The document discusses the need for an independent legal framework to adjudicate Islamic finance disputes, as existing courts inadequately apply Sharia law. It analyzes two cases (Beximco, Blom Bank) to show how English common law disassociates Islamic aspects when governing Islamic finance contracts. The Dubai World Islamic Finance Arbitration Center (DWIFAC) and its jurisprudence office (DWIFACJO) could offer a globally recognized arbitration center for Islamic finance disputes. DWIFACJO may establish a uniform Islamic banking law and standardized dispute resolution contract to create legal certainty for the industry.

2. Introduction
As the Islamic finance industry is growing annually at a rate of 10% to 15%
per year, it is imperative that a unique, independent legal framework is
established in order to effectively adjudicate Islamic finance disputes.
Currently, Islamic finance disputes are being adjudicated in inadequate civil
and common law courts and arbitration centers where the contracts in dispute
are being transformed from Islamic to conventional transactions.

3. Aim
The aim of this presentation is to explore the role of the Dubai World
Islamic Finance Arbitration Center (“DWIFAC”) and its‟
jurisprudence office (DWIFACJO) as the dispute resolution center of
the Islamic finance industry, fitting in with the recent 2013 Sheikh
Mohammad „Dubai as the Capital of the Islamic Economy‟ initiative.

4. Objective
The objective of the presentation is to show how using a common
law jurisdiction inadvertently transforms Islamic financial
transactions into conventional disputes.
This is done through analysis of the cases Beximco Pharmaceuticals
Ltd, Bangladesh Export Import Co. Ltd., Mr. Ahmad Solail Fasiuhur
Rahman, Beximco (Holdings) Ltd. v. Shamil Bank of Bahrain E.C.
[2004] EWCA Civ 19 and Investment Dar Co KSCC v Blom
Development Bank Sal [2009] EWHC 3545.
Through case analysis combined with an exploration of the efficacy
of existing arbitration centers, this presentation will seek to reveal
that the Islamic finance industry currently lacks an adequate dispute
resolution mechanism and facility to adjudicate disputes arising from
Islamic finance contracts.

5. Should Courts Be Used?
Asutay and Hasan (2011:64) state that due to the common law,
interpretational approach used to resolve Islamic finance cases in
UK/common law courts, Shari’ah is denied as a valid source of law
for governing a commercial dispute or Islamic finance transaction.
When English/common law is designated as the governing
jurisdiction of an Islamic finance contract, courts tend to sever any
association with Shari’ah by recognizing conflict of laws and
asserting that only a national law can govern the contract.

6. Should Courts Be Used?
Judges then strictly apply English law to the commercial
dispute, further disassociating the Islamic aspects of the transaction
from the adjudication process.
Islamic finance dispute resolution must contain recourse to Shari’ah
in order to preserve Shari’ah compliance and the Islamic component
of the financial transaction.

7. Beximco
In Beximco, the defendant/borrower entered into a murabahah
agreement with the plaintiff.
The defendant defaulted and after a series of various termination
events under the agreements, the plaintiff finally brought the case to
court and made an application for summary judgment.
The defendant argued that the murabahah agreements were invalid
and unenforceable because they were in actuality disguised loans
charging interest (Asutay and Hasan, 2011: 56).

8. Beximco
English law was confirmed as the governing law and it was further
confirmed that English law does not recognize Shari’ah law as a
valid source of law to govern a commercial contract.
Furthermore, even if Shari’ah law were recognized under English
law, under the conflict of law rules applicable in England and
Wales, according to this judgment and the new Rome I, English law
would prevail as the governing law must be the law of a State.

9. Beximco
Colon (2011:425) points out that according to Beximco, under
English law a murabahah agreement may be treated the same as an
interest-bearing loan, which ironically was part of the initial claim
that based on the governing law clause, the murabahah agreements
were invalid and unenforceable because they were in truth disguised
loans charging interest (Asutay and Hasan, 2011: 56).
In fact, the adjudication of the dispute by an English court guarantees
turning the murabahah agreements into loans charging interest.

10. Beximco
Beximco interpreted the contract in light of the commercial goals that
it served to accomplish, as English law requires (Colon 2011:426)
and in line with the common law, interpretational approach as
explained by Asutay and Hasan.
This strict approach decimated the Islamic finance transaction
(2011:431).

11. Blom Bank
In Blom Bank, the Investment Dar (TID) was an investment company
registered in Kuwait and the Blom Development Bank (BDB) was a
bank incorporated in Lebanon.
A wakalah investment agreement was entered into between the two
parties governed by English law (Asutay and Hasan, 2011: 57).
The agreement provided that Blom deposit a certain amount of money
with TID, appointing TID as its wakil (agent) to manage the money as
an investment (ISRA, 2012:758).

12. Blom Bank
When TID defaulted on payments under the wakalah
agreement, BDB sued TID in the High Court of England and applied
for summary judgment on the grounds of default in payment (claim
in contract) and the deposits held in trust (claim in equity) (Asutay
and Hasan, 2011: 57).
The master found that there was an arguable defense to the
contractual claim, but not to the trust claim due to a
misunderstanding of Shari’ah and the application of common law to
an Islamic finance transaction.

13. Blom Bank
TID raised the defense of ultra vires (Asutay and Hasan, 2011: 57).
TID argued that the wakalah agreement, which was approved by its
own Shari’ah board, did not comply with the Shari’ah and was
therefore void and against TID‟s constitutional documents (Asutay
and Hasan, 2011: 57 and ISRA 2012:758).
Although within the wakalah arrangement some issues of Shari’ah
non-compliancy arose, since the contract was approved by the TID
Shari’ah Board and constituted a binding contract in both common
and Islamic law with valid offer and acceptance.
Thus, TID should have been held to the terms of the contract.

14. Blom Bank
The judge ignored the valid and binding contract and the original
contractual intent of the parties, applied western trust law to the
wakalah arrangement and unjustly ruled that TID was only liable to
pay Blom the principle amount.
In the concerned wakalah arrangement, at the end of every wakalah
period, TID was obligated to pay 5% profit to Blom.
The issue arose when TID defaulted on payments of Blom‟s principal
and the agreed profits. Blom claimed that TID should pay it the
principal deposits plus the contractually agreed 5% profit.
However, TID argued that the agreement was not Shari’ah
compliant, being an agreement for deposit taking with interest, and
therefore null, being ultra vires and beyond its legal capacity to
conform.

15. Blom Bank
According to the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standard No. 5(2/2/2) on
Guarantees, „it is not permissible to combine agency and personal
guarantees in one contract at the same time (i.e. the same party acting
as agent on the one hand and acting as guarantor on the other
hand), because such a combination conflicts with the nature of these
contracts.
In addition, a guarantee given by a party acting as an agent in respect
of an investment, turns the transaction into an interest-based loan
since the capital of the investment is guaranteed in addition to the
proceeds of the investment (i.e. as though the investment agent had
taken a loan and repaid it with an additional sum, which is
tantamount to riba).‟
In this case, TID, as agent, also guaranteed Blom a 5% return.

16. Blom Bank
However, even if the wakalah agreement in question really was a
loan with interest in disguise or a similar contraption, due to the fact
that this agreement was approved by the TID Shari’ah board, TID
should be held to the terms of the contract.
TID should not be allowed to suddenly claim that the transaction is
non-Shari’ah compliant in order to evade its contractual obligations
to Blom Bank.

17. Blom Bank
Jurists agree that an agent‟s possession is one of trust, analogous to
deposits and similar to possessions (Zuhayli 2007: 675).
This ruling follows from the fact that the agent would possess goods
as a legal representative of the principal (who is the owner).
Thus, his possession is similar (but not the same) to that of a
depository, following its rules for trust and guarantee (Zuhayli 2007:
675).
Under Shari’ah, TID was holding the 5% profit on trust for Blom as
agent for principal even if the guarantee combined with agency is
thought by some to have turned the wakalah into a deposit taking
with interest or to have simulated an interest-bearing loan.

18. Blom Bank
Although under Shari’ah, TID was technically only supposed to
receive an agency fee, in this wakalah arrangement, TID was
contractually to receive an agency fee plus all return above 5%, thus
bearing risk of loss.
In a proper wakalah arrangement, the principal bears all risk of loss
and profit, while the agent only receives an agency fee.
According to the AAOIFI Shari’ah Standard No. 21(4/2/c), „…the
amount payable as remuneration for agency should be known,
whether in lump sum or as a share of a specific amount of income.
It may also be defined in terms of an amount of income to be known
in the future, as when remuneration is linked to an indicator that may
be quoted at the beginnings of different intervals of time.

19. Blom Bank
However, it is not permissible to leave remuneration for agency
undetermined and allow the agent to take an unspecified share from
the entitlements of principal‟ (2004: 415).
In this arrangement, the agent was to take an unspecified share from
the entitlements of the principal, being any amount of return above
5%.
These Shari’ah issues were totally ignored by the judge.
In this transaction, the judge misapplied Shari’ah law, ignored the
reality of the Islamic finance and banking industry, and then judged
the contracts in relation to Western trust law, unfairly ruling that
Blom was only entitled to the principal amount.

20. Blom Bank
The judge ordered an interim payment to be paid to Blom based on
the fact that the contract was null and void (no trust) and that the
transaction was ultra vires (non- Shari’ah compliant).
The judge should have ruled that Blom was entitled to the deposit
amount plus any profit made up to a limit of 5% (if profit was made)
rather than just the deposit amount.

21. Beximco and Blom Bank
Beximco illustrates how selecting English law as the governing law
of an Islamic finance contract may invalidate the application of
Shari’ah to the dispute as Shari’ah is not recognized as a valid source
of law for governing commercial transactions in the UK and is not
seen as a national law in relation to Rome I.
Blom Bank reveals how the misapplication of Shari’ah by a UK
judge may be detrimental to the effective adjudication of the Islamic
finance dispute.

22. Benefits of Arbitration
Why Arbitration?
 Permissible in Islam;
 Time and Cost Effective;
 Ability to apply Shari’ah and commercial business practice to the
dispute;
 Parties may select arbitrators;
 Parties may structure the process to the needs of the dispute;
 ADR preserves the relationship of the disputing parties.

23. Arbitration in Islamic Finance
Currently, Islamic finance disputes may be submitted to the
arbitration institutions around the world. However, Lawrence and
Khan called The Qatar International Center for Commercial
Arbitration (“QICCA”), the Qatar Financial Center (“QFC”), the
Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration
(“CRCICA”), the International Islamic Mediation and Arbitration
Center (“IMAC”) based in Hong Kong, and the Singapore
International Arbitration Center (“SIAC”) and Lawrence and Khan
were told that very few Islamic finance cases had been brought to
them for adjudication as of yet.
Yakoob, Smolo, and Muhammad (2011:18) state that the reality is
that most of the institutions have not heard of any arbitration or
mediation cases based on Islamic finance. Despite the establishment
of the centers, especially the KLRCA, none has been substantially
involved in Islamic finance cases.

24. Arbitration in Islamic Finance
When Oseni and Ahmed approached KLRCA arbitrators, one
arbitrator revealed to them that not more than two cases had been
arbitrated (Oseni and Ahmad 2011:11).
Agha (2009:29) says that none of these institutions are globally
recognized centers for Islamic finance dispute resolution.
Even though the International Islamic Center for Reconciliation and
Arbitration (“IICRCA”) in Dubai was established by the Islamic
Development Bank (“IDB”) and has arbitration rules, that give
priority to Shari’ah in the event of a conflict of laws, the IICRCA is
not a globally recognized dispute resolution center for Islamic
finance and is rarely used.

25. DWIFAC and DWIFACJO
It is clear that state courts in common and civil law jurisdictions are
inadequate to adjudicate Islamic finance disputes due to the lack of
recognition of Shari’ah law, lack of independent Shari’ah advisory
committees, and/or the inability of court staff to effectively apply
Islamic finance and Shari’ah concepts in dispute resolution.
In addition, the currently existing arbitration centers are insufficient
to handle Islamic finance matters due to lack of properly trained staff;
inadequate procedure and rules; misapplication and non-application
of Shari’ah and preference for national law; legal uncertainty; and
lack of popularity as a mode of dispute resolution.

26. DWIFAC
The Dubai World Islamic Finance Arbitration Center or (“DWIFAC”) may
offer the Islamic finance industry a globally recognized arbitration center
complete with the DWIFAC jurisprudence office, which may issue a uniform
Islamic banking law and a standardized DWIFAC dispute resolution contract,
creating harmony, legal certainty, and investor confidence in and across the
Islamic finance industry.
The DWIFAC standardized dispute resolution contract contains a built-in
dispute resolution mechanism, facilitating early dispute settlement and
completion of contract.

27. DWIFAC
This contract may be attached to all Islamic finance contracts
industry-wide, making DWIFAC the central dispute resolution
authority for the industry.

28. DWIFAC
As it stands now, the `UAE does not have an Islamic Banking
law, however, it has a law allowing Islamic Banks to exist, UAE
Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 Regarding Islamic Banks, Financial
Institutions, and Investment Companies.
There had previously been a proposed law for governing Islamic
banks in 1985, but it had not been backed up by a decree and
therefore, that is why the law is not in existence now.
However, Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 was promulgated to legalize
Islamic banking in the UAE.

29. Supreme Shari’ah Council
Article 5 provides that a Supreme Shari’ah Council should be
established and approved through a cabinet decision, but it never
materialized.
The Supreme Shari’ah Council would oversee Islamic
banks, financial institutions, and investment companies and its‟
opinion would be binding.

30. Supreme Shari’ah Council
However, Article 6 was implemented, which requires that each
Islamic firm establish its own Shari’ah Supervisory Authority
(“SSA”) consisting of three members, to be approved by the Shari’ah
Supervisory Council (ISRA 2013:656) and inserted into the articles
of association (ISRA 2013: 656).
The SSA is obligated to apply Shari’ah to the company operations
and contracts (Thani, Abdullah, Hasan 2004: 256).

31. DWIFAC
DWIFACJO may take the opportunity to formulate and issue a
Uniform Islamic Banking Law based upon the draft of the UAE 1985
Islamic Banking Law, UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 Regarding
Islamic Banks, Financial Institutions and Investment Companies, the
Law Regulating Islamic Financial Business DIFC Law No. 13 of
2004, and AAOIFI standards.
The new law may then be utilized as the substantive law in DWIFAC
arbitrations and submitted to the UAE government for approval and
gazetting as this law would be necessary for the UAE in order to
fulfill its mandate of becoming the capital of the Islamic economy.

32. Supreme Shari’ah Council
In addition, DWIFAC may establish a central Shari’ah Supervisory
Authority or Supreme Shari’ah Council for the UAE, which may be
utilized by all existing UAE dispute resolution bodies, including the
Central Bank of the UAE, the Dubai Courts, and the
DIFC/DFSA, which lacks such a board.
The Supreme Shari’ah Council may fulfill its original purpose of
approving the Shari’ah boards of all Islamic financial institutions in
the UAE, including in the DIFC.

33. DWIFAC
A special component of the DWIFAC dispute resolution mechanism
is the special relationship between DWIFAC, the Central Bank of the
UAE, the Dubai Courts, the DIFC, DIFC-LCIA, and DIAC.
The Central Bank of the UAE (“CBUAE”) was formed in 1980 and
is primarily responsible for overseeing banks in the UAE, except in
the DIFC, where the regulatory authority is the Dubai Financial
Services Authority or (“DFSA”).
The DFSA is a Shari’ah Systems Regulator, requiring that any
Islamic firm must have a Shari’ah Supervisory Board (“SSB”).

34. DIFC
The DFSA is unfortunately not itself a Shari’ah regulator and has not
constituted its‟ own Shari’ah Board to oversee the regimes in Islamic
firms (DFSA: 2010).
There appears to be a substantial amount of Islamic finance business
being conducted in the DIFC, under the regulation of the DFSA,
however, the DIFC lacks an adequate Islamic finance dispute
resolution mechanism and centralized Shari’ah authority.

35. DWIFAC
DWIFAC, which shall be funded by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid
Al Maktoum, may act as the independent central dispute resolution
authority and Shari’ah regulator connecting all of the adjudication
apparatus‟s of Dubai, the UAE, and the DIFC into one consolidated
framework for the adjudication of Islamic finance disputes with a
centralized Shari’ah authority in the form of the Shari’ah Supreme
Council.
The decisions of the Shari’ah Supreme Council shall be binding and
available to the public for review, thereby giving certainty to legal
decisions and promoting confidence amongst investors.

36. DWIFAC
The DIFC, Dubai Courts, Central Bank of the UAE, and the IICRCA
may refer arbitration to DWIFAC and/or utilize the DWIFAC
Ambassador‟s List and facilities.
In addition, DWIFAC may utilize the expert
determination, mediation, and other services of the Dubai and DIFC
Courts and the arbitrators of the IICRCA, DIFC-LCIA, DIAC, and
the Central Bank of the UAE governance unit.
DWIFAC awards may be enforceable in the Dubai and DIFC Courts
through a special protocol.

37. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
I propose that DWIFACJO issue a standardized dispute resolution
contract, which may be attached to the main contract.
The DWIFACJO standardized dispute resolution contract may
contain a similar built-in dispute resolution mechanism as the FIDIC
contract containing three stages including (1) the Dispute Resolution
Board (DAB), (2) amicable settlement, and (3) final referral to
DWIFAC arbitration.

38. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
Within thirty days of the occurrence of the subject-matter of a
dispute, any party to the contract may submit a claim to the
DAB, addressed to the chairman of the DAB and with a copy to all
parties of the contract.

39. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
However, if any of the parties to the contract considers that there are
circumstances, which justify the late submission, she may submit the
details to the DAB for a ruling.
If the DAB considers that it, in all the circumstances, is fair and
reasonable that the late submission be accepted, the DAB shall have
the authority to override the relevant thirty day limit and if it so
decides, it shall advise both the parties accordingly.

40. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
The DAB shall have sixty days to issue a binding ruling, which must
be implemented immediately.
If either party is not satisfied with the DAB ruling, either party can
give notice of dissatisfaction to the other before the thirty days after
the day on which she received the decision on or before the thirty
days after the day on which the said period of sixty days expired.

41. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
If there is no dissatisfaction within thirty days after the day on which
she received the decision, the DAB‟s decision shall become final and
binding upon both parties.
The DAB‟s decision may then only be overturned by settlement or
arbitration.

42. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
The DAB shall consist of three people who must be suitably qualified
in law, Islamic finance, and Shari’ah.
Each party shall nominate one member for the approval of the other
party.
The parties shall consult both these members and shall agree upon
the third member, who shall be appointed to act as chairman.

43. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
However, if a list of potential members is included in the contract, the
members shall be selected from those on the list, other than anyone
who is unable or unwilling to accept appointment to the DAB.

44. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
The agreement between the parties and either a sole member
(adjudicator) or each of the three members shall incorporate by
reference the General Conditions as written by DWIFACJO, with
such amendments as agreed between them.
The composition of the DAB shall be by nomination and then jointselection.
DAB members are to be re-numerated jointly by the parties with each
paying half of any fees.
DAB members may only be replaced by mutual agreement.

45. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
The appointment of any member may be terminated by mutual
agreement of both parties, but not by any party acting alone.
Unless otherwise agreed by both parties, the appointment of the DAB
shall expire when the discharge of the matter shall have become
effective.
Where the parties fail or are otherwise unable to agree upon the
appointment, nomination or replacement of any member of the
DAB, then the appointing official so named in the contract shall
make the appointment.

46. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
DWIFAC may establish an Ambassador‟s List similar to the FIDIC
President‟s List, from which arbitrators and DAB members may be
selected, if not specified in the contract.
Persons who have successfully completed a DWIFAC Adjudication
Assessment Workshop and International Arbitrator‟s Islamic Finance
Contracts Course and applied for entry to the DWIFAC Ambassador's
List of Approved Dispute Adjudicators are entered on the List for
five years.

47. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
Successful attendees at an Adjudication Assessment Workshop are
required to be fluent in English and to be thoroughly familiar with
Islamic finance, law, and Shari’ah.
There may be situations where a party fails to comply with a DAB
decision.
In such cases, the other party may refer the failure to DWIFAC
arbitration.

48. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
Where notice of dissatisfaction has been given, both Parties shall
attempt to settle the dispute amicably before the commencement of
arbitration.
However, unless both Parties agree otherwise, arbitration may be
commenced on or after the fiftieth day after the day on which notice
of dissatisfaction was given.
The attempt to obtain an amicable settlement during this prescribed
period of fifty days is a condition precedent to a referral to
arbitration.

49. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
There is no given time frame to refer a dispute to arbitration,
however, it should be without undue delay.
Once the arbitration procedure has been initiated, the arbitration shall
commence according to the DWIFAC arbitration rules.
The arbitrator(s) shall have full power to open up, review, and revise
any decision of the DAB relevant to the dispute.
Neither party shall be limited in the proceedings before the
arbitrator(s) to the evidence or arguments previously put before the
DAB to obtain its decision or to the reasons for dissatisfaction given
in its notice of dissatisfaction.

50. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
Any decision of the DAB shall be admissible in evidence in the
arbitration.
Arbitration may be commenced prior to or after completion of the
contract.
The obligations of the Parties and the DAB shall not be altered by
reason of any arbitration being conducted during the progress of the
contract.

51. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
The arbitration shall be conducted in the English language and any
arbitral decision shall be final and binding.
All of the DWIFAC decisions (see Appendix B) are to be published
in English, French, and Arabic and the arbitration itself to be
conducted in English.
In the event of a conflict of laws, the Shari’ah shall prevail.
A valid arbitration decision should lead to a verdict that conforms to
the rules of the Shari’ah (AAOIFI 2004:559).

52. Shari’ah
The Shari’ah and legal basis of the arbitration decision shall be
mentioned in the decision (AAOIFI 2004:559).

53. DWIFACJO Standardized
Dispute Resolution Contract
In the context of DWIFAC, the center may make arrangements with
the Dubai and DIFC courts for enforceability of DWIFAC arbitration
awards.
However, parties to the dispute must realize that the arbitration award
issued by DWIFAC may be overturned or enforced in other
jurisdictions (International Bechtel Co. Ltd. v. Department of Civil
Aviation of the Government of Dubai 300 F. Supp. 2d 112 (DDC.
2004)) or challenged in UAE courts based on Article 216 of the Civil
Procedure Law.

54. Shari’ah Supreme Council
Shari’ah Supreme Council decisions shall act as a source of
precedent and shall be binding, thus providing legal certainty to
Islamic finance dispute adjudication.
The Shari’ah Supreme Council established by DWIFAC shall act as
the highest Shari’ah authority for DWIFAC arbitration, the UAE, and
the DIFC.

55. Conclusion
It is not efficient for the Islamic finance industry to use domestic
common and civil law litigation, which does not recognize
Shari’ah, gives priority to secular national laws, or relies on a
controversial Shari’ah Advisory Committee (“SAC”) to adjudicate
Shari’ah issues.
It is clear that international arbitration is more beneficial than
mediation and expert determination and the best alternative dispute
resolution mechanism available for Islamic finance.

56. Conclusion
However, it is also evident that none of the existing arbitration
centers can provide an adequate mechanism for adjudication of
disputes for the international Islamic finance industry.

57. Conclusion
The DWIFAC arbitration center along with the DWIFAC
jurisprudence office (DWIFACJO) provides the best solution of the
dispute resolution conundrum of the Islamic finance industry,
providing a globally recognized center for dispute resolution located
in one of the world‟s major financial centers, which adjudicates
disputes using arbitration incorporating lex mercatoria and Shari’ah,
the DWIFACJO uniform banking law, the DWIFAC arbitration rules,
and the procedural law of Dubai as well as uses highly qualified
Shari’ah and Islamic finance/law arbitrators.

58. Conclusion
DWIFAC may also organize and utilize the existing dispute
resolution framework in Dubai, the DIFC, and the UAE,
consolidating the centers into one hierarchical system, which includes
the Shari’ah Supreme Council for the efficient adjudication and
regulation of Islamic finance disputes.
In addition, the DWIFACJO standardized dispute resolution contract
contains a built-in dispute resolution mechanism, encouraging early
dispute settlement and completion of contract.

59. Conclusion
We should take this opportunity in the creation of the Dubai World
Islamic Finance Arbitration Center (DWIFAC) and DWIFACJO to
encourage practitioners in the Islamic finance industry, which
promotes Shari’ah based rather than Shari’ah compliant
products, and to pursue Holy Book Banking based on the concept of
Risalah, recognizing the teaching of all of God‟s prophets.