The document discusses Fidel Castro's rise to power in Cuba, detailing the U.S. government's actions that inadvertently supported his regime, emphasizing how the media and certain U.S. officials contributed to the perception of Castro as a reformer. It highlights key historical events, such as the 1952 coup attempt and the Bay of Pigs invasion, asserting that the U.S. State Department was aware of Castro's communist affiliations while publicly denying them. The narrative reflects on the consequences of Castro's rule, including the suppression of civil liberties and the alignment with Soviet communism.

1. _____________________________________________________________
FIDEL CASTRO'S
CLIMB TO POWER
By William P. Hoar
American Opinion Magazine
American Opinion Publishing Incorporated
www.thenewamerican.com – www.jbs.org
_____________________________________________________________
Fidel Castro's dictatorship in Cuba, contended Senator J. William
Fulbright to President John F. Kennedy in March 1961, is a "thorn in
the flesh, but it is not a dagger in the heart." Yet through U.S. actions,
which helped put Castro in control in Havana, then ensured that he
would be strong enough to hold that power, U.S. Presidents -- including,
most recently, Bill Clinton -- have had to deal with the communist
dictator of Cuba, who became much more than an irritation.
Early Revolutionary Days
Born in 1928 to a sugar cane contractor, Fidel Castro demonstrated an
early affection for power, studying Hitler's Mein Kampf and spending
hours mimicking before tape recorder and mirror the Italian Fascist
Benito Mussolini. While some of his apologists have argued that Castro was
somehow forced into communism (even after he boldly declared himself a
Marxist/Leninist), his early history exposes him as a gangster and
revolutionary. In 1947, for example, Castro participated in an invasion of
the Dominican Republic. In 1948, when the meeting in Colombia of the
Ninth International Conference of American States was attended by a
large contingent of communist students, including Fidel, there were
thousands killed in the Bogotazo riots. The bloody frenzy was touched off
by the assassination of Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. Shortly
before Gaitan's killing, Castro was seen in the presence of the assassin (who
1

2. was himself killed); the communists were prepared to take advantage of the
violence.
Subsequently, U.S. Ambassador to Peru and Brazil William Pawley
testified before Congress that he had heard a voice on the radio saying
(hyperbolically, it turned out):
"This is Fidel Castro from Cuba. This is a Communist revolution. The
president has been killed; all the military establishments in Colombia
are now in our hands; the navy has capitulated, and this revolution
has been a success." The police and even the president of Colombia
uncovered Castro's role -- identifying him and another Red as "first-
grade agents of the Third Front of the USSR in South America."
On July 26, 1953, Castro led an abortive coup attempt against Cuba's
president, Fulgencio Batista. Although Castro and his brother Raul, a
known communist, were sentenced to 15 and 13 years respectively, Batista
amnestied them after 22 months. The Castro's left Cuba for Mexico,
where they hooked up with Argentine communist Ernesto "Che"
Guevara and others to prepare for an invasion of Cuba. The resulting
82-man "invasion" in December 1956 was a dismal failure, and Fidel and a
small band of survivors took to the Sierra Maestra.
Enter Herbert Matthews
The American media, in particular Herbert Matthews of the New York
Times, built up the myth of Fidel Castro -- the supposed agrarian
reformer. John Kennedy compared the Cuban revolution to the American
one, and called Fidel "part of the legacy of Bolivar." JFK also bought the
fable of U.S. exploitation of a downtrodden Cuba.
Matthews, who had earlier backed the communist side in the Spanish
Civil War, also exaggerated such things as the alleged poor health care of
Cubans and even a lack of shoes. Yet even Kennedy house historian Arthur
Schlesinger admitted that pre-Castro Cuba ranked near the top in Latin
America in "education, literacy, social services and urbanization." Cuba's
communist revolution did not start from the "bottom up." Che Guevara, in
the World Marxist Review, acknowledged as much: "The armed struggle
was initiated by the petty bourgeoisie."
2

3. In a series of articles starting in February 1957, Matthews blasted
Batista and fawned on Fidel,
"the rebel leader of Cuba's youth," who was a "flaming symbol."
General Batista, assured Matthews, "cannot possibly hope to suppress
the Castro revolt." Fidel Castro's program, came the word from the
Times, "amounts to a new deal for Cuba, radical, democratic, and
therefore anti-Communist."
Matthews' coverage of Castro in the New York Times was reprinted by
Castro supporters and distributed in Cuba, leading to a series of public-
relations successes.
As a Castro publicist put it:
"Both Matthews and the New York Times could be considered
practically in our pockets, so it was better to keep them in reserve for
the future."
A succession of media puffs were run by NBC, CBS, and Life. At the time
that Batista supposedly could not resist Castro, Castro and his men had been
involved in but two minor actions -- one in which they butchered sleeping
guards, according to Guevara. Little wonder, as Guevara later admitted
when the revolution was over,
"The presence of a foreign journalist, American for preference, was
more important for us than a military victory."
Others in the media also helped in the same vein as Matthews, including
Jean-Paul Sartre and C. Wright Mills. When a triumphant Fidel visited
New York, in a stage-managed performance akin to the "guerrilla theater"
in the Sierra Maestra, Norman Mailer proclaimed that
"it was as if the ghost of Cortez had appeared in our century riding
Zapata's white horse."
Castro, wrote Mailer, was
"the first and greatest hero to appear in the world since the Second
War."
3

4. Help at the U. S. Department of State
Obviously it took more than press clippings to communize Cuba -- it
also took the U.S. State Department. When Ambassador Earl E.T.
Smith was posted to Havana, he was told outright that (as later
recounted before a Senate subcommittee by another ambassador,
Robert Hill) he had been
"assigned to Cuba to preside over the downfall of Batista. The
decision has been made that Batista has to go. You must be very
careful."
In charge of the project, as Smith found out, were Roy Rubottom,
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, and William
Wieland, director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs. Both,
as it happens, had been in Colombia at the time of the Bogotazo riots
and knew about Castro's actions but had not reported about it at that
time, nor did they deign to mention that most pertinent matter to
Ambassador Smith when he went to Cuba in July 1957. As late as 1961,
Wieland and Rubottom were officially peddling the line that Fidel was not a
communist, though they knew otherwise, as was later determined in security
hearings. Friends of Wieland, for example, testified that he had told them in
1957 and 1958 that he knew that Castro was a communist. There can be no
doubt that Rubottom and Wieland were covering for Castro.
Smith, a brave man who risked the wrath of all those pushing the Red
line -- in Havana and in Washington -- later recalled in The Fourth
Floor:
I now know that those in charge of Cuban affairs in the State
Department were advised from many other sources of the Communist
infiltration of the 26th of July Movement and the Communist
sympathizers who held important positions in the Movement,
especially among the troops led by Raul Castro.
From the time Castro landed in the Province of Oriente in December
1956, the State Department received reports of probable Communist
infiltration and exploitation of the 26th of July Movement. The State
Department was aware of Castro's contacts with Communists in
Mexico. Certain officials in the State Department were familiar with
4

5. Castro's part in the bloody Communist-inspired uprising in Bogota,
known as the "Bogotazo" of 1948. In addition to my reports and
information from many outside sources, the State Department also
had reports from its own Bureau of Research and Intelligence.
All of which led Smith to testify before the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee that the U.S.
"Government and the United States press played a major role in
bringing Castro to power."
The turning point in ousting Batista, and opening the way to Castro,
many agree, was the announcement in March 1958 that the U.S. was
cutting off arms sales to the Batista government, a move engineered by
Wieland and Rubottom, among others. Prior to that, Fidel (who never had
more than 3,000 fighters) had not amassed more than 300 men. In cutting
off support to Batista, the supposedly pro-Batista Eisenhower
Administration signed the death warrant for resistance to communism
in Cuba. Castro, in the meantime, was clandestinely supplied with arms
from the United States while officials looked the other way.
Former Ambassador William Pawley, the organizer of the Flying Tigers
in China, repeatedly tried to warn President Eisenhower as well as
Wieland and Rubottom of Fidel's communist allegiance.
To no avail, Pawley later wrote:
"I believe that the deliberate overthrow of Batista by Wieland and
Matthews, assisted by Rubottom, is almost as great a tragedy as the
surrendering of China to the Communists by a similar group of
Department of State officials fifteen or sixteen years ago and we will
not see the end in cost of American lives and American resources for
these tragic errors."
To imply that these were merely errors is, we believe, to be charitable. When
Pawley was asked in 1961 by the general counsel of a Senate subcommittee
about Wieland (who served as the ambassador's press attaché in Brazil) and
about the possibility of Wieland's being a communist himself, Pawley
demurred. Was Wieland serving "the cause of our enemies" intentionally?
Answered Pawley:
5

6. "I have got to say that he is either one of the most stupid men living or
that he is doing it intentionally."
U.S Embassy Assistance to Reds
Except largely for the ambassadors (Smith, and before him Arthur
Gardner), the U.S. embassy in Havana was as pro-Castro as the State
Department. New York Times correspondent Ruby Hart Phillips, who
was presented with an orchid by Castro as he rolled into Havana, wrote that
at the time of the revolution,
"one man laughingly asked me if I knew of the 'Castro cell' in the U.S.
Embassy. It was no secret that several of the officials there favored
the overthrow of Batista and the assumption of power by Castro."
The U.S. consul in Santiago was also sympathetic to Castro.
The public affairs officer of the U.S. embassy in Cuba helped to arrange
press interviews with Castro in the mountains; he went so far as to hide
an underground Castroite (a Matthews confidante and later minister in
Castro's cabinet) in his house. The embassy even harbored an American
pilot who was illegally supplying arms to Castro but whose plane had
crashed on its 20th mission. A "Student Directorate" assassination attempt
on Batista was known beforehand by the embassy, which did nothing.
Fidel Castro’s True Color
While the State Department and the leftist U.S. media whitewashed Castro,
even after he took over officially on January 1, 1959, and the bloodthirsty
cry of Paredon! (to the Wall!) preceded hundreds of executions, not all had
been blind. Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch Society, for
instance, presciently wrote in the September 1958 American Opinion
that Castro's whole past was evidence that "he is a Communist agent
carrying out Communist orders...."
Confiscations of U.S. property took place; schools were turned into
propaganda factories; civil liberties were suspended; free elections were
dismissed; and alliances with Moscow were made. On October 13, 1960
nearly 400 locally owned firms -- sugar mills, banks, large industries -- were
socialized. After that came the socialization of all commercial real estate.
6

7. There was a takeover of the courts. The rival anti-Batista forces agreed to
lay down their arms, sealing their fate. Revolutionary "justice" and
purges began, as the non-Reds in Castro's movement learned they had
been duped.
The horrendous suffering and torture in Castro's prisons has been painfully
described by Armando Valladares, a 22-year veteran of such ordeals who
was freed by Western pressure. In Against All Hope, Valladares writes
movingly of condemned Cuban patriots crying, "Long Live Christ the
King! Down with Communism!" -- until guards were unnerved and gags
had to be applied before the firing squads took over.
In comparison, the words of Herbert Matthews, not that long before,
are as dust:
"Castro has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the
need to restore the constitution, to hold elections."
How about the alleged anti-communism'? Well, as Castro explained in Le
Figaro magazine in June 1986, back in 1959 the U.S. wanted
"us to make a strategic and tactical error and proclaim a doctrine as
a communist movement. In fact, I was a communist.... I think that a
good Marxist-Leninist would not have proclaimed a socialist
revolution in the conditions that existed in Cuba in 1959. I think I was
a good Marxist-Leninist in not doing that, and when we did not make
known our underlying beliefs."
Belated Anti-Castroism
In the summer of 1960, Cuba was flooded with Soviet arms. In response
to the growing threat to the U.S., a plan was formulated by the Central
Intelligence Agency during the Eisenhower Administration to oust
Castro. Though JFK knew about this before the election (as, of course, did
Vice President Nixon), Kennedy tried to make political hay of anti-Castro
feeling in the presidential debates -- backing any exile effort against Castro.
Nixon felt compelled to keep mum on the plans being considered. In short,
JFK didn't inherit an out-of-control policy when he came into the White
House.
7

8. The President-elect was also briefed during the interregnum about the
idea (akin to a 1954 CIA effort in Guatemala) to get rid of Castro. The
effort against Castro was not to be a military operation, however. And, as we
know now, it was not going to get rid of Castro either. It is not far-fetched
to think that the liberals in the new Administration, drawn into the
notion begrudgingly (and some of whom favored "Castroism without
Castro"), deliberately sabotaged the operation known now as the "Bay
of Pigs" fiasco. Whether the effort might have worked may be debated, but
that it couldn't work the way it was carried out seems indisputable -- with
some 1,400 Cubans abandoned on the beaches to murderous fire from
aircraft and tanks.
By the time the anti-Castro move came, the plans had been revised
drastically at JFK's orders. The President, however, seemed to have little
idea of the dangers of an amphibious landing, especially at night. While the
original plan did not involve direct U.S. forces, the CIA and military, it
seems clear, expected that if need be U.S. forces would be available to
prevent a failure. And, indeed, the Cubans were led to believe that they
would have air cover and whatever other support was needed to
succeed.
However, Kennedy seemed obsessed with keeping the official forces of
the U.S. out of action. A larger plan, centered on the city of Trinidad, was
the initial proposal presented. But this site (which had a fallback plan for
guerrilla activity from the Escambray Mountains) was scrubbed at the last
minute for one that would make "less noise" at the Zapata swamp area near
Bahia de Cohinos -- the Bay of Pigs, which happened to be one of Fidel's
favorite fishing spots.
The Kennedy Administration, it has since been learned, was deeply
involved (before and after the Bay of Pigs) in assassination plans against
Castro; some involved a mobster who shared a mistress with JFK. LBJ,
who said Kennedy was running "a damn Murder Incorporated in the
Caribbean," later surmised that Kennedy "was trying to get Castro, but
Castro got to him first."
Be that as it may, the Cuban patriots never got the backing they were
promised. This despite the King of Camelot's noble promise to "pay any
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any
foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."
8

9. Betrayal of Cuban Exile Brigade 2506
Named for the serial number of a Cuban who died in training, Brigade
2506 was supposed to land intact on Cuba's southern coast and establish
a beachhead. Operation Pluto, as Mario Lazo pointed out in Reader's Digest
in 1964 and a subsequent book, was essentially an air operation that
demanded that Castro's air force be first knocked out on the ground.
That is exactly what didn't happen.
The planning for the operation was hardly a secret. There were early
accounts of training in Guatemala (the brigade later transferred to Nicaragua
before embarking) in the New York Times, La Hora out of Guatemala City,
and in subsequent reports in The Nation and elsewhere. Shortly before the
invasion, the New York Times (among others) had much of the pertinent
information, editing its front-page account of the coming assault slightly
when the White House found out about it. Press secretary Pierre Salinger,
who said that Castro knew everything eight days before the invasion but
the time and place, called it "the least covert military operation in history."
Two weeks before the Bay of Pigs, Nikita Khrushchev told Walter
Lippman about the pending attack, saying it would fail. Secrecy was
almost nonexistent. Even as the force was nearing its target, the New York
Times actually called Revolución in Havana to see if they had any word on
details yet; that publication alerted Fidel.
Two top agents running the operation wanted to quit due to all the
debilitating changes, as Peter Wyden points out in The Bay of Pigs. They
were convinced to stay, but when action began, matters got worse. The
President, who had equivocated before, began to hedge even more -- even as
the operation was underway. As the political risk was lessened (in his mind,
ostensibly), the military risks grew.
The promised air "umbrella," it turned out, wasn't there for the Cuban
exiles. There were supposed to be three air strikes, but after the first (largely
ineffective) one caused a ruckus at the United Nations, the President
cancelled the second one outright -- without even telling top military
commanders. Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke didn't find out
until ten hours after that vital strike cancellation. Potential cover from
the carrier Essex was vetoed. Only a moderate one and one-half strikes
were permitted; of the 48 sorties that had been scheduled to knock out
9

10. Castro's planes, only eight were allowed. Just a handful of Castro's planes
were knocked out, with appalling results. Militarily, the operation was a
fiasco, with ammunition and communications being early casualties. Then
the bloodbath on the beaches began.
Betrayal and Beyond
Even so, CNO Burke thought the situation could have been retrieved by
using a barrage from but one destroyer, but that too was refused by
JFK, who said he didn't want the U.S. to become involved.
"We are involved, sir," Burke reportedly argued. "We trained and
armed these Cubans. We helped land them on the beaches.
G**d***it, Mr. President, we can't let those boys be slaughtered
there!"
But they were deserted. Cuban calls for help became more pitiful to
those Americans who were handcuffed.
A typical one from the beach commander:
"Do not see any friendly air cover as you promised. Need jet support
immediately. Pepe."
Plea denied. The final message from the beach commander of the Free
Cubans, sent to the U.S. vessels standing offshore of the Bay of Pigs:
"I am destroying all my equipment. I have nothing left to fight with.
The enemy tanks are already in my position. Farewell, friends!"
Arthur Schlesinger noted the irony that the President was then willing
to take more risks to take the Cubans off the beach than to put them on.
Some 114 in the invading force were killed; 1,189 were captured; of the 150
or so others, a few were rescued and some never landed. Though the anti-
communist underground had not even been alerted, Castro rounded up
perhaps 300,000 Cuban suspects and declared that his was a socialist
revolution after all. It gave Castro, reported Paul Johnson, "the
opportunity to wage a terror-campaign against the opposition."
The eventual ransom of the Cuban exiles was humiliating and complicated.
At first, Castro's asking price was some $28 million in tractors. After show
10

11. trials started, arrangements were finally made to get Brigade 2506 returned,
at a cost of around $53 million in medical supplies and baby food, with the
donating pharmaceutical companies given tax breaks by Robert Kennedy.
When the men of Brigade 2506 were released, after a year and a half,
President Kennedy was handed the flag of the brigade in a dramatic
Miami ceremony. He vowed,
"I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a
free Havana."
In 1976, however, lawyers for the brigade were forced to hire a lawyer to get
the flag back from the U.S. government; it had been crated up in the
Kennedy Library in Massachusetts.
Some six months after the Orange Bowl event celebrating the release of the
Cuban fighters, the President met with Herbert Matthews, as Matthews
recounted in Revolution in Cuba. "Fidel Castro ought to be grateful to us,"
remarked Kennedy. "He gave us a kick in the a** and it made him
stronger than ever." That is why some believe it was the perfect failure.
_____________________________________________________________
11