This document summarizes the changing relations between Ankara, Baghdad, and Erbil (the capital of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq) from the late 1930s to present day. It examines the shift from close cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad based on common political and economic interests to warmer relations between Ankara and Erbil. Key factors in the change include the evolution of Kurdish nationalism and nation-building in northern Iraq, Turkey's changing policy towards the Kurdistan Regional Government under the AKP government, and economic opportunities that have arisen from trade and investment between Turkey and the KRG. The document also notes the ambiguous role of the United States in these shifting regional dynamics.

1. Erbil & Ankara relations, extensibility between
strategy and tactic - legal analysis
Seminar’s Questions :
1- What was the nature of the relations between
Ankara and Baghdad before the shift?
2- What is the explanation for the change among
the three partners of the triangle?
3- What is the role of the US in this change?
4- To what extent are the changes tactical and to
what extent strategic?

2. Publishing a new book in Turkey
under title (Yeni Komşumuz
Kürdistan (Our New Neighbor
Kurdistan)) By Turkish author
Simla Yerlikaya on January 2013.

3. 1- The nature of the relations between Ankara and
Baghdad
A. Common economic and geopolitical interests;
common internal enemies, namely the Kurds, It
reflected in Saadbad Pact 1937, Baghdad Pact
1955.
B. External rivals such as Syria and Iran; as well as
common ideological and political affinities.
C. The regimes in both countries declared
themselves to be secular and opposed to political
Islam there was still strong Sunni bonds between
the governments of the two states which were
led by Sunnis until 2003.

4. D. In certain periods, the two states also shared a
pro-western orientation.

5. 2- The explanation for the change among the three
partners of the triangle
A. Evolution in the Kurdish camp.
A process of nation building;
Militarization of the society and the establishment
of an army independently from the existing state;
Weakness of the state which brings about a
change in the balance of power between itself and
the quasi state;
And finally the existence of external patronage.

6. B. Turkey’s changing conceptualization.
Coming AKP to authority in Turkey in 2002;
Becoming KRG as a part of solution in Kurdish
issue in North Kurdistan.
C. Turkey’s motivations for the shift.
60% of all the companies active in the South
Kurdistan are Turkish;
Employing 50,000 Turks;
The volume of trade between Turkey and the KRG
reached $ 9 billion in 2012 equaling that between
Turkey and Iran.

7. The vision of so-called neo-Ottomanism which
was promoted by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu fits well in the new policy of engaging the
KRG.
Davutoğlu “historic” visit to the KRG in October
2009 where he declared that Turkey could serve as a
bridge to Europe for the KRG while the KRG could
serve as a gateway to the Gulf for Turkey.
Rolling KRG safety valve against the spread of
Shi`ism into Turkey.
The expectation KRG role in post – Assad stage .

8. 3- The American ambiguous role.
4- Conclusion …

9. A lot thanks for your attendance!,
And God bless Kurdish Nation!