Course on Regulation and Sustainable Energy in Developing Countries - Session 2 Case studies

Delivery mechanisms for Rural Energy Services
with Renewable Energies in Developing Countries
Selected case studies
Leonardo Webinar 8th December 2011
Dr Xavier LEMAIRE, Research Associate
Sustainable Energy Regulation Network - REEEP
University College London – Energy Institute
Course on Regulation and Sustainable Energy in Developing Countries – session 2

Summary
 1. Cases of large-scale dissemination of photovoltaic systems
 Fee-for service rural concessions
 Small companies: Zambia
 Large concessions: South Africa
 Micro-credit schemes
 Indonesia
 Bangladesh
 Non-regulated market in Kenya
 2. Cases of large-scale dissemination of RET in China
 Bio-digesters
 Mini-hydro
 Small wind

Criteria selection of case studies
 Decentralised generation with RET
 Large-scale dissemination
 Several hundreds to ten thousands units (small wind generators, mini-hydro)
 Ten thousands to several hundred thousands or even million units (bio-digesters or
solar home systems)
 Market-driven approach
 Market for installation
 Number of systems disseminated justify local installers
 And even the implementation of local manufacturers
 Market for maintenance
 End-users pay for maintenance contract
 Enable small operators in rural areas to run an energy business
 Public organisations / State
 Subsidy / Capacity building
 Create an enabling environment

Large-scale dissemination of PV systems
 Indonesia
 Bangladesh
 Bio-digesters
 Mini–hydro
 Small wind

Large-scale dissemination of solar home systems
 Regulated rural energy services concessions (regulation / price + quality)
“fee for service model”
 South Africa (currently 34,000+), Zambia, Uganda, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Cap
Verde, Morocco (80,000+), Argentina (70,000+), Peru, Bolivia, Kiribati, Fiji, ,…
 (Un)regulated competitive private sector (regulation / quality)
“dealer sales model”
 Micro-credit: Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, China, Vietnam, India, The
Philippines,…
 Cash sale: Kenya (200,000+)
 Other variants: leasing (=hire-purchase)
 TOTAL world wide 2,400,000+ / 3.000,000 households?

International funding
Government
Energy service companies
Loan or capital grant
End-users
Install and maintain SHS
Soft loan or grant
Monthly fee
International funding
Government
Energy service companies
Loan or capital grant
End-users
Install and maintain SHS
Soft loan or grant
Provide a credit
Reimburse credit
Micro-finance institutions
Fee-for service scheme Micro-credit scheme
Source: X. Lemaire, 2011
Fee-for service scheme vs. micro-credit scheme

Fee for service – Utility model (“(R)ESCOs”)
1. Government give a subsidy to an enterprise to buy PV solar
systems & install them in the houses of their clients
2. Clients pay a monthly fee to get the small utility to maintain the PV
solar systems for them.
 This kind of scheme helps to solve the question of up front cost
and the question of maintenance (unlike a simple loan).
 It helps also to:
- centralise decisions and aggregate environmental benefits of
individual systems (bulk purchase, climate funding)
- facilitate enforcement of standards and codes of practices
 therefore lower costs of systems for users.

Photovoltaic ESCOs in Zambia (1)
1. Energy Service Companies are small existing local enterprises
selected in 1998 and staff trained
2. Government gave a loan to the ESCOs and bought SHS
3. ESCOs installed & maintain SHS in the houses of their clients
4. Clients pay installation cost of 100-150 US$ and a monthly fee of
8-13 US$ which covers running costs
5. ESCOs reimburse the loan over 10 years & benefit from a capital
subsidy of 50% of SHS

A house between Lundazi & Chipata

A school near Chipata

 Multiple actors:
 Swedish International Development Agency for funding
 Stockholm Environment Institute, University of Zambia and
Department of Energy involved in monitoring/training
 Regulator issues of licences and definition of codes of
practice and standards
 In 2006, 3 ESCOs, more than 400 clients + waiting list of several
hundred clients
 2 fully operational – one had financial difficulties
 Good record of payment - Few thefts
 4-5 jobs consolidated/concession

 Good social impact
 Extended hours of business for small shops
 Improved results for pupils in schools with solar systems
 ESCOs fragile financial equilibrium
 Limited customer base
 High inflation rate in Zambia (400%  10-20%)
 Pilot project
 Huge investment – limited number of system
 Only standard 50 Wp
 Pre-electrification
 Extension of the grid to the three towns
 Reduce customers base to outskirts
 Disruption of activities

Rural electrification in South Africa
 Massive rural electrification effort since 1994, end of apartheid.
 More than 2.5 million households connected to the grid BUT more
than 1.5 million households in remote areas unlikely to be
connected.
 Concessionaire fee-for service with solar photovoltaic has been
adopted in 1999 to install more than 300,000 Solar Home Systems.
 Currently 3 concessions, only 34,000 SHS. Subsidies for extension
stopped while other PV projects went on (schools, health centres).
 Project initially monitored by the national regulator, now
Department of Mineral and Energy.

The Nura Concession
The biggest and one of the
most successful concession in
South Africa
Very large concession of
10.000 Km2 with 11.000 Solar
Home Systems
Eight energy stores (LPG +
solar electricity) +
Headquarters
Economies of scale and more
than 70 jobs created

Organisation of the reporting system
Clients Energy stores
Tokens
from SHS
Headquarters
Technicians
Source: X. Lemaire, REEEP,2006.

Cost off-grid /on grid in South Africa
Solar Grid
Capital Cost per
Household
R 4,000
(530 US$)
R 10,000 – 15,000
(1,300 – 2,000 US$)
Subsidy per
Household
R 3,500
(460 US$)
R 4,000
(530 US$)
Utility Cost per
Household
R 500
(70 US$)
R 6,000 – 11,000
(770 US$ - 1,470 US$)
Source: NuRa, 2006.
Pre-paid monthly fee = 61 Rands (8 US$)
Free Basic Alternative Energy = 50% of the fee

Successes and difficulties in South Africa
 Proximity with clients and delay in maintenance?
 good human resource management
 Software + system of reporting + GPS
 Complaints mainly linked:
 To small size of the systems (no colour TV! no cooking!)
 Cost of the fee (4-8 US dollars) even subsidised remain high for rural people
 Understanding of the contract? Question of ownership of the systems
 Difficulties linked to:
 Lack of coordination with grid authorities
 Differentiated fees due to non-homogeneous interpretation of free tariff
 Fees can vary according to the policy of the municipalities who give or not a
subsidy (Free Basic Electricity for first 50 kWh/month) (since 2007 Free Basic
Alternative Electricity of 55 R)
 Lack of continuous support
 No more/limited subsidies to buy new systems and increase the number of
systems managed from 2006 to 2010,

Solar Vision
NuRa
KES
(Shell Eskom)
Sharp increase of installations?

Small or large rural energy companies?
Very small companies
(e.g. Zambia, Pacific)
 100-150 clients each
 900 US dollars/SHS
 2-4/5 jobs
 Only photovoltaic
 Specialised technicians
 Low maintenance
Proximity with the client
Cost of systems remain high
Customer basis limited
Fragile-only highest income
Large companies
(e.g. South Africa)
 11,000 -30,000 clients each
 550 US dollars/SHS
 + 70 jobs
 Multi-energy
 LPG, paraffin,…
 Other RE and diesel
Reduction of costs
Logistic difficulties
Complexity management
- Local stores
- System of reporting
 Break-even point?

Credit sales model: Indonesia
 Company called Sudimara Energi
 More than 30,000 systems installed
 Company installed 50 Wp systems and provided maintenance contracts by
trained technicians
 Credit reimbursed in 4 years – more than 95% repaid
 Cost systems remained low as manufactured in Indonesia
 Financial crisis of 1997
 devaluation = increase prices solar modules
 company folded
 Main lessons
 Loan and maintenance by the same company who install the system and
has a direct interest to keep them running to keep customers satisfied and
get them pay the credit
 Solar business = fragile

Credit sales model in Bangladesh (1)
 IDCOL – Government Owned
financial institution Infrastructure
Development Company Limited
(IDCOL) was established on 14 May
1997 by the Government of
Bangladesh
 IDCOL is playing a major role in
bridging the financing gap for
developing medium and large-scale
infrastructure and renewable energy
projects in Bangladesh.
 The company now stands as the
market leader in private sector
energy and infrastructure financing
in Bangladesh.
 RE investment portfolio – 174 million
US$ - 97% on SHS.
Source: Mondal, 2009

 Grameen Shakti
 Established in 1996
 Company install mainly 50 Wp systems and provide maintenance
contracts by trained technicians so systems function and provide reliable
electricity
 Belongs to the family of companies set around Grameen Bank
 Grameen Bank set up in 1983
 Grameen Shakti can rely on the network of micro-retailers of the
Grameen Bank
 Activity
 Till 1999, only 1,147 systems installed!
 Only after a loan from the International Finance Corporation/ World
Bank, solar activity took off
 More than 464,000 SHS installed in September 2010
 636,322 SHS installed in May 2011

Source: Komatsu, 2011
Source: Komatsu, 2011
Yearly installation of SHS by Grameen Shakti
Size of SHS proposed by Grameen Shakti

Options Cash Basis Loan 2
years
Loan 3 years
Initial
payment
100% initial
payment with
4% discount
25% initial
payment
15% initial
payment
Interest
rate
8%
interest
rate
12% interest
rate
Options for purchase of SHS with Grameen Shakti (after loan from IFC/World Bank)
Source X. Lemaire, 2011 from Miller, 2009.
 Moved today from 3 options to 6 options

 Main lessons
 Need to keep solar systems running to keep customers satisfied and get them
reimburse the loan:
 annual visit from technicians during the financing period
 one year maintenance contracts for few dollars per month afterwards
 Diversification of loans and systems (10 Wp to 130 Wp) proposed to end-users
 Importance of training:
 6,700 women trained as technicians;
 they receive a 4 year technical degree in one of the 45 Grameen Technology Centres
 Reasons of success
 Costs systems are low as manufactured in Japan
 Cost of 50 Wp = around 400 US$
 Support from an international organisation to expand customer base
 Existing dense network of retailers for micro-credit
 Limits
 Quality of installation and components could fluctuate

(Modular) cash sales models in Kenya
 Advantages of direct sales
 Base of hundreds of owner shops who sell PV system
 They can (or not) install the system
 End-users buy components by components of the PV system
 More than 200,000 SHS disseminated but very small systems
10-14 Wp for less than 200 US$
 Limits
 Only a minority (5% of rural inhabitants) can afford to buy directly
a system without credit
 People buy the cheapest components – size too small so
customers not satisfied
 Installation is not properly done leading to low system
performance from the start and lack of maintenance leads to
early system failure

Cash flow /costumer base
Source: World Bank, 2008.
Reach higher
number of
households
Cash flow for PV company
Source IEA, 2003

Conclusion on delivery mechanism for SHS
 No best delivery mechanism
 Choice and adaptation
 according to existing institutional framework and cultural habits in a country
 according to target / number of people to reach
 Finance
 Necessity of external funding to cover capital cost & expand scheme to new customers
 Difficult to do without subsidies at the start
 Equilibrium of solar companies always fragile
 Tension between high fees <-> capacity of payment of end-users
 Coordination between different actors needed
 E.g. MFIs and installers
 Future
 Mobile phones
 Generate a demand for small load (0.5 billion mobile phone users do not have electricity)
 Reduce transaction costs for micro-payments

Large-scale dissemination of RET in China
 Indonesia
 Bangladesh
 Bio-digesters
 Mini–hydro
 Small wind

Dissemination of bio-digesters in China (1)
 A long story
 First institutions to promote biogas in the 30s
 State support from beginning 70s with high priority to rural biogas
digester for small farms
 Opening of the countries in the 80s with numerous environmental
laws and regulations and standards to support bio-energy
 National Rural Biogas construction Plan 2003-2010
  Above 30 million bio-digesters
 Two types of bio-digesters (280-300+ US$ for 8m3)
 Concrete: small/big maintenance every 2-3 years/every 4-5 years
 Glass Fiber Reinforced Plastic from 2000 – no maintenance

Dissemination of bio-digesters in China (2)
Source: Zhang, 2009.
http://greeningchina.wordpress.com/
Fiberglas reinforced
plastic digesters

Dissemination of bio-digester in China (2)
 60% of biogas digesters were operating in 2007
 Mainly the ones constructed before 1990 in China not
operating
 Poorly constructed – leakage
 Technology  temperature well above 10C
 Level of biogas production acceptable low in cold regions
 North China 5-8 months per year
 Central China 7-9 months per year
 Southern China 10-12 months per year
 Lack of maintenance and technical support
 In the past financial support only for construction
 Not enough follow-up : most provinces have small rural energy offices with
lack of staff

Dissemination of bio-digester in China (3)
 Technology and policy changes in China
 Modern biogas technologies
 Scheme of Low-temperature Biogas Production and Commercialized Utilization Technology
 Size of bio-digesters tend to increase
 Linked to increase size of farms
 Increase productivity to provide gas/heat, cooking
 10,000 pig farm = 100 kW electricity capacity
 Standardization engineering equipment and materials used in
construction
 31 standards for biogas construction
 From 2003 to 2009, 3 billion US$ invested
 82% for households bio-digesters (subsidy around 150 US$ for 8m3 +/- half of the price)
 10% medium & large scale bio-digesters
 8% to finance service system
 Encourage creation of local consultancy and service providers

Dissemination of small hydro in China (1)
 SHP < 50 MW
 SHP integrated most of the times with the grid
 Small hydro responsibility of local government while large hydro
responsibility of central government
 Preferential tax policy
 Profit reinvested in SHP and local grids
 State subsidy to multi-channel fund (local self-financing + loan from
banks)
 ratio state funding : private& individual funding 1:25
 More and more Independent Power Producers
 End 2007:
 54,317 SHP power stations
 47,389 MW installed capacity
 28,934 SHP business with shareholders

 SHP < 50 MW
 SHP integrated most of the times with the
grid
 End 2007:
 54,317 SHP power stations
 47,389 MW installed capacity
Source: CREIA, REN21, 2009

 Research
 Increased efficiency of SHP station
 More stringent technical specifications
 Established standard planning procedures
 Limits
 Low quality of equipment
 Only few stations uses new technology when upgrading
 Low cost of sale of electricity to large grid
 Sub-optimal use of equipment
 Low annual utilization hours
 High distribution losses
 Low automation

Dissemination of small wind in China
 Off-grid turbines for rural electrification
 100W to 100 kW
 Promotion of local manufacturing
 From 1983 to end 2008, China has produced more than 500,000
small wind turbines
 36 turbine production companies + 28 parts production
companies
 Network of retailers for maintenance
 Particular efforts:
 Training technicians
 Users manual

Conclusion on RETs in China
 China emerging country
 Huge customer base <->small fragmented markets like
most developing countries
 State/public banks facilitate access to funding at low costs
 Lessons
 Some renewable energy technologies are mature and
already very cheap
 Nurture a local market for manufacturing takes time
 Tax breaks, customs barriers, stable policy framework,…
 Importance of creating also a local market for maintenance
& follow-up of installations

References for solar home systems (1)
 Delivery models for solar home systems
 Schultem B., van Hermert B. H., Sluijsc Q. Summary of Models for the
Implementation of Solar Home Systems in Developing Countries. Report IEA
PVPS T9-02. IEA, Paris, France, 2003.
 Krause M., Nordstrom S. (eds.). Solar Photovoltaics in Africa – Experiences
with Financing and Delivery Models. UNDP and GEF, New York, USA,
2004.
 Zambia
 Lemaire X., 2009. Fee-for service companies for rural electrification with
photovoltaic systems: the case of Zambia. Energy for Sustainable
Development. 13, 18-23.
 Gustavsson M. 2008. Solar Energy for a Brighter Life – A Case Study of
Rural Electrification Through Solar Photovoltaic Technology in the Eastern
Province, Zambia, PhD dissertation.

References for solar home systems (2)
 South Africa
 Lemaire X., 2011. Off-grid electrification with solar home systems. The experience of a
fee-for-service concession in South Africa. Energy for Sustainable Development, 15,
277-283.
 Integrated Rural Energy Utilities – A review of Literature and Opportunities for the
Establishment on an IREU, REEEP – Restio Energy, July 2008.
 NuRa In-depth Case study – Integrating further?, REEEP – Restio Energy, March 2009.
 Bangladesh
 Barua D. 2001. Strategy for promotions and development of renewable technologies in
Bangladesh: Experience from Grameen Shakti. Renewable Energy. 22, 205-210.
 Komatsu D. 2011. Are micro-benefits negligible? The implications of the rapid
expansion of Solar Home Systems in Bangladesh for sustainable development. Energy
Policy. 4022-4031.
 Mondal A. M. 2010. Economic viability of solar home system: Case study of
Bangladesh. Renewable Energy. 35, 1125-1129.
 Sovacool B. K., Drupady I. M. 2011. Summoning Earth and Fire: The energy
development implications of Grameen Shakti (GS) in Bangladesh. Energy, 36, 4445-
4459.

Other references
 China
 Chen Y. et al., 2010. Households Gas use in rural China: A study of opportunities and
constraints. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review. 14. 545-549. 6073-6081.
 Jiang. X. 2011. A review of the biogas industry in China, Energy Policy, 39.
 Zhang et al. 2009. Renewable Energy in China: Pattern and Policy, Renewable Energy,
2813-2823.
 CREIA/REN21, Background paper: Chinese Renewable Status report, October 2009.
 To go further
 Designing sustainable off-grid rural electrification projects: principles and practices, World
Bank/ESMAP, 2008.
 Lemaire X., Kerr D. SERN literature review 2010 – an annotated bibliography and reference
guide on off-grid and rural electrification, REEEP.
 Softwares
 HOMER
 http://homerenergy.com/
 RET-Screen
 http://www.retscreen.net/

Contact
 University College London -Energy Institute. Central House - 14
Upper Woburn Place London WC1H 0NN United Kingdom
 Xavier.Lemaire@reeep.org
 REEEP - Sustainable Energy Regulation Network
 http://www.reeep.org/830/sern.htm

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