This document summarizes a presentation given by Allan Schwartz from the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) at a national conference on risk management. It provides background on AMSA's role and responsibilities, which include maritime safety, environmental protection, search and rescue, and responding to incidents at sea. It then discusses AMSA's risk assessment and management approaches, including identifying and mitigating risks through activities like vessel tracking, inspections, and emergency towage. Finally, it examines high profile incidents that AMSA has responded to, such as the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, highlighting lessons learned.

1. NATIONAL CONFERENCE &
EXHIBITION 2014
Embedding Risk in Everything we do.
Allan Schwartz
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
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2. Who is AMSA???
IWRAP Mk2
IALA’s Quantitative Risk Assessment
Model

3. Australian Maritime Safety Authority
http://www.amsa.gov.au/about-amsa/corporate-information/mission-and-vision/

4. AMSA’s purpose
Is to:
► provide leadership in the development of safety and
environmental protection standards for responsible
operation of ships and safety to seafarers;
► monitor compliance with safety and environment
protection standards;
► respond to threats to the marine environment;
► provide systems that aid safe marine navigation; and
► rescue people in maritime and aviation distress
situations.

5. Australia’s Maritime Zone
► 3rd largest EEZ – 8.232 m km2
► 12,000 islands
► 59,736 kms of coastline
► 6 maritime boundaries
► covers all 5 of world’s ocean
temperature zones

6. Townsville
Geraldton

7. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
Internal Organisational Risk Management
Comcover Awards for Excellence in Risk Management

8. But why???

9. External Risk
Response – the obvious one
• Search and Rescue
• Pollution Response
• Casualty/Incident Response

12. Dornier airborne SAR units

14. Pacific Adventurer

15. Pacific Adventurer

17. Other incidents

20. Ship banned from Australian ports
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority has today placed a three-month ban on Vega Auriga (IMO 9347786).
The Liberian-flagged, 9981gt container vessel now on its way to Auckland, New Zealand from Brisbane, Australia is prohibited from entering any
Australian port for three months.
The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) reported that the vessel had been detained three times since July 2013 for breaches of the Maritime
Labour Convention.
The breaches included improper payment of wages, inadequate living and working conditions and inadequate maintenance making the vessel
unseaworthy and substandard.
An AMSA spokesperson told IHS Maritime that the improper payment of wages were systemic, but would not divulge the amount. AMSA had notified
authorities in the next port of call.
“New Zealand is aware of the issues, as are all members of the Tokyo MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) on Port State Control,” he told IHS
Maritime.
General manager of AMSA’s Ship Safety Division Allan Schwartz stressed that ships trading with Australia must meet international standards.
“Vessels that do not meet such standards, including standards for the welfare and treatment of crew, pose an increased risk to seafarers, safe operations
and the marine environment,” he said in a release.
“Seafarer welfare is just as important as the proper maintenance of ship equipment, and an integral part of safe operations. A failure in either system
could lead to serious accidents.”
The ship’s management has been contacted for comment.

21. What if?

24. Prevention – the less obvious one

25. Marine Environment -Emergency Towage
► minimum level of emergency towage
around coast for incident management
► three tiers:
- Level 1: dedicated ETV (tug) in
northern Great Barrier Reef & Torres
Strait
- Level 2: contracted capability in
strategic locations
- Level 3: vessels of opportunity

26. National Risk Assessment (Frequency)
1999 Risk Assessment 2011Risk Assessment

27. National Risk assessment (Environment)
Environmental Sensitivity Environmental Risk Index

28. Risk Assessment – Future Trends
o Increase of 79% in total national port
traffic
o Increase of 81% in total national traffic
o Small commercial vessels assumed to
remain at present levels
o Offshore drilling assumed to remain at
current levels
o Offshore oil production to reduce by
89%
o Condensate production to increase by
73% (overall decline by 35%)
o Shore based oil consumption to
increase by 14%
Source 2011 2020
Tonnes/
year
% Tonnes
/year
%
Trading
ships at sea
212 22.3 387 32.2
Trading
ships in
port
174 18.3 337 28.1
Small
commercial
vessels
2 .2 2 .2
Offshore
production
310 32.7 217 18.1
Offshore
drilling
209 22 209 17.4
Shore-based
42 4.5 48 4

31. Navigation Safety

33. Traffic Routeing Measures

36. Craft Tracking
GBR – ReefVTS
Remainder - AMSA

37. Craft Tracking

38. Under Keel Clearance

40. The commodities
boom…

41. Inspections
For Bulk Carriers
=100 * EXP(-4 + ship age + time since previous inspection + (0.587 * coefficient if new) + (0.4536 *
LN(1 + number of deficiencies at previous inspection)) + (0.354 * 1, if not inspected previously) + (-
0.2212 * LN(Gross tonnage)) + Flag State coefficient) / (1 + EXP(-4 + ship age + time since
previous inspection + (0.587 * coefficient if new) + (0.4536 * LN(1 + number of deficiencies at
previous inspection)) + (0.354 * 1, if not inspected previously) + (-0.2212 * LN(Gross tonnage)) +
Flag State coefficient))
For Other Ship Types
=100 * EXP(-3.07 + ship age + time since previous inspection + (0.00958 * time since last special
survey) + (0.086 * coefficient if new) + (0.326 * LN(1 + number of deficiencies at previous
inspection)) + (0.444 * coefficient if not previously inspected) + (-0.2054 * LN(gross tonnage)) + ship
type coefficient + Flag State coefficient + RO coefficient) / (1 + EXP(-3.07 + ship age + time since
previous inspection + (0.00958 * time since last special survey) + (0.086 * coefficient if new) +
(0.326 * LN(1 + number of deficiencies at previous inspection)) + (0.444 * coefficient if not
previously inspected) + (-0.2054 * LN(gross tonnage)) + ship type coefficient + Flag State
coefficient + RO coefficient))
LN indicates natural logarithms. EXP = exponential.

43. Current AIS vessel
tracks in Australia

44. Projected Traffic in
2015

45. Projected Traffic in
2020

46. Projected Traffic in
2025

47. Projected Traffic in
2030

48. Ports in the North West

49. Production & exploration
leases off shore (2009)
Petroleum – Exploration & Production leases

50. Existing & Proposed
Marine Parks
Marine Parks – Existing & Proposed

52. The Search for Malaysia Airlines MH370
AMSA Experience

53. B777-200ER 9M-MRO

54. Flight Path derived from RADAR data.
Source: JIT/Google Earth, ATSB Report.

56. Source: Inmarsat, ATSB website.

57. MH370 Handshakes
Source: ATSB

58. Source: Satellite Comms Working Group, ATSB Report.

59. Example of one comparison against actual flight
MH021 7 March 2014
Red path = predicted path; Yellow track = actual aircraft track
Source: Satellite Working Group, ATSB Report.

60. Possible southern final positions S1-S3 based on MH370 max range and time
Source: JIT/Google Earth, ATSB Report.

61. Possible final positions S4-S5 with 7th arc and max range cruise line
Source: JIT/Google Earth, ATSB Report.

62. Information: Many Sources – some examples
 Flight details - plan, fuel load, performance data
 Emergency equipment - distress beacons, slide rafts, etc
 B777 structural materials (what will float?)
 Cargo Manifest (debris analysis)
 Satellite imagery
 Contrail analysis – satellite imagery
 Weather and environmental – atmospheric and oceanographic
 Underwater hydrophones
 Logistics – search aircraft, vessels, personnel, equipment, shore-based
support, communications

63. Plot of hydrophone acoustic event recorded
Magenta cross = most probable location of source; yellow area = uncertainty region
Most Probable Location
Source: Curtin University, ATSB Report.

64. Some of the Search Challenges
 Minimal data to calculate accurate splash point
 No ELT detections
 Last known position versus subsequent time flown to unknown location
 Vast and changing search areas
 Remote oceanic area, long distance offshore
 Movement of search areas following JIT analysis – time to redeploy search
assets.
 Elapsed time – impact on oceanic drift and debris dispersal
 Tropical Cyclone influence on drift calculations and search
 Search aircraft – available endurance
 Availability of detailed description of cargo from manifest
 Information on B777 components likely to float.

65. Some of the Search Challenges
 Time for ships to reach aircraft sightings
 Availability of ship-borne helicopters to investigate sightings
 Sea pollution
 Poor weather and search conditions on a number of days
 Elapsed time between satellite imagery analysis and tasking aircraft/ships to
investigate possible objects
 Multi-national civil/military coordination and communication
 Sustainment of large logistical requirements
 Media appetite. Social media useful.
 Processing large amount of publicly submitted data online and crowd sourcing
satellite imagery.

66. Drift Planning Working Group
 Supplement standard JRCC drift planning.
 Purpose – to ensure international best methodology and
consensus drift modelling techniques applied to MH370 splash
point area
 Search area – floating debris
 “Reverse” drift – from floating debris location backwards
to estimated splash point.

67. Drift Planning Working Group
 Maritime SAR and Oceanography experts:
 AMSA
 CSIRO – Marine and Atmospheric Research
 Asia Pacific Applied Science Associates (APASA)
 Australian Bureau of Meteorology
 Global Earth Modelling Systems (GEMS)
 US Coast Guard
 Multiple datasets/models
 SLDMBs

68. • Zero Leeway model –
confirms actual
surface Total Water
Movement
• Provides sea water
temperature – varied
from 7 to 28oC
• SLDMB – Self Locating Datum Marker buoy
• MetOcean Product – GPS receiver and Iridium
transmitter – average life 21 days
• Can be deployed from aircraft or vessel

69. SLDMBs
• 33 x SLDMB’s successfully
deployed to validate drift
modelling
• Comparisons run against all
three oceanic current data
sets used for modelling

71. Day 52 - Overall Drifted Probability Area

72. Day 52 – Drifted Probability Area Comparison – East Coast Australia

73. Day 52 – Drifted Probability Area Comparison - Europe

74. Day 52 – Drifted Probability Area Comparison – North America

75. Day 52 – Drifted Probability Area Comparison - China

76. JACC – Joint Agency Coordination Centre
 Established 30th March.
 Ensure the search being coordinated by AMSA and
ATSB is reinforced by strong liaison with all relevant
stakeholders, including families of passengers.
 Staff seconded from relevant departments/agencies.
 Originally located Perth. Moved to Canberra 9th May
2014.

77. Search Phase Transition – 28th April 2014
• Search for floating debris suspended
• Transition to intensified underwater search
• Search led by ATSB
• Overall investigation – Malaysian Government

78. End of Search Phase – 28th April 2014
• 42 day search. 345 flight sorties. 3177 total flight hours.
• 4.7 million square km cumulative search area
• Search aircraft:
• Civil – Australia and NZ (10)
• Military – Australia (5), USA (2), China (2), New Zealand (2), Japan
(3), Malaysia (2), Republic of Korea (2)
• Search vessels:
• Civil – Merchant ships
• Military – Australia, China, USA, UK, Malaysia

81. Ocean Shield TPL search coverage 4-14 April 2014
Source: Phoenix International and ATSB Report.

82. Next search phase
 Led by ATSB.
 Further work continued to refine analysis of both flight and satellite data by
specialists from UK, USA and Australia.
 Priority area determined approximately 60,000 km2
 This area subject of surface search Day 21-26.
 Bathymetry of ocean floor since mid-May. Contracted vessel and Chinese
military vessel.
 Tender for specialist company capable of deep-water search for MH370.
 Intensified underwater search planned to commence August 2014.
Expected to take 12 months.

84. Comparison with AF447
 1st June 2009
 Air France Airbus A330, Flight AF447
 Rio de Janeiro to Paris
 228 persons on board
 Crashed in remote area, Atlantic Ocean
 Investigation - French BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et
d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile)

85. Comparison with AF447
AF447 MH370
Flight Planned Route Was on planned route when reported
missing.
Deviated significantly from planned route to
take up unknown route.
Last Known Position Was reporting by ACARS every 10 minutes.
ACARS failure messages from AF447 were
received by Air France including a Last
Known Position (LKP).
Was reporting by ACARS up till disappeared.
No further data other than satellite pings via
INMARSAT.
Speed Known = Mach 0.82 derived from ACARS
message information.
Unknown.

86. Comparison with AF447
AF447 MH370
Search Area Initial Search Area:
40NM (74KM) radius centred on Last Known
Position (LKP)
= 17,000 square KM.
Initial Australian Search Area:
693,170 square KM = 40 times larger than
AF447 initial search area.
Cumulative Australian search area total
18MAR to 28APR (last day search for
surface debris):
Almost 4.7 million square KM.
Search for Surface Debris 26 days.
This was based on no further bodies or
aircraft debris being found for the final 9
days of the search.
- Aircraft search operations ceased.
- Ship search operations ceased, except
for French Navy vessels which
remained conducting acoustic search
for the ULBs.
In Australian SRR = 42 days

87. Comparison with AF447
AF447 MH370
First Floating Debris Found Day 5 about 70KM from LKP.
NOTE – the BEA report states that this
(distance) considerably complicated the
search for the underwater wreckage.
Nil associated with MH370.
Floating Debris/Bodies Marine pollution contributed to confusion in
the early days of the search. Air searches
found lots of debris – it was difficult for air
crews to distinguish between marine
pollution and small debris that may have
been from AF447. It was not until ships
arrived in the area working with aircraft that
debris was able to be identified properly.
About 50 bodies were recovered by ships.
Same experience with marine pollution.
Datum Buoys deployed 9 33

88. Comparison with AF447
AF447 MH370
“Drift Committee” An expert working group of experts in SAR
drift, oceanography, meteorology, etc
attempted to estimate the crash location
through “reverse drift” calculations.
Various positions were calculated by
different agencies using different methods
and models with up to a 100KM variance.
Similar expert working group formed within
AMSA’s RCC Australia.
Nil surface debris located to allow “reverse
drift” calculation.
Satellite imagery No useful results.
Images from civil and military satellites were
used.
Aircraft flown to investigate objects
detected by satellite failed to identify debris
from AF447.
Similar experienced.

89. Comparison with AF447
AF447 MH370
Wreckage Location 6.5NM (12KM) from LKP.
Depth 3900 metres.
Wreckage found 2APR11 (671 days after
AF447 missing) following detection by AUVs
of a concentration of SONAR returns.
Wreckage spread over area of 10,000
square metres. Few large parts found.
2 further months spent recovering flight
recorders and aircraft parts, mapping debris
and recovering human remains.
Unknown.
Search area depth 3800 - 4800 metres.

90. Comparison with AF447
AF447 MH370
Cost of SAR Operation Estimated 80 million Euro
($118 million AUD)
TBA
Cost of Undersea
Operation
Estimated 31 million Euro
($46 million AUD)
TBA
Total Cost of SAR and
Undersea Operations
Estimated 111 million Euro
($164 million AUD)
TBA

92. NATIONAL CONFERENCE &
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