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Machine Learning Security
Evasion Competition 2020
Hyrum Anderson - @drhyrum and Zoltan Balazs -
@zh4ck
Whoami
@zh4ck
Head of Vulnerability Research Lab @ CUJO AI
Zombie Browser Toolkit
• https://github.com/Z6543/ZombieBrowserPack
HWFW Bypass tool
• Similar stuff was used in PacketRedirect in Danderspritz FlewAvenue by EQGRP
• https://github.com/Z6543/hwfwbypass
Malware Analysis Sandbox Tester tool
• https://github.com/Z6543/Sandbox_tester
Played with crappy IoT devices – my RCE exploit code running on ~600 000 IP cameras via Persirai
• https://jumpespjump.blogspot.hu/2015/09/how-i-hacked-my-ip-camera-and-found.html
• https://jumpespjump.blogspot.hu/2015/08/how-to-secure-your-home-against.html
Invented the idea of encrypted exploit delivery via Diffie-Hellman key exchange, to bypass exploit detection
appliances
• https://www.mrg-effitas.com/generic-bypass-of-next-gen-intrusion-threat-breach-detection-systems/
Co-organizer of the Hackersuli meetup
Programme committee member of the Hacktivity conference
Whoami
@drhyrum
architect, Azure Trustworhy Machine Learning @ Microsoft
• ML security as a 1st class, practical security concern
cofounder and co-chair, CAMLIS https://camlis.org/
background
• (1st) signal processing, machine learning
• (2nd) information security
relevant research
• Reinforcement learning AV evasion:
• https://github.com/endgameinc/gym-malware
• Co-creator of EMBER 2017 and 2018 datasets:
• https://github.com/endgameinc/ember
https://skylightcyber.com/2019/07/18/cylance-i-kill-you/
ML detection bypass in the past
Super l33t ML malware detection bypass from 2019
• strings RocketLeague.exe >> mimikatz.exe
Super l33t ML malware detection bypass from 2016
• upx.exe
evademalwareml.io 2019
Purpose: advance the field of offensive and defensive ML-based malware detection
Step 1: Download 50 working malware samples
Step 2: Download 3 ML model with weights (white-box attack)
Step 3: Modify the malware samples to evade detection by all models
Step 4: PROFIT! Award: Nvidia Titan RTX
evademalwareml.io 2019
Outcomes
~70 people registered
11 contestant able to bypass at least one ML model
Winner: 2019 August 28, 15:25 UTC William Fleshman
• Will's writeup: https://towardsdatascience.com/evading-machine-learning-malware-classifiers-
ce52dabdb713
Writeups from other competitive teams
• Jakub Debski https://www.eset.com/blog/company/evading-machine-learning-detection-in-a-
cyber-secure-world/
• Fabricio Ceschin et al., https://secret.inf.ufpr.br/papers/roots_shallow.pdf
evademalwareml.io 2019
Approaches used
Packing the samples with a packer
• nice, but if the sample is already
packed, chances are it will not work
• this is partially a competition-specific
issue, if you write your own malware,
you can create your own packer which
can bypass ML detection
This image was designed by Ange Albertini https://corkami.blogspot.com
evademalwareml.io 2019
Approaches used
Adding new sections to the executable
• even better if these sections are from known benign files, e.g. resources from MS files
• works most of the time, but can break malware
• some malware/packer has self-checks, and adding new sections can break this
• just by adding a new section – you can bypass some AV (out of scope)
• fun fact: some AV uses shortcuts for signature-based detection like if section==X check this. Improves performance,
easy to bypass.
evademalwareml.io 2019
Approaches used
Appending extra data to the executable, a.k.a overlay
• actually, this was the winner strategy …
• dumb, plain, simple, and it works
• it works if you have the ML models and weights, a.k.a white-box attack
• this overlay technique will not bypass static signature AV checks (out of scope)
• except when the AV has a rule that Filesize less than X …
• yes, this still happens
cat overlay >> malware.exe
Overlay 
evademalwareml.io 2019
Some key takeaways
malconv and non neg malconv is too academic
• but not effective in practice
LIEF is awesome https://github.com/lief-project/LIEF
Malware is tricky
• some samples do not reproduce the same IoCs over time
• mainly because of C&C down
• packed and protected samples are hard to deal with
evademalwareml.io 2019
Fun with SSDeep
SSDeep
is a program for computing context triggered piecewise hashes (CTPH). Also called fuzzy hashes,
CTPH can match inputs that have homologies. Such inputs have sequences of identical bytes in
the same order, although bytes in between these sequences may be different in both content and
length.
6144:9dA3OOLEQ5dIZHlxBM/lxBM/lxBM/lxBMe:9u3O+EQ5dIrMpMpMpMe
49152:lOctKPaSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS:c2O
12288:I8Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88MrZ:Ilr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lrZ
49152:IOctnPjppprOctnPjppprOctnPjppprOctnPjppprOctnPjppprOctnPjppp:J2P02P02P02P02P02P
mlsec.io 2020
DEFENDER CHALLENGE
• Create your own ML model and submit to the competition
• Docker All The Things
ATTACKER CHALLENGE
• Black-box attack against submitted defences
• Source code provided for only the ember model
Sponsors and partners
• Microsoft, CUJO AI, VMRay, MRG Effitas
Main organizer people remained the same 
Win Azure credits for your take over the world ML research plans
mlsec.io 2020
Defensive track
Two submissions that passed minimum
requirements
Look for the following ML models in your
offensive track
• ember [default model for which there is
code]
• needforspeed
• domumpqb
mlsec.io 2020
Offensive track - Aug 06 – Sep 18, 2020
AoE
Malware families
• Remcos
• Lokibot
• Raccoon
• Netwire
• Hawkeye
• Azorult
• Amadey
• Agent Tesla
• Ursnif
• Trickbot
• Sodinokibi
• njRAT
• Nanocore
• Maze
• Masslogger
• Gh0st RAT
• Dharma
• AsyncRat
• Zeppelin Ransomware
• VHD Ransomware
• Qbot
• Paymen45 ransomware
• Formbook
• Citadel
• Ave Maria
MLSEC 2020 attacker flowchart
1. register at https://mlsec.io
2. review terms of service
3. download 50 provided malware samples
4. <your secret sauce to modify samples>
5. verify malware functionality (Windows 10 x64)
6. Optional: Use the API!
7. upload ZIP; partial uploads ok (upload rate limiting)
8. up to 3 points for each sample (# of evade models)
9. highest score wins
10. to win, your solution must be published (e.g., blog)
Mind the sample names
Filenames in downloaded ZIP
001
002
003
…
050
Filenames in uploaded ZIP
001
002
003
…
050
tips!
You might consider some of these manipulations
• add / remove signature
• change section names/properties
• modify imports/exports
• create TLS callback
• change PE header
• fix/change checksum
• add/modify/remove version info
• new entry point that redirects
• change code/data (no-ops)
tips!
Not allowed / won’t function:
• Droppers
Multiple registration is against the rules and will result in immediate disqualification
Join the Slack channel!
https://join.slack.com/t/evademalwareml/shared_invite/zt-9birv1qf-KJFEiyLLRVtrsNDuyA0clA
mlsec.io 2020
About the frontends and backends
Python – Flask Admin for GUI
Cloudflare, Nginx, Gunicorn for scalability and
performance
Python backend scripts scheduled by CRON
VMRay sandbox
mlsec.io 2020 API
1. Submit sample to all ML model
curl -X POST https://api.mlsec.io/api/ml_submit_sample_all?api_token=<API_KEY> --data-binary @001
2. Submit sample to specific ML model
curl -X POST https://api.mlsec.io/api/ml_submit_sample?api_token=<API_KEY>&model=ember --data-binary @001
3. Get ML model results
curl -X GET https://api.mlsec.io/api/ml_get_sample?api_token=<API_KEY>&jobid=<JOB_ID>
4. Upload ZIP
curl -X POST https://api.mlsec.io/api/post_one_zip/new/?url=%2Fzipfile%2F&api_token=<API_KEY> --form "name=name" --form
path=@my.zip
5. Query specific ZIP status
curl -X GET https://api.mlsec.io/api/get_one_zip/<ID>?api_token=<API_KEY>
6. Query all sample status
curl -X GET https://api.mlsec.io/api/get_all_sample/?api_token=<API_KEY>
7. Query specific sample status
curl -X GET https://api.mlsec.io/api/get_one_sample/<ID>?api_token=<API_KEY>
The Winners of 2020
Winner of attacker track - Fabrício Ceschin and Marcus Botacin
https://secret.inf.ufpr.br/2020/09/29/adversarial-malware-in-machine-learning-detectors-our-mlsec-2020-secrets/
Defender track winner in white paper format - Erwin Quiring, Lukas Pirch, Michael Reimsbach, Daniel Arp, Konrad
Rieck
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.09569.pdf
Defender track second place in white paper format - Fabrício Ceschin and Marcus Botacin
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8636415
Attacker track, second place – Wunderwuzzi a.k.a Johann Rehberger
https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/microsoft-machine-learning-security-evasion-competition/
Winners and stats
Attacker Winner: XOR crypter/Base64 obfuscation + lot of dead imports to
the import table
Defender Winner:
In total, ~60 people registered for the competition.
2 people submitted a valid Docker image with a working ML-based malware
detection inside.
5 people were able to bypass at least a single ML model while preserving
the malware functionality.
The ML engines checked samples 5,654 times in total.
Real life AV/ML evasion
If you are interested in how these
techniques works in REAL LIFE
https://cujo.com/machine-learning-
security-evasion-competition-
2020-results-and-behind-the-
scenes/
Thank You
Hyrum Anderson - @drhyrum and Zoltan Balazs - @zh4ck
See you at HITB's Discord channel for
questions & answers!

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Machine Learning Security Evasion Competition 2020 Recap

  • 1. Machine Learning Security Evasion Competition 2020 Hyrum Anderson - @drhyrum and Zoltan Balazs - @zh4ck
  • 2. Whoami @zh4ck Head of Vulnerability Research Lab @ CUJO AI Zombie Browser Toolkit • https://github.com/Z6543/ZombieBrowserPack HWFW Bypass tool • Similar stuff was used in PacketRedirect in Danderspritz FlewAvenue by EQGRP • https://github.com/Z6543/hwfwbypass Malware Analysis Sandbox Tester tool • https://github.com/Z6543/Sandbox_tester Played with crappy IoT devices – my RCE exploit code running on ~600 000 IP cameras via Persirai • https://jumpespjump.blogspot.hu/2015/09/how-i-hacked-my-ip-camera-and-found.html • https://jumpespjump.blogspot.hu/2015/08/how-to-secure-your-home-against.html Invented the idea of encrypted exploit delivery via Diffie-Hellman key exchange, to bypass exploit detection appliances • https://www.mrg-effitas.com/generic-bypass-of-next-gen-intrusion-threat-breach-detection-systems/ Co-organizer of the Hackersuli meetup Programme committee member of the Hacktivity conference
  • 3. Whoami @drhyrum architect, Azure Trustworhy Machine Learning @ Microsoft • ML security as a 1st class, practical security concern cofounder and co-chair, CAMLIS https://camlis.org/ background • (1st) signal processing, machine learning • (2nd) information security relevant research • Reinforcement learning AV evasion: • https://github.com/endgameinc/gym-malware • Co-creator of EMBER 2017 and 2018 datasets: • https://github.com/endgameinc/ember
  • 4. https://skylightcyber.com/2019/07/18/cylance-i-kill-you/ ML detection bypass in the past Super l33t ML malware detection bypass from 2019 • strings RocketLeague.exe >> mimikatz.exe Super l33t ML malware detection bypass from 2016 • upx.exe
  • 5. evademalwareml.io 2019 Purpose: advance the field of offensive and defensive ML-based malware detection Step 1: Download 50 working malware samples Step 2: Download 3 ML model with weights (white-box attack) Step 3: Modify the malware samples to evade detection by all models Step 4: PROFIT! Award: Nvidia Titan RTX
  • 6. evademalwareml.io 2019 Outcomes ~70 people registered 11 contestant able to bypass at least one ML model Winner: 2019 August 28, 15:25 UTC William Fleshman • Will's writeup: https://towardsdatascience.com/evading-machine-learning-malware-classifiers- ce52dabdb713 Writeups from other competitive teams • Jakub Debski https://www.eset.com/blog/company/evading-machine-learning-detection-in-a- cyber-secure-world/ • Fabricio Ceschin et al., https://secret.inf.ufpr.br/papers/roots_shallow.pdf
  • 7. evademalwareml.io 2019 Approaches used Packing the samples with a packer • nice, but if the sample is already packed, chances are it will not work • this is partially a competition-specific issue, if you write your own malware, you can create your own packer which can bypass ML detection This image was designed by Ange Albertini https://corkami.blogspot.com
  • 8. evademalwareml.io 2019 Approaches used Adding new sections to the executable • even better if these sections are from known benign files, e.g. resources from MS files • works most of the time, but can break malware • some malware/packer has self-checks, and adding new sections can break this • just by adding a new section – you can bypass some AV (out of scope) • fun fact: some AV uses shortcuts for signature-based detection like if section==X check this. Improves performance, easy to bypass.
  • 9. evademalwareml.io 2019 Approaches used Appending extra data to the executable, a.k.a overlay • actually, this was the winner strategy … • dumb, plain, simple, and it works • it works if you have the ML models and weights, a.k.a white-box attack • this overlay technique will not bypass static signature AV checks (out of scope) • except when the AV has a rule that Filesize less than X … • yes, this still happens cat overlay >> malware.exe Overlay 
  • 10. evademalwareml.io 2019 Some key takeaways malconv and non neg malconv is too academic • but not effective in practice LIEF is awesome https://github.com/lief-project/LIEF Malware is tricky • some samples do not reproduce the same IoCs over time • mainly because of C&C down • packed and protected samples are hard to deal with
  • 11. evademalwareml.io 2019 Fun with SSDeep SSDeep is a program for computing context triggered piecewise hashes (CTPH). Also called fuzzy hashes, CTPH can match inputs that have homologies. Such inputs have sequences of identical bytes in the same order, although bytes in between these sequences may be different in both content and length. 6144:9dA3OOLEQ5dIZHlxBM/lxBM/lxBM/lxBMe:9u3O+EQ5dIrMpMpMpMe 49152:lOctKPaSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS:c2O 12288:I8Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88Mr88MrZ:Ilr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lr8lrZ 49152:IOctnPjppprOctnPjppprOctnPjppprOctnPjppprOctnPjppprOctnPjppp:J2P02P02P02P02P02P
  • 12. mlsec.io 2020 DEFENDER CHALLENGE • Create your own ML model and submit to the competition • Docker All The Things ATTACKER CHALLENGE • Black-box attack against submitted defences • Source code provided for only the ember model Sponsors and partners • Microsoft, CUJO AI, VMRay, MRG Effitas Main organizer people remained the same  Win Azure credits for your take over the world ML research plans
  • 13. mlsec.io 2020 Defensive track Two submissions that passed minimum requirements Look for the following ML models in your offensive track • ember [default model for which there is code] • needforspeed • domumpqb
  • 14. mlsec.io 2020 Offensive track - Aug 06 – Sep 18, 2020 AoE Malware families • Remcos • Lokibot • Raccoon • Netwire • Hawkeye • Azorult • Amadey • Agent Tesla • Ursnif • Trickbot • Sodinokibi • njRAT • Nanocore • Maze • Masslogger • Gh0st RAT • Dharma • AsyncRat • Zeppelin Ransomware • VHD Ransomware • Qbot • Paymen45 ransomware • Formbook • Citadel • Ave Maria
  • 15. MLSEC 2020 attacker flowchart 1. register at https://mlsec.io 2. review terms of service 3. download 50 provided malware samples 4. <your secret sauce to modify samples> 5. verify malware functionality (Windows 10 x64) 6. Optional: Use the API! 7. upload ZIP; partial uploads ok (upload rate limiting) 8. up to 3 points for each sample (# of evade models) 9. highest score wins 10. to win, your solution must be published (e.g., blog)
  • 16. Mind the sample names Filenames in downloaded ZIP 001 002 003 … 050 Filenames in uploaded ZIP 001 002 003 … 050
  • 17. tips! You might consider some of these manipulations • add / remove signature • change section names/properties • modify imports/exports • create TLS callback • change PE header • fix/change checksum • add/modify/remove version info • new entry point that redirects • change code/data (no-ops)
  • 18. tips! Not allowed / won’t function: • Droppers Multiple registration is against the rules and will result in immediate disqualification Join the Slack channel! https://join.slack.com/t/evademalwareml/shared_invite/zt-9birv1qf-KJFEiyLLRVtrsNDuyA0clA
  • 19. mlsec.io 2020 About the frontends and backends Python – Flask Admin for GUI Cloudflare, Nginx, Gunicorn for scalability and performance Python backend scripts scheduled by CRON VMRay sandbox
  • 20. mlsec.io 2020 API 1. Submit sample to all ML model curl -X POST https://api.mlsec.io/api/ml_submit_sample_all?api_token=<API_KEY> --data-binary @001 2. Submit sample to specific ML model curl -X POST https://api.mlsec.io/api/ml_submit_sample?api_token=<API_KEY>&model=ember --data-binary @001 3. Get ML model results curl -X GET https://api.mlsec.io/api/ml_get_sample?api_token=<API_KEY>&jobid=<JOB_ID> 4. Upload ZIP curl -X POST https://api.mlsec.io/api/post_one_zip/new/?url=%2Fzipfile%2F&api_token=<API_KEY> --form "name=name" --form path=@my.zip 5. Query specific ZIP status curl -X GET https://api.mlsec.io/api/get_one_zip/<ID>?api_token=<API_KEY> 6. Query all sample status curl -X GET https://api.mlsec.io/api/get_all_sample/?api_token=<API_KEY> 7. Query specific sample status curl -X GET https://api.mlsec.io/api/get_one_sample/<ID>?api_token=<API_KEY>
  • 21. The Winners of 2020 Winner of attacker track - Fabrício Ceschin and Marcus Botacin https://secret.inf.ufpr.br/2020/09/29/adversarial-malware-in-machine-learning-detectors-our-mlsec-2020-secrets/ Defender track winner in white paper format - Erwin Quiring, Lukas Pirch, Michael Reimsbach, Daniel Arp, Konrad Rieck https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.09569.pdf Defender track second place in white paper format - Fabrício Ceschin and Marcus Botacin https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8636415 Attacker track, second place – Wunderwuzzi a.k.a Johann Rehberger https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/microsoft-machine-learning-security-evasion-competition/
  • 22. Winners and stats Attacker Winner: XOR crypter/Base64 obfuscation + lot of dead imports to the import table Defender Winner: In total, ~60 people registered for the competition. 2 people submitted a valid Docker image with a working ML-based malware detection inside. 5 people were able to bypass at least a single ML model while preserving the malware functionality. The ML engines checked samples 5,654 times in total.
  • 23. Real life AV/ML evasion If you are interested in how these techniques works in REAL LIFE https://cujo.com/machine-learning- security-evasion-competition- 2020-results-and-behind-the- scenes/
  • 24. Thank You Hyrum Anderson - @drhyrum and Zoltan Balazs - @zh4ck See you at HITB's Discord channel for questions & answers!