Nine-dashed Line Map Submitted by China to United Nations on 7 May 2009 China did not explain the legal basis for the dashes. The dashes had no fixed coordinates. “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” - China’s Note Verbale of 7 May 2009 The Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia promptly protested China’s claim under this dashed lines map. The Philippines belatedly protested on 11 April 2011.
West Philippine Sea Disputes jezel fagtanan suciasJezel Sucias
Why did China conquers all the islands at West Philippine Sea? This presentation will help you understand from its origin the history how did they acquire such territory. this will also give you knowledge about why did the Philippine Island struggles so much in defending their territory also at the West China Sea.
The South China Sea West Philippine Sea DisputeBerean Guide
Our Stake in the West Philippine Sea
A Talk By Justice Antonio Carpio
Hosted by Pimentel Institute for Leadership and Governance
April 25,2016 Club Filipino
West Philippine Sea Disputes jezel fagtanan suciasJezel Sucias
Why did China conquers all the islands at West Philippine Sea? This presentation will help you understand from its origin the history how did they acquire such territory. this will also give you knowledge about why did the Philippine Island struggles so much in defending their territory also at the West China Sea.
The South China Sea West Philippine Sea DisputeBerean Guide
Our Stake in the West Philippine Sea
A Talk By Justice Antonio Carpio
Hosted by Pimentel Institute for Leadership and Governance
April 25,2016 Club Filipino
THE PRIMER is an initiative of independent researchers. The facts and analyses presented herein represent the authors’ own appreciation of published material and primary sources that were accessible to them during the course of the research.
They do not represent any position of the government of the Republic of the Philippines, unless stated otherwise, nor of the publisher.
The purpose of this Primer is to make available in a single updated volume a simplified and objective rendering of the historical background, current conditions, pertinent issues and policy questions regarding the territorial and maritime disputes in the West Philippine Sea.
It is intended to assist students, researchers, media practitioners, non-specialist members of the civil service, as well as the general public, in deepening their understanding of the many different issues of the West Philippine Sea disputes.
The questions and answers are framed from a Filipino perspective that focuses on information that the authors
considered to be most important and of interest to citizens of this country, rather than information that may be highlighted by various foreign authors, organizations or governments. The contents are not intended as advocacy of any particular position or policy recommendation.
The authors would like to thank Lucio B. Pitlo III for his invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this Primer. For inquiries and comments, please contact the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman.
Aileen S.P. Baviera, PhD
Jay Batongbacal, JSD
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Presentation for THE LEGAL PROVISIONS ABOUT THE EXPLORATION OF HYDROCARBONS IN AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Course:Oil and Gas Law
MSc Oil and Gas Technology Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology School of Engineeringms, http://msc.petrotech.teikav.edu.gr/
The fundamental focus of maritime strategy centres on the control of human activity at sea. There is the effort to establish control for oneself or to deny it to an enemy and there is the effort to use the control that one has in order to achieve specific ends. The security of Sri Lanka derives from a combination of factors, including the maintenance of a highly competent naval force equipped with advanced technology and structured for unique geostrategic environment. Sri Lanka is now in the midst of a transition from a focus on internal security to an external security. The maritime strategy should be as much as it has to deal with the linkage between national strategic interests of the country. This may be the most appropriate time for Sri Lanka to re-appreciate our national interests and to derive National and Military objectives based on those interests.
Philippine Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio's Lecture to the 2017 Geological Convention on the South China Sea Maritime Dispute
China, South China Sea Dispute, Philippines, USA, Spratlys, Artificial Islands, Reclamation, Regular Patrols, Military Conflict, Militarization, ADIZ, Air Defense Identification Zone
THE PRIMER is an initiative of independent researchers. The facts and analyses presented herein represent the authors’ own appreciation of published material and primary sources that were accessible to them during the course of the research.
They do not represent any position of the government of the Republic of the Philippines, unless stated otherwise, nor of the publisher.
The purpose of this Primer is to make available in a single updated volume a simplified and objective rendering of the historical background, current conditions, pertinent issues and policy questions regarding the territorial and maritime disputes in the West Philippine Sea.
It is intended to assist students, researchers, media practitioners, non-specialist members of the civil service, as well as the general public, in deepening their understanding of the many different issues of the West Philippine Sea disputes.
The questions and answers are framed from a Filipino perspective that focuses on information that the authors
considered to be most important and of interest to citizens of this country, rather than information that may be highlighted by various foreign authors, organizations or governments. The contents are not intended as advocacy of any particular position or policy recommendation.
The authors would like to thank Lucio B. Pitlo III for his invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this Primer. For inquiries and comments, please contact the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman.
Aileen S.P. Baviera, PhD
Jay Batongbacal, JSD
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
Presentation for THE LEGAL PROVISIONS ABOUT THE EXPLORATION OF HYDROCARBONS IN AN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Course:Oil and Gas Law
MSc Oil and Gas Technology Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology School of Engineeringms, http://msc.petrotech.teikav.edu.gr/
The fundamental focus of maritime strategy centres on the control of human activity at sea. There is the effort to establish control for oneself or to deny it to an enemy and there is the effort to use the control that one has in order to achieve specific ends. The security of Sri Lanka derives from a combination of factors, including the maintenance of a highly competent naval force equipped with advanced technology and structured for unique geostrategic environment. Sri Lanka is now in the midst of a transition from a focus on internal security to an external security. The maritime strategy should be as much as it has to deal with the linkage between national strategic interests of the country. This may be the most appropriate time for Sri Lanka to re-appreciate our national interests and to derive National and Military objectives based on those interests.
Philippine Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio's Lecture to the 2017 Geological Convention on the South China Sea Maritime Dispute
China, South China Sea Dispute, Philippines, USA, Spratlys, Artificial Islands, Reclamation, Regular Patrols, Military Conflict, Militarization, ADIZ, Air Defense Identification Zone
Implications of Chinese Activities in the South China Sea and Benham RiseSam Rodriguez Galope
China’s Creeping Expansion in the SCS from 1946 to 2016 Before World War II, China’s southernmost defense perimeter was Hainan Island. Before the war, China did not have a single soldier or sailor stationed in any SCS island outside of Hainan Island. In 1946, right after the war, China took over the Amphitrite Group of the Paracels and Itu Aba in the Spratlys following the defeat of the Japanese, moving China’s defense perimeter southward. China (Kuomintang) vacated Itu Aba in 1950 until 1956, when Taiwan occupied Itu Aba. In 1974, China forcibly dislodged the South Vietnamese from the Crescent Group of the Paracels. In 1987, China installed a weather radar station in Fiery Cross Reef. In 1988, China forcibly evicted Vietnam from Johnson South Reef, and seized Subi Reef from the Philippines, moving further south China’s defense perimeter in the Spratlys. In 1995, China seized Mischief Reef from the Philippines, just 125 NM from Palawan and 594 NM from Hainan. In 2012, China seized Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, just 124 NM from Luzon. In 2013, China seized Luconia Shoals from Malaysia, just 54 NM from Sarawak’s coast. In 2014, China started island-building on rocks and submerged areas in the Spratlys to construct air and naval bases.
2. China’s grand design is to control the South China Sea for economic and military purposes. China wants all the fishery, oil, gas and mineral resources within the nine-dashed line. China already takes 50% of the annual fish catch in the South China Sea as more than 80% of its coastal waters are already polluted. China has the largest fishing fleet in the world, with 220,000 sea-going vessels and 2,640 long- distance ocean-going vessels. China’s fish consumption is the highest in the world considering China’s 1.4 billion population. China is the largest net importer of petroleum in the world. China wants the lion’s share of the oil and gas in the South China Sea. The Chinese estimate that the South China Sea holds 130 billion barrels of oil, and if this is correct, the South China Sea is as rich in oil as Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. The South China Sea is also rich in methane hydrates - said to be one of the fuels of the future. China wants to secure all these methane hydrates for itself. China also wants the South China Sea as a sanctuary for its nuclear-armed submarines – free from surveillance by U.S. submarine-hunting Poseidon airplanes or U.S. nuclear attack submarines. China wants a second-strike nuclear capability, joining the ranks of the U.S. and Russia. China’s Grand Design in the South China Sea
Presentation by Antonio T. Carpio, Chair of the Second Division and Chair of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of the Philippines, at the Elcano Royal Institute on 11 May 2015.
- o -
Presentación de Antonio T. Carpio, magistrado de Filipinas, en una reunión realizada el 11 de mayo de 2015 en la sede del Real Instituto Elcano.
This is Justice Antonio T. Carpio's latest presentation on the South China Sea Dispute. It has 154 slides which contains maps made by Europeans, Chinese, and Foreigners from as early as the 13thC. The maps disprove China's claims that they have historical rights over the Paracels, Spratlys, and Scarborough shoal.
The South China Sea Dispute – An Update, Lecture Delivered on April 23, 2015 at a forum sponsored by the Bureau of Treasury and the Asian Institute of Journalism and Communications at the Ayuntamiento de Manila
Lecture South China Sea an Update 23 April 2015 Ayuntamiento de Manila BADGE
Download (PDF, 11.06MB)
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China, South China Sea Dispute, Philippines, USA, Spratlys, Artificial Islands, Reclamation, History, Maps, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Lecture, West Philippine Sea
China, South China Sea Dispute, Philippines, USA, Spratlys, Artificial Islands, Reclamation, History, Maps, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Lecture, West Philippine Sea
China, South China Sea Dispute, Philippines, USA, Spratlys, Artificial Islands, Reclamation, Regular Patrols, Military Conflict, Militarization, ADIZ, Air Defense Identification Zone, Maps, Cartographic Exhibit, Justice Antonio T. Carpio
Remarks on the 50th Anniversary of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treati...Sam Rodriguez Galope
Keynote Speech on the 50th Anniversary of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Department of Foreign Affairs 26 November 2019 Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Ret.) Acting Secretary Enrique Manalo, Undersecretary Eduardo Malaya, Atty. Igor Bailen, other officials and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs, distinguished guests, friends, a pleasant afternoon to everyone. Thank you for inviting me here this afternoon to join you in celebrating the Golden Anniversary of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As you know, the most important source of international law are treaties. Treaties regulate relations between and among states. Treaties constitute the law between and among treaty states. Treaties must be observed faithfully between and among treaty states as expressed in the maxim pacta sunt servanda. Harmonious relations between and among treaty states can be maintained only if states uniformly apply and interpret treaties that regulate their relations. Treaties cannot operate to regulate relations and conduct of states if treaty states have different interpretations of treaties to which they are parties. There can be no effective dispute settlement between and among treaty states without uniform and universally accepted rules of treaty interpretation.
Follow the Rule of Law, But Aspire for the Rule of Justice Ateneo Law School ...Sam Rodriguez Galope
Follow the Rule of Law, But Aspire for the Rule of Justice
Ateneo Law School Commencement Speech
Ateneo de Manila University, July 14, 2019
Justice Antonio T. Carpio
.
"Is war really the only way of enforcing the arbitral Award? The answer is, of course, a resounding no. Waging war to enforce the arbitral Award is against the rule of law, both under domestic law and international law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines has renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Our Constitution prohibits the government from going to war to enforce the arbitral Award. Under the United Nations Charter, war has been outlawed as a means of settling disputes between states.
.
"Any war of aggression can even subject the leaders of the aggressor state to prosecution for a crime against humanity, even if the aggressor state is not a member of the Rome Statute, as when the act of aggression is referred to the International Criminal Court by the Security Council. In short, it is against the rule of law to go to war to enforce the arbitral Award.
.
"Is there a way to enforce the arbitral Award using the rule of law in the absence of an enforcement mechanism under UNCLOS? This, in essence, is the question that President Rodrigo Duterte publicly asked me last June 24, 2019. Let me quote the Philippine Star news report on that day: “Xi Jinping (said) there will be trouble. So answer me, Justice,” Duterte said, referring to Carpio, “give me the formula and I’ll do it.”
.
"In short, President Duterte asked me before the entire Filipino people - show me the formula to enforce the arbitral Award without going to war with China and I will do it.
.
"My response is yes, Mr. President, there is a formula – and not only one but many ways of enforcing the arbitral Award without going to war with China, using only the rule of law. Let me mention a few of these, and I hope the President will implement them as he had promised."
.
~Justice Antonio T. Carpio
Second Quarter 2018 Social Weather Survey: 4 out of 5 Pinoys repudiate govern...Sam Rodriguez Galope
The Second Quarter 2018 Social Weather Survey, conducted from June 27-30, 2018, found that four out of five adult Filipinos repudiate the government’s policy of doing nothing about China’s intrusion in the West Philippine Sea.
The June 2018 survey asked, “Is [activity] RIGHT or NOT RIGHT for the Philippine government to do in resolving the conflict between the Philippines and China about the West Philippine Sea?” Five specific activities were tested.
To this, 81% said it is not right to leave China alone with its infrastructures and military presence in the claimed territories [Chart 1].
At the same time, 80% said it is right for the government to strengthen the military capability of the Philippines, especially the Navy.
Seventy-four percent said it is right for the government to bring the issue to international organizations, like the United Nations or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), for a diplomatic and peaceful negotiation with China about the claimed territories.
Seventy-three percent said it is alright to have direct, bilateral negotiations between the Philippines and China to discuss the resolution of the issue of the claimed territories.
Sixty-eight percent said the government should ask other countries to mediate the issue of the claimed territories.
81% say it is not right to do nothing about China’s intrusion in claimed territories
80% want the military, particularly the Navy, to be strengthened
74% want to bring the issue to international organizations for diplomatic negotiations
73% say it is alright for PH and China to have direct, bilateral negotiations
68% say the government should ask other countries to mediate
Net trust in China falls to “Bad” -35
https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20180714202446&mc_cid=ed998182eb&mc_eid=6280559e78
Remarks on 2nd Anniversary of the Arbitral Ruling on South China Sea Dispute ...Sam Rodriguez Galope
The July 12, 2016 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal was a
landmark ruling for three reasons. First, the Arbitral
Tribunal ruled that China’s so-called historic nine-dashed
line cannot serve as legal basis to claim any part of the
waters or resources of the South China Sea. China, like all
other coastal states in the South China Sea, cannot claim
maritime zones beyond what UNCLOS allows, that is, not
exceeding 350 NM from the coastline. The result is that
about 25 percent of the South China Sea are high seas, and
all around the high seas are the exclusive economic zones
of the adjacent coastal states. Of course, in the high seas
and exclusive economic zones there is freedom of
navigation and freedom of overflight as recognized under
customary international law and UNCLOS.
Ideas that Divide the Nation
Address to the 2018 Graduates on Recognition Day
National College of Public Administration & Governance
University of the Philippines, 22 June 2018
Our nation today is facing radical proposals to change its historic identity, its grant of regional autonomy, and its foreign policy. Because these proposals are radical and divisive, they require the deepest examination from all sectors of our society - from lawyers, public administrators, historians, political experts, businessmen, scientists, farmers, NGOs, and all other sectors in our society. I call these proposals Ideas that Divide the Nation.
We should be wary of new concepts imported from foreign shores and alien to our history as a people, which could Divide the Nation and even lead to the dismemberment of the Philippine state. Let me point out a few examples of these divisive ideas that have been introduced into our national discourse.
Japanese Translation: The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine Sovereign Right...Sam Rodriguez Galope
On 29 October 2011, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio delivered a speech before the Ateneo de Davao University College of Law on its 50th Founding Anniversary. Entitled e Rule of Law as the Great Equalizer, the speech signaled the beginning of his advocacy to protect the maritime entitlements of the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea as conferred by international law. In that speech, Justice Carpio declared:
This battle to defend our EEZ from China, the superpower in our region, is the 21st century equivalent of the battles that our forebears waged against Western and Eastern colonizers from the 16th to the 20th century. e best and the brightest of our forebears fought the Western and Eastern colonizers, and even sacri ced their lives, to make the Philippines free. In this modern- day battle, the best and the brightest legal warriors in our country today must stand up and fight to free the EEZ of the Philippines from foreign encroachment. In this historic battle to secure our EEZ, we must rely on the most powerful weapon invented by man in the settlement of disputes among states – a weapon that can immobilize armies, neutralize aircraft carriers, render irrelevant nuclear bombs, and level the battle eld between small nations and superpowers.
That weapon – the great equalizer – is the Rule of Law. Under the Rule of Law, right prevails over might.
This eBook is a collation of Justice Carpio’s lectures and speeches on the South China Sea dispute and the historic arbitral award rendered in favor of the Philippines. Totaling more than 140 lectures and speeches and spanning a period of more than five years, or from October 2011 to March 2017, these presentations were made in various fora, both in the Philippines and abroad. An earlier collation of his lectures and speeches was published in Antonio T. Carpio, Historical Facts, Historical Lies, and Historical Rights in the West Philippine Sea, 88 Phil. L.J. 389 (2014).
is ebook is interactive — if you click on a map or photo, or on the underlined name of the source of a photo or illustration, it will bring you to its online source.
Acceptance of Ruling is Material -- Statement of Justice Antonio T. CarpioSam Rodriguez Galope
Why China’s Acceptance of the Ruling Is Material
Statement of Justice Antonio T. Carpio
China is legally bound by the tribunal’s ruling, whether China likes it or not. That is the compulsory nature of international law. But China can decide to go rogue and refuse to accept and implement the ruling.
This is what China has done – refusing to vacate Mischief Reef which the tribunal ruled is submerged at high-tide and forms part of the Philippine EEZ. The tribunal ruled that only the Philippines can exploit or erect a structure in Mischief Reef.
In international law, where there is no world policeman to enforce a legally binding ruling, acceptance and implementation of the ruling by the losing State is obviously material. More so if the losing State is a military power, and the winning State is not.
Remarks before the 2017 U.P. Alumni Homecoming Never Give Up Honor, Soverei...Sam Rodriguez Galope
A pleasant afternoon to everyone.
On behalf of this year’s alumni awardees, I wish to thank the Board of Directors of the University of the Philippines Alumni Association headed by its President, Atty. Ramon Maronilla, for this signal award conferred on us. I am sure I speak for the all of the awardees here tonight that we are truly honored and humbled by this recognition. We will certainly treasure this award.
This year’s theme of the Alumni Homecoming is “Itanghal ang Dangal” - Show Honor. Honor is of course the first half of the U.P. Motto – “Honor and Excellence.”
The emphasis on showing honor correctly points out that honor comes before excellence, that there must be honor above all, even as there must be excellence in all that we do.
PRECEDENT AS A SOURCE OF LAW (SAIF JAVED).pptxOmGod1
Precedent, or stare decisis, is a cornerstone of common law systems where past judicial decisions guide future cases, ensuring consistency and predictability in the legal system. Binding precedents from higher courts must be followed by lower courts, while persuasive precedents may influence but are not obligatory. This principle promotes fairness and efficiency, allowing for the evolution of the law as higher courts can overrule outdated decisions. Despite criticisms of rigidity and complexity, precedent ensures similar cases are treated alike, balancing stability with flexibility in judicial decision-making.
RIGHTS OF VICTIM EDITED PRESENTATION(SAIF JAVED).pptxOmGod1
Victims of crime have a range of rights designed to ensure their protection, support, and participation in the justice system. These rights include the right to be treated with dignity and respect, the right to be informed about the progress of their case, and the right to be heard during legal proceedings. Victims are entitled to protection from intimidation and harm, access to support services such as counseling and medical care, and the right to restitution from the offender. Additionally, many jurisdictions provide victims with the right to participate in parole hearings and the right to privacy to protect their personal information from public disclosure. These rights aim to acknowledge the impact of crime on victims and to provide them with the necessary resources and involvement in the judicial process.
Military Commissions details LtCol Thomas Jasper as Detailed Defense CounselThomas (Tom) Jasper
Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Notice of the Chief Defense Counsel's detailing of LtCol Thomas F. Jasper, Jr. USMC, as Detailed Defense Counsel for Abd Al Hadi Al-Iraqi on 6 August 2014 in the case of United States v. Hadi al Iraqi (10026)
ASHWINI KUMAR UPADHYAY v/s Union of India.pptxshweeta209
transfer of the P.I.L filed by lawyer Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay in Delhi High Court to Supreme Court.
on the issue of UNIFORM MARRIAGE AGE of men and women.
DNA Testing in Civil and Criminal Matters.pptxpatrons legal
Get insights into DNA testing and its application in civil and criminal matters. Find out how it contributes to fair and accurate legal proceedings. For more information: https://www.patronslegal.com/criminal-litigation.html
Car Accident Injury Do I Have a Case....Knowyourright
Every year, thousands of Minnesotans are injured in car accidents. These injuries can be severe – even life-changing. Under Minnesota law, you can pursue compensation through a personal injury lawsuit.
Introducing New Government Regulation on Toll Road.pdfAHRP Law Firm
For nearly two decades, Government Regulation Number 15 of 2005 on Toll Roads ("GR No. 15/2005") has served as the cornerstone of toll road legislation. However, with the emergence of various new developments and legal requirements, the Government has enacted Government Regulation Number 23 of 2024 on Toll Roads to replace GR No. 15/2005. This new regulation introduces several provisions impacting toll business entities and toll road users. Find out more out insights about this topic in our Legal Brief publication.
A "File Trademark" is a legal term referring to the registration of a unique symbol, logo, or name used to identify and distinguish products or services. This process provides legal protection, granting exclusive rights to the trademark owner, and helps prevent unauthorized use by competitors.
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In 2020, the Ministry of Home Affairs established a committee led by Prof. (Dr.) Ranbir Singh, former Vice Chancellor of National Law University (NLU), Delhi. This committee was tasked with reviewing the three codes of criminal law. The primary objective of the committee was to propose comprehensive reforms to the country’s criminal laws in a manner that is both principled and effective.
The committee’s focus was on ensuring the safety and security of individuals, communities, and the nation as a whole. Throughout its deliberations, the committee aimed to uphold constitutional values such as justice, dignity, and the intrinsic value of each individual. Their goal was to recommend amendments to the criminal laws that align with these values and priorities.
Subsequently, in February, the committee successfully submitted its recommendations regarding amendments to the criminal law. These recommendations are intended to serve as a foundation for enhancing the current legal framework, promoting safety and security, and upholding the constitutional principles of justice, dignity, and the inherent worth of every individual.
How to Obtain Permanent Residency in the NetherlandsBridgeWest.eu
You can rely on our assistance if you are ready to apply for permanent residency. Find out more at: https://immigration-netherlands.com/obtain-a-permanent-residence-permit-in-the-netherlands/.
How to Obtain Permanent Residency in the Netherlands
Final Arbitral Award: July 12, 2016
1.
2. Nine-dashed Line Map
Submitted by China to United
Nations on 7 May 2009
China did not explain the legal basis
for the dashes. The dashes had no fixed
coordinates.
“China has indisputable sovereignty
over the islands in the South China
Sea and the adjacent waters, and
enjoys sovereign rights and
jurisdiction over the relevant waters as
well as the seabed and subsoil
thereof.” - China’s Note Verbale of 7
May 2009
The Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia
promptly protested China’s claim
under this dashed lines map. The
Philippines belatedly protested on 11
April 2011.
3. • In 2013, China released a new map of China, adding a 10th
dash on the eastern side of Taiwan. In its 2013 map,
China claims the ten dashes are its “national boundaries,”
without again explaining the legal basis or giving the fixed
coordinates for the dashes. The 2013 China map was
published by SinoMaps Press, under the jurisdiction of
China’s State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. This
means the 2013 Map is an official Chinese government
map.
• In its Note Verbale of June 7, 2013 to China, the
Philippines stated it "strongly objects to the indication
that the nine-dash lines are China's national boundaries
in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea.”
China’s 2013 Map with Ten Dashes
As China’s “National Boundaries”
4. China Claims the Ten Dashes
In the 2013 Map Are China’s
“National Boundaries”
5. Core Dispute: China’s Claim to 80 Percent of Philippine EEZ
Under the nine-dashed line, China claims the Reed Bank, James Shoal, waters within the EEZ of Vietnam,
and prohibits foreign fishing vessels from fishing in the high seas of the South China Sea without
permission from China. In short, China claims all the resources within the nine-dashed line, which
encloses 85.7 percent of the South China Sea. Under the nine-dashed line, China wants to grab 80
percent of the EEZ of the Philippines in the South China Sea.
6. China’s Creeping Expansion in the SCS from 1946 to 2016
Before World War II, China’s
southernmost defense perimeter was
Hainan Island. Before the war, China
did not have a single soldier or sailor
stationed in any SCS island outside of
Hainan Island. In 1946, right after
the war, China took over the
Amphitrite Group of the Paracels and
Itu Aba in the Spratlys following the
defeat of the Japanese, moving
China’s defense perimeter southward.
China (Kuomintang) vacated Itu Aba
in 1950 until 1956, when Taiwan
occupied Itu Aba. In 1974, China
forcibly dislodged the South
Vietnamese from the Crescent Group
of the Paracels. In 1987, China
installed a weather radar station on
Fiery Cross Reef. In 1988, China
forcibly evicted Vietnam from
Johnson South Reef, and seized Subi
Reef from the Philippines, moving
further south China’s defense
perimeter in the Spratlys.
In 1995, China seized Mischief Reef from the Philippines, just 125 NM from
Palawan and 594 NM from Hainan. In 2012, China seized Scarborough Shoal
from the Philippines, just 124 NM from Luzon. In 2013, China seized Luconia
Shoals from Malaysia, just 54 NM from Sarawak’s coast. In 2014, China started
island-building on rocks and submerged areas in the Spratlys to construct air and
naval bases.
7. China’s grand design is to control the South China Sea for economic and military
purposes. China wants all the fishery, oil, gas and mineral resources within the
nine-dashed line. China already takes 50% of the annual fish catch in the South
China Sea as more than 80% of its coastal waters are already polluted. China has
the largest fishing fleet in the world, with 220,000 sea-going vessels and 2,640 long-
distance ocean-going vessels. China’s fish consumption is the highest in the world
considering China’s 1.4 billion population.
China is the largest net importer of petroleum in the world. China wants the lion’s
share of the oil and gas in the South China Sea. The Chinese estimate that the
South China Sea holds 130 billion barrels of oil, and if this is correct, the South
China Sea is as rich in oil as Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. The South China
Sea is also rich in methane hydrates - said to be one of the fuels of the future.
China wants to secure all these methane hydrates for itself.
China also wants the South China Sea as a sanctuary for its nuclear-armed
submarines – free from surveillance by U.S. submarine-hunting Poseidon airplanes
or U.S. nuclear attack submarines. China wants a second-strike nuclear capability,
joining the ranks of the U.S. and Russia.
China’s Grand Design in the South China Sea
8. Maritime Zones under UNCLOS
An island above water at high tide is entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea. If such island is capable of human habitation or economic life of its
own, it is entitled to a 200 NM EEZ. If there is an outer continental shelf beyond 200 NM, the island is entitled to an ECS of 150 NM from
the outer limits of its EEZ. The maximum maritime zone a coastal state can claim is 150 NM from the outer limits of its 200 NM EEZ (or 100
NM from the 2500 meter isobath, a limitation which does not apply to coastal states in the South China Sea based on the geology and
geomorphology of the South China Sea). China is claiming maritime zones more than 150 NM from the outer limits of its EEZ, or more than
350 NM from its coastlines in Hainan Island or its mainland.
9. Low Tide Elevation vs. Rock/Island
A low-tide elevation is not entitled to a territorial sea or any maritime zone. A rock above water at high
tide is entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea. An island capable of human habitation or economic life of its
own is entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea, a 200 NM EEZ, and an outer continental shelf of 150 NM from
the outer limits of its EEZ (or 100 NM from the 2500 meter isobath, if applicable).
11. China Seized Scarborough Shoal in 2012
Just as in 1995 when China seized Mischief Reef, the Philippines had no military capability to defend or
retake Scarborough Shoal in 2012 when China seized the shoal. The Philippines decided to bring the
dispute to a forum where warships, warplanes and nuclear bombs do not count - to an UNCLOS arbitral
Tribunal which would resolve the dispute solely based on the Law of the Sea. Robert Kaplan, in his book
Asia’s Cauldron, called this resort to international law the “ultimate demonstration of weakness.”
12. 1. China’s claim to historic rights under the nine-dashed line
is contrary to UNCLOS, without lawful effect and cannot
be the basis of any maritime entitlement (territorial sea,
exclusive economic zone and outer continental shelf).
2. No geologic feature in the Spratlys is capable of human
habitation or economic life of its own so as to generate a
200-NM EEZ that overlaps with Palawan’s EEZ.
3. Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation not entitled to any
maritime zone. It is part of the continental shelf of the
Philippines. It cannot be the subject of sovereignty by any
state. Only the Philippines can erect structures on Mischief
Reef.
4. Reed Bank is a fully submerged area forming part of the
EEZ of the Philippines.
Major Issues Raised in the Arbitration &
Resolved by the Annex VII UNCLOS Tribunal
13. • The nine-dashed line has no legal effect and cannot serve as legal basis to
claim any maritime entitlement under UNCLOS. In short, “there was
no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the
sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.”
• China’s maritime zones, just like those of other coastal states, cannot
extend beyond the limits prescribed under UNCLOS. Maritime
entitlements must be claimed only from land.
• All historic rights in the EEZ, ECS and high seas were
extinguished upon effectivity of UNCLOS: “[A]ny historic rights that
China may have had to the living and non-living resources within the
‘nine-dash line’ were superseded, as a matter of law and as between the
Philippines and China, by the limits of the maritime zones provided for
by the Convention.”
• “[T]here was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive
control over the waters [of the South China Sea] or their resources.”
The Tribunal upheld the Philippine position on this issue.
Ruling on China’s Claim to Historic Rights
Under the Nine-Dashed Line
14. High Seas and EEZs in South China Sea
“[T]he Tribunal concludes that China’s claim to historic rights to the living and non-living resources
within the ‘nine-dash line’ is incompatible with the Convention to the extent that it exceeds the limits of
China’s maritime zones as provided for by the Convention.” (Para 261, Award of 12 July 2016)
15. 1136 AD “Hua Yi Tu”
“The Philippines submits that Chinese historic maps dating back to 1136, including those
purporting to depict the entirety of the Empire of China, consistently show China’s territory
extending no further south than Hainan.” (Para 195, Award of 12 July 2016)
16. 1896 “Huang Chao Zhi Sheng Yu Di Quan Tu” or The Qing
Empire’s Complete Map of All Provinces
During the Chinese dynasties, Hainan Island was a part of Guangdong Province. Hainan
became a separate province only in 1988. The Qing Dynasty saw one of the largest expansions
of Chinese territory throughout the Chinese dynasties. The Qing dynasty ceded Formosa to
Japan in 1895 following the Qing’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).
18. 1595 Ortelius Map - Champa Kingdom and Champa Sea
Before Portuguese navigators coined the name South China Sea, the sea was known as the Champa Sea,
after the Cham people who established a great kingdom in central Vietnam from the late 2nd to the 17th
century. The Chams had sailboats with outriggers, just like the sailboats of the Austronesians. The
ancestors of the Chams spoke a Malayo-Polynesian language that is derived from the Austronesian
language, just like the Tagalog language. The word “cham” comes from the flower of the champaka tree.
This flower is the symbol of the Cham Kingdom. The Chams are believed to have migrated from Borneo
to central Vietnam.
“For centuries the South
China Sea was known by
navigators throughout Asia
as the Champa Sea, named
for a great empire that
controlled all of central
Vietnam xxx.” - National
Geographic, June 18, 2014
19. Islands in the Champa Sea Had Austronesian Names
1596 Linschoten Map: “Pulo” in Tagalog means an “island, isolated place.”
https://www.tagalog-dictionary.com/search?word=pulo.
20. 1688 Coronelli Terrestrial Globe
Vincenzo Coronelli made this famous terrestrial globe in 1688. This map is one of the 12 gores (sections) of the 1688
globe. Famous for his atlases and globes, Coronelli was the Father General of the Franciscan Order. The Franciscans
arrived in the Philippines in 1578.
22. • In 1932, the French occupied the uninhabited
Paracels. China sent a Note Verbale to the French
Government on September 29, 1932 protesting
the French occupation of the Paracels. In its
Note Verbale, the Chinese Government officially
declared:
Expansion of Southernmost
Territory of China Started in 1932
23. “Note of 29 September 1932 from the Legation of
the Chinese Republic in France to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Paris
On the instructions of its Government, the
Legation of the Chinese Republic in France has
the honor to transmit its Government’s reply to
the Foreign Ministry’s Note of 4 January 1932 on
the subject of the Paracel Islands.”
xxxx
24. “xxx The eastern group is called the Amphitrites
and the western group the Crescent. These groups
lie 145 nautical miles from Hainan Island, and
form the southernmost part of Chinese
territory.” (Emphasis supplied)
xxx [Source: Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands,
Monique Chemelier-Gendreau, Annex 10, Kluwer Law
International, 2000]
25. “Southernmost Part of Chinese Territory” – the Paracels
The Paracels - “These groups lie 145 nautical miles from Hainan Island, and form
the southernmost part of Chinese territory.” China’s Note Verbale to France of 29
September 1932
27. • None of the geologic features (rocks and islands) in the Spratlys
is capable of “human habitation or economic life of [its] own” so
as to be entitled to a 200-NM EEZ.
• Since there is no other EEZ that overlaps with Palawan’s EEZ, the
Tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on the maritime issues in the
Spratlys.
• The Spratlys cannot be taken as a single unit to determine
capability to sustain human habitation or economic life;
• To be entitled to a 200-NM EEZ, the geologic feature must have
the “objective capacity, in its natural condition, to sustain either a stable
community of people or economic activity that is not dependent on
outside resources or purely extractive in nature.”
• Itu Aba, the largest geologic feature in the Spratlys, does not
satisfy this requirement. Thus, Itu Aba is entitled only to a 12-
NM territorial sea.
• The Tribunal upheld the Philippine position on this issue.
Ruling on Status of Geologic Features in
Spratlys to Generate 200-NM EEZ
29. • Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation; it is not land or
territory that can be subject to sovereignty; it is not
entitled to a territorial sea; it forms part of the
Philippines’ continental shelf within the Philippine
EEZ; only the Philippines can erect structures or an
artificial island on Mischief Reef; China cannot
appropriate Mischief Reef as its own territory or
maritime zone; China’s structures on Mischief Reed are
illegal.
• Reed Bank is entirely submerged and forms part of the
Philippine EEZ as it is within 200-NM from Philippine
baselines. Only the Philippines can exploit the natural
resources in Reed Bank.
Ruling on Status of Mischief Reef and Reed Bank
31. • Scarborough Shoal is a high-tide elevation entitled to
12-NM territorial sea but not to a 200-NM EEZ since
obviously it is not capable of human habitation.
• The territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal is a traditional
fishing ground of Filipino and Chinese fishermen, as
well as fishermen from other countries; China cannot
prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing in Scarborough
Shoal.
• The Tribunal upheld the Philippine position on this
issue.
Ruling on Status of Scarborough Shoal;
Right to Traditional Fishing
33. Disputed Area after the Ruling of Tribunal
The Tribunal ruled that McKennan Reef is above water at high tide. McKennan Reef and Johnson South
Reef are the only Chinese-occupied high-tide features within the Philippine EEZ in the Spratlys.
Scarborough Shoal, McKennan Reef and Johnson South Reef are thus the only disputed land features
occupied by China within the entire Philippine EEZ. The Tribunal ruled that these three land features
generate only a 12-NM territorial sea, with no EEZ.
34. The Philippine EEZ in the SCS has an area of about 381,000
square kilometers. Deducting the 4,650 square kilometers
total territorial seas of Johnson South Reef, McKennan Reef
and Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines has an EEZ of about
376,350 square kilometers in the SCS free from any Chinese
claim.
This maritime area is larger than the total land area of the
Philippines of approximately 300,000 square kilometers.
All the living and non-living resources in this huge maritime
area – the fish, oil, gas and other minerals – belong
exclusively to the Philippines.
The Philippines’ EEZ in the South China Sea
Is Larger than its Total Land Area
35. China Claimed Reed Bank in 2010
In February 2010, the Philippines awarded a Service Contract to Sterling Energy (predecessor of Forum Energy) for Block SC 72 in the Reed
Bank. China protested, sending a Note Verbale to the Philippines on 22 February 2010, "express[ing] its strong objection and indignation,”
and asserting "indisputable sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Nansha Islands (Spratlys) and its adjacent waters.” China
demanded that the Philippines "withdraw the Service Contract immediately.” China sent another Note Verbale on 13 May 2010 again
demanding that the Philippines "immediately withdraw the decision to award the Service Contract” to Sterling Energy. Block SC 72 is 85
NM from Palawan, well within the Philippines’ EEZ, and 595 NM from Hainan. The entire Reed Bank is a fully submerged area even at
low-tide.
36. China Reiterated its Claim to Reed Bank in 2011
In 2011, the Philippines invited bids for the exploration of Area 3 and Area 4 in the Reed Bank, well within
the Philippines’ EEZ. On 4 July 2011, China protested and sent a Note Verbale to the Philippines, stating:
“The Chinese government urges the Philippine side to immediately withdraw the bidding offer in Areas 3
and 4, refrain from any action that infringes on China's sovereignty and sovereign rights.”
37. Chinese Coast Guard Vessels Harassed
A Philippine Survey Ship in Reed Bank in 2011
In March 2011, two Chinese coast guard vessels, the CMS-71 and CMS-75, prevented a Philippine-
commissioned ship, the MV Veritas Voyager, from undertaking oil and gas survey in the Reed Bank,
which is entirely within the Philippines’ EEZ. The nine-dashed line cuts through Malampaya, the
Philippines’ largest operating gas field which supplies 40% of the energy requirement of Luzon.
Malampaya will run out of gas in 10-12 years.
38. What is the Legal Basis of the Philippines’
Claim to Scarborough Shoal
• The 1898 Treaty of
Paris between Spain
and the United States
drew a rectangular line
wherein Spain ceded
to the United States all
of Spain’s territories
found within the treaty
lines. Scarborough
Shoal lies outside of
the treaty lines.
39. China’s Argument Why Philippines Does Not Have
Sovereignty Over Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated: "The
three treaties that stipulate the Philippines'
territory, the first in 1898, the second in 1900 and
the third in 1930, all regulated the Philippines'
western boundary line at 118 degrees east
longitude. Areas in the west of the 118 degrees
east longitude do not belong to the Philippines.
But the Nansha islands claimed now by the
Philippines, the Huangyan Islands, are all in the
west of the 118 degrees east longitude.” Speech on
25 February 2016 at the CSIS, Washington, D.C.
40. • In the 1900 Treaty of Washington, Spain clarified that it had
also relinquished to the United States “all title and claim of
title, which (Spain) may have had at the time of the
conclusion of the Treaty of Peace of Paris, to any and all
islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside
the lines” of the Treaty of Paris. Thus, under the 1900 Treaty
of Washington, Spain ceded to the United States all territories,
to which Spain had title or claim of title, lying outside the
lines of the Treaty of Paris. These territories outside the lines,
west of the 118 degrees east longitude, included Scarborough
Shoal and the Spratlys.
• *Treaty between Spain and the United States for Cession of Outlying
Islands of the Philippines, signed on 7 November 1900.)
1900 Treaty of Washington between Spain & United States*
41. When the issue of whether Scarborough Shoal forms part of
Philippine territory, Secretary Cordell Hull of the U.S. State
Department stated in his Memorandum of July 27, 1938 to Harry
Woodring, Secretary of War:
Because of the absence of other claims, the shoal should be
regarded as included among the islands ceded to the United
States by the American-Spanish Treaty of November 7, 1900*…
In the absence of evidence of a superior claim to Scarborough
Shoal by any other government, the Department of State would
interpose no objection to the proposal of the Commonwealth
Government to study the possibilities of the shoal as an aid to air
and ocean navigation.
*Treaty of Washington; boldfacing supplied.
Source: A CNA Occasional Paper, Philippine Claims in the South China Sea: A Legal Analysis, Mark E. Rosen, JD,
LLM [citing François-Xavier Bonnet, The Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal, available at www.irasec.com.] (2014)
In 1938 the U.S. Had Already Determined
Scarborough Shoal Is Part of Philippine Territory
42. The U.S. has officially recognized that territories Spain ceded to the
U.S. under the 1900 Treaty of Washington are covered by the MDT.
On 6 January 1979, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance officially
wrote to Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo:
“Metropolitan territory of the Philippines” means all the land
areas and all adjacent waters subject to the sovereignty of the
Republic of the Philippines, in accordance with international law,
lying within the area delineated in the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898, and in the Treaty of Washington of
November 7, 1900, and subsequently amended in the Treaty of
the United States and Great Britain on January 2, 1930.”
Thus, Scarborough Shoal is part of Philippine territory and is
covered by the MDT, as expressly recognized by the U.S.
Government.
U.S. Recognized Scarborough Shoal Is Covered by MDT
43. 1899 “Islas Filipinas, Mapa General Observatorio de Manila.”
Published in 1899 in Washington, D.C. by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.
44. Article 11, Annex VII, UNCLOS. “The award shall be
final and without appeal, unless the parties to the
dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate
procedure. It shall be complied with by the parties to
the dispute.”
Article 300, UNCLOS. “State parties shall fulfill in
good faith the obligations assumed under this
Convention xxx.”
Thus, China and the Philippines, which have both
ratified UNCLOS, have the obligation to comply in
good faith with the award.
Next Steps – Enforcement of Ruling
45. 1. Enforcement of the ruling by the world’s naval
powers with respect to freedom of navigation
and overflight for military vessels and aircraft in
the high seas and EEZs of the South China Sea.
2. Enforcement of the ruling by the Philippines
with respect to its exclusive right to exploit the
resources of its EEZ in the South China Sea.
Two Aspects in Enforcement of Ruling
46. Maritime Zones under UNCLOS
An island above water at high tide is entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea. If such island is capable of human habitation or
economic life of its own, it is entitled to a 200 NM EEZ. If there is an outer continental shelf, it is entitled to an OCS of
150 NM from the outer limits of its EEZ (or 100 NM from the 2500 meter isobath, a limitation which does not apply to
coastal states in the South China Sea based on the geology and geomorphology of the South China Sea). China is claiming
maritime zones more than 150 NM from the outer limits of its EEZ, or more than 350 NM from its coastlines in Hainan
Island or its mainland.
47. 1. The United States says its military forces will continue to operate in the disputed South
China Sea in accordance with international law. The US Chief of Naval Operations John
Richardson said, "The US Navy will continue to conduct routine and lawful operations
around the world, including in the South China Sea, in order to protect the rights,
freedoms and lawful uses of sea and airspace guaranteed to all. This will not change.”*
2. France is urging the 27-nation EU to coordinate naval patrols in the South China Sea to
ensure a "regular and visible" presence in the disputed waters illegally claimed by China
xxx. The French government said the protection of freedom of the seas is vital from an
economic standpoint. It's also concerned a loss of this right in the South China Sea
might lead to similar problems in the Arctic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea, said Defense
Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian.**
3. British Ambassador to the U.S. Kim Darroch stated that British Typhoon fighter jets that
visited Japan in October 2016 flew over the South China Sea in their return flight to
assert freedom of overflight. He added: “Certainly, as we bring our two new aircraft
carriers on-stream in 2020, and as we renew and update our defense forces, they will be
seen in the Pacific. And we absolutely share the objective of this U.S. administration,
and the next one, to protect freedom of navigation and to keep sea routes and air routes
open.”***
World’s Naval Powers Will Sail and
Fly in the High Seas and EEZs of SCS
* http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2016/07/20/476110/US-Navy-South-China-Sea
** http://en.yibada.com/articles/147065/20160731/france-urges-european-union-join-patrolling-south-china-sea.htm
*** http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-southchinasea-fighters-idUSKBN13R00D
49. 1. Philippine response if China installs a gas
platform in the Reed Bank;
2. Recovery of damages from China for severe
harm to the marine environment in the Spratlys;
3. Suspension of China’s exploration permits for
the seabed until China complies with the ruling;
4. Suspension of China’s application for an outer
continental shelf in the East China Sea until
China complies with the ruling.
Civil Enforcement of Exclusive Right to the EEZ
50. 1. Under the Phil-US Mutual Defense Treaty,* any armed attack
on a Philippine public vessel (Navy or Coast Guard) in the
Pacific area (clarified to include the South China Sea**) is a
ground to invoke the treaty. Thus, Philippine Navy and Coast
Guard ships or aircraft patrolling the Philippine EEZ in the
South China Sea are covered by the treaty. The US has declared
that China must comply with the ruling of the Tribunal,
recognizing the right of the Philippines to patrol the West
Philippine Sea.
2. Anti-access, area denial military strategy (e.g. Vietnam’s mobile
EXTRA rocket artillery system recently acquired from Israel).
• Article IV of the MDT provides: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of
the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the
common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. . . . .”
• Letter of U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo
dated 6 January 1979; Letter of U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Thomas C. Hubbard to Foreign
Secretary Domingo L. Siazon dated 24 May 1999.
Military Enforcement of Exclusive Right to the EEZ
51. 1. Overtime the rulings in the Philippines v. China arbitration will
be followed by other arbitral tribunals, cementing the rulings
as principles of international law. For example, the standard
of what constitutes an island capable of human habitation of
its own could be applied in succeeding cases. Also, the
extinguishment of historic claims in the EEZ, ECS and high
seas could be reiterated in succeeding cases.
2. Coastal states that stand to benefit from the rulings will
naturally invoke and apply the rulings. This will create a body
of legal literature supporting the rulings as the authoritative
interpretation of UNCLOS. It will also result in state practice
adopting the rulings. Thus, the Philippines should now
negotiate its maritime boundaries with Malaysia (EEZ and
ECS) and Vietnam (ECS), applying the Tribunal’s ruling that
no geologic feature in the Spratlys generates an EEZ and that
the nine-dashed line has no legal effect.
3. The Philippines should also delineate its extended continental
shelf (ECS) from Luzon and file its claim with the CLCS,
there being no legal impediment from the nine-dashed line.
Judicial Awards, State Practice and International Agencies
52. Extended Continental Shelf from Luzon
China can raise two grounds to oppose the Philippines’ ECS claim before the UNCLCS. First, China can
again raise its nine-dashed line claim but the UNCLCS is bound by the award of the UNCLOS tribunal.
Second, China can claim that the Philippines’ ECS overlaps with China’s ECS but this means China
accepts that the Philippines has an EEZ from Luzon.
53. As a win-win solution to the territorial dispute in the Spratlys, (the Tribunal’s
ruling does not resolve the territorial dispute), all claimant states should suspend
for 100 years their territorial claims and declare all the low-tide and high-tide
features in the Spratlys, and an area of 3--NM around each feature, an international
marine peace park* for the benefit of all coastal states in the South China Sea.
This insures that the Spratlys will remain the South China Sea’s nursery where fish
spawn. The eggs and larvae of fish that spawn in the Spratlys are carried by
currents to the coasts of China, Vietnam, Luzon, Palawan, Malaysia, Brunei,
Natuna Islands, as well as the Celebes and Sulu seas.
The claimant states will hold on to whatever islands/structures they now possess.
Only coast guard personnel and vessels can be stationed in the Spratlys. The
islands/structures can only be used for marine scientific research and eco-tourism.
There is a precedent to this. The 1994 peace agreement between Israel and Jordan
created the Red Sea Marine Peace Park in the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea.
* First proposed by Dr. John W. McManus in 1994, The Spratly Islands: A Marine Peace Park? Ambio, Vol. 23, No. 3,
May 1994; See also John W. McManus, Kwang-Tsao Shao and Szu-Yin Lin in 2010. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/00908320.2010.499303?journalCode=uodl20
Declare the Spratlys an International Marine Peace Park
54. 1. “Kwang-Tsao Shao, a marine-biodiversity expert at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica in
Taipei, says that at meetings that include his mainland peers, there is
consensus from ecologists on both sides of the strait that the region should be
set aside as a marine protected area.”*
2. Prof. Edgardo Gomez, Philippine national scientist for marine biology, and
other marine biologists at the U.P. Marine Science Institute, support a marine
protected area in the Spratlys.**
3. Professors Nguyen Chu Hoi and Vu Hai Dang, Vietnamese marine ecologists,
support a marine protected area in the Spratlys.***
* http://www.nature.com/news/south-china-sea-ruling-sparks-conservation fears-1.20279
** http://www.fpi.sais-jhu.edu/#!Marine-Peace-Park-Plan-Offers-Promise-for-South-China-Sea/c1qvb/
563ba7370cf28330832ed0fb
*** Nguyen Chu Hoi and Vu Hai Dang, Building a Regional Network and Management Regime of Marine Protected Areas in
the South China Sea for Sustainable Development, 18 J.INT’L WILD LIFE L. & POL’Y (2015).
Marine Ecologists from PROC, Taiwan, the Philippines and
Vietnam Support a Spratlys Marine Protected Area
55. Dispersal of Eggs and Larvae of Fish
Of the total world annual fish catch, 12% comes from the SCS, valued at US$21.8 billion. The
SCS has 3,365 species in 263 families of fish. Bordered by 12 countries with two billion people,
the SCS is one of the top five most productive fishing zones in the world in terms of total
annual fish catch. (Boom or Bust, the Future of Fish in the South China Sea, U. Rashid Sumaila & William
W.L. Cheung, 2015)
56. “If we don’t do this (establish a Marine Protected
Area), we are headed toward a major, major
fisheries collapse in a part of the world where
[that] will lead to mass starvation,” Prof. John
McManus warned on 12 July 2016 in a
Washington, D.C. forum organized by the Center
for Strategic and International Studies.*
* http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-south-china-sea-environment-20160713-snap
story.html
Major Fisheries Collapse
Could Lead to Mass Starvation
58. Scarborough Shoal and North Korea
1. President Trump:
1. "We have China who is really trying” to convince Kim Jong Un to stop North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program.
2. "I think, long-term, we are going to have a very, very great relationship (with President
Xi of China) and I look very much forward to it," Trump said.
3. “He is a very good man and I got to know him very well.”
4. “We don’t know whether or not they’re able to do that, but I have absolute confidence
that he will be trying very very hard” to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
5. Trump said he wouldn't want to "cause difficulty" for the Chinese leader (Xi) by again
breaking with the “one China” policy. "He's a friend of mine. I think he's doing an
amazing job as a leader, and I wouldn't want to do anything that comes in the way of
that. So, I would certainly want to speak to him first," Trump said.
2. No FONOPS in South China Sea Since Trump Took Office
1. The U.S. Navy has not conducted any Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)
near disputed Chinese features in the South China Sea since President Donald Trump
took office. (The Diplomat, 8 May 2017)
2. The Trump administration appears to be easing up on Beijing in the South China Sea,
in what is being seen as another concession to China by the new US President who
hopes for a solution in North Korea. (CNN, 4 May 2017)
59.
60. Chinese Detection/Defense Capabilities in the South China Sea
Published by the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative | http;//amti.csis.org | Updated March 27, 2017
62. 2016 Chairman’s Statement of 28th & 29th ASEAN Summits:
“We remain seriously concerned over recent and ongoing
developments and took note of the concerns expressed by some
Leaders on the land reclamations and escalation of activities in the
area, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions
and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region.
xxx
We emphasized the importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint
in the conduct of all activities, including land reclamation that could
further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in the South
China Sea."
2017 Chairman’s Statement on 30th ASEAN Summit:
No mention of reclamation and militarization.
ASEAN Chairman’s Statements
63. 1. Declaration by the United States affirming that
Scarborough Shoal is part of Philippine territory
and therefore covered by the Phil-U.S. Mutual
Defense Treaty;
2. Philippine Navy Ships and Philippine Air Force
aircraft to patrol Scarborough Shoal. If
subjected to armed attack by Chinese forces,
invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Last Ditch Effort to Stop Reclamation on Scarborough Shoal