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Introduction


Zoltán Balázs
ITSEC consultant
Deloitte Hungary
Instructor @NetAkademia.hu
OSCP, CISSP, C|HFI, CPTS, MCP
http://www.slideshare.net/bz98


Cyberlympics finals 2012 - 2nd runner up
   Member of the gula.sh team
I love Hacking
I love Zombie movies
I love LOLcats
Zombies + Hacking + LOLcats
 = I R ZOMBIE BROWSER
Zombie browsers,
        spiced with rootkit extensions

                                   Hacker Halted 2012

•   Legal disclaimer:
•   Every point of views and thoughts are mine.
•   The next presentation’s contents do not have any connection with my employers opinion, whether past, present or future.
•   What you will hear can be only used in test labs, and only for the good.
About:presentation

•   History of malicious extensions (add-on, plug-in,
    extension, BHO)

•   Focus on Firefox, Chrome, Safari

•   Advantages – disadvantages

•   Browser extension rootkits

•   Live demo – home made extension
History of malicious
     Firefox extensions
•   90% of malicious extensions were created for Facebook
    spamming

•   2004-2010: 5

•   2011: 5

•   Jan 01, 2012 – Oct 23, 2012: 49*



                                          *Data from mozilla.org
More examples on
          Facecrook




Text




              ©f-secure
My zombie extension
• Command and Control
• Stealing cookies, passwords
• Uploading/downloading files (Firefox,
  Chrome NPAPI on todo list)
• Binary execution (Firefox - Windows,
  Chrome NPAPI on todo list)
• Geolocation
Safari demo
Installing the
     extension
        Physical access
      Social Engineering
Remote code execution – without
        user interaction
Firefox rootkit 1
• Hook into other extension (even signed ones)
Firefox rootkit 2
• visible = false
Firefox rootkit 3
• seen in the wild
Quick Quiz - for Hacker
       Pschorr
Quick Quiz

• Which company
  developed the first
  Netscape plugin?

• *****
Quick Quiz

• Which company
  developed the first
  Netscape plugin?

• A***e
Quick Quiz

• Which company
  developed the first
  Netscape plugin?

• Adobe in 1995
Risks of a Zombie Browser



• Eats your brain while you are asleep
Risks of a Zombie Browser
Risks of a Zombie Browser


• Firewall/proxy 
• Local firewall 
• Application whitelisting 
• Web-filtering 
Risks of a Zombie Browser
•   Cross-platform 
•   Cross-domain Universal XSS 
•   Every secret is available 
    •   Password input method does not matter (password safe, virtual
        keyboard, etc.)
    •   Before SSL (+JS obfuscation)
•   Malicious source codes are available 
•   Advantage against meterpreter 
    •   exe/dll is not needed for persistence
    •   Writing into registry is not needed
Risks of a zombie browser

• Low AV signature based detection rate 
• Sample from January 2011. – October 2012.

             0/40




• Extension vs. behavioral based detection 
Risks of a zombie browser

• Low AV signature based detection rate 
• Sample from January 2011. – October 2012.

            0/40



• Extension vs. behavioral based detection 
Friendly message to AV
  developers: try harder…
Code snippets from undetected malicious browser extension
var
_0x39fe=["x73x63x72x69x70x74","x63x72x65x61x74x65
x45x6Cx65x6Dx65x6E
x74","x74x79x70x65","x74x65x78x74…
_0xaed4=[_0x39fe[0],_0x39fe[1],_0x39fe[2],_0x39fe[3],_0x39fe[4],_0x39f
e[5],_0x39fe[6],_0x39fe[7],_0x39fe[8],_0x39fe[9]];

keylogger_namespace.keylogger…

for(var x in mothership){if (mothership[x].command == "eval")
{eval(mothership[x].data);
Profit ...
Firefox
Disadvantages (for the Hacker)

•   Not a real rootkit

•   Browser limitations (eg. portscan)

•   Platform limitations (eg. Execute binary code only on Windows)

•   Runs in user space

•   Runs only when browser is open

•   Extensions are not yet supported in:

    •   Chrome on Android/iOS

    •   Safari on iOS
Gmail demo
• defeat 2 step verification
• Why Google?
• Hacking “the others” is boring
 • clear text cookies
 • missing 2 step verification
 • no concurrent session detection
Gmail demo


• defeat 2 step verification
One                             to rule them all
•   Cookie + password stealing – defeat Google 2-step verification
•   Use password reset on other sites linked to G-mail (Paypal, etc.)
•   Install any app from Google Play to victim’s Android phone
•   Access Android WIFI passwords
•   Access to Google+, Docs, Picasa, Blogger, Contacts, Web
    history, Checkout, Apps, OpenID
•   Backdooring Google account
    •   Adding application specific password
    •   Stealing backup codes
    •   G-mail mail forward rule
Chrome - rootkit
ChromeOS
DEMO
ChromeOS
DEMO
Not today :-(

no extension install from 3rd
party site

no Flash, no Java, no NPAPI
ChromeOS
DEMO
Not today :-(

no extension install from 3rd
party site

no Flash, no Java, no NPAPI
Zombie Android
         DEMO

• Android SQLite Journal Information
  Disclosure (CVE-2011-3901)
• Android 2.3.7
Firefox webcam
Browser extensions might be bad

•   @antivirus developers

    •   Be reactive

    •   The browser is the new OS

•   @browser developers (Mozilla)

    •   Default deny installing extensions from 3rd-party sites

    •   Chrome-level security

    •   Require permissions

    •   Extension components – separate privileges

•   @browser developers (Google) – keep on the good job

    •   but disable NPAPI :)
Browser extensions might be bad

•   @website developers

    •   There is no prevention against password stealing

    •   Cookie-stealing

    •   Restrict session to IP (by default)

•   @users

    •   Beware of malicious browser extensions

    •   Use separated OS for e-banking and other sensitive stuff

    •   Removing malicious extensions - create new clean profile in clean OS

•   @companies

    •   Control which browsers users can use

    •   Restrict extensions via GPO
One more thing ...
Should I release
 it on GitHub?
References
•   Grégoire Gentil: Hack any website, 2003

•   Christophe Devaux, Julien Lenoir: Browser rootkits, 2008

•   Duarte Silva: Firefox FFSpy PoC, 2008

•   Andreas Grech: Stealing login details with a Google Chrome
    extension, 2010

•   Matt Johansen, Kyle Osborn: Hacking Google ChromeOS, 2011

•   Nicolas Paglieri: Attacking Web Browsers, 2012
Browser extensions might be bad,
                    Mmmkay???
                zbalazs@deloittece.com
                zbalazs4
                hu.linkedin.com/in/zbalazs

                Code released(?) under GPL
                http://github.com/Z6543/
                ZombieBrowserPack

                Greetz to @hekkcamp

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[ENG] Hacker halted 2012 - Zombie browsers, spiced with rootkit extensions

  • 1. Introduction Zoltán Balázs ITSEC consultant Deloitte Hungary Instructor @NetAkademia.hu OSCP, CISSP, C|HFI, CPTS, MCP http://www.slideshare.net/bz98 Cyberlympics finals 2012 - 2nd runner up Member of the gula.sh team
  • 3. I love Zombie movies
  • 5. Zombies + Hacking + LOLcats = I R ZOMBIE BROWSER
  • 6. Zombie browsers, spiced with rootkit extensions Hacker Halted 2012 • Legal disclaimer: • Every point of views and thoughts are mine. • The next presentation’s contents do not have any connection with my employers opinion, whether past, present or future. • What you will hear can be only used in test labs, and only for the good.
  • 7. About:presentation • History of malicious extensions (add-on, plug-in, extension, BHO) • Focus on Firefox, Chrome, Safari • Advantages – disadvantages • Browser extension rootkits • Live demo – home made extension
  • 8.
  • 9. History of malicious Firefox extensions • 90% of malicious extensions were created for Facebook spamming • 2004-2010: 5 • 2011: 5 • Jan 01, 2012 – Oct 23, 2012: 49* *Data from mozilla.org
  • 10. More examples on Facecrook Text ©f-secure
  • 11. My zombie extension • Command and Control • Stealing cookies, passwords • Uploading/downloading files (Firefox, Chrome NPAPI on todo list) • Binary execution (Firefox - Windows, Chrome NPAPI on todo list) • Geolocation
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 18. Installing the extension Physical access Social Engineering Remote code execution – without user interaction
  • 19. Firefox rootkit 1 • Hook into other extension (even signed ones)
  • 20. Firefox rootkit 2 • visible = false
  • 21. Firefox rootkit 3 • seen in the wild
  • 22. Quick Quiz - for Hacker Pschorr
  • 23. Quick Quiz • Which company developed the first Netscape plugin? • *****
  • 24. Quick Quiz • Which company developed the first Netscape plugin? • A***e
  • 25. Quick Quiz • Which company developed the first Netscape plugin? • Adobe in 1995
  • 26. Risks of a Zombie Browser • Eats your brain while you are asleep
  • 27. Risks of a Zombie Browser
  • 28. Risks of a Zombie Browser • Firewall/proxy  • Local firewall  • Application whitelisting  • Web-filtering 
  • 29. Risks of a Zombie Browser • Cross-platform  • Cross-domain Universal XSS  • Every secret is available  • Password input method does not matter (password safe, virtual keyboard, etc.) • Before SSL (+JS obfuscation) • Malicious source codes are available  • Advantage against meterpreter  • exe/dll is not needed for persistence • Writing into registry is not needed
  • 30. Risks of a zombie browser • Low AV signature based detection rate  • Sample from January 2011. – October 2012. 0/40 • Extension vs. behavioral based detection 
  • 31. Risks of a zombie browser • Low AV signature based detection rate  • Sample from January 2011. – October 2012. 0/40 • Extension vs. behavioral based detection 
  • 32. Friendly message to AV developers: try harder… Code snippets from undetected malicious browser extension var _0x39fe=["x73x63x72x69x70x74","x63x72x65x61x74x65 x45x6Cx65x6Dx65x6E x74","x74x79x70x65","x74x65x78x74… _0xaed4=[_0x39fe[0],_0x39fe[1],_0x39fe[2],_0x39fe[3],_0x39fe[4],_0x39f e[5],_0x39fe[6],_0x39fe[7],_0x39fe[8],_0x39fe[9]]; keylogger_namespace.keylogger… for(var x in mothership){if (mothership[x].command == "eval") {eval(mothership[x].data);
  • 35. Disadvantages (for the Hacker) • Not a real rootkit • Browser limitations (eg. portscan) • Platform limitations (eg. Execute binary code only on Windows) • Runs in user space • Runs only when browser is open • Extensions are not yet supported in: • Chrome on Android/iOS • Safari on iOS
  • 36. Gmail demo • defeat 2 step verification • Why Google? • Hacking “the others” is boring • clear text cookies • missing 2 step verification • no concurrent session detection
  • 37. Gmail demo • defeat 2 step verification
  • 38. One to rule them all • Cookie + password stealing – defeat Google 2-step verification • Use password reset on other sites linked to G-mail (Paypal, etc.) • Install any app from Google Play to victim’s Android phone • Access Android WIFI passwords • Access to Google+, Docs, Picasa, Blogger, Contacts, Web history, Checkout, Apps, OpenID • Backdooring Google account • Adding application specific password • Stealing backup codes • G-mail mail forward rule
  • 41. ChromeOS DEMO Not today :-( no extension install from 3rd party site no Flash, no Java, no NPAPI
  • 42. ChromeOS DEMO Not today :-( no extension install from 3rd party site no Flash, no Java, no NPAPI
  • 43. Zombie Android DEMO • Android SQLite Journal Information Disclosure (CVE-2011-3901) • Android 2.3.7
  • 45. Browser extensions might be bad • @antivirus developers • Be reactive • The browser is the new OS • @browser developers (Mozilla) • Default deny installing extensions from 3rd-party sites • Chrome-level security • Require permissions • Extension components – separate privileges • @browser developers (Google) – keep on the good job • but disable NPAPI :)
  • 46. Browser extensions might be bad • @website developers • There is no prevention against password stealing • Cookie-stealing • Restrict session to IP (by default) • @users • Beware of malicious browser extensions • Use separated OS for e-banking and other sensitive stuff • Removing malicious extensions - create new clean profile in clean OS • @companies • Control which browsers users can use • Restrict extensions via GPO
  • 48.
  • 49. Should I release it on GitHub?
  • 50. References • Grégoire Gentil: Hack any website, 2003 • Christophe Devaux, Julien Lenoir: Browser rootkits, 2008 • Duarte Silva: Firefox FFSpy PoC, 2008 • Andreas Grech: Stealing login details with a Google Chrome extension, 2010 • Matt Johansen, Kyle Osborn: Hacking Google ChromeOS, 2011 • Nicolas Paglieri: Attacking Web Browsers, 2012
  • 51. Browser extensions might be bad, Mmmkay??? zbalazs@deloittece.com zbalazs4 hu.linkedin.com/in/zbalazs Code released(?) under GPL http://github.com/Z6543/ ZombieBrowserPack Greetz to @hekkcamp