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Introduction


Zoltán Balázs
ITSEC consultant

Deloitte Hungary
Instructor @NetAkademia.hu
OSCP, CISSP, C|HFI, CPTS, MCP
http://www.slideshare.net/bz98



Cyberlympics finals 2012 - 2nd runner up
I love Hacking
I love Zombie movies
I love LOLcats
Zombies + Hacking +
LOLcats = I R ZOMBIE
Zombie browsers,
         spiced with rootkit extensions


                                       DefCamp 2012

•   Legal disclaimer:

•   Every point of views and thoughts are mine.

•   The next presentation’s contents do not have any connection with my employers opinion, whether past, present or future.

•   What you will hear can be only used in test labs, and only for the good.
About:presentation

• History of malicious extensions (add-on, plug-in,
   extension, BHO)

• Focus on Firefox, Chrome, Safari
• Advantages – disadvantages
• Browser extension rootkits
• Live demo – home made extension
History of malicious
     Firefox extensions

• 90% of malicious extensions were created for
   Facebook spamming

• 2004-2010: 5
• 2011: 5
• Jan 01, 2012 – Oct 23, 2012: 49*

                                     *Data from mozilla.org
More examples
       on Facecrook




Text




             ©f-secure
My zombie extension
• Command and Control
• Stealing cookies, passwords
• Uploading/downloading files (Firefox,
  Chrome NPAPI on todo list)

• Binary execution (Firefox - Windows, Chrome
  NPAPI on todo list)

• Geolocation
Safari demo
Installing the
  extension
    Physical access
  Social Engineering
Remote code execution –
without user interaction
Firefox rootkit 1
• Hook into other extension (even signed ones)
Firefox rootkit 2
•visible = false
Firefox rootkit 3
•seen in the wild
Risks of a Zombie Browser




•Eats your brain while you are asleep
Risks of a Zombie Browser
Risks of a Zombie Browser


•Firewall/proxy 
•Local firewall 
•Application whitelisting 
•Web-filtering 
Risks of a Zombie Browser
•   Cross-platform 

•   Cross-domain Universal XSS 

•   Every secret is available 

    •   Password input method does not matter (password
        safe, virtual keyboard, etc.)

    •   Before SSL (+JS obfuscation)

•   Malicious source codes are available 

•   Advantage against meterpreter 

    •   exe/dll is not needed for persistence
Risks of a zombie browser

• Low AV signature based detection rate 
• Sample from January 2011. – October 2012.


             0/40




• Extension vs. behavioral based detection 
Risks of a zombie browser

• Low AV signature based detection rate 
• Sample from January 2011. – October 2012.


            0/40



• Extension vs. behavioral based detection 
Friendly message to AV
developers: try harder…
Code snippets from undetected malicious browser
extension
var
_0x39fe=["x73x63x72x69x70x74","x63x72x65x61x7
4x65x45x6Cx65x6Dx65x6E
x74","x74x79x70x65","x74x65x78x74…
_0xaed4=[_0x39fe[0],_0x39fe[1],_0x39fe[2],_0x39fe[3],_0x39fe[4],
_0x39fe[5],_0x39fe[6],_0x39fe[7],_0x39fe[8],_0x39fe[9]];

keylogger_namespace.keylogger…

for(var x in mothership){if (mothership[x].command == "eval")
Profit ...
Firefox
Disadvantages (for the
              Hacker)
•   Not a real rootkit

•   Browser limitations (eg. portscan)

•   Platform limitations (eg. Execute binary code only on Windows)

•   Runs in user space

•   Runs only when browser is open

•   Extensions are not yet supported in:

    •   Chrome on Android/iOS

    •   Safari on iOS
Gmail demo
• defeat 2 step verification
• Why Google?
• Hacking “the others” is boring
 • clear text cookies
 • missing 2 step verification
 • no concurrent session detection
Gmail demo


•defeat 2 step verification
One                         to rule them all
•   Cookie + password stealing – defeat Google 2-step verification

•   Use password reset on other sites linked to G-mail (Paypal, etc.)

•   Install any app from Google Play to victim’s Android phone

•   Access Android WIFI passwords

•   Access to Google+, Docs, Picasa, Blogger, Contacts, Web history,
    Checkout, Apps, OpenID

•   Backdooring Google account

    •   Adding application specific password

    •   Stealing backup codes

    •   G-mail mail forward rule
Chrome - rootkit
Chrome - distributed
 password hash cracking
• Idea and coding by my friend and colleague, WoFF
• Password hash cracking performance
 • Javascript: 82,000 hash/sec
 • Chrome native client: 840,000 hash/sec
 • Native code (john): 11,400,000 hash/sec
Zombie Android


•Android SQLite Journal Information
  Disclosure (CVE-2011-3901)

•Android 2.3.7
Firefox webcam
Browser extensions might be bad

•   @antivirus developers

    •   Be reactive

    •   The browser is the new OS

•   @browser developers (Mozilla)

    •   Default deny installing extensions from 3rd-party sites

    •   Chrome-level security

    •   Require permissions

    •   Extension components – separate privileges

•   @browser developers (Google) – keep on the good job

    •   but disable NPAPI :)
Browser extensions might be bad

•   @website developers

    •   There is no prevention against password stealing

    •   Cookie-stealing

    •   Restrict session to IP (by default)

•   @users

    •   Beware of malicious browser extensions

    •   Use separated OS for e-banking and other sensitive stuff

    •   Removing malicious extensions - create new clean profile in clean OS

•   @companies

    •   Control which browsers users can use

    •   Restrict extensions via GPO
One more thing ...
References
•   Grégoire Gentil: Hack any website, 2003

•   Christophe Devaux, Julien Lenoir: Browser rootkits, 2008

•   Duarte Silva: Firefox FFSpy PoC, 2008

•   Andreas Grech: Stealing login details with a Google
    Chrome extension, 2010

•   Matt Johansen, Kyle Osborn: Hacking Google ChromeOS,
    2011

•   Nicolas Paglieri: Attacking Web Browsers, 2012
Browser extensions might be bad,
                   Mmmkay???
                 zbalazs@deloittece.com
                 zbalazs4
                 hu.linkedin.com/in/zbalazs

                 Code released under GPL
                 http://github.com/Z6543/
                 ZombieBrowserPack

                 Greetz to @hekkcamp

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Zombie browsers spiced with rootkit extensions - DefCamp 2012

  • 1. Introduction Zoltán Balázs ITSEC consultant Deloitte Hungary Instructor @NetAkademia.hu OSCP, CISSP, C|HFI, CPTS, MCP http://www.slideshare.net/bz98 Cyberlympics finals 2012 - 2nd runner up
  • 3. I love Zombie movies
  • 5. Zombies + Hacking + LOLcats = I R ZOMBIE
  • 6. Zombie browsers, spiced with rootkit extensions DefCamp 2012 • Legal disclaimer: • Every point of views and thoughts are mine. • The next presentation’s contents do not have any connection with my employers opinion, whether past, present or future. • What you will hear can be only used in test labs, and only for the good.
  • 7. About:presentation • History of malicious extensions (add-on, plug-in, extension, BHO) • Focus on Firefox, Chrome, Safari • Advantages – disadvantages • Browser extension rootkits • Live demo – home made extension
  • 8.
  • 9. History of malicious Firefox extensions • 90% of malicious extensions were created for Facebook spamming • 2004-2010: 5 • 2011: 5 • Jan 01, 2012 – Oct 23, 2012: 49* *Data from mozilla.org
  • 10. More examples on Facecrook Text ©f-secure
  • 11. My zombie extension • Command and Control • Stealing cookies, passwords • Uploading/downloading files (Firefox, Chrome NPAPI on todo list) • Binary execution (Firefox - Windows, Chrome NPAPI on todo list) • Geolocation
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 18. Installing the extension Physical access Social Engineering Remote code execution – without user interaction
  • 19. Firefox rootkit 1 • Hook into other extension (even signed ones)
  • 22. Risks of a Zombie Browser •Eats your brain while you are asleep
  • 23. Risks of a Zombie Browser
  • 24. Risks of a Zombie Browser •Firewall/proxy  •Local firewall  •Application whitelisting  •Web-filtering 
  • 25. Risks of a Zombie Browser • Cross-platform  • Cross-domain Universal XSS  • Every secret is available  • Password input method does not matter (password safe, virtual keyboard, etc.) • Before SSL (+JS obfuscation) • Malicious source codes are available  • Advantage against meterpreter  • exe/dll is not needed for persistence
  • 26. Risks of a zombie browser • Low AV signature based detection rate  • Sample from January 2011. – October 2012. 0/40 • Extension vs. behavioral based detection 
  • 27. Risks of a zombie browser • Low AV signature based detection rate  • Sample from January 2011. – October 2012. 0/40 • Extension vs. behavioral based detection 
  • 28. Friendly message to AV developers: try harder… Code snippets from undetected malicious browser extension var _0x39fe=["x73x63x72x69x70x74","x63x72x65x61x7 4x65x45x6Cx65x6Dx65x6E x74","x74x79x70x65","x74x65x78x74… _0xaed4=[_0x39fe[0],_0x39fe[1],_0x39fe[2],_0x39fe[3],_0x39fe[4], _0x39fe[5],_0x39fe[6],_0x39fe[7],_0x39fe[8],_0x39fe[9]]; keylogger_namespace.keylogger… for(var x in mothership){if (mothership[x].command == "eval")
  • 31. Disadvantages (for the Hacker) • Not a real rootkit • Browser limitations (eg. portscan) • Platform limitations (eg. Execute binary code only on Windows) • Runs in user space • Runs only when browser is open • Extensions are not yet supported in: • Chrome on Android/iOS • Safari on iOS
  • 32. Gmail demo • defeat 2 step verification • Why Google? • Hacking “the others” is boring • clear text cookies • missing 2 step verification • no concurrent session detection
  • 33. Gmail demo •defeat 2 step verification
  • 34. One to rule them all • Cookie + password stealing – defeat Google 2-step verification • Use password reset on other sites linked to G-mail (Paypal, etc.) • Install any app from Google Play to victim’s Android phone • Access Android WIFI passwords • Access to Google+, Docs, Picasa, Blogger, Contacts, Web history, Checkout, Apps, OpenID • Backdooring Google account • Adding application specific password • Stealing backup codes • G-mail mail forward rule
  • 36. Chrome - distributed password hash cracking • Idea and coding by my friend and colleague, WoFF • Password hash cracking performance • Javascript: 82,000 hash/sec • Chrome native client: 840,000 hash/sec • Native code (john): 11,400,000 hash/sec
  • 37. Zombie Android •Android SQLite Journal Information Disclosure (CVE-2011-3901) •Android 2.3.7
  • 38.
  • 40. Browser extensions might be bad • @antivirus developers • Be reactive • The browser is the new OS • @browser developers (Mozilla) • Default deny installing extensions from 3rd-party sites • Chrome-level security • Require permissions • Extension components – separate privileges • @browser developers (Google) – keep on the good job • but disable NPAPI :)
  • 41. Browser extensions might be bad • @website developers • There is no prevention against password stealing • Cookie-stealing • Restrict session to IP (by default) • @users • Beware of malicious browser extensions • Use separated OS for e-banking and other sensitive stuff • Removing malicious extensions - create new clean profile in clean OS • @companies • Control which browsers users can use • Restrict extensions via GPO
  • 43.
  • 44. References • Grégoire Gentil: Hack any website, 2003 • Christophe Devaux, Julien Lenoir: Browser rootkits, 2008 • Duarte Silva: Firefox FFSpy PoC, 2008 • Andreas Grech: Stealing login details with a Google Chrome extension, 2010 • Matt Johansen, Kyle Osborn: Hacking Google ChromeOS, 2011 • Nicolas Paglieri: Attacking Web Browsers, 2012
  • 45. Browser extensions might be bad, Mmmkay??? zbalazs@deloittece.com zbalazs4 hu.linkedin.com/in/zbalazs Code released under GPL http://github.com/Z6543/ ZombieBrowserPack Greetz to @hekkcamp