics within the usage of biometric data along the lines of data permissibility and renewability. Finally, we provide suggestions for improving biometric data collection and processing in the modern smart city.
A realist synthesis to develop an explanatory model of how policy instruments...Araz Taeihagh
Abstract
Background
Child and maternal health, a key marker of overall health system performance, is a policy priority area by the World Health Organization and the United Nations, including the Sustainable Development Goals. Previous realist work has linked child and maternal health outcomes to globalization, political tradition, and the welfare state. It is important to explore the role of other key policy-related factors. This paper presents a realist synthesis, categorising policy instruments according to the established NATO model, to develop an explanatory model of how policy instruments impact child and maternal health outcomes.
Methods
A systematic literature search was conducted to identify studies assessing the relationships between policy instruments and child and maternal health outcomes. Data were analysed using a realist framework. The first stage of the realist analysis process was to generate micro-theoretical initial programme theories for use in the theory adjudication process. Proposed theories were then adjudicated iteratively to produce a set of final programme theories.
Findings
From a total of 43,415 unique records, 632 records proceeded to full-text screening and 138 papers were included in the review. Evidence from 132 studies was available to address this research question. Studies were published from 1995 to 2021; 76% assessed a single country, and 81% analysed data at the ecological level. Eighty-eight initial candidate programme theories were generated. Following theory adjudication, five final programme theories were supported. According to the NATO model, these were related to treasure, organisation, authority-treasure, and treasure-organisation instrument types.
Conclusions
This paper presents a realist synthesis to develop an explanatory model of how policy instruments impact child and maternal health outcomes from a large, systematically identified international body of evidence. Five final programme theories were supported, showing how policy instruments play an important yet context-dependent role in influencing child and maternal health outcomes.
Addressing Policy Challenges of Disruptive TechnologiesAraz Taeihagh
This special issue examines the policy challenges and government responses to disruptive technologies. It explores the risks, benefits, and trade-offs of deploying disruptive technologies, and examines the efficacy of traditional governance approaches and the need for new regulatory and governance frameworks. Key themes include the need for government stewardship, taking adaptive and proactive approaches, developing comprehensive policies accounting for technical, social, economic, and political dimensions, conducting interdisciplinary research, and addressing data management and privacy challenges. The findings enhance understanding of how governments can navigate the complexities of disruptive technologies and develop policies to maximize benefits and mitigate risks.
Navigating the governance challenges of disruptive technologies insights from...Araz Taeihagh
The proliferation of autonomous systems like unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomous vehicles and AI-powered industrial and social robots can benefit society significantly, but these systems also present significant governance challenges in operational, legal, economic, social, and ethical dimensions. Singapore’s role as a front-runner in the trial of autonomous systems presents an insightful case to study whether the current provisional regulations address the challenges. With multiple stakeholder involvement in setting provisional regulations, government stewardship is essential for coordinating robust regulation and helping to address complex issues such as ethical dilemmas and social connectedness in governing autonomous systems.
A scoping review of the impacts of COVID-19 physical distancing measures on v...Araz Taeihagh
Most governments have enacted physical or social distancing measures to control COVID-19 transmission. Yet little is known about the socio-economic trade-offs of these measures, especially for vulnerable populations, who are exposed to increased risks and are susceptible to adverse health outcomes. To examine the impacts of physical distancing measures on the most vulnerable in society, this scoping review screened 39,816 records and synthesised results from 265 studies worldwide documenting the negative impacts of physical distancing on older people, children/students, low-income populations, migrant workers, people in prison, people with disabilities, sex workers, victims of domestic violence, refugees, ethnic minorities, and people from sexual and gender minorities. We show that prolonged loneliness, mental distress, unemployment, income loss, food insecurity, widened inequality and disruption of access to social support and health services were unintended consequences of physical distancing that impacted these vulnerable groups and highlight that physical distancing measures exacerbated the vulnerabilities of different vulnerable populations.
Data Sharing in Disruptive Technologies Lessons from Adoption of Autonomous S...Araz Taeihagh
Autonomous systems have been a key segment of disruptive technologies for which data are constantly collected, processed, and shared to enable their operations. The internet of things facilitates the storage and transmission of data and data sharing is vital to power their development. However, privacy, cybersecurity, and trust issues have ramifications that form distinct and unforeseen barriers to sharing data. This paper identifies six types of barriers to data sharing (technical, motivational, economic, political, legal, and ethical), examines strategies to overcome these barriers in different autonomous systems, and proposes recommendations to address them. We traced the steps the Singapore government has taken through regulations and frameworks for autonomous systems to overcome barriers to data sharing. The results suggest specific strategies for autonomous systems as well as generic strategies that apply to a broader set of disruptive technologies. To address technical barriers, data sharing within regulatory sandboxes should be promoted. Promoting public-private collaborations will help in overcoming motivational barriers. Resources and analytical capacity must be ramped up to overcome economic barriers. Advancing comprehensive data sharing guidelines and discretionary privacy laws will help overcome political and legal barriers. Further, enforcement of ethical analysis is necessary for overcoming ethical barriers in data sharing. Insights gained from this study will have implications for other jurisdictions keen to maximize data sharing to increase the potential of disruptive technologies such as autonomous systems in solving urban problems.
Call for papers - ICPP6 T13P05 - PLATFORM GOVERNANCE IN TURBULENT TIMES.docxAraz Taeihagh
CALL FOR PAPERS
T13P05 - PLATFORM GOVERNANCE IN TURBULENT TIMES
https://www.ippapublicpolicy.org/conference/icpp6-toronto-2023/panel-list/17/panel/platform-governance-in-turbulent-times/1428
Abstract submission deadline: 31 January 2023
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
Platforms significantly increase the ease of interactions and transactions in our societies. Crowdsourcing and sharing economy platforms, for instance, enable interactions between various groups ranging from casual exchanges among friends and colleagues to the provision of goods, services, and employment opportunities (Taeihagh 2017a). Platforms can also facilitate civic engagements and allow public agencies to derive insights from a critical mass of citizens (Prpić et al. 2015; Taeihagh 2017b). More recently, governments have experimented with blockchain-enabled platforms in areas such as e-voting, digital identity and storing public records (Kshetri and Voas, 2018; Taş & Tanrıöver, 2020; Sullivan and Burger, 2019; Das et al., 2022).
How platforms are implemented and managed can introduce various risks. Platforms can diminish accountability, reduce individual job security, widen the digital divide and inequality, undermine privacy, and be manipulated (Taeihagh 2017a; Loukis et al. 2017; Hautamäki & Oksanen 2018; Ng and Taeihagh 2021). Data collected by platforms, how platforms conduct themselves, and the level of oversight they provide on the activities conducted within them by users, service providers, producers, employers, and advertisers have significant consequences ranging from privacy and ethical concerns to affecting outcomes of elections. Fake news on social media platforms has become a contentious public issue as social media platforms offer third parties various digital tools and strategies that allow them to spread disinformation to achieve self-serving economic and political interests and distort and polarise public opinion (Ng and Taeihagh 2021). The risks and threats of AI-curated and generated content, such as a Generative Pre-Trained Transformer (GPT-3) (Brown et al., 2020) and generative adversarial networks (GANs) are also on the rise (Goodfellow et al., 2014) while there are new emerging risks due to the adoption of blockchain technology such as security vulnerabilities, privacy concerns (Trump et al. 2018; Mattila & Seppälä 2018; Das et al. 2022).
The adoption of platforms was further accelerated by COVID-19, highlighting their governance challenges.
Call for papers - ICPP6 T13P03 - GOVERNANCE AND POLICY DESIGN LESSONS FOR TRU...Araz Taeihagh
CALL FOR PAPERS
T13P03 - GOVERNANCE AND POLICY DESIGN LESSONS FOR TRUST BUILDING AND RESPONSIBLE USE OF AI, AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS AND ROBOTICS
https://www.ippapublicpolicy.org/conference/icpp6-toronto-2023/panel-list/17/panel/governance-and-policy-design-lessons-for-trust-building-and-responsible-use-of-ai-autonomous-systems-and-robotics/1390
Abstract submission deadline: 31 January 2023
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
Artificial intelligence (AI), Autonomous Systems (AS) and Robotics are key features of the fourth industrial revolution, and their applications are supposed to add $15 trillion to the global economy by 2030 and improve the efficiency and quality of public service delivery (Miller & Sterling, 2019). A McKinsey global survey found that over half of the organisations surveyed use AI in at least one function (McKinsey, 2020). The societal benefits of AI, AS, and Robotics have been widely acknowledged (Buchanan 2005; Taeihagh & Lim 2019; Ramchurn et al. 2012), and the acceleration of their deployment is a disruptive change impacting jobs, the economic and military power of countries, and wealth concentration in the hands of corporations (Pettigrew et al., 2018; Perry & Uuk, 2019).
However, the rapid adoption of these technologies threatens to outpace the regulatory responses of governments around the world, which must grapple with the increasing magnitude and speed of these transformations (Taeihagh 2021). Furthermore, concerns about these systems' deployment risks and unintended consequences are significant for citizens and policymakers. Potential risks include malfunctioning, malicious attacks, and objective mismatch due to software or hardware failures (Page et al., 2018; Lim and Taeihagh, 2019; Tan et al., 2022). There are also safety, liability, privacy, cybersecurity, and industry risks that are difficult to address (Taeihagh & Lim, 2019) and The opacity in AI operations has also manifested in potential bias against certain groups of individuals that lead to unfair outcomes (Lim and Taeihagh 2019; Chesterman, 2021).
These risks require appropriate governance mechanisms to be mitigated, and traditional policy instruments may be ineffective due to insufficient information on industry developments, technological and regulatory uncertainties, coordination challenges between multiple regulatory bodies and the opacity of the underlying technology (Scherer 2016; Guihot et al. 2017; Taeihagh et al. 2021), which necessitate the use of more nuanced approaches to govern these systems. Subsequently, the demand for the governance of these systems has been increasing (Danks & London, 2017; Taeihagh, 2021).
Call for papers - ICPP6 T07P01 - EXPLORING TECHNOLOGIES FOR POLICY ADVICE.docxAraz Taeihagh
CALL FOR PAPERS
T07P01 - EXPLORING TECHNOLOGIES FOR POLICY ADVICE
https://www.ippapublicpolicy.org/conference/icpp6-toronto-2023/panel-list/17/panel/exploring-technologies-for-policy-advice/1295
Abstract submission deadline: 31 January 2023
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
Knowledge and expertise are key components of policy-making and policy design, and many institutions and processes exist – universities, professional policy analysts, think tanks, policy labs, etc. – to generate and mobilize knowledge for effective policies and policy-making. Despite many years of research, however. many critical ssues remain unexplored, including the nature of knowledge and non-knowledge, how policy advice is organized into advisory systems or regimes, and when and how specific types of knowledge or evidence are transmitted and influence policy development and implementation. These long-standing issues have been joined recently by use of Artificial Intelligence and Big data, and other kinds of technological developments – such as crowdsourcing through open collaboration platforms, virtual labour markets, and tournaments – which hold out the promise of automating, enhancing. or expanding policy advisory activities in government. This panel seeks to explore all aspects of the application of current and future technologies to policy advice, including case studies of its deployment as well as theoretical and conceptual studies dealing with moral, epistemological and other issues surrounding its use.
Perspective on research–policy interface as a partnership: The study of best ...Araz Taeihagh
This article serves as a blueprint and proof-of-concept of Singapore’s Campus for Research Excellence and Technological Enterprise (CREATE) programmes in establishing effective collaborations with governmental partners. CREATE is a research consortium between Singapore’s public universities and international research institutions. The effective partnership of CREATE partners with government stakeholders is part of its mission to help government agencies solve complex issues in areas that reflect Singapore’s national interest. Projects are developed in consultation with stakeholders, and challenges are addressed on a scale that enables significant impact and provides solutions for Singapore and internationally. The article discusses the lessons learnt, highlighting that while research–policy partnerships are widespread, they are seldom documented. Moreover, effective communication proved to be a foundation for an effective partnership where policy and research partners were more likely to provide formal and informal feedback. Engaging policy partners early in the research co-development process was beneficial in establishing effective partnerships.
Whither policy innovation? Mapping conceptual engagement with public policy i...Araz Taeihagh
Abstract
A transition to sustainable energy will require not only technological diffusion and behavioral change, but also policy innovation. While research on energy transitions has generated an extensive literature, the extent to which it has used the policy innovation perspective – entailing policy entrepreneurship or invention, policy diffusion, and policy success – remains unclear. This study analyzes over 8000 publications on energy transitions through a bibliometric review and computational text analysis to create an overview of the scholarship, map conceptual engagement with public policy, and identify the use of the policy innovation lens in the literature. We find that: (i) though the importance of public policy is frequently highlighted in the research, the public policy itself is analyzed only occasionally; (ii) studies focusing on public policy have primarily engaged with the concepts of policy mixes, policy change, and policy process; and (iii) the notions of policy entrepreneurship or invention, policy diffusion, and policy success are hardly employed to understand the sources, speed, spread, or successes of energy transitions. We conclude that the value of the policy innovation lens for energy transitions research remains untapped and propose avenues for scholars to harness this potential.
The rapid developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the intensification in the adoption of AI in domains such as autonomous vehicles, lethal weapon systems, robotics and alike pose serious challenges to governments as they must manage the scale and speed of socio-technical transitions occurring. While there is considerable literature emerging on various aspects of AI, governance of AI is a significantly underdeveloped area. The new applications of AI offer opportunities for increasing economic efficiency and quality of life, but they also generate unexpected and unintended consequences and pose new forms of risks that need to be addressed. To enhance the benefits from AI while minimising the adverse risks, governments worldwide need to understand better the scope and depth of the risks posed and develop regulatory and governance processes and structures to address these challenges. This introductory article unpacks AI and describes why the Governance of AI should be gaining far more attention given the myriad of challenges it presents. It then summarises the special issue articles and highlights their key contributions. This special issue introduces the multifaceted challenges of governance of AI, including emerging governance approaches to AI, policy capacity building, exploring legal and regulatory challenges of AI and Robotics, and outstanding issues and gaps that need attention. The special issue showcases the state-of-the-art in the governance of AI, aiming to enable researchers and practitioners to appreciate the challenges and complexities of AI governance and highlight future avenues for exploration.
What is the point of small housing associations.pptxPaul Smith
Given the small scale of housing associations and their relative high cost per home what is the point of them and how do we justify their continued existance
Understanding the Challenges of Street ChildrenSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Canadian Immigration Tracker March 2024 - Key SlidesAndrew Griffith
Highlights
Permanent Residents decrease along with percentage of TR2PR decline to 52 percent of all Permanent Residents.
March asylum claim data not issued as of May 27 (unusually late). Irregular arrivals remain very small.
Study permit applications experiencing sharp decrease as a result of announced caps over 50 percent compared to February.
Citizenship numbers remain stable.
Slide 3 has the overall numbers and change.
Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale warAntti Rautiainen
Anarchist group ANA Regensburg hosted my online-presentation on 16th of May 2024, in which I discussed tactics of anti-war activism in Russia, and reasons why the anti-war movement has not been able to make an impact to change the course of events yet. Cases of anarchists repressed for anti-war activities are presented, as well as strategies of support for political prisoners, and modest successes in supporting their struggles.
Thumbnail picture is by MediaZona, you may read their report on anti-war arson attacks in Russia here: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/10/13/burn-map
Links:
Autonomous Action
http://Avtonom.org
Anarchist Black Cross Moscow
http://Avtonom.org/abc
Solidarity Zone
https://t.me/solidarity_zone
Memorial
https://memopzk.org/, https://t.me/pzk_memorial
OVD-Info
https://en.ovdinfo.org/antiwar-ovd-info-guide
RosUznik
https://rosuznik.org/
Uznik Online
http://uznikonline.tilda.ws/
Russian Reader
https://therussianreader.com/
ABC Irkutsk
https://abc38.noblogs.org/
Send mail to prisoners from abroad:
http://Prisonmail.online
YouTube: https://youtu.be/c5nSOdU48O8
Spotify: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/libertarianlifecoach/episodes/Russian-anarchist-and-anti-war-movement-in-the-third-year-of-full-scale-war-e2k8ai4
A process server is a authorized person for delivering legal documents, such as summons, complaints, subpoenas, and other court papers, to peoples involved in legal proceedings.
Many ways to support street children.pptxSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
2. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 2 of 19
Literature on international and transboundary policy transfer typically encapsulates
both technical knowledge transfer and a soft power extension. These transfers tend to flow
from an advanced country to a developing country or from a well-developed jurisdiction
to a less-developed jurisdiction within the same country [7]. The South Korean initiative
in Honduras (construction of Honduras economic zones), the Sino-Singapore Suzhou
Industrial Park, which is a collaborative developmental initiative between the Singapore
and Suzhou government in China [8], the City Mentorship Programmes among different
cities in Africa [9], and the transfer of Delta planning expertise from the Netherlands to
Bangladesh to help Bangladesh solve its recurring water management problems [10] are
some of the key examples of transboundary transfer that signal both diplomatic inten-
tions and economic interests of the transferring country to the recipient country, typically
established through technical and operational knowledge transfer.
Nevertheless, an international and transboundary transfer can occur between or
among advanced countries/jurisdictions through broad adoption of ideas, concepts, and
philosophies modified to suit the local contexts. For instance, the transfer of integrated
care policies for long-term care from Europe to Singapore is perceived to occur in a multi-
scalar and multi-site network that involves the transfer of ideas, philosophies, concepts,
and integrated care principles from multiple advanced jurisdictions in Europe to Singa-
pore [11]. In the same vein, there can be city-to-city policy transfer between countries,
which draws policy ideas from foreign jurisdictions and less of policy goals and content,
policy instruments, and negative lessons [12]. Likewise, the transfer of the cap-and-trade
policy to Tokyo [13] and Japan’s adoption of feed-in-tariff through a structured eight-step
process [14] reflect a broad-based policy transfer process that draws inspirations and ideas
from multiple advanced jurisdictions through a fact-finding approach that dispatches offi-
cial delegations to learn from abroad. Furthermore, a cross-country collaborative transfer
between Australia and Sweden on a regulatory compliance programme has shown that
transboundary transfer is an iterative process linked to domestic policy cycles and tends to
be effective when mobilised around similar policy concerns from both jurisdictions [6].
While much has been written about Singapore’s involvement in transnational urban
development such as the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city [16–19] and Suzhou’s industrial
park [8,18,19], more research is needed for explaining the process of knowledge transfer in
these urban development initiatives, the explicit roles and expertise of the agents involved
in the transfer, and the extent to which these transfers facilitate transboundary learning.
There remain knowledge gaps in understanding how transfer occurs in the context of smart
city developments and transboundary learning in a regional network such as ASEAN that
presents diversity in developmental stages, cultural norms, and economic interests for each
country. Paving the way to a common vision for the region by confronting these diversities
is a key challenge to any regional initiative.
Using a case of the initiation and development of ASEAN Smart Cities Network
(ASCN), a regional smart city network in Southeast Asia, we examined the early policy
processes of ASCN spearheaded by Singapore since November 2017 during the ASEAN
summit by focusing on the agenda-setting and formulation processes. Specifically, this
study aims to find out how a regional smart city development network evolves in one
of the most culturally diverse regions in the world, how policy ideas and initiatives are
transferred across national borders, how local conditions come into play in the transfer
processes, and how a common agenda is pursued and policy challenges are addressed by
various agents. To achieve these aims, we asked the following research questions: (i) As
a global city and a forerunner in smart city developments, how does Singapore facilitate
knowledge exchange and transfer within the ASCN? (ii) What is the significance of ASCN
to Singapore and ASEAN? (iii) Who are the agents involved in the transfer processes,
and what are the resources and expertise they offer to ASCN? (iv) What are the scopes
and dimensions of knowledge exchange and policy transfer in ASCN, and how do these
transfers occur? (v) What are the enablers for and barriers to these transfers?
3. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 3 of 19
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the next section provides a back-
ground to the literature of policy transfer. The third section reports the case study method
undertaken in the inquiry of this research and details the processes of data collection and
data analysis. The fourth section documents the case by describing the formation of the
ASCN, as well as analysing the major actors of the ASCN, the roles that Singapore as
an inaugural host plays in the formation of this network, the significance of the ASCN,
scopes of knowledge transfer and exchange in ASCN, and facilitators of and barriers to
transboundary learning and knowledge exchange in the ASCN. The fifth section discusses
the nature of transfer within members in the ASCN, and how and from where the network
could potentially derive lessons and inspirations, as well as the importance of considera-
tion of local contexts. Section 5 provides policy recommendations, and the final section
concludes with key insights for other regional smart cities networks worldwide.
2. Background to Policy Transfer
2.1. Policy Transfer: Definitions and Conceptual Evolution
There have been several mechanisms for categorising the various overlapping concepts
of policy transfer, convergence, and diffusion, with policy transfer and diffusion categorised
under policy learning [20], convergence seen as a form of transfer driven by structural
forces [21], and policy transfer seen as an overarching concept over diffusion [22]. Here,
we focus on understanding the role of policy transfer and diffusion, particularly in terms
of transboundary learning.
Policy transfer is broadly defined as a process through which ‘knowledge about poli-
cies, administrative arrangement institutions, and ideas in one political setting is used in
development of policies, administrative arrangement institutions, and ideas in another
political setting’ [23]. In its earlier days, policy transfer literature focused on understanding
the role of agency [21], the logic behind the selection of ideas, lessons learnt from other
systems [24], and structural forces leading to convergence of policies [25]. Increasingly,
there has been a greater emphasis placed on understanding the role of agents (individuals,
interest groups, and organisations) in disseminating policies. It has moved away from
viewing transfer as just ‘lesson-drawing’, which dealt with a voluntary form of policy
transfer emerging from a desire to adopt best practices, to including a more coercive form,
where one government can push another to adopt a certain policy [23]. The move towards
understanding an agents’ motivations and strategies in policy transfer also puts emphasis
on “the force of knowledge and the agency” [26], while still including the impact of var-
ious structural forces [21]. Therefore, exploring policy transfer allows us to observe the
variation in policy goals and objectives, but still accounts for any possible differences in
the type of policy tools or instruments selected. Likewise, policy diffusion can be defined
as the processes through which policy choices in one country either liberate or restrict the
policy choices in another country [27]. Initial explorations of policy diffusion were in the
form of policy innovation, with its impetus emerging from outside the polity due to the
expanse of innovation across different governments or sectors within the government [28].
Understanding the mechanisms of policy transfer and diffusion such as learning from
early adopters, competition between cities, imitation of larger organisations, and coercion
through vertical or horizontal sectors can help us identify the different patterns of move-
ment of policy innovation across cities [29]. Alternatively, other mechanisms that target
transboundary diffusion of economic policy include (1) altered payoffs where the policy
selections and decisions made in one country affect the financial, material, and reputational
benefits for other countries; and (2) selection of policies in one country altering the informa-
tion set that determines policy choices of other countries [27]. This approach emphasises
that governments systematically consider the choices made by culturally similar countries
while shaping their own choices.
Although both diffusion and transfer in policy studies contribute to policy change, dif-
fusion focuses on the structure, whereas policy transfer focuses more on agency [30]. They
also play a key role in understanding the mechanisms of policy change, policy adoption,
4. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 4 of 19
and movement across transboundary scales. As we want to understand the mechanisms
behind transboundary policy learning, we focused our research under policy transfer and
diffusion that occurs intentionally. Moreover, as both conceptualisations can manifest
distinctly, we aimed to integrate them to establish a pattern for understanding transbound-
ary learning, as elaborated below. Our approach, based on an existing framework for
understanding policy transfer [31], asks the following questions: Why does the policy
transfer process occur at transboundary level? Who are the agents involved in this process?
What forms does policy transfer at this scale take and what facilitates it? Lastly, what are
the enablers and barriers to policy transfer?
2.2. Why Transfer
From a transferring country’s perspective, transboundary policy transfer occurs as
countries seek to build legitimate identities in pursuing their geopolitical interests in the
region. From a macroeconomic perspective, transboundary transfer of technical knowledge
in city-building is a strategic means for a developed foreign state to improve its commer-
cial interests in a developing country [18,32]. For instance, in Singapore’s transboundary
initiatives with China through the Suzhou Industrial Park and eco-city in Tianjin through
the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city project, Singapore adopted a ‘self-learning through
teaching’ approach. This approach entails knowledge transfer through a mutually reinforc-
ing and concurrent transfer process that involved direct teaching and self-learning which
occurred via feedback from receiving cities (Suzhou and Tianjin) [18]. In the same vein, the
intention of policy transfer for the European Commission in Latin America was driven by
the motivation of EU members to increase their sphere of influence while capitalising on
the rapid economic growth in emerging economies such as Brazil and its political position
as a regional leader in South America [32].
On the other hand, receiving countries of policy transfer from a developed foreign
state is an effective way for the former to strengthen its governance and policy capacities.
In particular, Brazil’s borrowing and learning of EU Cohesion Policy was pursued as a
means to strengthen its regional policy and reduce territorial developmental disparities.
Drawing practical insights from the EU Cohesion Policy, Brazil embarked on a policy
learning journey from the selection of geographical targets for development, attraction of
dedicated investments, implementation of programmes, and the practical management of
tools, as well as the specific design and delivery of policies [32].
2.3. Agents of Policy Transfer
In the literature, three groups of agents have been identified to play instrumental
roles in transnational or transboundary policy transfer. The first group of agents includes
transnational private and corporate actors such as specialist consultancies with expertise in
urban planning and design as policy transfer agents [33]. They work closely with state-
owned conglomerates with core competencies in transportation, waste management, and
property construction in the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city project [33]. The literature
also highlighted the crucial role of local technocrats such as engineers and consultants in
ensuring that the process of knowledge transfer is rooted before the foreign experts depart
from the country [33].
Local-level bureaucrats and technocrats who possess exhaustive and extensive local
networks, and who can navigate the local policy environment to see through the imple-
mentation of ideas constitute the second group of agents that are important to facilitate
transboundary learning and transfer. For example, municipal leaders who steer the local
adoption of transferred policy ideas and local officials who learn and shape their respective
organisational roles to align with the overarching transfer goals are crucial in urban climate
policy transfer [12,13]. In the adoption of the cap-and-trade policy in Tokyo, the political
commitment of the Governor of Tokyo was instrumental in enabling the climate change
mitigation policies to be formally established in the policy agenda [13]. However, to achieve
scalability and sustainability, municipal officials play important roles as learning agents
5. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 5 of 19
when localising these policies [6,12]. In the transfer of urban spatial policies, they learn
and adapt these policies to their respective contexts and tap into their local networks for
political opportunities and their interpersonal relations with their foreign peers for mutual
learning [12]. These local actors often have access to broad local networks that are crucial
in translating the policy initiatives on the ground [6].
Lastly, think tanks and academics represent the third important group of agents of
policy transfer, especially in promoting knowledge diffusion from foreign countries to the
local bureaucrats [13,21]. In Tokyo, the academics and nongovernmental organisations
play important roles in shuttling knowledge about the cap-and-trade policy, which was
shown to be successful in the US for local officials from the environmental bureau [13].
2.4. Forms of Policy Transfer
Voluntary transfer, direct coercive or negotiated transfer, and indirect coercive transfer
are major forms of policy transfer established in some of the earliest literature on policy
transfer [23,31,34]. Voluntary transfer in a country tends to stem from the public’s dis-
satisfaction with the status quo or the lack of effective policies to tackle long-standing
policy problems [23]. It is inherently motivated by a government’s intention to draw
policy lessons from other countries to solve policy problems; hence, this is often an action-
oriented approach to transfer that is often accompanied by rational and legitimised political
strategies to move policy agenda to the mainstream [34]. The use of benchmarking and
yardstick competition among the EU governments as tools to measure themselves on a set
of common standards is regarded as a form of voluntary transfer and learning [35]. Direct
coercive transfer, a much rarer circumstance compared to voluntary transfer, occurs when
a government is forced by another government to adopt certain policies [23]. It resembles a
‘negotiated transfer’, which occurs when a country is compelled by authoritative parties,
such as influential international organisations, global financial institutions, or influential
donor countries, to adopt certain policies as requisites to receive other forms of advantages
such as grants, loans, and foreign or donor investments [34]. Imposing a set of economic
rules on developing countries as requisites for receiving financial assistance from the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and the strict regulatory standards imposed by World Trade
Organisations on its member countries are examples of direct coercive transfer [36]. An
indirect coercive transfer is often triggered by externalities and interdependence among
countries, forcing countries to either work together or emulate certain policies to solve a
common problem that directly affects all parties [23]. At times, indirect coercive transfer
occurs when countries are concerned with lagging behind their neighbouring countries [34].
Sometimes, this is also a manifestation of fiscal and resource dependence from the receiving
jurisdictions [37]. While the above are four distinct forms of transfer, in some occasions,
the transfer occurs and sometimes evolves in a continuum that creates a spectrum ranging
from complete voluntary transfer, through semi-voluntary transfer, obligated transfer,
and semi-coercive transfer, to absolute coercive transfer [38]. It is argued that complete
voluntary transfer and absolute coercive transfer are uncommon, and most transfers are
more likely to fall towards the two ends of the spectrum [38] or occur in mixtures with
both elements of voluntariness and coerciveness [31].
2.5. Approaches to and Objects of Policy Transfer
The policy transfer literature has discussed approaches to policy transfer as processes
of policy-oriented learning [34], gradations or degrees [31], or mechanisms [30]. The
approaches to policy transfer are described as policy-oriented learning that could happen
in the forms of copying (adopting a policy or a programme wholesale without modification),
emulation (using policy and programme blueprints from other countries as best practices
to inform the construction of policy or programme standards), hybridisation (drawing
ideas from and combining elements of several successful policies and programmes to
suit the unique cultural context of a country), or inspiration (using policy ideas from
other countries as motivations to instil fresh thinking of a policy problem to facilitate
6. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 6 of 19
the construction of a different policy solution) [39]. These approaches are related to the
four different degrees to policy transfer—copying (complete transfer of the entire policy),
emulation (transferring idea behind a policy or a programme), combination (transferring a
mixture or different policies or programmes), and inspiration (using policy ideas in other
countries to inspire renewed appraisals towards policy problems) [31]. On the other hand,
the policy transfer approach can also be attributed to four different mechanisms—learning,
competition, coercion, and mimicry [30]. Derived from lesson-drawing [40], learning is
described as a rational decision from governments to adopt policies that have worked
to produce effective outcomes in other countries and adapt them to local conditions [30].
While competition is demonstrated by the pressing need for more jurisdictions to adopt
similar policies such as investor-friendly policies owing to the growing importance of
capital mobility, coercion is the exact opposite in which donor countries or entities often
compel recipient countries to institute policy change [30]. A recent study on policy diffusion
of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) suggested that the compelling need for transfer
is the intention of policy adopting jurisdictions and hinges on the competition of exporting
jurisdictions to maximise their geopolitical and military influence [41]. Mimicry resembles
the concept of ‘emulation’ [31,34], in that countries adopt what are perceived as successful
policies and programmes from other countries in a more normative sense to inform the
local implementation norms [30].
Policy goals, structure, and content, policy instruments, institutions, ideology, and
ideas, as well as attitudes, concepts, and negative lessons, have been identified as the seven
objects of transfer [23]. While ideology and ideas, as well as attitudes and concepts, tend
to be transferred using inspiration as an approach, policy goals, structure, and content,
policy instruments and institutions tend to be transferred using other approaches such as
copying, emulation, mimicry, or hybridisation [23].
2.6. Facilitators of Policy Transfer
Effective policy transfer occurs through building a thorough understanding and anal-
ysis on how a certain policy or programme has shown to be successful in other jurisdictions
before adapting it to the local political and operational contexts, including commissioning
reports to study the direct consequences of local adaptation of these policies [38]. This is
best illustrated by the transfer of the Working Families Tax Credit, which has shown much
success in the US, by the Blair government to the UK context [38].
Ideological similarities between the two countries are major facilitators of policy
transfer due to agents’ tendency to adopt or transfer lessons from jurisdictions that are
politically and institutionally closer and more familiar to them [6,12,23]. For instance, the
transboundary transfer of environmental policies between the US and Canada is attributed
to the value consensus between the two countries. In the same vein, the transfer of similar
policies between the US and Sweden resulted in the convergence of safety and health
regulations in both countries [23]. The shared interest in the need to tackle a common
policy challenge between two jurisdictions using a similar regulatory tool also enables
collaborative policy transfer, depicted in the collaborative relations between Australia and
Sweden in developing a regulatory compliance tool [6]. Likewise, the transfer could also
be facilitated by countries that share a similar cultural and linguistic base. In the transfer of
regional policies from the EU to Brazil, the history of migratory flows from the EU to Brazil
formed an institutional identification on Brazil’s part, which paved the way to the transfer
through a series of EU–Brazil policy dialogues [32].
Furthermore, political motivation from the host country demonstrated in the form
of coercive transfer is another facilitator for transfer to occur, as illustrated in the case of
Turkey in which the political will of transfer was galvanised by a strong political desire to
receive EU pre-accession funds by the politicians to establish their political legitimacy [42].
Powerful economic incentives and citizens’ demand for policy parity may also induce
governments to construct similar policies to match their neighbouring countries, creating
spill-over effects [35,37].
7. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 7 of 19
Diplomacy is another facilitator for transboundary transfer to occur [10,32]. For
instance, the transfer of regional policies from the EU to China was driven by trade
agreements and the intention to preserve diplomatic ties between them [32]. Likewise,
the transfer of delta planning and water management expertise from the Netherlands
to Bangladesh is also seen as a diplomatic tool in enabling the Dutch government to
strengthen and continue building the long-standing bilateral ties between both countries,
in addition to helping the Bangladeshi government to achieve its political aspiration to
move the country up the income ladder [10].
Broad involvement of the private sector in the transfer process, coupled with intense
collaborations between the private sector and the local government, can also facilitate the
success of policy transfer [43]. Broad private sector involvement can give leverage to the
government to diversify the ownership structure, especially in terms of financing mega-
projects. Moreover, the private sector’s involvement can accelerate administrative efficiency
and give rise to the adoption of market-based operational principles and standards that
are attractive to the private sector in the transfer process [43]. In the case of the Sino-
Singapore Tianjin Eco-City Project, which saw broad-based policy transfer from Singapore
to Tianjin, private sector involvement enabled this transboundary project between two
countries to enjoy a variety of private financing sources such as corporate bonds, bank
loans, and other private capital that extend far beyond government grants. Additionally,
market-based operations facilitate both knowledge and capital transfer from various private
entities, thereby buffering the financial pressure faced by the local governments in projects
financing [43].
Resources are also another important facilitator of transfer, and it has been shown that
better-resourced jurisdictions tend to be more successful in transfer due to their higher
policy capacity [35].
2.7. Barriers to Policy Transfer
The complexity of the policy and programme poses a major barrier to transfer in that a
higher degree of complexity tends to affect policy transferability [23]. This is compounded
by the lack of information gathered about how something that has operated successfully in
a foreign system can work in the local context [38]. For instance, the lack of details of what
some policy best practices convey and the lack of systematic evaluations of the transfer
processes can lead to scepticism and distrust among the designated officials to implement
the transfer [44].
Political influence also plays a part in limiting the amount, degree and extent of policy
transfer. This is most commonly observed in selective transfer, whereby individuals or
countries look for ideas in familiar places or lessons that would be perceived to receive
the least amount of resistance from the electorate. This often narrows the boundary of the
search for good lessons and could potentially stifle innovation and constrain the transfer
process [38].
Lack of policy capacity is identified as another barrier to successful policy transfer [42].
Most notably, the lack of analytical capacity and the lack of domestic expertise from the
host country to facilitate the transfer process often weaken domestic political support for
transfer to occur [42].
Institutional and structural constraints faced by agents who are involved in the transfer
of policy represent another major barrier to transfer [23]. These constraints entail a lack of
bureaucratic efficiency in the receiving country, lack of technological capacity to maintain
operational standards in adopting new technology, and lack of economic resources to
engage in policy transfer [23]. At times, the difficulty of transboundary transfer could
stem from domestic political constraints in securing financial resources and deploying a
sufficient number of bureaucrats for transnational activities due to their preoccupation with
their existing duties [12]. High leadership turnover without ensuring proper succession
in steering the implementation of a newly established programme can also contribute to
policy and programme failure [45].
8. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 8 of 19
3. Methods
An in-depth single-case study describing and explaining the formation and evolution
of the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) was conducted. A case study is a flexible
method that can facilitate inquiry revolving around examining a contextualised contem-
porary phenomenon within its real-life context [46]. From an in-depth study of a single
case, inferences can be made to understand a broader context of a similar phenomenon [47].
In documenting and analysing the case, we focused on the early policy process—notably
agenda-setting and formulation—of ASCN. As ASCN was formally started in November
2017, focusing on the early policy process would inform its subsequent implementation, in
addition to shedding light on how similar policy initiatives could be managed in the future.
Data were collected using a combination of interviews and document analysis [48]. In-
depth individual interviews were conducted by the first and the third authors from fall 2019
to winter 2020 with 19 key informants across seven countries, namely, Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. The respondents were mainly mid-level
and high-level civil servants helming the positions as smart city officers, national-level
policymakers, practitioners from the private industries, researchers from universities, and
think-tanks comprising sectors such as urban planning, education, national development,
and communications. For the 11 respondents who were based in Singapore, either on-site
interviews or phone interviews were conducted. The other eight respondents who were
based in other ASEAN countries were approached via email for online interviews. A
purposive sampling approach was adopted through email invitations sent to all smart
city officers from the ASCN. After the first wave of interviews, the snowball sampling
approach was adopted through referrals and recommendations to recruit more respondents,
particularly in sectors and under-represented areas from the first waves. Semi-structured
interviews were conducted to obtain information concerning the formation of ASCN,
agenda-setting and formulation of ASCN, scopes of the transfer involved among the
network cities in ASCN, significance and rationale of ASCN, agents involved in the transfer
processes, and facilitators that propel transfer and barriers to the success of ASCN. In
addition to interviews, document analysis was conducted through secondary information
collected from news articles, official websites of ASCN and the ASEAN Secretariat, policy
documents, and government reports.
Both interview data and secondary information from official documents were triangu-
lated to achieve credibility and reliability of the information obtained [49]. These data were
analysed thematically to identify similar themes, and the case narratives were strengthened
by pattern matching and explanation building to derive logical explanations to the events
and insights unfold [46,50]. In analysing the data, we focused on teasing out the early
policy processes of the ASCN, mapping out the major actors involved, and determining
the role of Singapore in the ASCN and the responses from other ASEAN members, the
scopes of knowledge exchange or transfer within the ASCN, and enablers and barriers to
the ASCN.
4. Findings
4.1. The Formation of the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN)
The idea of ASCN was first proposed by Singapore’s Prime Minister Mr Lee Hsien
Loong at the ASEAN leaders’ summit in Singapore in November 2017. Within a month
of the establishment of the ASEAN Smart Cities Governance Workshop, 26 cities within
ASEAN came together to form the network [51]. ASCN aims to serve as a regional plat-
form to create synergistic and multiplier effects for each country in ASEAN and enable
them to share best practices and secure funding from private investment and multilateral
funding institutions to advance the development of their smart cities [52]. ASCN’s role
in spearheading smart cities in ASEAN is seen to be significant to its member countries,
particularly as the region is expanding with a projected addition of 90 million to the popula-
tion living in urban cities in the region by 2030. The combined GDP of ASEAN is expected
to increase by twofold over the next decade, with the expectation to add one trillion USD
9. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 9 of 19
of GDP in the implementation of technology and digital agenda by 2030 [51]. These rapid
demographic and economic expansions introduce significant demands on urban cities,
making ASEAN a fertile ground for foreign direct investment in conventional goods and
services, as well as technological and digital transformation. These trends are already
demonstrated through recent inflows of foreign investments into ASCN from Australia
and Switzerland. The Australian government has pledged 30.3 million AUD into ASEAN
smart cities, while the Swiss government and the World Bank have jointly established an
18 million CHF Indonesia Sustainable Urbanisation Multi-Donor Trust Fund to facilitate
the urban development in Indonesia [52].
As the leader of ASCN, Singapore hosted the first ASCN meeting and workshops
in 2018 before passing the baton to Thailand in 2019, who hosted the next annual ASCN
meeting on 23 August 2019 in Bangkok [53]. The meeting was also held in parallel with
the ASCN Conference and exhibition, where the ASCN’s role as a catalyst for economic
development was reiterated by Thailand’s Minister of Foreign affairs. Other important
outcomes from this meeting also included the participating countries selecting Singapore to
provide advice and support as an ‘ASCN Shepherd’ for an additional 2 years. In 2020, the
ASCN conference (held online due to the Covid-19 pandemic) was organised by Vietnam
as the next ASEAN chair. Keeping the post-pandemic future in mind, the targets for ASCN
were extended to include strategies and partnerships between participating smart cities for
a post-pandemic economic landscape [54]. Currently, Brunei Darussalam has undertaken
the chairmanship for the ASEAN region and will continue the ASCN frameworks in
2021 [55].
4.2. Analysis of ASCN
4.2.1. Major Actors in ASCN
At its formation in 2018, the Singapore government was key in spearheading the
ASCN. The Ministry of Finance (MFA) led the strategic directions of ASCN, with govern-
ment think-tanks such as the Centre for Liveable Cities (CLC) acting as a knowledge partner.
Other core government or statutory boards that were involved in ASCN from Singapore
included the Ministry of Trade and Industries (MTI), Enterprise SG, Info-communications
Media Development Authority (IMDA), and Smart Nation and Digital Government Office
(SNDGO) under the Prime Minister’s Office. Beyond government actors, four important
groups of stakeholders were also involved in forming and propagating the ASCN agen-
das. These stakeholders comprised (i) international/regional organisations such as the
ASEAN Secretariat that supports the ASCN through its Integration and Monitoring Direc-
torate, (ii) private companies and government-linked corporations (GLCs), (iii) multilateral
institutions, and (iv) universities and think-tanks (Respondent 2).
In addition to Singapore-based government and private actors in the early years of
ASCN, foreign actors such as the US, Japanese, and Korean companies, as well as the
Australian government, also signalled their interests to engage ASCN as a coordinating
platform to directly engage and collaborate with all the ASEAN members.
4.2.2. How Does Singapore Facilitate Knowledge Exchange in ASCN?
As the network initiator, Singapore facilitated the formation of various partnerships
among the cities in the network and various public and private actors both in Singapore
and abroad (Respondent 11). Since the inception of ASCN in 2018, there have been
more than 40 partnerships forged between member cities and various public and private
agencies in Singapore in the form of a memorandum of understandings and letter of intent
(Respondent 2).
In addition to facilitating business partnerships and working relations, Singapore
has branded itself as a resource provider in ASCN. Various capacity-building efforts were
visible in Singapore’s engagement with the member cities. Government-led think tanks
such as the Centre for Liveable Cities (CLC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have
been organising various capacity-building workshops several times a year, and delegates
10. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 10 of 19
from each member cities, typically comprising a political office holder, a technocrat, and
a junior bureaucrat, have been invited. These workshops create a sharing platform for
Singapore to share its urban planning and management history and experience from the
policy perspective. Based on each workshop’s feedback, the agendas were developed to
serve the learning needs of the member cities. For instance, one of the major limitations
highlighted by member cities is the lack of expertise and experience in procurement and
funding solicitation. As a result, a workshop in 2019 was organised to transfer knowledge
in writing bankable proposals to improve cities’ capacities in soliciting funding. The
MFA usually sent out such official invitations and announcements. Aside from public
agencies and the private sector, retired senior government officials were also mobilised as
consultants and advisors to ASCN through the facilitation of CLC. Their advisory roles
serve to enhance the legitimacy of ASCN, as well as potentially offer smart city ideas and
solutions to ASCN (Respondents 2 and 12).
4.2.3. Significance of ASCN to Singapore and ASEAN
The formation of ASCN is largely seen as a soft power extension for Singapore, in
line with its intention to be a responsive global city to share its success stories and urban
management lessons with other aspiring cities in the region (Respondent 2). ASCN is a
natural step forward in Singapore’s diplomatic move to engage its ASEAN partners, as
well as to be more connected in the region, which would likely bring more opportunities for
the youth to diversify their exposures and skillsets in the face of the Fourth Industrial Rev-
olution (Respondent 8). Furthermore, most ASEAN members perceive Singapore’s unique
position as an acclaimed world-class city and a leading global business and technology
hub that could provide the leadership and technical expertise in institutionalising smart
city solutions (Respondents 3–6, 9, 16, and 17). Having gained experiences from decades of
rapid domestic social development and having benefited from various technology transfers
from other advanced economies in the past, Singapore’s public and private sectors are
well positioned to expand their footholds and export their urban management experiences
to a wider ASEAN region (Respondent 16). Many mega-cities and second-tier cities in
ASEAN have witnessed massive urbanisation and exponential population growth but are
yet to close the gaps of infrastructure provisions as the demands for basic public services
rise. Through ASCN, better collaborations among major cities in ASCN can be established
to fill these infrastructure gaps (Respondents 12, 14, and 16). Additionally, ASCN can
spur healthy geopolitical competition among the member cities in the network and en-
able cities to offer smart city solutions to one another. Instead of marketing Singapore
as the only solution exporter, ASCN should be branded as a platform that allows cities
to forge collaborations to offer solutions that could address similar developmental needs
(Respondent 12).
ASCN is seen as a symbiotic platform for private companies and start-ups to work
directly with the governments across major cities in the region. It is the first initiative in
ASEAN that links city to city directly, which could potentially minimise bureaucracy and
enable smart city policies and solutions to be implemented more easily (Respondent 9).
While this diaspora enables companies to reach out to a larger market and boost their
business opportunities, it also allows governments to tap into some of the smart city
solutions that these companies are providing (Respondent 5). There is also strong interest
from the private companies based in Singapore for a more visible and institutionalised
platform that provides stability and continuity, and ASCN is perceived to hold this promise.
As many smart city solution providers are not equipped with the know-how to navigate
the complexity of politics and bureaucracy in other ASEAN countries, a Singapore-initiated
platform like ASCN provides a well-coordinated structure and integrating buffer for the
private actors (Respondent 9).
Furthermore, the formation of ASCN can further strengthen ASEAN as a brand name
and regional pact that is competitive and strong among all the strategic alliances in the
world. Better regional cooperation established through ASCN will also enable all ASEAN
11. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 11 of 19
countries to cast away the shadows imposed by some of the largest economies in the
world, such as the US and China, by balancing their political hegemonies, in addition to
leveraging Singapore’s good relations with these major superpowers (Respondent 10). In a
fast-changing world imbued with higher uncertainties today, smart city development is
not just a grandiose aspiration but an imperative for ASEAN (Respondent 9).
4.2.4. Scopes of Knowledge Exchange and Transfer in ASCN
In ASCN, the scopes of knowledge exchange and transfer occur multidirectionally.
Owing to Singapore’s role as the leader of the network, most of the knowledge exchanges
flow from Singapore to other ASEAN cities in the network at this point. These cities are
ready to learn some of the developmental success stories from Singapore (Respondent 6).
Moreover, Singapore’s status as a global city also makes it a legitimate initiator for it
to expand its effort in sharing the successful policy lessons in smart city development.
Its ability to transform from a third-world to a first-world country within three decades
is still an inspiration to many. The developmental challenges that it has faced along
the way could provide governance lessons and benchmarking systems to other cities
(Respondents 3, 6, and 15). In Singapore, CLC is designated to achieve this role, becoming
the de facto resource provider in the ASCN platform, linking cities within the network to
appropriate resources in Singapore based on their respective urban development problems
(Respondent 2). Capacity-building workshops were held quarterly in Singapore in which
government delegates from the member cities were invited to Singapore to network and
learn from one another, specifically in terms of urban planning and management. These
engagements often occurred in formal and informal conversations and exchanges, direct
learning through the forging of city-to-city partnerships, training, and sharing of city-
level experiences, and consolidation of best practices across cities (Respondent 6 and 15).
In addition to facilitating city-to-city learning, initiatives were started to connect retired
government officials in Singapore in the policy process with some cities in the network
to provide consultancies at the policy level (Respondent 2). In these capacity-building
workshops, other countries/cities can work with Singapore-based companies to develop
technology-based solutions to urban problems and to tap into the prowess of technologies
in city planning (Respondent 3). Essentially, CLC also aims to create a bigger regional
consumer market for local companies eyeing to expand their business ventures beyond
Singapore (Respondent 2).
Within ASEAN, the scopes of knowledge exchange and learning are either bidirec-
tional or multidirectional. In addition to Singapore, other countries such as Malaysia
and Thailand have emerged as knowledge providers for smart city development to other
ASEAN cities (Respondents 3 and 6). Malaysia, for instance, launched its own Smart
Cities Framework in 2019 [56]. Furthermore, it was also opined that a big country such
as Thailand, with cities of diverse nature, could offer multipronged solutions to other
second-tiered and third-tiered cities in ASEAN which are aiming to focus on one industry.
For instance, Thailand has cities that are agriculture-based, tourism-based, elderly domi-
nant, and heritage-oriented, in addition to the commercially driven cosmopolitan city of
Bangkok. These diverse experiences and lessons in governing cities of a specific nature
could be emulated by many other developing countries in ASEAN aspiring to infuse a
strong social focus in their respective smart city development (Respondent 3). Furthermore,
ASCN is seen as a platform for less developed countries/cities in the network to obtain
developmental assistance needed for leapfrogging various developmental stages when
adopting technology solutions in the development of smart cities (Respondent 19).
4.2.5. Enablers of Transboundary Learning and Knowledge Exchange in ASCN
Five major enablers—effective branding from Singapore, hunger and thirst for knowl-
edge from ASEAN, presence of alternative funding options, enthusiasm from the commer-
cial private actors, and heightened interest shown by external ASEAN members—propel
knowledge exchange among member cities within ASCN (see Table 1 for summary).
12. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 12 of 19
Table 1. Enablers of transboundary learning and knowledge exchange in ASCN (source: authors).
Enablers of Transboundary Learning and Knowledge Exchange in ASCN
• Effective branding from Singapore
• Hunger and thirst for knowledge from ASEAN
• Presence of alternative funding options
• Enthusiasm from the commercial private actors
• Heightened interests shown by external ASEAN members
One of the most important enablers of transboundary learning in ASCN is the strong
commitment through effective branding of the smart nation idea from Singapore as the
leader of ASCN (Respondents 7, 10, 15, and 16). Singapore is one of the first countries in
ASEAN to embark on a Smart Nation Programme (officially launched by the Prime Minister
in 2014). Capitalising on the general perception of Singapore as a leader of innovations
among the members in the network, Singapore attempts to make a contribution as one of the
world’s leading global innovation hubs by positioning the smart city idea strategically to its
ASEAN partners (Respondent 7). The capacity-building efforts and training opportunities
initiated by Singapore and extended to other member cities are also important to sustain
the enthusiasm and collective interest towards ASCN (Respondent 10). These efforts are
reciprocated by the members, demonstrating clear political commitments from the top
leadership level (i.e., mayors, governors) among some of the cities within the network
(Respondents 10, 15, and 16).
Another significant enabler of transboundary learning and knowledge exchange in
ASCN is the hunger and thirst of cities within the network to learn from one another to
bring smart city solutions to their respective cities (Respondents 4, 6, and 17). Through
close collaborations and willingness to share developmental lessons related to best practices
and technology adoption, member cities within ASCN can foster mutual learning and tap
into the collective wisdom of the network to address some of the problems encountered
(Respondent 6).
Moreover, alternative funding sources can be an enabler to facilitate the transfer
of policy lessons within ASCN (Respondents 16 and 17). For instance, local banks and
multilateral institutions can expand their services to the entire region by providing more
financing options for cities within the network, especially for cities that are less resource-
endowed (Respondent 16).
Enthusiasm for new opportunities from private solution providers to expand their
operations beyond a country is another instrumental enabler in facilitating transboundary
learning and knowledge exchange in ASCN (Respondent 16). Grassroot involvement and
public participation from the local actors are important to see through the development
of smart city initiatives in their respective cities and sustain the implementation of these
projects or initiatives (Respondent 10).
Heightened interest from the world’s major economies towards the investment oppor-
tunities in ASEAN through ASCN is another enabler of knowledge exchange among the
member cities and the external parties (Respondent 4). For instance, a high-level meeting
initiated by Japan Smart Cities Network, held in Yokohama, Japan, in October 2019, en-
abled member cities to come together to share their respective developmental lessons in
the pursuit of their respective smart city agendas, in addition to collectively improving the
ASCN smart city action plans [57].
4.2.6. Barriers to Transboundary Learning and Knowledge Exchange in ASCN
We also identify five major barriers for enabling transboundary learning and knowl-
edge exchange in ASCN—lack of strong political will among ASEAN countries, entrenched
multilevel bureaucracy and complex governance structures impeding communication and
reporting, lack of resources (fiscal), lack of sufficient policy capacity, and lack of operational
and regulatory mechanisms (see Table 2 for summary).
13. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 13 of 19
Table 2. Barriers to transboundary learning and knowledge exchange in ASCN (source: authors).
Barriers to Transboundary Learning and Knowledge Exchange in ASCN
• Lack of strong political will among ASEAN countries
• Entrenched multi-level bureaucracy and complex governance structures impeding
communication and reporting
• Lack of resources (fiscal)
• Lack of sufficient policy capacity
• Lack of operational and regulatory mechanisms
Lack of strong political will among ASEAN countries is one of the major barriers
to transboundary learning and knowledge exchange in ASCN (Respondents 1–3, 5, and
6). First, getting political buy-in and ensuring all relevant stakeholders agree to the
visions of smart city development and subsequently taking ownership in realising and
sustaining these visions often present governance challenges in smart city development
(Respondent 3). Due to limited funding and novelty of the smart city ideas, smart city
adoption is slow in many ASEAN countries. This is compounded by the long-haul process
taken in the political engagement process for technocrats to convince decision-makers to
pursue certain smart city ideas (Respondent 6).
Furthermore, entrenched multilevel bureaucracy and complex governance structures
in some countries impede the communication process needed to pursue seamless develop-
ment in knowledge transfer and learning (Respondents 2, 4, 5, 8, and 9). Some respondents
opined that, in large countries, facilitating multi-agency collaboration is a huge challenge,
creating many ‘reporting entities’ that slow down the execution process to drive common
programmes that could benefit all cities collectively (Respondents 4 and 5). Unlike Singa-
pore’s Smart Nations Office, which reports directly to the Prime’s Minister Office, many
other city-level smart city offices are subsumed under the local government office at the
municipal or provincial levels. Often, they do not enjoy similar mandates as the Singapore
Smart Nations Office that can drive many smart city initiatives directly and effectively
(Respondent 4). The lack of a clear reporting mechanism and the multilevel governance
structure impede effective cross-jurisdictional learning. Across ASEAN, there is a lack of
a policy champion at the national level that could also navigate local-level bureaucracies
to exert pressure for the adoption of ideas required for smart city development at the city
level (Respondent 9).
Lack of resources is also a common problem that hinders transboundary exchange
and learning (Respondents 1–3, 6, and 15). Many countries in ASEAN are struggling
with having sufficient fiscal resources to finance smart city projects. It is commonplace
that letters of intent and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) may not lead to concrete
projects due to ambiguity in the nature of funding with the partners (Respondents 11 and
12). In some ASEAN countries with large populations, strategic decisions often have to be
made to prioritise cities that will see immediate impacts from smart city developments in
the face of scarce resources (Respondent 3). Priorities of each city and country may also
change in the face of institutional or political reforms (Respondent 15).
Lack of sufficient policy capacity that could see through the fruition of different
smart city projects is perceived as a barrier in promoting transboundary learning and
knowledge exchange in ASCN. In many ASEAN countries, the ability to articulate a smart
city problem effectively in a coherent proposal that could appeal to donors is lacking. That
is to say, the ability to come up with a bankable proposal is lacking due to the deficit
in analytical capacity within the bureaucracies (Respondents 2, 11, 12, and 15). High
turnover of smart city officers in some ASEAN countries is common, and new Chief Smart
City Officers often encounter a steep learning curve to catch up with the developmental
trends (Respondent 4). Smart city roadmaps in each city need to be followed through and
implemented. To systematise this, there is a need to construct a set of unifying performance
indicators that apply to all smart cities in ASCN, which is currently lacking (Respondent 5).
Building the right ecosystem that supports smart city development and promotes PPP
14. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 14 of 19
fairly and transparently is also lacking among the member cities of ASCN (Respondent 5).
Furthermore, the capacity to steer implementation at both the national and local levels is
an issue. To date, there remains a lack of clarity in the current national policy frameworks
and existing legal infrastructures that can facilitate smart city initiatives in some countries
in ASEAN (Respondents 9 and 16).
The lack of operational and regulatory mechanisms also poses a barrier to effective
knowledge transfer in ASCN. To date, there is a lack of official protocols to follow up
with the various partnerships and MOUs formed from each ASCN meeting. For instance,
CLC has limited knowledge about the extent to which these projects have made progress
(Respondent 2). Furthermore, implementation mechanisms to help cities realise their action
plans through different funding opportunities is lacking (Respondent 17). Clear project
planning, coordination among different parties, a better understanding of the smart city
technologies deployed, and long-term planning are operational codes that need to be set
in place in time to come (Respondent 16). The lack of regulatory mechanisms for smaller
start-ups intending to get a foothold in other countries has also surfaced as a barrier to
creating an inclusive knowledge exchange platform, as there is a lack of mechanisms to
connect local start-ups in Singapore with other smart cities in the region (Respondent 7).
5. Discussion
The case of policy transfer within the ASCN has found that most transfers are volun-
tary transfers between cities intending to learn from Singapore or between cities that have
identified commonalities in the urban challenges faced. Overall, the scope of knowledge
transfer is fairly limited to the transference of policy ideas at the initial stage. While the
ASCN is primarily driven by government actors and government-linked corporations
in Singapore at this point, involvement across the private sector, including conglomer-
ates, start-ups, small and medium enterprises, and other commercial entities, should be
promoted in the longer run. Furthermore, academics and researchers should also be proac-
tively engaged with the industries to codesign smart city solutions. A multipronged and
multi-stakeholder approach should be considered to include citizens in the framework of
smart city development, whereby they could be mobilised to be more actively engaged in
various smart city initiatives, especially at the stage of idea conceptualisation.
On the above note, ASCN could potentially draw inspirations from many other emerg-
ing academic or civil society-driven smart city observatories or councils that have been
launched across the world recently. For instance, the Smart Cities Research Cluster at the
University of New South Wales in Australia directly engages citizens through participa-
tory urbanism, as well as industrial experts, to develop sustainable smart infrastructures
and smart service delivery through the use of smart technologies and evidence-based
design [56]. Likewise, the Australian Urban Observatory, a non-profit platform started
by RMIT university with a more domestic focus, aims to transform complex urban data
into easily understood liveability maps across entire Australian cities to facilitate policy
decision making [58]. In Europe, Smart City Labs have been established at the city level
and regional level to connect industry experts, scientists, and citizens to experiment with
new ideas, prototypes, and services in various areas ranging from transport to logistics and
healthcare [59,60]. For example, the United Smart Cities Lab in Vienna has been designed
as an open workspace for companies and start-ups to have easy and direct access to city
representatives, technology providers, and international experts to utilize platforms and
solutions, as well as meet early adopters willing to bring their ideas to life [60].
Our findings also shed light on the importance of considering local contexts when
the transfer happens [11,61,62]. The transfer is a continuous process, and it is important
to consider how the entire idea will come together wholly over time [11]. Learning is
often an open and unstructured process that involves lesson-drawing and borrowing ideas
rather than a wholesale translation of concrete policy content [12]. Even with the member
states in European Union (EU), it has been acknowledged that substantial differences in
social, cultural, institutional, and economic situations among the member states often
15. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 15 of 19
reduce the relevance and applicability of best practices identified. For instance, policy
options for urban spatial planning should be differentiated to suit national contexts, and,
instead of adopting the identified best practices, it is better to take them as references and
adapt them to local circumstances [44]. As such, contextualising the bureaucratic hurdles
and bureaucratic culture in each country is important. Moreover, politics, administrative
culture, and policy capacity are different across different cities in the network, and all these
contextual factors should be considered. Furthermore, the strategic alliances that ASEAN
members forge with world superpowers such as the US, China, and the EU need to be
considered in the context of ASCN. These relations need to be understood holistically to
avoid contradictions and diplomatic tensions.
5.1. Trans-Boundary Learning: Policy Implications for Singapore and ASEAN
5.1.1. Promoting Enablers of Knowledge Transfer and Drivers of Smart City Development
for Cities in the ASCN
The five enablers identified in this case study should be strengthened to sustain
the interests from the cities within the network to engage in long-term partnerships and
initiatives in the future. Furthermore, these enablers can be promoted in tandem with
other major drivers of smart city development in developing countries identified by a prior
review study [63]. These include building the financing capacity of the city government,
building a strong regulatory environment that fosters investor confidence and citizen trust,
building up technology and infrastructure readiness, investing in human capital through
upskilling and skill enhancement, ensuring stability in economic development, active
citizen engagement in determining smart city solutions, welcoming knowledge transfer and
participation from the private sector, and creating a supportive ecosystem that promotes
innovation and learning [63]. Indeed, these factors, coupled with a governance style that
is highly adaptable to the emerging needs required to foster fertile grounds for various
technology test-beds, as well as a favourable regulatory milieu for the implementation of
novel technology, are essential ingredients identified in Singapore’s success in rolling out
novel and disruptive technologies [64–66]. As such, Singapore is well positioned to be the
conduit to facilitate knowledge exchange and policy transfer for smart city development.
As a regional pact, ASEAN should embrace cross-regional and cross-continent partnerships
that could elevate the collaborations formed within the ASCN. While the US, Japan, Korea,
and Australia have signalled strong interests to engage the network cities, ASCN could
consider tapping into the economic prowess of other advanced OECD countries to galvanise
global collaboration around innovation [52].
5.1.2. Addressing Policy Challenges by Building Local Policy Capacity
Defined as ‘the ability to marshal the necessary resources to make intelligent collective
choices about and set strategic directions for the allocation of scarce resources to public
ends’ [67], policy capacity encompasses three major competencies/skills required, opera-
tional, analytical, and political, as well as capabilities/resources at three different levels,
individual, organisational, and systematic [68]. In many cities within the network, the
capacity to turn policy ideas into long-term concrete implementation plans has been identi-
fied as a challenge. This is compounded by the fact that countries with vast geography tend
to observe enormous disparities in local policy capacity [69]. To ensure a successful transfer,
long-term capacity-building efforts within ASCN, which are instituted as the focus of each
partnership forged in different smart city ventures, should focus beyond the expansion
of governmental bureaucratic capacity at the system level. Within cities, initiatives need
to be planned to galvanise capacity-building efforts at the organisational and individual
levels. To do so, the three core domains of policy capacity should be given emphasis. While
operational and analytical capacities can be developed incrementally through workshops
and long-term mentorship programmes, political capacity necessitates strong political will
from the local government, as well as acknowledgement of the importance of smart city
solutions in tackling some of the most pressing urban problems.
16. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 16 of 19
5.1.3. Collaborative Policy Transfer between a Transfer City and a Recipient City
At the point of writing this article, the complete implementation and execution of
smart city ideas remains to be observed in the network, and concrete collaborations are
yet to be formed (Respondent 4). Due to its nascent formation, ASCN currently lacks a
success story, and the long-term return of investment is unclear (Respondent 12). Policy
transfer is an iterative process of learning, adjustment, and improvement which will only
be effective when subjected to jurisdictions’ domestic processes of analysis, evaluation and
review [6]. Adopting the spirit of collaborative policy transfer is important to mobilise
resources and interests from two or more jurisdictions facing similar policy concerns to
collectively enhance critical thinking and reflexive practices towards finding solutions for
the problems faced [6]. Hence, stronger partnerships can be identified between a transfer
city and a recipient city within the network, whereby a common policy problem regarding
smart city development that is inflicting both cities is mutually identified. A transfer city
would possess a stronger capacity to tackle the same problem, but it remains relatable to
the recipient city in terms of its developmental stage, political culture, and social mores.
The recipient city could draw lessons from the transfer city in different stages of the policy
process, particularly in implementing and evaluating a specific smart city solution.
5.1.4. From an Information-Sharing Platform to Tool- or Instrument-Based Transfer
The ASCN should also look beyond being an information-sharing platform and
explore ways to bring about tangible benefits to the member cities within the network
(Respondents 3 and 4). As such, policy transfer between cities in the future ought to pay
more attention to the details of transfer beyond ideology transfer. For instance, in urban
planning, documenting examinations of the transferability of spatial planning methods,
tools, techniques, and operating rules would be worthwhile instead of transferring policy
ideas without considering the different jurisdictional contexts [44]. Moving forward, policy
transfer within the ASCN could consider tool- or instrument-based transfer that directly
addresses a niche urban problem using technological solutions.
6. Conclusions
As a new and exclusive regional smart city network in Southeast Asia, ASCN is
important for Singapore and ASEAN to strengthen their geopolitical positions. It links the
governments of Singapore and major cities in the region and creates cross-border business
opportunities for private companies and start-ups. This study examined the agenda-setting
and formulation processes of ASCN on the grounds of an in-depth analysis based on
primary data collected through 19 key informant interviews and secondary data collected
through a desktop search. This study delivers a comprehensive investigation of scopes,
enablers, and barriers of transboundary learning and transfer in ASCN.
This study demonstrates that ASCN is promising to serve as a regional platform
for cities across ASEAN countries to forge collaborations with one another in smart city
development and enable knowledge sharing of best practices. ASCN has seen policy
transfers from Singapore to cities intending to learn from Singapore or between cities that
face common urban challenges. Singapore has effectively branded the smart nation idea
and offered to be a resource provider in ASCN. Assuming this role enables Singapore to
facilitate knowledge exchanges among cities in ASEAN, bolstered by other facilitators,
including a thirst for knowledge from other ASEAN member countries, access to alternative
funding resources, enthusiasm from private sector actors, and heightened investment
interests from the major economies of the world.
However, ASCN is at an initial development stage, and there is room for improve-
ment. First, policy transfers across national borders in ASCN are mostly focused on
exchanges of policy ideas. ASCN should move forward transboundary learning beyond
ideology transfer, paying attention to exchanges of policy instruments and institutions
with considerations of local contextual details. Given that there are few cases of complete
implementation of smart city ideas, emphasising tool- or instrument-based transfer and
17. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6502 17 of 19
calibrating these tools or instruments over time is conducive to concretising smart city ideas
and plans [70]. Rather than transferring policy ideas, the tool- or instrument-based transfer
also brings up the importance of contextualising the policy instruments being transferred,
especially in a culturally diverse region like ASEAN. Second, there are spaces for member
cities in ASCN to pursue further cooperation so that collaborative policy transfers can
be established. Considering that policy learning is an iterative process, collaborative pol-
icy transfer can mobilise resources (e.g., financial resources, policy capacity) and similar
interests from both a transfer city and a recipient city to collectively find solutions for
the common policy challenges faced. Third, ASCN is primarily driven by government
actors and government-linked corporations in Singapore at the moment, but it is critical to
have a broader involvement of the private sector, academics and researchers, and citizens.
Active involvement of citizens and private sector actors have been identified as enablers
of policy transfer in the literature, while academics and researchers, private sector actors,
and bureaucrats and technocrats are the three key groups of agents for transboundary
policy transfer.
This study offers crucial policy implications for transboundary learning and transfer
in ASCN. Our findings also shed light on the transition from ideology policy transfer to
instrument-based policy transfer and the importance of incorporating local contexts when
the transfer happens. Empirically, this study contributes to the literature on smart cities by
addressing the knowledge gap—the relative lack of understanding of how policy transfer
occurs in the context of smart city development and how transboundary learning occurs in
a regional network like ASEAN that presents diversity in developmental stages, cultural
norms, and economic interests for each country.
Author Contributions: Conceptualisation, A.T.; methodology, S.-Y.T. and A.T.; validation, A.T.;
formal analysis, S.-Y.T. and A.T.; investigation, S.-Y.T. and A.T.; resources, A.T.; data curation, S.-Y.T.
and K.S.; writing and editing S.-Y.T., A.T. and K.S.; supervision, A.T.; project administration, A.T.;
funding acquisition, A.T. All authors read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research is supported by the National Research Foundation, Prime Minister’s Of-
fice, Singapore under its Campus for Research Excellence and Technological Enterprise (CREATE)
programme and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Acknowledgments: Araz Taeihagh is grateful for the support provided by the National Research
Foundation, Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore under its Campus for Research Excellence and
Technological Enterprise (CREATE) programme and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,
National University of Singapore.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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