This document summarizes the state of flexicurity policies in France. It discusses three versions or initiatives of flexicurity that have been attempted in France since 2008. The first, under Sarkozy, failed to reset policy direction and saw only incremental changes. The second, under Hollande, saw some limited experiments but unions did not fully support agreements. The current approach under Hollande has been scattershot and unfinished, picking up earlier competitiveness agenda but facing political and union tensions. Overall, France has seen a messy process of policy adjustment with path dependency, lack of consensus, and failure to fully articulate flexicurity policies across different levels of government and unions.

1. Flexicurity à la française?
Navigating labour market policy
in difficult times
Susan Milner
University of Bath
Sheffield Business School, UACES
workshop, 28 May 2015

2. Flexicurity in the French context
• A ‘spent’ concept? Divisive; weak credibility
after 2008
• High salience
• (Apparent) congruence with twin processes of
employer-led national-level bargaining
(Refondation sociale) and state-driven
‘modernisation of social dialogue’)
• Problem of articulation between levels of
dialogue/bargaining

3. Version I: the Sarkozy initiative
• 2008 law (based on social partner agreement) set
the parameters (actor positioning): consensus on
portability of employment-based rights (‘making
employment secure’)
• But failed to reset the policy direction
• Path dependency: incrementalism (new form of
‘probation’ contract rather than reform of
existing contracts) and lowest common
denominator trade-offs
• 2010 follow-up (tripartite fund): state
disinvestment caused distrust

4. Version II: the
Socialist relaunch of social summitry
• 11 January 2013 agreement:
portability of accrued
occupational benefits; state
support for retraining
measures; higher taxes on very
short contracts; monitoring of
redundancy shifted from
public authorities to
bargaining
BUT CGT and FO did not sign

5. 2013 law (LSE): (limited) experiments
in local flexicurity
• Agreement toned down on redundancies; but
internal mobility clauses retained (no bargaining
follow-up identified)
• Portability of health cover currently subject to
sectoral & local bargaining; legislation will force
employers to provide cover by January 2016
• Unemployment insurance coverage extended
(mostly) for those in short-term employment
• Social security coverage for part-time workers:
limited impact on bargaining (fast food, cleaning)
• ‘Database’ for union reps (BDES): little impact

6. 2013 law: personal training accounts
• ‘the major social achievement of the Hollande
presidency’?
• an individual (portable) right: 150 hours in
total
• levy-funded (0.2% of wage bill)
• in force since January 2015 but so far no
takers…

7. Main innovation = ‘competitiveness
agreements’
• ‘Employment maintenance contracts’: 10
agreements registered by March 2015
(automotive, engineering, IT), smaller companies
(100-200), all unions have signed at least one
• ‘Competitiveness pacts’: 21 agreements
(automotive, air transport, metals, shipbuilding,
maintenance), larger companies, all unions have
signed
• Short-time working: little effect, numbers stable
2013-14, mainly manufacturing, more SMEs

8. Version III (current): a scattergun
(state-led) approach?
• Unfinished business: reforming information,
consultation and dialogue mechanisms (June
2015)
• Macron law: picking up earlier
‘competitiveness’ agenda
• National-level tensions (CGT, FO esp.)
• Political tensions still around employment
contracts

9. Overall assessment
• Messy process of adjustment: union demands
taken forward (logic of portability of rights, or
rights-based employability) but subject to
procedural ‘drag’
• Path dependency
• Failure of trust-building and consensus-building
• Heavy contingency (economic and political)
rather than political agency or policy design
• Lack of articulation between levels still a
structural constraint (little impetus for sectoral or
local bargaining)