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DDOS MITIGATION EXPERIENCE
About
IP ServerOne
01.
•  Founded in 2003
•  52 Employees
•  Managing over 4500 physical servers
•  Total 150 Racks in 5 data centers
across Malaysia and Singapore
•  Contributing 10% of Malaysia’s
domestic traffic
•  Approximately 6.8 Gbit/s total traffic
sending to the Internet at peak
•  300 Gbps DDoS mitigation capacity in
MY, SG, HK, TW	
About
IP ServerOne
What is a
DDoS attack?
02.
•  We believe that everyone should be
more aware of DDoS attacks and their
possible impacts on a business
•  To share on the DDoS trend
happening in our local community
•  To share the possible ways to detect
any kind of DDoS attack, and help to
blackhole the affected IP addresses
automatically with opensource utility
•  Giving an idea of IPSERVERONE’s
anti-ddos system deployment in our
own data centers
Why
choosing
this topic?
01
02
03
04
A cyberattack carried out over networks
that intentionally is done by someone
In short, it’s
a downtime to the provider
Or
a downtime to the customer
What is the level
of attacks we encounter?
2-5
attacks
per day
Over
100 attacks
per month
Mostly range
from 4.5 Gbps
to 8.9 Gbps
Attacks mainly
come from
overseas
Which types of
attack we mostly get?
UDP
floods
TCP Flag
floods
(SYN, ACK…)
HTTP/
HTTPS
flood
DNS/ NTP/
SSDP/
CHARGEN
amplification
attack
Bandwidth level attack:
International link is
around 81 Gbit/s
Packet per second (pps) attack:
16.6 Mbps, bandwidth is
approximately 6.6 Gbps
Attacks from
international link:
Bandwidth level attack:
12 Gbps from
single provider
Packet per second (pps) attack:
10.6 Mbps, bandwidth
is approximately 4.9 Gbps
Attacks from
Malaysia’s peering
DDoS activity within Malaysia
A DDoS alert report
sample on a local attack
ISP A
183.81.160.0/21
ISP B
210.5.40.0/21
ISP C
45.64.168.0/22
Due to the ports being closed
TCP RST flag/ ICMP
send back to the victim IP
Due to the ports being closed
TCP RST flag/ ICMP
send back to the victim IP
Attacker Internet
VICTIM Server
45.64.168.254
A new way of DDoS attack
(via Direct Peering)
Spoofed IP Source: 45.64.168.254:80
Destination: 210.5.40.0 – 210.5.47.254 (all ISP B IP addresses)
Destination: 183.81.160.0 – 183.81.167.254 (all ISP A IP addresses)
Destination Port: 80,443,22,21…. TCP Flag: SYN
•  The attacker can control how to flow the
attack to the victim network; For
example: Via MyIX? Or direct peering &
etc.
•  The ISP A, or ISP B think that the victim
server is attacking all their IP address
range.
•  ISP A, or ISP B will not be able to do
any blackhole as all of their IP
addresses are affected.
•  Victim ISP cannot react to it as the
packet was spoofed from outside of the
victim network.
The impacts
from this
new method
attack:
01
02
03
04
Make sure you have
enough bandwidth to
take the spoofed
packet
Apply ACL, or
using Flowspec
to mitigate this
issue
Solutions for these
kind of attacks:
DDoS
detection tool
must be available
To do tcpdump /
nfdump when you
are under-attack it’s
way too slow
A Dedicated
Blackhole router
that integrates with
ExaBGP can make
the NOCs’ lives easier
To sleep better
How do we detect a
DDoS attack?
03.
We use netflow to detect any kind of DDoS attack
How do we detect a DDoS attack:
Internet
Core router 1
Access switch
Netflow / Sflow
DDoS
mitigation
Device
Normal
internet
Border router 1
Border router 2
Myix router
1. We use out of path deployment
2. NTA will collect flow from all the border routers
3. Traffic will pass through normally from:
border > core router > access > switch > server
Detector deployment architecture
The detector will look at the netflow packet
and will count for the number of packet per
seconds towards single destination IP address.
In layman term, it will count how many:
1. SYN packet received per second for single IP
2. ACK packet received per second for single IP
3. DNS packet received per second for single IP
4. NTP packet received per second for single IP
5. UDP packet received per second for single IP
6. ..... (and many many more )
How does a
detector
work?
Each IP Group would contain its own IP range and threshold setting
We categorize all our IP addresses into Multiple IP address groups
Detector Threshold setting
Besides Packet Per second check, it will also check for:
maximum inbound bandwidth per second for single IP
DDoS detector also detects
based on bandwidth
Open-source utility that
can do a DDoS Detection:
Here are the typical mitigation methods:
Method Null Route Self-Mitigate 100% Cloud Hybrid
Operation impact IP got blocked Can access as
usual
Access as usual,
but may be
higher latency
Can access as
usual
Cost to
implement
FREE Expensive Manageable
Cost
Expensive
Limitation Not all IX support
Null route
High cost and
high technical
skills
Latency issue Skill set and cost.
Impact to the
provider
Customer may
be leaving
$$$ $ $$$$
When a DDoS is detected,
what is the mitigation plan?
Updates from MYIX:
MyIX route server is
now supporting
blackhole community
It may help on
reducing the DDoS
attacks from MyIX
peering members that
learned the route from
MyIX route server
How do we
Mitigate DDoS attacks
at IP ServerOne?
04.
netflow will be sending from all our border routers
Internet
Core router 1
Access switch
Netflow /
Sflow
Border router 1
Border router 2
Myix router
Cleanpipe
provider
Traffic from the internet to server
Traffic from server to internet
Attack traffic
We send flows to our
Network Traffic Analyzer
It may be taking less than 90 seconds
to complete the DDoS detection + mitigation
Time required for a DDoS Detection:
At IP ServerOne, the Anti-DDoS is based on hybrid model
On-Premise device + Cloud based protection
The reason why we are mitigating the attacks ourselves are:
Most of the cloud
providers are
located overseas
70% of our
bandwidth is
going through MyIX
Cloud providers could have false positive sometime.
Troubleshooting on this is very difficult; we are using
BGP communities to do traffic engineering; so that
those targetted customers will be coming through our
own link rather than other cloud providers.
DDoS
Mitigation
•  When the victim’s server IP is under attack
•  The detector will advertise a /32 over to all borders router, so that all traffic towards the victim
server will be next-hop to the filtering device for cleaning purpose
•  Traffic towards other servers is not affected
DDoS filter
Border router Core router
Normal traffic
How do we deploy the
mitigation device:
What does the
Anti-DDoS filter do?
Where to
START?
05.
To combat against a DDoS, let’s start with detection process first:
Where to start?
Commercial solution=
you can visit our booth
Open-source solution=
fastnetmon
(we highly recommend trying this)
ANY
QUESTIONS?
06.
ThanksOUR INFRASTRUCTURE; YOUR GROWTH
E-mail: cllee@ip.my
Mobile: +6 012-331 9286
IP ServerOne Solutions Sdn. Bhd. (800140-T)
A-1-1 & A-1-2, Block A, Glomac Damansara,
Jalan Damansara, 60000 Kuala Lumpur,
Wilayah Persekutuan, Malaysia.
03 2026 1688
www.ipserverone.com
ISO Certificate No: IS 651738

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DDOS Mitigation Experience from IP ServerOne by CL Lee

  • 3. •  Founded in 2003 •  52 Employees •  Managing over 4500 physical servers •  Total 150 Racks in 5 data centers across Malaysia and Singapore •  Contributing 10% of Malaysia’s domestic traffic •  Approximately 6.8 Gbit/s total traffic sending to the Internet at peak •  300 Gbps DDoS mitigation capacity in MY, SG, HK, TW About IP ServerOne
  • 4. What is a DDoS attack? 02.
  • 5. •  We believe that everyone should be more aware of DDoS attacks and their possible impacts on a business •  To share on the DDoS trend happening in our local community •  To share the possible ways to detect any kind of DDoS attack, and help to blackhole the affected IP addresses automatically with opensource utility •  Giving an idea of IPSERVERONE’s anti-ddos system deployment in our own data centers Why choosing this topic? 01 02 03 04
  • 6. A cyberattack carried out over networks that intentionally is done by someone In short, it’s a downtime to the provider Or a downtime to the customer
  • 7. What is the level of attacks we encounter? 2-5 attacks per day Over 100 attacks per month Mostly range from 4.5 Gbps to 8.9 Gbps Attacks mainly come from overseas
  • 8. Which types of attack we mostly get? UDP floods TCP Flag floods (SYN, ACK…) HTTP/ HTTPS flood DNS/ NTP/ SSDP/ CHARGEN amplification attack
  • 9. Bandwidth level attack: International link is around 81 Gbit/s Packet per second (pps) attack: 16.6 Mbps, bandwidth is approximately 6.6 Gbps Attacks from international link:
  • 10. Bandwidth level attack: 12 Gbps from single provider Packet per second (pps) attack: 10.6 Mbps, bandwidth is approximately 4.9 Gbps Attacks from Malaysia’s peering
  • 12. A DDoS alert report sample on a local attack
  • 13. ISP A 183.81.160.0/21 ISP B 210.5.40.0/21 ISP C 45.64.168.0/22 Due to the ports being closed TCP RST flag/ ICMP send back to the victim IP Due to the ports being closed TCP RST flag/ ICMP send back to the victim IP Attacker Internet VICTIM Server 45.64.168.254 A new way of DDoS attack (via Direct Peering) Spoofed IP Source: 45.64.168.254:80 Destination: 210.5.40.0 – 210.5.47.254 (all ISP B IP addresses) Destination: 183.81.160.0 – 183.81.167.254 (all ISP A IP addresses) Destination Port: 80,443,22,21…. TCP Flag: SYN
  • 14. •  The attacker can control how to flow the attack to the victim network; For example: Via MyIX? Or direct peering & etc. •  The ISP A, or ISP B think that the victim server is attacking all their IP address range. •  ISP A, or ISP B will not be able to do any blackhole as all of their IP addresses are affected. •  Victim ISP cannot react to it as the packet was spoofed from outside of the victim network. The impacts from this new method attack: 01 02 03 04
  • 15. Make sure you have enough bandwidth to take the spoofed packet Apply ACL, or using Flowspec to mitigate this issue Solutions for these kind of attacks:
  • 16. DDoS detection tool must be available To do tcpdump / nfdump when you are under-attack it’s way too slow A Dedicated Blackhole router that integrates with ExaBGP can make the NOCs’ lives easier To sleep better
  • 17. How do we detect a DDoS attack? 03.
  • 18. We use netflow to detect any kind of DDoS attack How do we detect a DDoS attack:
  • 19. Internet Core router 1 Access switch Netflow / Sflow DDoS mitigation Device Normal internet Border router 1 Border router 2 Myix router 1. We use out of path deployment 2. NTA will collect flow from all the border routers 3. Traffic will pass through normally from: border > core router > access > switch > server Detector deployment architecture
  • 20. The detector will look at the netflow packet and will count for the number of packet per seconds towards single destination IP address. In layman term, it will count how many: 1. SYN packet received per second for single IP 2. ACK packet received per second for single IP 3. DNS packet received per second for single IP 4. NTP packet received per second for single IP 5. UDP packet received per second for single IP 6. ..... (and many many more ) How does a detector work?
  • 21. Each IP Group would contain its own IP range and threshold setting We categorize all our IP addresses into Multiple IP address groups Detector Threshold setting
  • 22. Besides Packet Per second check, it will also check for: maximum inbound bandwidth per second for single IP DDoS detector also detects based on bandwidth
  • 23. Open-source utility that can do a DDoS Detection:
  • 24. Here are the typical mitigation methods: Method Null Route Self-Mitigate 100% Cloud Hybrid Operation impact IP got blocked Can access as usual Access as usual, but may be higher latency Can access as usual Cost to implement FREE Expensive Manageable Cost Expensive Limitation Not all IX support Null route High cost and high technical skills Latency issue Skill set and cost. Impact to the provider Customer may be leaving $$$ $ $$$$ When a DDoS is detected, what is the mitigation plan?
  • 25. Updates from MYIX: MyIX route server is now supporting blackhole community It may help on reducing the DDoS attacks from MyIX peering members that learned the route from MyIX route server
  • 26. How do we Mitigate DDoS attacks at IP ServerOne? 04.
  • 27. netflow will be sending from all our border routers Internet Core router 1 Access switch Netflow / Sflow Border router 1 Border router 2 Myix router Cleanpipe provider Traffic from the internet to server Traffic from server to internet Attack traffic We send flows to our Network Traffic Analyzer
  • 28. It may be taking less than 90 seconds to complete the DDoS detection + mitigation Time required for a DDoS Detection:
  • 29. At IP ServerOne, the Anti-DDoS is based on hybrid model On-Premise device + Cloud based protection The reason why we are mitigating the attacks ourselves are: Most of the cloud providers are located overseas 70% of our bandwidth is going through MyIX Cloud providers could have false positive sometime. Troubleshooting on this is very difficult; we are using BGP communities to do traffic engineering; so that those targetted customers will be coming through our own link rather than other cloud providers. DDoS Mitigation
  • 30. •  When the victim’s server IP is under attack •  The detector will advertise a /32 over to all borders router, so that all traffic towards the victim server will be next-hop to the filtering device for cleaning purpose •  Traffic towards other servers is not affected DDoS filter Border router Core router Normal traffic How do we deploy the mitigation device:
  • 33. To combat against a DDoS, let’s start with detection process first: Where to start? Commercial solution= you can visit our booth Open-source solution= fastnetmon (we highly recommend trying this)
  • 35. ThanksOUR INFRASTRUCTURE; YOUR GROWTH E-mail: cllee@ip.my Mobile: +6 012-331 9286 IP ServerOne Solutions Sdn. Bhd. (800140-T) A-1-1 & A-1-2, Block A, Glomac Damansara, Jalan Damansara, 60000 Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan, Malaysia. 03 2026 1688 www.ipserverone.com ISO Certificate No: IS 651738