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Fred størseth. new strains of society hidden, dynamic and emergent vulnerabilities
The SAMRISK II project aims to address new and unknown vulnerabilities in society through stress-testing existing approaches. The project will (1) explore how stress-testing methods can be applied to societal threats, and (2) use stress-testing to identify the limitations of current risk analysis and resilience methods for complex emerging threats. It involves researchers from Norway, the US, and other Nordic countries, with a budget of 7 million Norwegian krone over 3 years.
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Fred størseth. new strains of society hidden, dynamic and emergent vulnerabilities
- 1. SAMRISK II project: New Strains of Society – Hidden, Dynamic and Emergent Vulnerabilities SINTEF Technology and Society NordForsk Conference New trends in societal security research in the Nordic countries 26-27 November 2014, Stockholm 1 Tor Olav Grøtan Senior Research Scientist Dpt of Safety Research tor.o.grotan@sintef.no
- 2. SINTEF Technology andSociety • Participants • SINTEF Technology and Society, Safety Research • The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) • University of Tulsa, USA • Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (FFI) • ….. • Budget: 7MNOK from SAMRISK II • Duration: 2014-17 • Project management SINTEF • Fred Størseth (fred.storseth@sintef.no) 2 The project
- 3. • Adressing vulnerabilitiesthat may be "unknown" in any sense: • Ignored – forgotten - never contemplated - impossible to identify - misunderstood or underestimated – stemming from emergence, rupture, discontinuity, variability, etc - • Presumed impact; society (as a whole) under enormous strain • Will the (beliefs in the) institutions endure the strain? • The deafening silence from missing answers – or unrealistic assumptions? • Will the public still be comforted by "we will revise our routines"? • Armed police in Norway November 2014 – of course (?) SINTEF Technology and Society • Drivers, e.g., • New forms of crime - safety & security – climate change , ++ • Dependencies, dynamics and dynamism between systems and domains • Need for new foci, e.g. • From threat pictures to threat landscapes • Vulnerability patterns 3 New Strains of Society – Hidden, Dynamic and Emergent Vulnerabilities
- 4. SINTEF Technology andSociety • A "shrinking" world • Where are the boundaries between society and systems? How do multiple systems cohere? How can vulnerabilities be identified? Can we see it as an "ecology"? E.g. • Safety/security "mindsets" as "industrial enclaves" in an open/dynamic society? • 9/11 signifies a crossroad, a new epoch, a rupture/discontinuity • Malicious, intended action; terror: A continual, persistent but unspecified threat • What is the impact on society, what is the strain? • ICT as a central analytical dimension: "the world connected through it" • Vulnerabilities when ICT fail • Failure, breakdown, disturbance (maintenance), virus/hacking etc etc • Vulnerabilities when ICT function as intended (ICT as prime mediator of interaction) • ICT as re-presentation technology, as organ-izing technology • Shared awareness and understanding? A matter of modelling? • Vertbatim vs gist; different (native) languages; Conditions for sensemaking? • Intensified potential for vulnerability: The "state of the world" as well as the threats and risks defined, transfused and understood by and through ICT 4 Some ideas and presumptions
- 5. • New threatsagainst society produce new patterns of risk and vulnerability • The recognition of this may imply the challenging of some core principles • The idea of distinct roles and clear responsibilities: Somebody must "own" (at least part of) the problem • What if the distinct roles cannot be identified? • What if there are no clear areas of responsibility? • New threats can "play out" in ways that influence an array of systems SINTEF Technology and Society • The idea of control: • The prevalent imperative of identifying and "translating" risk into cintrollable parameters • How can we identfy and act on risks that are constantly changing, crossing and traversing system boundaries, affecting a number of parties ? • We must acknowldge the fact that the "standard toolbox" and approaches are insufficient • New threats demand new thinking and new methods – for vulnerability as well as risk 5 New Strains: Foundations
- 6. • Out pointof departure is what we actually have (predominantly from industrial safety) • Methods, theoretical foundations, views and contemplations • The aim is however not just to "re-contextualize" into the societal context. • We will approach the borderlines and the impasses – where methods stalemate , SINTEF Technology and Society where understanding stops • We will explore how existing methods and principles can be related to, developed and translated into addressing complex landscapes of threats that • involve multiple systems in interplay • is imprinted by substantial uncertainty , e.g., related to • Extent, potential of escalation, degree of danger, vulnerability by coupling • can imply generation, transfer and relocation of risk • We will build "landscapes" of threat and vulnerability within different areas, e.g.: • Offshore activity in sensitive areas • Pandemic • Critical infrastructure integrated with ICT (incl. "ICT as mediator") 6 New Strains; Approach
- 7. • Develop ananalytical framework for understanding and managing new threats and SINTEF Technology and Society vulnerabilities towards society • The objective is not to generate more knowledge to reduce uncertainty, but • to establish new principles for contemplation and approach, and • new ways to acknowledge and explore the new strains • Point of departure; existing methods and theory, with a special focus on: • Risk analysis • Barrier management • Resilience • Stress-testing • Intention: to put ourselves (safety science, practice) to the test • Establish borderlines and limitations of existing/prevalent approaches • Objective: to identifiy how approaches and methods must be developed in order to adress the societal threats we will face, including • Where it stops – where "control", methods and tools can promise no more • Including the new & "promising", e.g. resilience (engineering) 7 New Strains; Defined targets
- 8. 1. The potentialof development related to stress-testing as a specific method (e.g., simulated barrier breakdown) to address societal threats 2. Stress-testing in a wider sense, as a principle or metaphor: • We intend to "stress-teste" our inventory of approaches and methods – in order to identify where and when our "tools" stop working SINTEF Technology and Society • INCLUDING the recent advances, • e.g., resilience (engineering) 8 Stress-testing; a double meaning
- 9. David D. Woods,2014 Hidden, dynamic and emergent vulnerabilities SINTEF Technology and Society 9 "STRESS-TESTING 2" Society … Regulator …. Company …. Creating, constructing, conditioning…
- 10. EXAMPLE. "Pulse ofRisk ExploreR" (PuRER): Project proposal Saf€ra (call.safera.eu) 2014 New safety Approaches Knowledge domain 2 (KD2) Stable/known systems Increasingly complex and dynamic systems SINTEF Technology and Society 10 Prevalent safety approaches Knowledge domain 1 (KD1) New risk management Approaches (KD2) Prevalent risk management approaches Knowledge domain 1 (KD1) PuRER "TORC" Compliance vs Resilience Emergent Generic risk drivers risks Sensitization to local conditions "Safety as done"
- 11. SINTEF Technology andSociety "expansion": occasions to extend the analytical horizon "flow": (re)-organized attention sensitivity to work as done "contraction": RA revisions Selected horizons Outcome: Approaches & methods providing increased sensitivity to emerging risks. Improved risk management Example: Exploring "The Pulse of Risk"
- 12. KD2 iNTeg-Risk KD1= STRESS-TEST!! SINTEF Technology and Society "expansion": occasions to extend the analytical horizon "flow": (re)-organized attention sensitivity to work as done "contraction": RA revisions Selected horizons Outcome: Approaches & methods providing increased sensitivity to emerging risks. Improved risk management PuRER: Abductive research process Theoretical inventory/resources + + "Drift into failure" + + + + + + + (TORC) Company / regulator practices and prospects Main metaphor
- 13. SINTEF Technology andSociety • Hermeneutical ideal • Continuous exchange • Part vs whole • Pre-understanding Understanding …. • "Safety" or "security" ? • Build/understand landscapes of threats • Analyse, stress-test our methods & approaches 13 Ambition: "Zoom In/Out" in large ("infinite") systems
- 14. SINTEF Technology andSociety 14 "Mantra" Forget your perfect offering There's a crack in everything That's where the light gets in Leonard Cohen (Anthem)