This is a presentation that I received from David Moosa Pidcock and here I am sharing the same with permission from David. This is an important source for anyone interested in history of wars, nature of political developments and future course of history.
A slideshow presentation using the Korean War to explain the effects of the US policy of Containment on the Cold War.
This slideshow is to be used as part of a direct-instruction lesson, and also includes opportunity for source analysis and discussion.
By the end of this lecture students should be able to:
Understand the elements of deterrence and military coercion
Determine appropriate tools of statecraft for implementing coercive strategies
Assess the complexity of coercion via military means
This is my first lecture on Cold War at National Law University Orissa, Cuttack, India. This lecturer is purely compiled from the web sources just for the use of nluo students. This work is not mine and it shall not be cited.
Major Richard Dick Winters (Band of Brothers)Alif Amirul
Major Richard Davis "Dick" Winters (January 21, 1918 – January 2, 2011) was an officer of the United States Army and a decorated war veteran. He is best known for commanding Easy Company of the 2nd Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, part of the 101st Airborne Division, during World War II, eventually being promoted to major rising to command of the entire 2nd Battalion.
This is a presentation that I received from David Moosa Pidcock and here I am sharing the same with permission from David. This is an important source for anyone interested in history of wars, nature of political developments and future course of history.
A slideshow presentation using the Korean War to explain the effects of the US policy of Containment on the Cold War.
This slideshow is to be used as part of a direct-instruction lesson, and also includes opportunity for source analysis and discussion.
By the end of this lecture students should be able to:
Understand the elements of deterrence and military coercion
Determine appropriate tools of statecraft for implementing coercive strategies
Assess the complexity of coercion via military means
This is my first lecture on Cold War at National Law University Orissa, Cuttack, India. This lecturer is purely compiled from the web sources just for the use of nluo students. This work is not mine and it shall not be cited.
Major Richard Dick Winters (Band of Brothers)Alif Amirul
Major Richard Davis "Dick" Winters (January 21, 1918 – January 2, 2011) was an officer of the United States Army and a decorated war veteran. He is best known for commanding Easy Company of the 2nd Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, part of the 101st Airborne Division, during World War II, eventually being promoted to major rising to command of the entire 2nd Battalion.
2014 EVA/Minerva Jerusalem International Conference on Digitisation of Cultural Heritage
http://2014.minervaisrael.org.il
http://www.digital-heritage.org.il
Lesson 1 Reading Iriye 1) When did WWII begin in Asia .docxcarliotwaycave
Lesson 1
Reading:
Iriye
1) When did WWII begin in Asia?
"WWII began when the Kwantung Army known as Manchuria attacked chines forces in Mukden, which was an important city in Manchuria. This all occurred in September 1931." (Introduction; Akira Iriye, Pg. 3)
2) Who governed the Chinese Republic?
"The Chinese Republic was governed since the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911 by Chiang Kai-shek of the Nationalist party." (Introduction; Akira Iriye, Pg. 4)
3) What was the League of Nations?
The League of Nations was an international organization that existed to promote international cooperation and preserve global peace.The League achieved some success, but it ultimately was unable to prevent WWII. By not imposing sanction japan was able to extend its empire and withdrew from the league of nations.
4) What was a rational for the Japanese government to invade Manchuria?
It was rational for Japan to invade Manchuria, to further expand its empire. Japan also possibly seen this as an opportunity to detach Manchuria from the new formed China proper Nationalist under Chiang Kai-shek. Who had domestic opposition to his rule from the Chinese Communist.They possibly seen this as an opportunity to gain social likeability from the Chinese people.
5) What happened in 1937 between China and Japan?
In 1937 skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese troops a few miles outside of Peipng grew into a full scale conflict. That resulted in bitter relationships between the two country's and escalated confidence within the Chinese Nationalist to
6) What was the so-called "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere?"
7) The “China Problem” had consisted of three issues. What were they?
8) How many proposals Japan submitted to the US in November 1941?
9) How many meetings did Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, summon in November 1941?
10) Who participated in these meetings?
11) According to Usui, what were Japan’s concessions?
12) What was Gotō’s article about?
13) Who was Mohammad Hatta?
14) How did Hatta view WWII?
15) Who was Ahmad Subardjo?
Yoshida
1) Why reading the “acknowledgment” is important?
2) In the 1943 history textbook (pp. 3-4), how was the war and NM described? Whose atrocities were included and excluded?
3) What was the Nanjing government?
4) What does “revisionist” (p. 5) mean?
5) Why Yoshida wrote the book?
6) How does Yoshida define the “Asia-Pacific War”? When did it begin and end?
7) Discuss the views/narratives that challenged the official view of the war with China.
8) What was Living Soldiers? Who wrote it?
9) Who was Yanaihara Tadao?
10) Who was Kaji Wataru?
11) Who was Wellington Koo?
12) What was the so-called Tanaka Memorial?
13) How did the Nationalist gov’t saw NM? How did its view differ from that of the foreign humanitarians in Nanjing?
14) Who was Tilman Durdin? What did he do?
15) Who was Archibald Steele? What did he do?
16) Who was Hino Ashihei? What did he do?
17) Who was Henry Luce?
18) Who.
CHAPTER ONE THE COURSE OF THE WAR On the very day thTawnaDelatorrejs
CHAPTER ONE
THE COURSE OF THE WAR
On the very day that President Barack Obama fielded a student’s question
in Moscow about whether a new Korean War was in the offing (July 7, 2009),
the papers were filled with commentary on the death of Robert Strange
McNamara. The editors of The New York Times and one of its best columnists,
Bob Herbert, condemned McNamara for knowing the Vietnam War was
un-winnable yet sending tens of thousands of young Americans to their deaths
anyway: “How in God’s name did he ever look at himself in the mirror?” Herbert
wrote. They all assumed that the war itself was a colossal error. But if McNamara
had been able to stabilize South Vietnam and divide the country permanently
(say with his “electronic fence”), thousands of our troops would still be there
along a DMZ and evil would still reside in Hanoi. McNamara also had a minor
planning role in the firebombing of Japanese cities in World War II: “What
makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?” he asked; people like
himself and Curtis LeMay, the commander of the air attacks, “were behaving as
war criminals.” McNamara derived these lessons from losing the Vietnam War:
we did not know the enemy, we lacked “empathy” (we should have “put
ourselves inside their skin and look[ed] at us through their eyes,” but we did not);
we were blind prisoners of our own assumptions. 1 In Korea we still are.
Korea is an ancient nation, and one of the very few places in the world
where territorial boundaries, ethnicity, and language have been consistent for
well over a millennium. It sits next to China and was deeply influenced by the
Middle Kingdom, but it has always had an independent civilization. Few
understand this, but the most observant journalist in the war, Reginald Thompson,
put the point exactly: “the thought and law of China is woven into the very
texture of Korea … as the law of Rome is woven into Britain.” The distinction is
between the stereotypical judgment that Korea is just “Little China,” or nothing
more than a transmission belt for Buddhist and Confucian culture flowing into
Japan, and a nation and culture as different from Japan or China as Italy or
France is from Germany.
Korea also had a social structure that persisted for centuries: during the five
hundred years of the last dynasty the vast majority of Koreans were peasants,
most of them tenants working land held by one of the world’s most tenacious
aristocracies. Many were also slaves, a hereditary status from generation to
generation. The state squelched merchant activity, so that commerce, and
anything resembling the green shoots of a middle class, barely developed. This
fundamental condition—a privileged landed class, a mass of peasants, and little
leavening in between—lasted through twentieth-century colonialism, too,
because after their rule began in 1910 the Japanese found it useful to operate
through local landed power. So, amid the crisis of nat ...
CHAPTER ONE THE COURSE OF THE WAR On the very day th.docxjeffsrosalyn
CHAPTER ONE
THE COURSE OF THE WAR
On the very day that President Barack Obama fielded a student’s question
in Moscow about whether a new Korean War was in the offing (July 7, 2009),
the papers were filled with commentary on the death of Robert Strange
McNamara. The editors of The New York Times and one of its best columnists,
Bob Herbert, condemned McNamara for knowing the Vietnam War was
un-winnable yet sending tens of thousands of young Americans to their deaths
anyway: “How in God’s name did he ever look at himself in the mirror?” Herbert
wrote. They all assumed that the war itself was a colossal error. But if McNamara
had been able to stabilize South Vietnam and divide the country permanently
(say with his “electronic fence”), thousands of our troops would still be there
along a DMZ and evil would still reside in Hanoi. McNamara also had a minor
planning role in the firebombing of Japanese cities in World War II: “What
makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?” he asked; people like
himself and Curtis LeMay, the commander of the air attacks, “were behaving as
war criminals.” McNamara derived these lessons from losing the Vietnam War:
we did not know the enemy, we lacked “empathy” (we should have “put
ourselves inside their skin and look[ed] at us through their eyes,” but we did not);
we were blind prisoners of our own assumptions. 1 In Korea we still are.
Korea is an ancient nation, and one of the very few places in the world
where territorial boundaries, ethnicity, and language have been consistent for
well over a millennium. It sits next to China and was deeply influenced by the
Middle Kingdom, but it has always had an independent civilization. Few
understand this, but the most observant journalist in the war, Reginald Thompson,
put the point exactly: “the thought and law of China is woven into the very
texture of Korea … as the law of Rome is woven into Britain.” The distinction is
between the stereotypical judgment that Korea is just “Little China,” or nothing
more than a transmission belt for Buddhist and Confucian culture flowing into
Japan, and a nation and culture as different from Japan or China as Italy or
France is from Germany.
Korea also had a social structure that persisted for centuries: during the five
hundred years of the last dynasty the vast majority of Koreans were peasants,
most of them tenants working land held by one of the world’s most tenacious
aristocracies. Many were also slaves, a hereditary status from generation to
generation. The state squelched merchant activity, so that commerce, and
anything resembling the green shoots of a middle class, barely developed. This
fundamental condition—a privileged landed class, a mass of peasants, and little
leavening in between—lasted through twentieth-century colonialism, too,
because after their rule began in 1910 the Japanese found it useful to operate
through local landed power. So, amid the crisis of nat ...
John Hi, Im John Green. This is Crash Course US History, andTatianaMajor22
John: Hi, I'm John Green. This is Crash Course US History, and today we're going to talk about the
Cold War. The Cold War is called "cold" because it supposedly never heated up into actual armed
conflict. Which means, you know, that it wasn't a war.
Past John: Mr. Green, Mr. Green, but if the war on Christmas is a war and the war on drugs is a
war...
Present John: You're not going to hear me say this often in your life, me from the past, but that was
a good point. At least the Cold War was not an attempt to make war on a noun, which almost never
works, because nouns are so resilient.
And to be fair, the Cold War did involve quite a lot of actual war, from Korea to Afghanistan as the
world's two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, sought ideological and strategic
influence throughout the world. So perhaps it's best to think of the Cold War as an era lasting
roughly from 1945 to 1990.
Discussions of the Cold War tend to center on international and political history, and those are very
important, which is why we've talked about them in the past. This, however, is United States
history, so let us heroically gaze, as Americans so often do, at our own navel.
Stan, why did you turn the globe to the green parts of not-America? I mean I guess to be fair, we
were a little bit obsessed with this guy.
So the Cold War gave us great spy novels, independence movements, an arms race, cool movies,
like "Doctor Strange Love" and "War Games", one of the most evil mustaches in history, but it also
gave us a growing awareness that the greatest existential threat to human beings is ourselves. It
changed the way we imagined the world and humanity's role in it.
In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, William Faulkner famously said, "Our tragedy today is a
general and universal physical fear so long sustained by now that we can even bear it. There are no
longer problems of the spirit. There is only the question: When will I be blown up?" So today we're
going to look at how that came to be the dominant question of human existence and whether we
can ever get past it.
(Intro plays)
So after World War II the US and the USSR were the only two nations with any power left. The
United States was a lot stronger. We had atomic weapons for starters, and also the Soviets had
lost twenty million people in the war, and they were lead by a sociopathic, mustachioed Joseph
Stalin. But the US still had worries, we needed a strong free market oriented Europe and, to a lesser
extent, Asia, so that all the goods we were making could find happy homes.
The Soviets, meanwhile, were concerned with something more immediate, a powerful Germany
invading them, again. Germany, and please do not take this personally Germans, was very, very
slow to learn the central lesson of world history: do not invade Russia, unless you're the Mongols.
[Mongoltage]
So at the end of World War II, the USSR encouraged the creation of pro communist go ...
El Puerto de Algeciras continúa un año más como el más eficiente del continente europeo y vuelve a situarse en el “top ten” mundial, según el informe The Container Port Performance Index 2023 (CPPI), elaborado por el Banco Mundial y la consultora S&P Global.
El informe CPPI utiliza dos enfoques metodológicos diferentes para calcular la clasificación del índice: uno administrativo o técnico y otro estadístico, basado en análisis factorial (FA). Según los autores, esta dualidad pretende asegurar una clasificación que refleje con precisión el rendimiento real del puerto, a la vez que sea estadísticamente sólida. En esta edición del informe CPPI 2023, se han empleado los mismos enfoques metodológicos y se ha aplicado un método de agregación de clasificaciones para combinar los resultados de ambos enfoques y obtener una clasificación agregada.
‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
01062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
03062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
An astonishing, first-of-its-kind, report by the NYT assessing damage in Ukraine. Even if the war ends tomorrow, in many places there will be nothing to go back to.
31052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
4. Whereas the successful prosecution of
the war requires every possible
protection against espionage and
against sabotage to national-defense
material, national-defense premises, and
national-defense utilities...;
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority
vested in me as President of the United
States, and Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and
direct the Secretary of War ... to
prescribe military areas in such places
and of such extent as he or the
appropriate Military Commander may
determine, from which any or all persons
may be excluded, and with respect to
which, the right of any person to enter,
remain in, or leave shall be subject to
whatever restrictions the Secretary of
War or the appropriate Military
Commander may impose in his
discretion.
Executive Order 1099, February 19, 1942
6. Memorandum from J. R. Oppenheimer to Brigadier General Farrell, May 11, 1945
7. 7. Psychological Factors in Target Selection
A. It was agreed that psychological factors in the target selection
were of great importance. Two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the
greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial
use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be
internationally recognized when publicity on it is released.
B. In this respect Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more
highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance
of the weapon. Hiroshima has the advantage of being such a size
and with possible focussing from nearby mountains that a large
fraction of the city may be destroyed. The Emperor's palace in Tokyo
has a greater fame than any other target but is of least strategic
value.
Minutes of the second meeting of the Target Committee, Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945
8. “I told [assistant Secretary of War John McCloy]
that my own opinion was that the time now and the
method to deal with Russia was to keep out mouths
shut and let our actions speak for our words. The
Russians will understand them better than anything
else... I told him this was a place where we really
held all the cards. I called it a royal straight flush
and we mustn't be a fool about the way we play it...
we have coming into action a weapon which will be
unique.”
Diary of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, May 14, 1945
10. Memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, Interim Committee Secretary, to Mr. Harrison, June 6, 1945
11. “Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties
that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. …
An important point about Russian participation on the war is
that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless
Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into
capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in
Japan. ...
General Marshall said that it was his personal view that the
operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue.”
Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945
12. “Admiral Leahy recalled that the President had been interested
in knowing what price the casualties for Kyushu would be...He
pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in
casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of
troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity
of the fighting...that this would give a good estimate of
casualties to be expected.
General Marshal pointed out that the total assault troops for the
Kyushu campaign were shown in the memorandum prepared
for the President as 766,700.”
Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945
13. “...I again gave [Truman] my reasons for eliminating
one of the proposed targets [Kyoto]. ...He was
particularly emphatic in agreeing with my
suggestion that if elimination was not doe, the
bitterness which would be caused...might make it
impossible during the long post-war period to
reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather
than to the Russians.”
Diary of Henry Stimson, July 24, 1945
16. “The strategic plans of our armed forces for the
defeat of Japan...had been prepared without the
reliance on the atomic bomb... I was informed that
such operations might be expected to cost over a
million casualties, to American forces alone...
My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with
the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the
armies which I had helped to raise.”
Henry Stimson, “The Decision to Use the Bomb,” Harper's Magazine, February, 1947
17. Q U E S T IO N S F O R
C O N S ID E R A T IO N
What do you agree with most?
What do you disagree with?
What surprised you?
What historical context contributes to each
viewpoint?
How does this contribute to your understanding of
this event/time period?
Has your perspective of this era or these people
changed?
What ideas are you struggling with? What