SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Future-proofing Maritime Ports against
Emerging Cyber-Physical Threats
Steven Sim
PSA Corporation Ltd
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
official policy or position of any organisation
PSA Singapore
World’s Busiest Transhipment Hub
30.59M
TEUs
handled in
2016
85%
of containers
handled are
transhipment
5%
of global
container
throughput
Connecting to 600 ports in 123 countries with daily sailings
Container Port 4.0
Source: Port.Today
Source: Straits Times
$1,050.00bn
$591.81bn
$586.54bn
$464.75bn
$432.01bn
$414.14bn
$294.15bn
$179.96bn
$98.20bn
Market crash
Human pandemic
Wind storm
Earthquake
Flood
Oil price shock
Cyber attack
Sovereign default
Terrorism
Cyber attack presents a
greater risk to economic
performance than
terrorism and sovereign
default combined
Source: Lloyd’s City Risk Index 2015-2025
Maritime Cybersecurity Threat Landscape
Maritime cyber threats are set to significantly
increaseNation states and sophisticated cybercriminals pose the greatest cyber threat to the maritime sector, using tactics that
can have a significant impact on their targets.
Levels of threats to the maritime industry
Low impact
Distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks and website
defacements.
Very low impact
Social media campaigns and
critical online chatter.
Medium
Interceptin
low-value d
email addr
passwords.
High impact
The threat actor can intercept
sensitive information, such as
confidential documents.
Very high impact
The threat actor can deploy and
utilise sophisticated malware to
target critical infrastructure, such
as databases or SCADA systems,
which are routinely used on ships.
Source: ControlRisks Cyber Security Academy
What are Cyber-Physical Threats?
• Threats that are targeted at Cyber-Physical Systems.
• Threats that uses blended Cyber and Physical attacks.
Threats that are targeted at
Cyber-Physical Systems
Industrialization 4.0
Source: Straits Times
What are Cyber Physical Systems (CPS)
• A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a system comprising of collaborating
elements that control physical entities, generally using feedback from
sensors they monitor. Typically tight controlled or monitored, integrated
with users.
• In the broad sense, OT (Operations Technology), ICS (Industrial Control
Systems) and SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
systems, IoT (Internet of Things) and IIoT (Industrial Internet of Things).
• Examples of CPS include smart grid, autonomous automobile systems,
process control systems, robotic systems, medical monitoring and
automatic pilot avionics.
Source: ScienceDirect, Wikipedia
CPS
Architecture
Source: Big future for cyber-physical
manufacturing systems by Design
World Sep 2015
Source:
BusinessWire
Source:
Tripwire
OT/ICS/SCADA Security Pains
1. Insecurity by design
2. Patches slow, may not be certified
3. Weak HMI security
4. Half-baked TCP/IP stacks
5. Insecure industrial protocols
6. Developer backdoors
Source: Belden
Stuxnet
Source - Chappatte/International Herald Tribune
First
worm
that
attacked
industrial
plants
Penetration testing of an AGV product
Source: Straits Times
Developer backdoors identified
WannaCry and NotPetya
Windows HMIs are vulnerable. Can vendors allow patch?
WannaCry NotPetya
If you think WannaCry and NotPetya are bad,
APT compaigns are worse
Impact WannaCry NotPetya APT
Data is leaked No No Yes
Stays persistent not detected Perhaps No Yes
Intent is hard to figure No No Yes
Exploits multiple vulnerabilities No Yes Yes
19
Internet of Things (IoT) Security Pains
Internet
Exposure
Recent Internet-
wide disruptions
due to
DDoS
Attacks
Recent Internet-
wide disruptions
due to
DDoS
Attacks
Recent DoS attacks
Dyn DNS
21st Oct 2016
ISP in Liberia
4th Nov 2016
Major
Shipping
, Pharma
NotPetya
27th Jun 2016
2 Million IoT
20th Apr 2017
World-
wide by
Bricker-
BoT
Internet of Things (IoT) Security Pains
24
IoT = Internet of Threats?
Source: DarkReading and ZDNet
Source: Radware
Source: Radware
Internet of Things (IoT) Security Pains
Lack of Orchestration
How big is the vulnerability management problem?
28Source: RiskBasedSecurity
Are we able to keep up with all the vulnerabilities?
29
Source: Microsoft
Can we accomplish this?
30
• How complex is your system?
• How fast can you test a patch?
• How complete is your testing?
• Can you afford to risk a self-inflicted Denial-of-Service?
Source: ZDNet
Threats that are blended
Cyber and Physical Attacks
"They'd board a vessel, locate by bar code specific sought-after crates containing
valuables, steal the contents of that crate — and that crate only — and then depart the
vessel without further incident. Fast, clean and easy," the report said. "When crews
eventually left their safe rooms hours later, it was to find that the pirates had headed
straight for certain cargo containers. It became apparent to the shipping company that
the pirates had specific knowledge of the contents of each of the shipping crates being
moved."
Source: Resilient Navigation and
Timing Foundation
Drones
Source: PC Magazine
What are
Possible Solutions
What can we do to protect ourselves?
1. [ADOPT] Adopt the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
2. [IDENTIFY] Determine Threat Scenarios and Cyber Kill Chain
3. [PROTECT] Implement Security by Design, by Default and by Deployment
4. [DETECT, RESPOND, RECOVER] Implement Integrated Security Analytics,
SoC, CSIRT/CERT
Determine Threat Scenarios and Cyber Kill Chain
1. Tender Specs (Firewall, VPN, etc)
2. Product allows Vulnerability to be Managed
3. Layered Defense Architecture
4. Architecture Security Review
1. Security Standards
2. Server Hardening i.e. Disable Unnecessary Services
3. Network-based Firewall
4. Pre-deployment Vulnerability Assessment & Penetration Testing
1. Regular Vulnerability Scan
2. Regular Vulnerability alert Monitoring
3. Timely Vulnerability Remediation/Patching
1. Security Training and Awareness
2. Security Advisories to Custodians
3. Phishing Simulation Exercise
Security by Design, by Default and in Deployment
OT
Physical
Security
Change
Mgmt
Network
Security
Security
Hardening
Account
Mgmt
Vuln
Mgmt
Incident
Mgmt
Security
Awareness
Manage risk for OT deployments
Security by Design
Mitigate by adequate segregation
Security by Design
Source: ISA/IEC-62443
• Take Reference from OT Guidelines
• ISA/IEC-62443
• NIST SP800-82
Vulnerability Management = Patch Management?
44
One of many possible solutions
One single vulnerability
Security in Deployment
Multiple Means of Vulnerability Remediation
45
Security in Deployment
• Disable unnecessary services
• Network-based firewall
• Host-based firewall
• Hardening the configuration
• Virtual Patching
What does this mean for WannaCry and NotPetya?
46
Security in Deployment
For Legacy OT/IOT/IIOT
• Disable SMB service
• Block SMB access at TCP/445 at
Network or Host-based Firewall
• Block malicious SMB traffic at
Network or Host-based Intrusion
Prevention System
Systems / Services
Vulnerability
Severity
Exploitable
remotely
from Internet
/ Building
Exploitable
remotely
from
Gateway /
Clients
Exploitable
only locally
on host
Internet / Extranet-
facing
Critical / High
Medium
Low
Intranet-facing
Critical / High
Medium
Low
Risk-based approach
1. Peace Time vs Heightened Threat Posture Dimension
2. Exploit Public Availability
Systems / Services
Vulnerability
Severity
Exploitable
remotely
from Internet
/ Building
Exploitable
remotely
from
Gateway /
Clients
Exploitable
only locally
on host
Internet / Extranet-
facing
Critical / High
Medium
Low
Intranet-facing
Critical / High
Medium
Low
Security in Deployment
Mitigating Measures via ‘Diamond-Ring’ approach
Operations Technology (OT)
Network
Untrusted
PhysicalSecurity
Trusted
Untrusted
OT
Equipment
Security Gateway
Firewall
IOT
Equipment
Firewall
IIOT
Equipment
Firewall
Trusted
Security in Deployment
Vulnerability Governance
49Source: ISACA
Automation of
vulnerability
identification and
fixing
Risk optimization and
acceptance of residual
risk
Security in Deployment
Source: Maritime Executive
Protection against GPS based attacks
Anti-drone dome
Protection against Drone Attacks
What about Detection, Response and Recovery?
1. Integrated Security Analytics
2. Integrated SoC
3. Integrated Security Incident Management
Source: NIST
Incident and BCM Management
1. Black Swans? Assume worst case. Can
business still continue?
2. Recovery order is important.
3. Conduct frequent drills and table-top
exercises.
Alignment of Risk
Enterprise Risk  Operation Risk  IT Risk
Source: ISACA
Common Pitfalls - Good Governance is key
1. Lack adequate inventory of systems and services, asset
classification, risk assessment
2. Lack of architecture governance, allowing too many
diverse technologies to be used in the environment
3. Buying technology to solve problems without adequately
trained people and processes
55
1. Two Dimensions of Cyber-Physical Threats to assess
• Emerging Cyber-Physical Threats are sophisticated. Cover all spaces.
2. Key Security Principles are still relevant against emerging threats
• Adopt NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
• Always consider Security by Design, by Default and in Deployment. Be pragmatic.
3. Good Risk Management and Governance is important
• Optimize risk. Technology is inadequate. Support with people and processes.
Three ways disaster changed laws and safety on seas
1. ICE PATROL 2. LIFE BOATS & DRILLS 3. RADIO CONTROL
Three ways disaster changed laws and safety on seas
1. ICE PATROL 2. LIFE BOATS & DRILLS 3. RADIO CONTROL
Cyber Security
Threat Detection &
Response
Incident & BCM
Processes & Drills
Incident Escalation
& Crisis Mgmt
Thank you for your kind attention. Stay in touch!
• https://www.linkedin.com/in/stevensim
• https://twitter.com/stevensim
• steven.sim@gmail.com

More Related Content

What's hot

SourceFire IPS Overview
SourceFire IPS OverviewSourceFire IPS Overview
SourceFire IPS Overview
GuardEra Access Solutions, Inc.
 
Birds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 Glance into the Enterprise InfoSec Field - Howard
Birds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 Glance into the Enterprise InfoSec Field - HowardBirds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 Glance into the Enterprise InfoSec Field - Howard
Birds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 Glance into the Enterprise InfoSec Field - Howard
HITCON GIRLS
 
Intelligence-based computer network defence: Understanding the cyber kill cha...
Intelligence-based computer network defence: Understanding the cyber kill cha...Intelligence-based computer network defence: Understanding the cyber kill cha...
Intelligence-based computer network defence: Understanding the cyber kill cha...
Huntsman Security
 
RSA Anatomy of an Attack
RSA Anatomy of an AttackRSA Anatomy of an Attack
RSA Anatomy of an Attack
integritysolutions
 
Sourcefire Webinar - NEW GENERATION IPS
Sourcefire Webinar -  NEW GENERATION IPSSourcefire Webinar -  NEW GENERATION IPS
Sourcefire Webinar - NEW GENERATION IPS
mmiznoni
 
Symantec Web Security Solutions
Symantec Web Security SolutionsSymantec Web Security Solutions
Symantec Web Security Solutions
Symantec
 
IPS Best Practices
IPS Best PracticesIPS Best Practices
IPS Best Practices
Heather Axworthy
 
Secure Access – Anywhere by Prisma, PaloAlto
Secure Access – Anywhere by Prisma, PaloAltoSecure Access – Anywhere by Prisma, PaloAlto
Secure Access – Anywhere by Prisma, PaloAlto
Prime Infoserv
 
New Horizons SCYBER Presentation
New Horizons SCYBER PresentationNew Horizons SCYBER Presentation
New Horizons SCYBER Presentation
New Horizons Computer Learning Centers / 5PE
 
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...
Muhammad FAHAD
 
The Network Enabled Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Network Enabled Emergency Operations Center (EOC)The Network Enabled Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Network Enabled Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
Cisco Crisis Response
 
The Top 20 Cyberattacks on Industrial Control Systems
The Top 20 Cyberattacks on Industrial Control SystemsThe Top 20 Cyberattacks on Industrial Control Systems
The Top 20 Cyberattacks on Industrial Control Systems
Muhammad FAHAD
 
The Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial Security
The Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial SecurityThe Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial Security
The Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial Security
Dragos, Inc.
 
Cyber security
Cyber securityCyber security
Cyber security
Aman Pradhan
 
Cloud security From Infrastructure to People-ware
Cloud security From Infrastructure to People-wareCloud security From Infrastructure to People-ware
Cloud security From Infrastructure to People-ware
Tzar Umang
 
Using Hackers’ Own Methods and Tools to Defeat Persistent Adversaries
Using Hackers’ Own Methods and Tools to Defeat Persistent AdversariesUsing Hackers’ Own Methods and Tools to Defeat Persistent Adversaries
Using Hackers’ Own Methods and Tools to Defeat Persistent Adversaries
EC-Council
 
Enhancing Authentication to Secure the Open Enterprise
Enhancing Authentication to Secure the Open EnterpriseEnhancing Authentication to Secure the Open Enterprise
Enhancing Authentication to Secure the Open Enterprise
Symantec
 
Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility InfrastructureSecuring Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure
Dragos, Inc.
 
Scalar Security Roadshow - Toronto Presentation
Scalar Security Roadshow - Toronto PresentationScalar Security Roadshow - Toronto Presentation
Scalar Security Roadshow - Toronto Presentation
Scalar Decisions
 

What's hot (19)

SourceFire IPS Overview
SourceFire IPS OverviewSourceFire IPS Overview
SourceFire IPS Overview
 
Birds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 Glance into the Enterprise InfoSec Field - Howard
Birds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 Glance into the Enterprise InfoSec Field - HowardBirds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 Glance into the Enterprise InfoSec Field - Howard
Birds of a Feather 2017: 邀請分享 Glance into the Enterprise InfoSec Field - Howard
 
Intelligence-based computer network defence: Understanding the cyber kill cha...
Intelligence-based computer network defence: Understanding the cyber kill cha...Intelligence-based computer network defence: Understanding the cyber kill cha...
Intelligence-based computer network defence: Understanding the cyber kill cha...
 
RSA Anatomy of an Attack
RSA Anatomy of an AttackRSA Anatomy of an Attack
RSA Anatomy of an Attack
 
Sourcefire Webinar - NEW GENERATION IPS
Sourcefire Webinar -  NEW GENERATION IPSSourcefire Webinar -  NEW GENERATION IPS
Sourcefire Webinar - NEW GENERATION IPS
 
Symantec Web Security Solutions
Symantec Web Security SolutionsSymantec Web Security Solutions
Symantec Web Security Solutions
 
IPS Best Practices
IPS Best PracticesIPS Best Practices
IPS Best Practices
 
Secure Access – Anywhere by Prisma, PaloAlto
Secure Access – Anywhere by Prisma, PaloAltoSecure Access – Anywhere by Prisma, PaloAlto
Secure Access – Anywhere by Prisma, PaloAlto
 
New Horizons SCYBER Presentation
New Horizons SCYBER PresentationNew Horizons SCYBER Presentation
New Horizons SCYBER Presentation
 
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...
 
The Network Enabled Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Network Enabled Emergency Operations Center (EOC)The Network Enabled Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
The Network Enabled Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
 
The Top 20 Cyberattacks on Industrial Control Systems
The Top 20 Cyberattacks on Industrial Control SystemsThe Top 20 Cyberattacks on Industrial Control Systems
The Top 20 Cyberattacks on Industrial Control Systems
 
The Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial Security
The Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial SecurityThe Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial Security
The Four Types of Threat Detection and Use Cases in Industrial Security
 
Cyber security
Cyber securityCyber security
Cyber security
 
Cloud security From Infrastructure to People-ware
Cloud security From Infrastructure to People-wareCloud security From Infrastructure to People-ware
Cloud security From Infrastructure to People-ware
 
Using Hackers’ Own Methods and Tools to Defeat Persistent Adversaries
Using Hackers’ Own Methods and Tools to Defeat Persistent AdversariesUsing Hackers’ Own Methods and Tools to Defeat Persistent Adversaries
Using Hackers’ Own Methods and Tools to Defeat Persistent Adversaries
 
Enhancing Authentication to Secure the Open Enterprise
Enhancing Authentication to Secure the Open EnterpriseEnhancing Authentication to Secure the Open Enterprise
Enhancing Authentication to Secure the Open Enterprise
 
Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility InfrastructureSecuring Electric Utility Infrastructure
Securing Electric Utility Infrastructure
 
Scalar Security Roadshow - Toronto Presentation
Scalar Security Roadshow - Toronto PresentationScalar Security Roadshow - Toronto Presentation
Scalar Security Roadshow - Toronto Presentation
 

Similar to Future-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threats

Airport security 2013 john mc carthy
Airport security 2013   john mc carthyAirport security 2013   john mc carthy
Airport security 2013 john mc carthyRussell Publishing
 
DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...
DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...
DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...
Shah Sheikh
 
Info sec 12 v1 2
Info sec 12 v1 2Info sec 12 v1 2
Conférence ENGIE ACSS 2018
Conférence ENGIE ACSS 2018 Conférence ENGIE ACSS 2018
Conférence ENGIE ACSS 2018
African Cyber Security Summit
 
Evolutionary ATM & Cyber Security - Selex ES - Angeloluca Barba
Evolutionary ATM & Cyber Security - Selex ES - Angeloluca BarbaEvolutionary ATM & Cyber Security - Selex ES - Angeloluca Barba
Evolutionary ATM & Cyber Security - Selex ES - Angeloluca Barba
Angeloluca Barba
 
White Hat 6 March 2015 v2.2
White Hat 6 March 2015 v2.2White Hat 6 March 2015 v2.2
White hat march15 v2.2
White hat march15 v2.2White hat march15 v2.2
Security automation in virtual and cloud environments v2
Security automation in virtual and cloud environments v2Security automation in virtual and cloud environments v2
Security automation in virtual and cloud environments v2
rpark31
 
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
TI Safe
 
Gartner technologies for Infosec 2014-2015
Gartner technologies for Infosec 2014-2015Gartner technologies for Infosec 2014-2015
Gartner technologies for Infosec 2014-2015Samuel Kamuli
 
Top Cyber News Magazine Daniel Ehrenreich
Top Cyber News Magazine Daniel Ehrenreich Top Cyber News Magazine Daniel Ehrenreich
Top Cyber News Magazine Daniel Ehrenreich
TopCyberNewsMAGAZINE
 
A theoretical superworm
A theoretical superwormA theoretical superworm
A theoretical superwormUltraUploader
 
Het ecosysteem als complete bescherming tegen cybercriminaliteit [pvh]
Het ecosysteem als complete bescherming tegen cybercriminaliteit [pvh]Het ecosysteem als complete bescherming tegen cybercriminaliteit [pvh]
Het ecosysteem als complete bescherming tegen cybercriminaliteit [pvh]
Nancy Nimmegeers
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #4 Biodun Awojobi and Wade Walters Security Programs and ...
GDG Cloud Southlake #4 Biodun Awojobi and Wade Walters Security Programs and ...GDG Cloud Southlake #4 Biodun Awojobi and Wade Walters Security Programs and ...
GDG Cloud Southlake #4 Biodun Awojobi and Wade Walters Security Programs and ...
James Anderson
 
Improve Cybersecurity posture by using ISO/IEC 27032
Improve Cybersecurity posture by using ISO/IEC 27032Improve Cybersecurity posture by using ISO/IEC 27032
Improve Cybersecurity posture by using ISO/IEC 27032
PECB
 
Stop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by Downloads
Stop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by DownloadsStop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by Downloads
Stop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by DownloadsInvincea, Inc.
 
G. Gritsai, A. Timorin, Y. Goltsev, R. Ilin, S. Gordeychik, and A. Karpin, “S...
G. Gritsai, A. Timorin, Y. Goltsev, R. Ilin, S. Gordeychik, and A. Karpin, “S...G. Gritsai, A. Timorin, Y. Goltsev, R. Ilin, S. Gordeychik, and A. Karpin, “S...
G. Gritsai, A. Timorin, Y. Goltsev, R. Ilin, S. Gordeychik, and A. Karpin, “S...qqlan
 
Needles, Haystacks and Algorithms: Using Machine Learning to detect complex t...
Needles, Haystacks and Algorithms: Using Machine Learning to detect complex t...Needles, Haystacks and Algorithms: Using Machine Learning to detect complex t...
Needles, Haystacks and Algorithms: Using Machine Learning to detect complex t...
DefCamp
 
Architecting cybersecurity to future proof smart cities against emerging cybe...
Architecting cybersecurity to future proof smart cities against emerging cybe...Architecting cybersecurity to future proof smart cities against emerging cybe...
Architecting cybersecurity to future proof smart cities against emerging cybe...
NUS-ISS
 

Similar to Future-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threats (20)

Airport security 2013 john mc carthy
Airport security 2013   john mc carthyAirport security 2013   john mc carthy
Airport security 2013 john mc carthy
 
DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...
DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...
DTS Solution - ISACA UAE Chapter - ISAFE 2014 - RU PWNED - Living a Life as a...
 
Info sec 12 v1 2
Info sec 12 v1 2Info sec 12 v1 2
Info sec 12 v1 2
 
Conférence ENGIE ACSS 2018
Conférence ENGIE ACSS 2018 Conférence ENGIE ACSS 2018
Conférence ENGIE ACSS 2018
 
Evolutionary ATM & Cyber Security - Selex ES - Angeloluca Barba
Evolutionary ATM & Cyber Security - Selex ES - Angeloluca BarbaEvolutionary ATM & Cyber Security - Selex ES - Angeloluca Barba
Evolutionary ATM & Cyber Security - Selex ES - Angeloluca Barba
 
White Hat 6 March 2015 v2.2
White Hat 6 March 2015 v2.2White Hat 6 March 2015 v2.2
White Hat 6 March 2015 v2.2
 
White hat march15 v2.2
White hat march15 v2.2White hat march15 v2.2
White hat march15 v2.2
 
Security automation in virtual and cloud environments v2
Security automation in virtual and cloud environments v2Security automation in virtual and cloud environments v2
Security automation in virtual and cloud environments v2
 
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
[CLASS2014] Palestra Técnica - Franzvitor Fiorim
 
Gartner technologies for Infosec 2014-2015
Gartner technologies for Infosec 2014-2015Gartner technologies for Infosec 2014-2015
Gartner technologies for Infosec 2014-2015
 
Top Cyber News Magazine Daniel Ehrenreich
Top Cyber News Magazine Daniel Ehrenreich Top Cyber News Magazine Daniel Ehrenreich
Top Cyber News Magazine Daniel Ehrenreich
 
Take Down
Take DownTake Down
Take Down
 
A theoretical superworm
A theoretical superwormA theoretical superworm
A theoretical superworm
 
Het ecosysteem als complete bescherming tegen cybercriminaliteit [pvh]
Het ecosysteem als complete bescherming tegen cybercriminaliteit [pvh]Het ecosysteem als complete bescherming tegen cybercriminaliteit [pvh]
Het ecosysteem als complete bescherming tegen cybercriminaliteit [pvh]
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #4 Biodun Awojobi and Wade Walters Security Programs and ...
GDG Cloud Southlake #4 Biodun Awojobi and Wade Walters Security Programs and ...GDG Cloud Southlake #4 Biodun Awojobi and Wade Walters Security Programs and ...
GDG Cloud Southlake #4 Biodun Awojobi and Wade Walters Security Programs and ...
 
Improve Cybersecurity posture by using ISO/IEC 27032
Improve Cybersecurity posture by using ISO/IEC 27032Improve Cybersecurity posture by using ISO/IEC 27032
Improve Cybersecurity posture by using ISO/IEC 27032
 
Stop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by Downloads
Stop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by DownloadsStop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by Downloads
Stop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by Downloads
 
G. Gritsai, A. Timorin, Y. Goltsev, R. Ilin, S. Gordeychik, and A. Karpin, “S...
G. Gritsai, A. Timorin, Y. Goltsev, R. Ilin, S. Gordeychik, and A. Karpin, “S...G. Gritsai, A. Timorin, Y. Goltsev, R. Ilin, S. Gordeychik, and A. Karpin, “S...
G. Gritsai, A. Timorin, Y. Goltsev, R. Ilin, S. Gordeychik, and A. Karpin, “S...
 
Needles, Haystacks and Algorithms: Using Machine Learning to detect complex t...
Needles, Haystacks and Algorithms: Using Machine Learning to detect complex t...Needles, Haystacks and Algorithms: Using Machine Learning to detect complex t...
Needles, Haystacks and Algorithms: Using Machine Learning to detect complex t...
 
Architecting cybersecurity to future proof smart cities against emerging cybe...
Architecting cybersecurity to future proof smart cities against emerging cybe...Architecting cybersecurity to future proof smart cities against emerging cybe...
Architecting cybersecurity to future proof smart cities against emerging cybe...
 

Recently uploaded

Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with ParametersEssentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Safe Software
 
ODC, Data Fabric and Architecture User Group
ODC, Data Fabric and Architecture User GroupODC, Data Fabric and Architecture User Group
ODC, Data Fabric and Architecture User Group
CatarinaPereira64715
 
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
Guy Korland
 
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Product School
 
DevOps and Testing slides at DASA Connect
DevOps and Testing slides at DASA ConnectDevOps and Testing slides at DASA Connect
DevOps and Testing slides at DASA Connect
Kari Kakkonen
 
Key Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdf
Key Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdfKey Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdf
Key Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdf
Cheryl Hung
 
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
Product School
 
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and backKnowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Elena Simperl
 
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Jeffrey Haguewood
 
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyesAssuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
ThousandEyes
 
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered QualitySoftware Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Inflectra
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Alan Dix
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
DianaGray10
 
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Frank van Harmelen
 
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdfLeading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
OnBoard
 
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish CachingAccelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Thijs Feryn
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
DianaGray10
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
Product School
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with ParametersEssentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
 
ODC, Data Fabric and Architecture User Group
ODC, Data Fabric and Architecture User GroupODC, Data Fabric and Architecture User Group
ODC, Data Fabric and Architecture User Group
 
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
 
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
Unsubscribed: Combat Subscription Fatigue With a Membership Mentality by Head...
 
DevOps and Testing slides at DASA Connect
DevOps and Testing slides at DASA ConnectDevOps and Testing slides at DASA Connect
DevOps and Testing slides at DASA Connect
 
Key Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdf
Key Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdfKey Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdf
Key Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdf
 
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
From Siloed Products to Connected Ecosystem: Building a Sustainable and Scala...
 
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and backKnowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
Knowledge engineering: from people to machines and back
 
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
 
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyesAssuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
 
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered QualitySoftware Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered Quality
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
 
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*
 
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdfLeading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
Leading Change strategies and insights for effective change management pdf 1.pdf
 
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish CachingAccelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
Accelerate your Kubernetes clusters with Varnish Caching
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Overview.pdf
 
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys at Amazon.pdf
 

Future-proofing maritime ports against emerging cyber-physical threats

  • 1. Future-proofing Maritime Ports against Emerging Cyber-Physical Threats Steven Sim PSA Corporation Ltd Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organisation
  • 2. PSA Singapore World’s Busiest Transhipment Hub 30.59M TEUs handled in 2016 85% of containers handled are transhipment 5% of global container throughput Connecting to 600 ports in 123 countries with daily sailings
  • 5. $1,050.00bn $591.81bn $586.54bn $464.75bn $432.01bn $414.14bn $294.15bn $179.96bn $98.20bn Market crash Human pandemic Wind storm Earthquake Flood Oil price shock Cyber attack Sovereign default Terrorism Cyber attack presents a greater risk to economic performance than terrorism and sovereign default combined Source: Lloyd’s City Risk Index 2015-2025
  • 7. Maritime cyber threats are set to significantly increaseNation states and sophisticated cybercriminals pose the greatest cyber threat to the maritime sector, using tactics that can have a significant impact on their targets. Levels of threats to the maritime industry Low impact Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks and website defacements. Very low impact Social media campaigns and critical online chatter. Medium Interceptin low-value d email addr passwords. High impact The threat actor can intercept sensitive information, such as confidential documents. Very high impact The threat actor can deploy and utilise sophisticated malware to target critical infrastructure, such as databases or SCADA systems, which are routinely used on ships. Source: ControlRisks Cyber Security Academy
  • 8. What are Cyber-Physical Threats? • Threats that are targeted at Cyber-Physical Systems. • Threats that uses blended Cyber and Physical attacks.
  • 9. Threats that are targeted at Cyber-Physical Systems
  • 11. What are Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) • A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a system comprising of collaborating elements that control physical entities, generally using feedback from sensors they monitor. Typically tight controlled or monitored, integrated with users. • In the broad sense, OT (Operations Technology), ICS (Industrial Control Systems) and SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, IoT (Internet of Things) and IIoT (Industrial Internet of Things). • Examples of CPS include smart grid, autonomous automobile systems, process control systems, robotic systems, medical monitoring and automatic pilot avionics. Source: ScienceDirect, Wikipedia
  • 12. CPS Architecture Source: Big future for cyber-physical manufacturing systems by Design World Sep 2015
  • 15. OT/ICS/SCADA Security Pains 1. Insecurity by design 2. Patches slow, may not be certified 3. Weak HMI security 4. Half-baked TCP/IP stacks 5. Insecure industrial protocols 6. Developer backdoors Source: Belden
  • 16. Stuxnet Source - Chappatte/International Herald Tribune First worm that attacked industrial plants
  • 17. Penetration testing of an AGV product Source: Straits Times Developer backdoors identified
  • 18. WannaCry and NotPetya Windows HMIs are vulnerable. Can vendors allow patch? WannaCry NotPetya
  • 19. If you think WannaCry and NotPetya are bad, APT compaigns are worse Impact WannaCry NotPetya APT Data is leaked No No Yes Stays persistent not detected Perhaps No Yes Intent is hard to figure No No Yes Exploits multiple vulnerabilities No Yes Yes 19
  • 20. Internet of Things (IoT) Security Pains Internet Exposure
  • 23. Recent DoS attacks Dyn DNS 21st Oct 2016 ISP in Liberia 4th Nov 2016 Major Shipping , Pharma NotPetya 27th Jun 2016 2 Million IoT 20th Apr 2017 World- wide by Bricker- BoT
  • 24. Internet of Things (IoT) Security Pains 24 IoT = Internet of Threats? Source: DarkReading and ZDNet
  • 27. Internet of Things (IoT) Security Pains Lack of Orchestration
  • 28. How big is the vulnerability management problem? 28Source: RiskBasedSecurity
  • 29. Are we able to keep up with all the vulnerabilities? 29 Source: Microsoft
  • 30. Can we accomplish this? 30 • How complex is your system? • How fast can you test a patch? • How complete is your testing? • Can you afford to risk a self-inflicted Denial-of-Service? Source: ZDNet
  • 31. Threats that are blended Cyber and Physical Attacks
  • 32.
  • 33. "They'd board a vessel, locate by bar code specific sought-after crates containing valuables, steal the contents of that crate — and that crate only — and then depart the vessel without further incident. Fast, clean and easy," the report said. "When crews eventually left their safe rooms hours later, it was to find that the pirates had headed straight for certain cargo containers. It became apparent to the shipping company that the pirates had specific knowledge of the contents of each of the shipping crates being moved."
  • 34. Source: Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation
  • 36.
  • 38. What can we do to protect ourselves? 1. [ADOPT] Adopt the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2. [IDENTIFY] Determine Threat Scenarios and Cyber Kill Chain 3. [PROTECT] Implement Security by Design, by Default and by Deployment 4. [DETECT, RESPOND, RECOVER] Implement Integrated Security Analytics, SoC, CSIRT/CERT
  • 39.
  • 40. Determine Threat Scenarios and Cyber Kill Chain
  • 41. 1. Tender Specs (Firewall, VPN, etc) 2. Product allows Vulnerability to be Managed 3. Layered Defense Architecture 4. Architecture Security Review 1. Security Standards 2. Server Hardening i.e. Disable Unnecessary Services 3. Network-based Firewall 4. Pre-deployment Vulnerability Assessment & Penetration Testing 1. Regular Vulnerability Scan 2. Regular Vulnerability alert Monitoring 3. Timely Vulnerability Remediation/Patching 1. Security Training and Awareness 2. Security Advisories to Custodians 3. Phishing Simulation Exercise Security by Design, by Default and in Deployment
  • 43. Mitigate by adequate segregation Security by Design Source: ISA/IEC-62443 • Take Reference from OT Guidelines • ISA/IEC-62443 • NIST SP800-82
  • 44. Vulnerability Management = Patch Management? 44 One of many possible solutions One single vulnerability Security in Deployment
  • 45. Multiple Means of Vulnerability Remediation 45 Security in Deployment • Disable unnecessary services • Network-based firewall • Host-based firewall • Hardening the configuration • Virtual Patching
  • 46. What does this mean for WannaCry and NotPetya? 46 Security in Deployment For Legacy OT/IOT/IIOT • Disable SMB service • Block SMB access at TCP/445 at Network or Host-based Firewall • Block malicious SMB traffic at Network or Host-based Intrusion Prevention System
  • 47. Systems / Services Vulnerability Severity Exploitable remotely from Internet / Building Exploitable remotely from Gateway / Clients Exploitable only locally on host Internet / Extranet- facing Critical / High Medium Low Intranet-facing Critical / High Medium Low Risk-based approach 1. Peace Time vs Heightened Threat Posture Dimension 2. Exploit Public Availability Systems / Services Vulnerability Severity Exploitable remotely from Internet / Building Exploitable remotely from Gateway / Clients Exploitable only locally on host Internet / Extranet- facing Critical / High Medium Low Intranet-facing Critical / High Medium Low Security in Deployment
  • 48. Mitigating Measures via ‘Diamond-Ring’ approach Operations Technology (OT) Network Untrusted PhysicalSecurity Trusted Untrusted OT Equipment Security Gateway Firewall IOT Equipment Firewall IIOT Equipment Firewall Trusted Security in Deployment
  • 49. Vulnerability Governance 49Source: ISACA Automation of vulnerability identification and fixing Risk optimization and acceptance of residual risk Security in Deployment
  • 50. Source: Maritime Executive Protection against GPS based attacks
  • 52. What about Detection, Response and Recovery? 1. Integrated Security Analytics 2. Integrated SoC 3. Integrated Security Incident Management Source: NIST
  • 53. Incident and BCM Management 1. Black Swans? Assume worst case. Can business still continue? 2. Recovery order is important. 3. Conduct frequent drills and table-top exercises.
  • 54. Alignment of Risk Enterprise Risk  Operation Risk  IT Risk Source: ISACA
  • 55. Common Pitfalls - Good Governance is key 1. Lack adequate inventory of systems and services, asset classification, risk assessment 2. Lack of architecture governance, allowing too many diverse technologies to be used in the environment 3. Buying technology to solve problems without adequately trained people and processes 55
  • 56. 1. Two Dimensions of Cyber-Physical Threats to assess • Emerging Cyber-Physical Threats are sophisticated. Cover all spaces. 2. Key Security Principles are still relevant against emerging threats • Adopt NIST Cybersecurity Framework. • Always consider Security by Design, by Default and in Deployment. Be pragmatic. 3. Good Risk Management and Governance is important • Optimize risk. Technology is inadequate. Support with people and processes.
  • 57. Three ways disaster changed laws and safety on seas 1. ICE PATROL 2. LIFE BOATS & DRILLS 3. RADIO CONTROL
  • 58. Three ways disaster changed laws and safety on seas 1. ICE PATROL 2. LIFE BOATS & DRILLS 3. RADIO CONTROL Cyber Security Threat Detection & Response Incident & BCM Processes & Drills Incident Escalation & Crisis Mgmt
  • 59. Thank you for your kind attention. Stay in touch! • https://www.linkedin.com/in/stevensim • https://twitter.com/stevensim • steven.sim@gmail.com