The document describes the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) project which developed an alternative launch abort system design for Orion as a risk mitigation effort. The MLAS project aimed to identify the simplest design that maximized nominal ascent performance using off-the-shelf parts where possible. A key part of the project was a pad abort flight test to validate models and tools. The document discusses the MLAS flight test vehicle configuration, the flight test itself, opportunities for resident engineers, skill development experiences of the resident engineers, and technical lessons learned from the project.

1. Developing Young Engineers to be Design
Engineers
Gary Dittemore, NASA JSC
Omar Torres, NASA LaRC
Sam Miller, NASA LaRC
Theo Muench, NASA GSFC
Used with Permission

2. MLAS Task, Approach, and Success Criteria
• Task:
– Develop an alternate LAS design as risk mitigation for the Orion
LAS. Demonstrate the alternate concept with a pad abort flight
test.
• Approach:
– Strive to identify the simplest design that will satisfy launch abort
requirements while maximizing nominal ascent performance
– Implement flight test by using off-the-shelf parts wherever
possible to minimize cost and shorten schedule
• Success Criteria:
– Obtain sufficient flight test data to assess performance, validate
models/tools, and support an MLAS Objective System design
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3. MLAS Flight Test Vehicle Configuration
Turnaround Drogues
Modified Sears-Haack Fairing
Motor Simulators
Separation Joints Coast Skirt
Boost Skirt
Drag Plates
Internally-Mounted Motors
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4. MLAS Flight Test
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5. MLAS Resident Engineer Opportunity
• Unique opportunity for direct, on-
going interactions between MLAS
residents, NASA Technical
Fellows, and Apollo-era veterans Resident
engineers
• Limited scope and short duration assisting in
of the MLAS project provided rare composite
systems engineering experience fin testing
• “Off-line” nature of the project
provided an opportunity to try-and-
fail
• As a group, residents were
responsible for all MLAS’
instrumentation – from
specification to flight
• Each resident was an integral
member of a subsystem
Resident engineers performing
camera vibration testing
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6. Residents and Mentors
Residents Mentors
Gary Dittemore (JSC) T.K. Mattingly
Geminesse Dorsey (JSC) Jerry McCullough
Joe Grady (GRC) Tom Modlin
Samantha Manning (KSC) Bob Ryan
Samuel Miller (LaRC) Dave Shemwell
Theodore Muench (GSFC) Milt Silveira
Terrian Nowden (GRC) Bob West
Sarah Quach (KSC)
Jerry Sterling (GSFC)
Omar Torres (LaRC)
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7. Skill Development
• Best training is hands on experience
– Requirement development
– Hardware selection and procurement
– Procedure writing: test/launch/recycle
– Vehicle test/check out
– Launch Resident engineer performing
camera vibration testing
• Understanding the risk balance
between engineering vs. schedule vs.
budget
• Flight hardware inspires
– Some peers at home centers left due to
dullness of their insight/oversight tasks
– MLAS afforded opportunity to make a
tangible difference in the exploration vision!
Resident engineers hardening
Space Fibre camera for flight
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8. Experience That Can’t Be Taught
• Strain gauge amplifier issue
– Hardware didn’t meet vendor spec
– Worked constant modifications and adjustments
– Eventually replaced amplifiers
• Retrospect illuminates the problem’s value...
– “You earned your scars; wear them well”
– Required delivery date plays a large part in corrective action
– Small team prioritizes itself
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9. Improved Thought Process and Approach to
Problems
• Unable to rely on well parameterized problems
– Ex. Shuttle program has well defined specs and procedures
– “Needed a push at the beginning to take ownership…”
• Understanding the design process
– Aware of the limitations and decisions involved
– “Models are only as good as the assumptions that went into
them”
• Also learned how NOT to think
– Need to have the goal in mind at all times
– The project is bigger than the subsystem!
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10. Effective Leadership
• Risk trades during progress of the project
– Management of critical path: Manifolded Motors
• Decisions based on past experience
– Connector issues
– Air data boom
• Methods of motivating group
– Shared personal experiences
– Tailored approaches to different personalities
– Communicated openly with all levels of workforce
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11. Theo Muench - Background
• Mechanical engineer
• GSFC Cryogenics - Research & Development - 4 years
• Solar Dynamics Observatory – I&T of propulsion
subsystem – 1 year
• Landsat Data Continuity Mission – TIRS cryogenic
subsystem
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12. Personal Motivation
• MLAS/resident engineer program provided access to
project managers in a quasi-peer/mentorship role
– Big picture perspective provides inspiration for performing
seemingly simple or mundane tasks
– Observing effective project management teaches leadership
skills/process
– In-depth exposure to role models allows for long-term career
goal realism
– Short term efficiency loss through exposing residents to high
level decision making process is traded for big picture
inspiration and teaching opportunities
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13. Networking
• MLAS was a multi-center staffed program
– Direct exposure to other NASA center’s facilities and
personnel
– Career building relationships garnered
– Provides global view of the NASA mission
– Experience of unity within the agency
– Understanding of why differences exist between centers
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14. Technical Story - Motor Pressure Transducers
• Expected to see 1200 psi +/- 100 psi for ~6 second
duration
• Post-flight review found that sensor pin-outs on vendor
specification sheet and calibration sheet differed
– Signal ground recorded instead of signal (0V read during flight)
• Pre-flight testing
– Individual sensors bench tested at multiple data points
– System end-to-end testing only performed at atmospheric
pressure
– No comparison of bench test and flight wiring harnesses
– End to end testing of pressure sensors occurred day before
shipment to pad
– Non-trivial to safely get high pressure source into proximity of
integrated pressure transducers
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15. Learning - Engineering Responsibility
(Ownership)
• Personal Background
– Minimal systems engineering responsibility
– Highest level of experience (ownership) = repair/maint. of POV
– My testing philosophy –based on personal experience
• I knew GSFC “testing philosophy” for robotic missions
– Risk management through responsibility division, & extensive
documentation
– Personally viewed as excessive and tedious
– Performed tests as instructed
• Learned the difference between “knowing the path” and
“walking the path”
– Gained a personal rational for system testing vs. an institutional
explanation
– Importance of communication/documentation
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16. Sam Miller - Background
• Electrical engineer
• LaRC earth science applications – 2 years
• Virtual reality research and development – 1 year
• Robotics R&D – 3 years
• Never worked on a flight project (!)
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17. Requirements and Complexity
• On requirements in early design…
– “A requirement is a road not to travel down…”
– Specify direction, preclude undesired paths, don’t impose
implementation
– Accomplish by having good design engineer: listen, discuss, formulate
– Ex. Bob Beil
– Ex. “01.01.09: Determine Relative dynamics of CM-forward fairing to
show margin to recontact”
• On complexity…
– Electronics: easy to add, but very hard to validate, test, and maintain
for launch
– Structures: initially hard, but taper away before launch
– Ex. Strain gauges, high-speed cameras, ground sensors
– Our direct participation in design/assembly/test matured our capacity to
engineer complex systems
effort
structures
electronics
launch time
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18. Three Generations…
Veterans
Me
Experts
Images:
http://www.clker.com/
www.fallingpixel.com
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19. Cross Discipline Decisions
• Cross-discipline view essential to good
engineering…
• Know expertise limits, avoid engineering-
judgment based decisions outside
discipline
• Ex. “Waterproof” box leak rate judgment
call was outside my expertise
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20. Gary Dittemore - Background
• Mechanical Engineer
• OMS/RCS Mission Operations/JSC – 5 years
• MLAS/NESC – 2 years
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21. Design Team Decisions
• Checks and Balances in an accelerated
design project
– Differing backgrounds working together
– Design Boards
– Peer Reviews
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22. Differing Background Experiences
• Operations Center
– Learning design process
• Research Center
– Learning operations processes
• Flight Test Center
– Learning to work with a larger program
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23. Systems Engineering
• System engineering’s criticality
– We all became systems
engineers
– Analysis Skills
– Insight
– Imagination
– Humility
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24. Smart Buyers
• “Smart buyers”
– Learned skills to become “smart buyers”
– Seeing, speaking, understanding
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25. Omar Torres - Background
• Electrical Engineer
• Navy aviation electronics technician
• Army Research Lab at White Sands Missile Range
• 2 NASA summer internships
• 1 Graduate Student Researcher Program (GSRP)
• NASA Langley Research Center – 5 years
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26. Omar’s Takeaways
• Participation with multidisciplinary team
– Exposed to effects of one subsystem’s actions to another’s workload
• MLAS was a challenge in many aspects
– Participated with avionics, aerodynamics, and GNC teams
– Had to adjust to a fast pace environment
– Seeing things from a systems perspective
– Took responsibilities on actions the team needed help with
• Opportunity to rise to a new level as an engineer
• One of a kind experience
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27. What We Learned
• We learned
– The relationship of all components of large engineering
endeavor (from leadership to procedures)
– To embrace responsibility
– Agency-wide participation engenders mutual respect
– To understand and value design, testing, and ops cultures
– An excellent method for developing young engineers
• We and our peers are ready for more!!
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28. Project Management Suggestions and
Benefits
• “Napkin to flight” made us better, more versatile engineers, cognizant of
system-level issues, risks, and trades
• Fast pace gives system perspective: the decisional trajectory is held in
the brains of all
• Real hardware responsibility forced us to “walk” paths we only “knew”
(at best)
• Real responsibility, with the capacity for unchecked failure, transforms
number crunchers to leaders
• Gathering top talent from multiple centers to work on a test project,
allows skill transfer back to multiple centers/organizations
• Developing young engineers through prototype work provides a new
generation of “smart buyers” for the Agency
• All engineers should have this type of experience…
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29. Questions?