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  2. 2. 1.Turkish-Israeli Relations since 1950s <ul><li>The “ups and downs-type relations” are based upon a stimulus-response correlation behind any Turkish negative stand toward Israel. In other words, each anti-Israeli policy stand of Turkey should be seen as a response, caused by the then international or domestic challenges that Turkey faced or by the then advantages that Turkey targetted to benefit from. 5 examples for the approval of this thesis of mine : </li></ul>
  3. 3. Example 1- Response <ul><li>In 1966, the Director of Turkish Military Intelligence, Sezai Orkunt told Israeli military Turkey was going to freeze the bilateral relations on the account of American support for the Greek Orthodox Church’s claims over their historical ties with İstanbul-Constantinople. Although the reasons indicated by the Turkish side had no direct relation related to Israeli policies or statements, Turkey made such a decision. </li></ul>
  4. 4. Example 1- Stimulus <ul><li>This decision was motivated by the perception that Turkish military believed that it would be strategically valuable to use its relations with Israel for preparing the most proper platform to negotiate with the U.S. </li></ul>
  5. 5. Example 2 - Response <ul><li>In 1973, Turkey recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole resresentative of Palestinian people, in 1975, Turkey voted in favor of a UN resolution that equated Zionism with racism, and in 1979, Turkey allowed PLO to open an office in İstanbul. </li></ul>
  6. 6. Example 2 - Stimulus <ul><li>This Turkish stand was motivated by the 1973 oil crisis and the perception of Turkish decision-makers that Turkey could control of oil to be used as a weapon against the states in need of it, and Turkey could use commercial opportunities that the Arab oil market would provide. </li></ul>
  7. 7. Example 3 - Response <ul><li>Upon the declaration of Israel that Jerusalem as its unified capital in 1980, Turkey diminished its relations with Israel in 1981. </li></ul>
  8. 8. Example 3 - Stimulus <ul><li>This Turkish political stand was motivated by two reasons </li></ul><ul><li>1. The military that was governing Turkey at that time needed to establish legitimacy and support for its authority through pleasing Turkish society with which the majority is Muslim. </li></ul><ul><li>2. And, this was thought to be a necessary attempt not to alienate the Arab world </li></ul>
  9. 9. Example 4 - Response <ul><li>At the first Palestinian İntifada in 1987, Turkey upgraded its sympathy for the Palestinian cause and Turkey recognized the Palestinian state in 1988, and blocked the military agreement with Israel </li></ul>
  10. 10. Example 4 - Stimulus <ul><li>This Turkish political stand was motivated by the reality that during the first half of the 1980s, Turkey’s trade with Arab and Muslim countries increased fivefold </li></ul>
  11. 11. Example 5 - Response <ul><li>As the consequence of the second Intifada in 2000, Erdogan directed harsh criticism at the Israeli government for their actions and policies toward the Palestinians and called Shoron’s government a sponsor of state terrorism </li></ul>
  12. 12. Example 5 - Stimulus <ul><li>This Turkish political stand was motivated by the fact that Erdogan prefered to please his public, and this gave his government credibility among the local public </li></ul>
  13. 13. <ul><li>As for the Stimulus – Response relationship in Hamas’ visit to Turkey, 4 diffferent stimulus can be determined for such a Turkish political choice </li></ul>
  14. 14. Stimulus 1 <ul><li>First of all, Turkey is now experiencing other exciting foreign policy initiatives, such as its dealings with the EU and Syria </li></ul>
  15. 15. Stimulus 2 <ul><li>Secondly, in 2005, Turkey offered to mediate between Syria and Israel, but kindly rejected by Israeli government, having the perception that Turkey was not yet enough influential position to fulfill this role </li></ul>
  16. 16. Stimulus 3 <ul><li>Thirdly, Erdogan’s government is aware of the fact that in case of any U.S. attack in Iran, the U.S. would not choose to cooperate with Turkey depending on her experience in 2003, so, Turkey has no intentions in regard to warming relations with the U.S. via Israel, “no need to increase relations with Israel” </li></ul>
  17. 17. Stimulus 4 <ul><li>Fourthly, Turkey requested to take place before the Russian Federation for having the role of mediator in Palestinian – Israeli peace/conflict process </li></ul>
  18. 18. Stimulus 5 <ul><li>Historically, Turkey has always been keen on being a regional power in the Middle East either through setting up economic alliances or having the role of mediator in any Middle East –related conflict </li></ul>
  19. 19. 2. The Determinants of Turkish-Israeli Relations <ul><li>The threat of Islamic fundamentalism (for Turkey) </li></ul><ul><li>The sense of “otherness” (isolation) in regard to the EU membership process, and in regard to the problematic relations with the U.S. (for Turkey) </li></ul><ul><li>The sense of isolation due to the Arab states’ policies toward Israel in the Middle East (for Israel) </li></ul><ul><li>Common political and societal identity : Israel and Turkey are the only two democratic and laic states in the Middle East </li></ul>
  20. 20. <ul><li>Pro-American orientation of Turkey and Israel </li></ul><ul><li>The strong relationship and identification with the West for Turkey </li></ul><ul><li>Respoctive military elite who are in favor for the continuity of the secular establishment of Turkey </li></ul><ul><li>U.S. positive involvement in the improvement of relations for maintaining a strong pro-western, pro-U.S. bloc in the Middle East </li></ul><ul><li>The historical defects in Turkish-Arab relations </li></ul>
  21. 21. 3. The Advantages of Relations for Turkey and Israel <ul><li>Relationship with Israel helped Turkey overcome isolation particularly in the Cold War period </li></ul><ul><li>Intense relations with Israel has increased U.S. support for Turkey </li></ul><ul><li>The contract to upgrade 54 F-14 jets boosted Israel’s defense industry </li></ul><ul><li>The right of Israeli air force passage to Turkey’s air space paves the way for Israel to train in Iran’s, Iraq’s and Syria’s backyard </li></ul><ul><li>Israel benefited from Turkish intelligence on Syria, Iran and Iraq </li></ul><ul><li>Israeli-Turkish cooperation in Central Asia might bloc Iran’s increasing influence in that region </li></ul>
  22. 22. 4. The Features that make Turkish-Israeli Relations Limited <ul><li>Alleged Israeli support for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state </li></ul><ul><li>No agreement on Cyprus issue between Ankara and Tel-Aviv </li></ul><ul><li>The favor of Israeli government for the status quo in Iraq, and Turkish insistance on the integrity of Iraqi territory </li></ul><ul><li>International isolation of Turkey in regard to Cyprus crisis and EU membership </li></ul><ul><li>Islamist-oriented governments in Turkey </li></ul><ul><li>Non resolution in Palestinian-Israeli conflict </li></ul><ul><li>The alleged Israeli military attempts to train Kurds in northern Iraq </li></ul>
  23. 23. 5. Challenges ahead for Turkey in regard to Turkish-Israeli relationship <ul><li>Cooling of Turkish-Syrian relations, which sees Turkish-Israeli relations as an anti-peace development </li></ul><ul><li>Cooling of Turkish-Iran relations </li></ul><ul><li>Isolation and marginalization of Turkey in the Middle East </li></ul><ul><li>The probability of Turkish decision-makers not tolerating Sharon’s or post-Sharon’s maneuvres in the occupied territories </li></ul><ul><li>The probability of Israeli support for the establishment of de facto and de jure independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq and probable Israeli-Kurdish strategic alliance </li></ul>
  24. 24. <ul><li>Probability of Israeli support in regard to Kurdish nationalism due to 2 basic reasons : 1. Israel regards a unitary Iraq as more dangerous and stronger than a disintegrated Iraq 2. Israelis might be sensitive toward the Kurdish jews, brought to Israel from northern Iraq, and currently, 30 executives of the KDP are Kurdish jews </li></ul><ul><li>Probability of Turkish support for the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) </li></ul><ul><li>Israeli attempt to warm relations with Southern Cyprus administration </li></ul><ul><li>Cooling of the relations between Turkish secular elite and religiously-oriented segments of society </li></ul>