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Distributed Mitigation Managed Service
against DDoS (DMMS)
www.iptp.net
Better network,
not just a bigger one.
In this presentation we are going to compare two ways of mitigating a volumetric DDoS attack:
a traditional and more commonly used Clean Pipe, Scrubbing or Cleaning Center Solution and
Distributed Mitigation Managed Service (DMMS) against DDoS based on Cleaning Network by IPTP Networks.
The comparison will be based on four key aspects associated with volumetric DDoS Mitigation:
CLEAN
PIPE
IPTP
DMMS
NetwoRK
VS
Latency
Reaction Time
1 Bandwidth
Expenses
3
42
www.iptp.net
Volumetric distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) is a special type of denial of service attack where the malicious
traffic is generated from multiple sources (for example, botnets or remotely controlled computers also known as
'zombies'). These attacks can come in different forms: DNS amplification, Reflexion attacks, SMURF and etc.
What is volumetric DDoS?
ISP2
ISP3
ISP1
50m
s
50 m
s
50 ms
Global
Internet
TARGET
SERVER
Error 504 Gateway Timeout
Error 504 Gateway Timeout
www.iptp.net
Malicious traffic
Legitimate traffic
Malicious traffic source
Legitimate traffic source
Router
High traffic load
Dangers of DDoS
Error 504
Gateway timeout
The message received when the user is
unable to reach web resources
under the Denial-of-Service attack.
www.iptp.net
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
100 Gbps
60 Gbps
500 Gbps
602 GbpsSurvey of DDoS attacks size peak over the years
Successful DDoS attack causes the target
system to stop responding, which can
degrade network in several ways:
• Slowing down access and network performance
by overloading it with malicious traffic.
• Causing unavailability of a targeted network
resource.
• Limiting the ability to access certain resources
such as servers, cloud and etc.
• Creating a diversion for network administrators
and using this to obtain unauthorized access to con-
fidential or sensitive information (A data breach).
Loss in revenue
1%
8%
12%
15%
5%
5%
7%
11%
21%
15%
Estimated loss in revenue for
each minute of downtime. *
* — Ponemon Institute© Research Report
$1—10
$10—100
$100—1 000
$1 000—5 000
$5 000—10 000
$10 000—25 000
$25 000—50 000
$50 000—100 000
over $100 000
hard to determine
Average total loss per minute $21, 699
www.iptp.net
How Clean Pipe solution works?www.iptp.net
ISP2
ISP3
DDoS
Mitigation
Service Provider
ISP1
50m
s
50 ms
50 ms
Global
Internet
TARGET
SERVER
CLEANING
CENTER
EXTRA BANDWIDTH
REQUIRED! ADDITIONAL
CHARGES OR LIMIT MAY APPLY
50 ms
FALSE TARGET
50 ms
Latency increased!
Latency increased!
A tunnel (Clean pipe)
Malicious traffic
Legitimate traffic
Malicious traffic source
Legitimate traffic source
Router
Low traffic load
High traffic load
Mitigation of volumetric DDoS on
limited network nodes.
Up to 3600 seconds
of reaction time.
Latency added
to the service.
Limited bandwidth capacity.
Extra charges for
bandwidth overload.
IPTP DMMS Networkwww.iptp.net
ISP2
ISP3
ISP1
50
m
s
50 ms
Global
Internet
IPTP Networks
global MPLS network
TARGET
SERVER
IPTP DMMS Firewalls
Malicious traffic
Legitimate traffic
Malicious traffic source
Legitimate traffic source
Router
High traffic load
Distributed mitigation on a global network perimeter.
No reaction time.
No added latency.
Bandwidth limits higher
by an order of magnitude.
No extra charges for
bandwidth overload.
1.1 Latency
ISP1 ISP2 CLEANING
CENTER
ISP3 TARGET
SERVER
WEB-SITE
VISITOR
50 ms 50 ms 50 ms 50 ms 50 ms
www.iptp.net
Clean Pipe or Cleaning Center
The route of an IP packet during a volumetric DDoS attack,
when redirected through the Cleaning Center.
• The traffic is routed through the Cleaning Center in both directions, which increases the number of
network nodes between the user and protected server.
• The created route results in additional distance for the IP packets to travel through, slowing down
the burst rate and dramatically increasing the latency.
1.2 Latency
• IP packets do not go any extra distances. Instead they move from the web-site visitor to the Target
Server and back exclusively via our distributed firewalls.
• All our firewalls are geographically-dispersed across the globe, applying distributed protection
against volumetric DDoS while adding no latency.
• This allows the traffic to be mitigated on the closest available firewalls, balancing the traffic load.
www.iptp.net
The route of an IP packet during a volumetric DDoS attack,
when protected by IPTP DMMS Network
IPTP
NETWORKS
IPTP
FIREWALL
TARGET
SERVER
WEB-SITE
VISITOR
IPTP DMMS Network
2.1 Reaction Time
Reaction time is the time from detection of a DDoS attack to a counter-reaction against it. From
when the first malicious packets arrive at the customer's doorstep to when they start being filtered
by a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider is also the period when the target infrastructure suffers
service unavailability, which if prolonged could lead to severe consequences.
3600sec
up to
sec
≈VS
Cleaning
Center
IPTP DMMS
Network
www.iptp.net
0
2.2 Reaction Time
• The time to recognise the problem, report to the provider and establish a tunnel results in delay
for the mitigation.
• Setting up a new tunnel every time DDoS attack occurs can be extremely time-consuming.
• It can take from 30 minutes to 1 hour and even longer for the mitigation to begin.
www.iptp.net
DDoS
Detect Report
to provider
Establish
a tunnel
Clean pipe or Cleaning Center
2.3 Reaction Timewww.iptp.net
• No time consumption for setting up a tunnel, instead the traffic is filtered directly at the border of
IPTP DMMS Network.
• No manual set-up.
• No tunnel required, the mitigation is carried out on the closest network equipment.
ROUTER IPTP
FIREWALL
TARGET
SERVER
WEB-SITE
VISITOR
“ZOMBIE”“ZOMBIE” “ZOMBIE”
Global Internet
IPTP GLOBAL
MPLS NETWORK
BOTNET
IPTP DMMS Network
IPTP
FIREWALL
www.iptp.net 3.1 Bandwidth
• Cleaning Center is normally located within one geographical point, normally this means a
restricted number of communications channels and a limited internet capacity.
• When the attack size exceeds Cleaning Centers capacity it results in channel aggregation as the
ports cease to withstand the traffic load.
Clean Pipe or Cleaning Center
Global
Internet
ISP1
ISP2
ISP3
CLEANING
CENTER
DDOS
MITIGATION
SERVICE PROVIDER
TARGET
SERVER
ISP4
IPTP DMMS Network
www.iptp.net 3.2 Bandwidth
• 1500 10 Gbps ports distributed across the globe and the total network capacity of over 30 Tb/s
allows to withstand heavy-bandwidth DDoS attacks, without the risk of service degradation.
• No cleaning centers, no additional tunnels and no limited network nodes.
• Distribution of traffic among multiple points in our network - no combined volume of traffic on one
network node.
OVER
150010 Gbps
ports
total
network capacity
30Tbps
DATA
CENTERS IN
22countries
worldwide
• When additional bandwidth is required, the ISP will charge the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider,
increasing the mitigation costs.
• The established tunnel and the attack traffic are often redirected through the routers of the same
ISP, escalating the traffic load. This results in extra-charges for the bandwidth.
www.iptp.net
Clean pipe or Cleaning Center
4.1 Expenses
Global
Internet
ISP1
ISP2
ISP3
CLEANING
CENTER
DDOS
MITIGATION
SERVICE PROVIDER
TARGET
SERVER
ISP4
$
BILL
$
BILL
Bill for extra bandwidth
Bill for extra traffic
4.2 Expenseswww.iptp.net
IPTP DMMS Network
• Can mitigate bandwidth-heavy DDoS attacks while applying no additional charges for the traffic.
• Advanced firewalls can handle multi-gigabits of traffic and filter any types of floods
(ICMP, UDP, SYN and others).
• As a One-Stop-IT-Shop we help to save costs for service provision, management and maintenance.
Limassol Dubai
Istanbul
Amsterdam
Helsinki
London
Slough
Paris
Marseille
Kiev
Stockholm
Zürich
Milan
Madrid
Frankfurt
Moscow
St.Petersburg
Novosibirsk
Vladivostok
Ashburn
Atlanta Dallas
Denver
ChicagoMiami
New York
Los Angeles
San Jose
Seattle
Washington
Toronto
São Paulo
Beijing
Hong Kong
Taipei
Singapore
Seoul
Tokyo
Mumbai Johannesburg
Nicosia
0USD
extra
traffic CHARGE
Summary
No reaction time.
No added latency
Bandwidth limits higher
by an order of magnitude
No extra charges for bandwidth overload
No volumetric DDoS
To summarise, Distributed Mitigation Managed Service
against DDoS by IPTP Networks covers
all the main aspects associated with DDoS Mitigation,
leaving you with:
www.iptp.net
Geographical
destribution
Advanced
firewalls
Highnetwork
capacity
Zeroreactiontime
Noextra
trafficcharges
No additional
latency
IPTP
DMMS
Network

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DMMS presentation25

  • 1. Distributed Mitigation Managed Service against DDoS (DMMS) www.iptp.net Better network, not just a bigger one.
  • 2. In this presentation we are going to compare two ways of mitigating a volumetric DDoS attack: a traditional and more commonly used Clean Pipe, Scrubbing or Cleaning Center Solution and Distributed Mitigation Managed Service (DMMS) against DDoS based on Cleaning Network by IPTP Networks. The comparison will be based on four key aspects associated with volumetric DDoS Mitigation: CLEAN PIPE IPTP DMMS NetwoRK VS Latency Reaction Time 1 Bandwidth Expenses 3 42 www.iptp.net
  • 3. Volumetric distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) is a special type of denial of service attack where the malicious traffic is generated from multiple sources (for example, botnets or remotely controlled computers also known as 'zombies'). These attacks can come in different forms: DNS amplification, Reflexion attacks, SMURF and etc. What is volumetric DDoS? ISP2 ISP3 ISP1 50m s 50 m s 50 ms Global Internet TARGET SERVER Error 504 Gateway Timeout Error 504 Gateway Timeout www.iptp.net Malicious traffic Legitimate traffic Malicious traffic source Legitimate traffic source Router High traffic load
  • 4. Dangers of DDoS Error 504 Gateway timeout The message received when the user is unable to reach web resources under the Denial-of-Service attack. www.iptp.net 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 100 Gbps 60 Gbps 500 Gbps 602 GbpsSurvey of DDoS attacks size peak over the years Successful DDoS attack causes the target system to stop responding, which can degrade network in several ways: • Slowing down access and network performance by overloading it with malicious traffic. • Causing unavailability of a targeted network resource. • Limiting the ability to access certain resources such as servers, cloud and etc. • Creating a diversion for network administrators and using this to obtain unauthorized access to con- fidential or sensitive information (A data breach).
  • 5. Loss in revenue 1% 8% 12% 15% 5% 5% 7% 11% 21% 15% Estimated loss in revenue for each minute of downtime. * * — Ponemon Institute© Research Report $1—10 $10—100 $100—1 000 $1 000—5 000 $5 000—10 000 $10 000—25 000 $25 000—50 000 $50 000—100 000 over $100 000 hard to determine Average total loss per minute $21, 699 www.iptp.net
  • 6. How Clean Pipe solution works?www.iptp.net ISP2 ISP3 DDoS Mitigation Service Provider ISP1 50m s 50 ms 50 ms Global Internet TARGET SERVER CLEANING CENTER EXTRA BANDWIDTH REQUIRED! ADDITIONAL CHARGES OR LIMIT MAY APPLY 50 ms FALSE TARGET 50 ms Latency increased! Latency increased! A tunnel (Clean pipe) Malicious traffic Legitimate traffic Malicious traffic source Legitimate traffic source Router Low traffic load High traffic load Mitigation of volumetric DDoS on limited network nodes. Up to 3600 seconds of reaction time. Latency added to the service. Limited bandwidth capacity. Extra charges for bandwidth overload.
  • 7. IPTP DMMS Networkwww.iptp.net ISP2 ISP3 ISP1 50 m s 50 ms Global Internet IPTP Networks global MPLS network TARGET SERVER IPTP DMMS Firewalls Malicious traffic Legitimate traffic Malicious traffic source Legitimate traffic source Router High traffic load Distributed mitigation on a global network perimeter. No reaction time. No added latency. Bandwidth limits higher by an order of magnitude. No extra charges for bandwidth overload.
  • 8. 1.1 Latency ISP1 ISP2 CLEANING CENTER ISP3 TARGET SERVER WEB-SITE VISITOR 50 ms 50 ms 50 ms 50 ms 50 ms www.iptp.net Clean Pipe or Cleaning Center The route of an IP packet during a volumetric DDoS attack, when redirected through the Cleaning Center. • The traffic is routed through the Cleaning Center in both directions, which increases the number of network nodes between the user and protected server. • The created route results in additional distance for the IP packets to travel through, slowing down the burst rate and dramatically increasing the latency.
  • 9. 1.2 Latency • IP packets do not go any extra distances. Instead they move from the web-site visitor to the Target Server and back exclusively via our distributed firewalls. • All our firewalls are geographically-dispersed across the globe, applying distributed protection against volumetric DDoS while adding no latency. • This allows the traffic to be mitigated on the closest available firewalls, balancing the traffic load. www.iptp.net The route of an IP packet during a volumetric DDoS attack, when protected by IPTP DMMS Network IPTP NETWORKS IPTP FIREWALL TARGET SERVER WEB-SITE VISITOR IPTP DMMS Network
  • 10. 2.1 Reaction Time Reaction time is the time from detection of a DDoS attack to a counter-reaction against it. From when the first malicious packets arrive at the customer's doorstep to when they start being filtered by a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider is also the period when the target infrastructure suffers service unavailability, which if prolonged could lead to severe consequences. 3600sec up to sec ≈VS Cleaning Center IPTP DMMS Network www.iptp.net 0
  • 11. 2.2 Reaction Time • The time to recognise the problem, report to the provider and establish a tunnel results in delay for the mitigation. • Setting up a new tunnel every time DDoS attack occurs can be extremely time-consuming. • It can take from 30 minutes to 1 hour and even longer for the mitigation to begin. www.iptp.net DDoS Detect Report to provider Establish a tunnel Clean pipe or Cleaning Center
  • 12. 2.3 Reaction Timewww.iptp.net • No time consumption for setting up a tunnel, instead the traffic is filtered directly at the border of IPTP DMMS Network. • No manual set-up. • No tunnel required, the mitigation is carried out on the closest network equipment. ROUTER IPTP FIREWALL TARGET SERVER WEB-SITE VISITOR “ZOMBIE”“ZOMBIE” “ZOMBIE” Global Internet IPTP GLOBAL MPLS NETWORK BOTNET IPTP DMMS Network IPTP FIREWALL
  • 13. www.iptp.net 3.1 Bandwidth • Cleaning Center is normally located within one geographical point, normally this means a restricted number of communications channels and a limited internet capacity. • When the attack size exceeds Cleaning Centers capacity it results in channel aggregation as the ports cease to withstand the traffic load. Clean Pipe or Cleaning Center Global Internet ISP1 ISP2 ISP3 CLEANING CENTER DDOS MITIGATION SERVICE PROVIDER TARGET SERVER ISP4
  • 14. IPTP DMMS Network www.iptp.net 3.2 Bandwidth • 1500 10 Gbps ports distributed across the globe and the total network capacity of over 30 Tb/s allows to withstand heavy-bandwidth DDoS attacks, without the risk of service degradation. • No cleaning centers, no additional tunnels and no limited network nodes. • Distribution of traffic among multiple points in our network - no combined volume of traffic on one network node. OVER 150010 Gbps ports total network capacity 30Tbps DATA CENTERS IN 22countries worldwide
  • 15. • When additional bandwidth is required, the ISP will charge the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider, increasing the mitigation costs. • The established tunnel and the attack traffic are often redirected through the routers of the same ISP, escalating the traffic load. This results in extra-charges for the bandwidth. www.iptp.net Clean pipe or Cleaning Center 4.1 Expenses Global Internet ISP1 ISP2 ISP3 CLEANING CENTER DDOS MITIGATION SERVICE PROVIDER TARGET SERVER ISP4 $ BILL $ BILL Bill for extra bandwidth Bill for extra traffic
  • 16. 4.2 Expenseswww.iptp.net IPTP DMMS Network • Can mitigate bandwidth-heavy DDoS attacks while applying no additional charges for the traffic. • Advanced firewalls can handle multi-gigabits of traffic and filter any types of floods (ICMP, UDP, SYN and others). • As a One-Stop-IT-Shop we help to save costs for service provision, management and maintenance. Limassol Dubai Istanbul Amsterdam Helsinki London Slough Paris Marseille Kiev Stockholm Zürich Milan Madrid Frankfurt Moscow St.Petersburg Novosibirsk Vladivostok Ashburn Atlanta Dallas Denver ChicagoMiami New York Los Angeles San Jose Seattle Washington Toronto São Paulo Beijing Hong Kong Taipei Singapore Seoul Tokyo Mumbai Johannesburg Nicosia 0USD extra traffic CHARGE
  • 17. Summary No reaction time. No added latency Bandwidth limits higher by an order of magnitude No extra charges for bandwidth overload No volumetric DDoS To summarise, Distributed Mitigation Managed Service against DDoS by IPTP Networks covers all the main aspects associated with DDoS Mitigation, leaving you with: www.iptp.net Geographical destribution Advanced firewalls Highnetwork capacity Zeroreactiontime Noextra trafficcharges No additional latency IPTP DMMS Network