1. 1 | P a g e
Yehudah Sunshine
Dr Avinoam Idan
Geography, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy
Turkish Policy Recommendations for Relations with an Independent Iraqi
Kurdistan
Introduction:
As regional hegemony fluctuate it is essential to have a heavily invested regional player as
an ally to ensure political and economic stability. Iraqi Kurdistan appears to be that illusive pillar
of stability in a regional humanitarian disaster formerly known as Syria and Iraq.1 What enables
Kurdistan to make the leap into the fields of nationhood and more so why should the Turkish
government facilitate Kurdish political advancement?
In order to conceptualize the reality of a Middle East with newly defined borders,
politically and militarily supported minority groups and a culture ripe with political and sectarian
dissent one must merely look to the newspapers or the internet.2 No longer do the tyrants of the
Arab world have sole domain over the political process, with the obvious caveats of the Saudi’s
and the Gulf States. With the wool removed from their eyes, the citizens of the broader Arab world
have gained the ability to force change. In no place is this reality more on the cusp then in the
1
“Who are the Kurds” The Council of Foreign Relations (http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-
africa/time-kurds/p36547#!/ )
2
“In the Mideast borders have always been drawn in blood” LA Times
(http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0322-mcmeekin-middle-east-sykes-picot-boundaries-
20150322-story.html )

2. 2 | P a g e
independent Iraqi Kurdistan. The real question then becomes; how will Turkey address these
regional political changes?
This document intends to concisely assess how the realization of an independent Iraqi
Kurdistan will effect Turkey politically and economically. To simplify this process a brief history
of the region, focusing on the shifts in regional power since the fall of the Saddam Hussein will be
followed by a discussion of the key economic interest which make the Kurdish region of particular
interest to regional and super regional players. To conclude the analysis a few key policy
suggestions will be presented and concisely accessed to determine what if any formal or informal
relations the Turkish state should have with a newly independent Iraqi Kurdistan.
Background:
The 2003 Iraq war saw not only the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime but also
ushered in a new regional quagmire on a scale unpredicted by its American game makers.3 In
altering the delicate balance of power in the region the Americans enabled a distinct shift in who
would now be capable partners for their broader regional goals. Kurdistan appeared to fit that role
with ease.
The independent Kurdish region had a lot to gain and much enthusiasm to facilitate a
transition from oppressed regional minority to an empowered, oil rich ethnic group with a building
desire for sovereignty of its own. To be sure, the Kurds were more than at any time in recent history
3
“Consequences of the War and Occupation of Iraq” Global Policy Forum
(https://www.globalpolicy.org/humanitarian-issues-in-iraq/consequences-of-the-war-and-occupation-of-
iraq.html)

3. 3 | P a g e
quintessential players in how the future of Iraq would be determined.4 In using the shift in political
atmosphere the Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan changed both; how the west viewed their participation as
a necessity for regional stability and to what extent its natural resources could be developed and
exported for economic gain.5
In short, the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime enabled a recalibration of the key players
needed to provide and ensure political stability in the Middle East. The Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan
now stand at the precipice of engagement with the broader international community. With oil,
military control of the region6 and a strong desire for home rule it is only a matter of time until
Iraqi Kurdistan becomes elevated to the status of strategically connected regional ally of those
desiring to build a bigger footprint in the Middle East for years to come.7
Oil in Iraqi Kurdistan:
By some estimates, the Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan currently possess upwards of 13 billion
barrels of oil reserves.8 This supply includes an increase of around 9 billion barrels of oil gained
when the Kurdish regional authority laid claim to the various disputed regions of northern Iraq. To
say this oil represents the key to Kurdish self-rule goes without saying. The Kurds, due to their
4
“Who are the Kurds” The Council of Foreign Relations (http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-
africa/time-kurds/p36547#!/ )
5
“Kurdistan Region begins exporting Kirkuk oil” Rudaw.Net
(http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/271120142 )
6
Iraqi Kurdistan, and many of the outlining disputed territories of Northern Iraq according to
7
“Investment factsheet” (http://www.iraq-jccme.jp/pdf/arc/04_krg_Investment_factsheet_en.pdf)
8
“Iraq’s big Kurdish Oil Deal” Fortune Magazine (http://fortune.com/2014/12/03/iraqs-big-kurdish-oil-
deal/ )

4. 4 | P a g e
crafty political and military workings have created a paradigm where they have become critical
players in the regional energy market.
To facilitate entrance to the market the Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan currently export 250,000
barrels a day through various Turkish controlled pipelines.9 In addition to the oil it exports, the
Kurds also send 300,000 barrels of oil a day through domestic, Iraqi pipelines. For the Kurds to
continue this policy seems shortsighted at best, and disastrous at worse. With independence grows
a desire for greater economic entitlement, and with that a shift in who it does business with.
With this said, it is only a matter of time until the Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan reassess their
broader economic relationship with entity formerly known as Iraq. To be sure, after decades of
harsh political treatment, compounded by the brutal tactics of Saddam it appears that alliances with
Iraq will only evolve out of political necessity, not a warm and fuzzy feeling of former compatriots.
With this change in economic alignment it is of no surprise that Kurdish officials have been on
record preparing for a vast increase of exports to Turkey.10
Policy Recommendations:
1) In order to promote broader economic cooperation the Turkish republic should create
a formal office of Turkish-Iraqi Kurdistan economic investment. This office should
contain regional policy and resource experts who will be used in cooperation with their
Kurdish colleagues to build a long term plan for economic planning and cooperation.
9
Ibid
10
“Kurdish regional gov’t to raise oil exports to Turkey” Daily News
(http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kurdish-regional-govt-to-raise-oil-exports-to-turkey------
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=81732&NewsCatID=348 )

5. 5 | P a g e
2) Turkey should continue investing in oil pipelines and infrastructure in Iraqi Kurdistan
to promote increase exports of oil resources.
3) To ensure regional stability Turkey should engage in basic intelligence sharing with
Kurdish authorities. By building a closer security relationship Turkey can insulate itself
from unneeded security concerns built out of the dissolution of the Iraqi State.
4) Turkey should make an effort to build diplomatic and strategic connections with major
Iraqi Kurdish leadership to telegraph future political moves and build trust among vital
players.
Conclusions:
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan have realized a rebirth of
sorts. In the years following the American led invasion the Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan have; built a
strong military, created relative political stability while ever increasing their territory and, more
importantly for the case of Turkey, its oil reserves. By shifting its fate from repressed minority
group to dominate regional player the Kurds have forced the international community to take
notice, not only of their military might, but how it compounded with significant oil reserves can
build a climate of political stability and regional economic cooperation.
As far as Turkey is concerned, the development of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan helps
diversify its energy interests, while decreasing the political fractionalization seen as a cornerstone
of broader Iraqi leadership.11 The Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan are willing partners for economic
cooperation and regional military support. In essence recognition and cooperation with the new
11
“Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Lydia Khalil The Brookings Institute
(http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/06/kurdistan-khalil )

6. 6 | P a g e
regime will build regional alliances, reaffirm economic relationships and help decrease the whole
scale violence and political turmoil that the Middle East has faced in the years following the
American invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Bibliography
"Global Policy Forum." Consequences of the War and Occupation of Iraq. Web. 31 Aug. 2015.
<https://www.globalpolicy.org/humanitarian-issues-in-iraq/consequences-of-the-war-
and-occupation-of-iraq.html>.
"Investment Factsheet." Iraq-jccme.jp. Web. 31 Aug. 2015. <http://www.iraq-
jccme.jp/pdf/arc/04_krg_Investment_factsheet_en.pdf>.
"Iraq's Big Kurdish Oil Deal." Fortune Magazine. Fortune Magazine, 3 Dec. 2014. Web. 31
Aug. 2015. <http://fortune.com/2014/12/03/iraqs-big-kurdish-oil-deal/>.
"Kurdish Regional Gov’t to Raise Oil Exports to Turkey." Hürriyet Daily News | Haber Detay.
Web. 31 Aug. 2015. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/kurdish-regional-govt-to-raise-
oil-exports-to-turkey------.aspx?pageID=238&nID=81732&NewsCatID=348>.
"Kurdistan Region Begins Exporting Kirkuk Oil." Rudaw. Web. 31 Aug. 2015.
<http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/271120142>.
McMeekin, Sean. "In the Mideast, Borders Have Always Been Drawn in Blood." Los Angeles
Times. Los Angeles Times, 20 Mar. 2015. Web. 31 Aug. 2015.
<http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0322-mcmeekin-middle-east-sykes-picot-
boundaries-20150322-story.html>.

7. 7 | P a g e
"Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?" The Brookings Institution. The Brookings
Institution, 3 June 2009. Web. 31 Aug. 2015.
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/06/kurdistan-khalil>.
"Who Are the Kurds" Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations. Web. 31
Aug. 2015. <http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/time-kurds/p36547#!/>.