This document provides statistics on the ten highest cartel fines imposed by the European Commission since 1969. It lists the largest fines per case and per company. The document then provides an overview of Article 101 of the TFEU, which prohibits anticompetitive agreements between undertakings. It discusses what constitutes an agreement under EU competition law and outlines the key elements analyzed in assessing potential violations of Article 101, including the concepts of object and effect. The document also touches on how economic principles like the prisoner's dilemma can help assess whether collusion between competitors is likely.
This document provides an overview of antitrust law, including:
- The history and goals of antitrust law in regulating monopolies and protecting competition.
- The different schools of thought regarding antitrust law and how it is interpreted.
- Key principles such as jurisdiction, exemptions, and enforcement of antitrust law.
- Provisions prohibiting monopolization, restraint of trade through various anticompetitive practices, and international considerations.
The need to have an effective Competition Law regimeAjithaa Edirimane
The document discusses the need for an effective competition law regime in Sri Lanka to attract foreign direct investment. It provides an overview of competition law, including its goals of promoting efficiency, innovation and consumer welfare. It describes anti-competitive practices like price fixing and abuse of dominant power. It also discusses competition law enforcement in the EU, US, India and weaknesses in Sri Lanka's existing framework. It argues that strengthening competition policies through higher fines, applying laws to all entities, and enhancing the regulatory authority could help attract more foreign investment.
This document provides an overview of a business environment lesson on competition policy and regulatory mechanisms in the UK. It discusses key concepts around competition like monopolies and oligopolies. It also outlines some of the main UK and EU competition laws and acts. Finally, it describes the roles of regulatory bodies in the UK that oversee competition like the Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading.
The document discusses different types of government regulations including social regulation, economic regulation, and antitrust regulations. It then provides examples of how governments regulate natural monopolies and industries through setting prices, limiting entry of new firms, and establishing regulatory agencies like the Federal Trade Commission. The document also covers the origins and key components of antitrust policy in the United States including the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and landmark antitrust cases.
The document discusses competition law as it relates to construction companies in the UK. It provides an overview of prohibited anti-competitive agreements, penalties for violations including large fines, and leniency programs. It also summarizes a major case where 103 construction companies were fined a total of £129 million for collusive tendering practices like cover pricing. Compliance training and policies are recommended to reduce risks of infringement.
This document provides an overview of dominant position and abuse of dominance under EU competition law. It defines dominance as substantial market power over a period of time. Market shares above 30-50% are generally considered dominant but entry conditions also factor in. Abuses can be exclusionary, aimed at foreclosing rivals, or exploitative of customers. Specific abuses discussed include excessive pricing, loyalty rebates, tying and bundling, margin squeezes, and predatory pricing. The legal tests for these abuses generally examine whether conduct would exclude an equally efficient competitor or harm competition.
The UK has four main bodies that govern competition:
1. The government ensures competition in the public interest and intervenes when necessary in privatized industries.
2. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) ensures businesses comply with competition law.
3. The Competition Commission reviews mergers, monopolies and regulatory inquiries, and hears appeals of OFT decisions.
4. Regulators like OFCOM and OFWAT have investigative and enforcement powers like the OFT over privatized industries.
The document lists the members of a group which includes 14 names. It then provides a brief overview of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 in India, which aims to prevent concentration of economic power and prohibit monopolistic and restrictive trade practices. The act was amended in 1991 and was replaced by the Competition Act of 2002 to promote competition and protect consumer interests in India.
This document provides an overview of antitrust law, including:
- The history and goals of antitrust law in regulating monopolies and protecting competition.
- The different schools of thought regarding antitrust law and how it is interpreted.
- Key principles such as jurisdiction, exemptions, and enforcement of antitrust law.
- Provisions prohibiting monopolization, restraint of trade through various anticompetitive practices, and international considerations.
The need to have an effective Competition Law regimeAjithaa Edirimane
The document discusses the need for an effective competition law regime in Sri Lanka to attract foreign direct investment. It provides an overview of competition law, including its goals of promoting efficiency, innovation and consumer welfare. It describes anti-competitive practices like price fixing and abuse of dominant power. It also discusses competition law enforcement in the EU, US, India and weaknesses in Sri Lanka's existing framework. It argues that strengthening competition policies through higher fines, applying laws to all entities, and enhancing the regulatory authority could help attract more foreign investment.
This document provides an overview of a business environment lesson on competition policy and regulatory mechanisms in the UK. It discusses key concepts around competition like monopolies and oligopolies. It also outlines some of the main UK and EU competition laws and acts. Finally, it describes the roles of regulatory bodies in the UK that oversee competition like the Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading.
The document discusses different types of government regulations including social regulation, economic regulation, and antitrust regulations. It then provides examples of how governments regulate natural monopolies and industries through setting prices, limiting entry of new firms, and establishing regulatory agencies like the Federal Trade Commission. The document also covers the origins and key components of antitrust policy in the United States including the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and landmark antitrust cases.
The document discusses competition law as it relates to construction companies in the UK. It provides an overview of prohibited anti-competitive agreements, penalties for violations including large fines, and leniency programs. It also summarizes a major case where 103 construction companies were fined a total of £129 million for collusive tendering practices like cover pricing. Compliance training and policies are recommended to reduce risks of infringement.
This document provides an overview of dominant position and abuse of dominance under EU competition law. It defines dominance as substantial market power over a period of time. Market shares above 30-50% are generally considered dominant but entry conditions also factor in. Abuses can be exclusionary, aimed at foreclosing rivals, or exploitative of customers. Specific abuses discussed include excessive pricing, loyalty rebates, tying and bundling, margin squeezes, and predatory pricing. The legal tests for these abuses generally examine whether conduct would exclude an equally efficient competitor or harm competition.
The UK has four main bodies that govern competition:
1. The government ensures competition in the public interest and intervenes when necessary in privatized industries.
2. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) ensures businesses comply with competition law.
3. The Competition Commission reviews mergers, monopolies and regulatory inquiries, and hears appeals of OFT decisions.
4. Regulators like OFCOM and OFWAT have investigative and enforcement powers like the OFT over privatized industries.
The document lists the members of a group which includes 14 names. It then provides a brief overview of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 in India, which aims to prevent concentration of economic power and prohibit monopolistic and restrictive trade practices. The act was amended in 1991 and was replaced by the Competition Act of 2002 to promote competition and protect consumer interests in India.
The Alcoa case of 1945 was the first case where the Supreme Court applied the per se rule to find a violation of the Sherman Act based solely on the existence of monopoly power, without evidence of predatory behavior.
73
12. Which of the following is an example of
a vertical merger?
a. A merger between two automobile
manufacturers.
b. A merger between an automobile
manufacturer and a tire manufacturer.
c. A merger between an automobile
manufacturer and a computer software firm.
d. A merger between two tire manufacturers.
B. A vertical merger is between firms at different stages of production, such as a manufacturer and its supplier. Option B is the only example of a vertical merger.
The document provides an overview of the MRTP Act of 1969 and the current competition law scenario in India. Some key points:
- The MRTP Act of 1969 aimed to prevent concentration of economic power and restrict unfair trade practices. It established the MRTP Commission to investigate monopolistic and restrictive trade practices.
- The Act was replaced by the Competition Act of 2002, which established the Competition Commission of India. The new law expanded the scope to also cover abuse of dominance and combinations/mergers.
- Unfair trade practices under MRTP Act included misleading ads, false representations, unsafe goods. The Commission could direct discontinuation or void related agreements.
- Competition policy aims to ensure fair competition through removal
This presentation by Max HUFFMAN, Professor of Law, Indiana University, was made during the discussion “Taxi, ride-sourcing and ride-sharing services” held at the 65th meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 4 June 2018. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at http://oe.cd/2gs.
This document summarizes the Competition Act of 2002 in India. The key points are:
1. The Competition Act of 2002 replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969.
2. The objectives of the new Act are to prohibit anti-competitive agreements like cartels, abuse of dominant market positions, and regulate combinations that could reduce competition.
3. The Act covers both horizontal restraints like price fixing and output restrictions, as well as vertical restraints like exclusive dealing and price discrimination.
The Competition Act of 2002 aims to ensure fair competition in markets and protect consumer interests over firm size. It established the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to eliminate anti-competitive practices, promote competition, and regulate combinations (mergers and acquisitions). The CCI, headed by a High Court judge, may pass orders directing firms to discontinue anti-competitive agreements or practices, impose penalties up to 10% of turnover, and approve or reject combinations. Its orders are enforceable like High Court orders, and appeals go to the Supreme Court. The Competition Amendment Bill of 2007 set up the Competition Appellate Tribunal as a quasi-judicial body to hear CCI appeals.
Competition Law awareness and enforcement are increasing day by day. Long-term, sustainable growth of big organization, corporation and companies warrants attention to competition law while strategising their growth.
The document discusses competition and competition policy in India. It defines competition as situations in markets where sellers strive for buyers to achieve business goals. Competition policy aims to promote efficiency and maximize welfare. The Competition Act of 2002 established a commission to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote competition, protect consumers, and ensure freedom of trade. The Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant positions. It regulates combinations and promotes competition advocacy. The Commission has powers like issuing cease/desist orders and imposing penalties.
The Diversified Industrials Conference 11 June 2014
• Antitrust Trends in Diversified Industrials - Ros Kellaway and Lesley Farrell from Eversheds LLP
• Commercial contracting pitfalls - Tony Andrews from Doncasters. Gary Pellow & Tom Bridgford from Eversheds LLP
• Energy costs – opportunities and challenges - Nick Sturgeon from Chemical Industries Association
• M&A in Africa - Rafik Mzah from AfricInvest and Jawad Fassi-Fehri, from Eversheds LLP, Africa Group
The Competition Act 2002 establishes the Competition Commission of India to prevent anti-competitive practices. The Act aims to promote fair competition in markets while also protecting consumer interests. It prohibits anti-competitive agreements between entities, abuse of dominant market positions, and combinations that could significantly reduce competition. The Commission regulates mergers, acquisitions, and other transactions to ensure they do not harm competition in relevant markets.
Competition law and policy aims to promote fair competition in markets. The Competition Act of 2002 established the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to prevent anti-competitive practices. The CCI prohibits anti-competitive agreements between companies, abuse of dominant market positions, and regulates mergers and acquisitions. It investigates complaints and makes orders to protect competition and consumers. The objectives of the Act are to prevent anti-competitive behavior and practices, promote fair competition, protect consumer interests and ensure freedom of trade in India.
This document discusses the progression from the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act to the Competition Act, and provides details on:
- The MRTP Act focused on preventing concentration of economic power and controlling monopolies, while the Competition Act prohibits monopolistic, restrictive, and unfair trade practices with the goal of promoting competition.
- It defines monopolistic, restrictive, and unfair trade practices and provides examples. There was a need to substitute the MRTP Act due to shortcomings identified by the Raghavan Committee.
- Key factors in the progression include a shift from controlling economic power to preventing anti-competitive practices, recognition of abuse of dominant position, removal of registration requirements, and
These speaking points by Jean-Yves Art - Microsoft cover a presentation made during a roundtable discussion on Jurisdictional nexus in merger control regimes held at the 123rd meeting of the Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement on 15 June 2014. More papers, presentations and contributions from delegations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/jurisdictional-nexus-in-merger-control-regimes.htm
Presentation on The competition act(2002)satya pal
The document summarizes the key aspects of the Competition Act of 2002 in India. It discusses the objectives of eliminating anti-competitive practices and promoting fair competition. The main features covered are the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements such as cartels, abuse of dominant market positions, and regulations governing mergers and acquisitions. Enforcement is carried out by the Competition Commission of India through investigations and imposition of penalties. The act aims to protect consumer welfare and ensure fair competition in the market.
National Webinar at the Centre for Corporate and Competition Law at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad on the topic ”Abuse of Dominance in Competition Law” on 27th August, 2021 by Shri Dhanendra Kumar, 1st Chairperson, Competition Commission of India (CCI).
This document discusses competition law in India. It provides an overview of the benefits of competition as well as the evolution of competition law in India from the MRTP Act of 1970 to the current Competition Act of 2002. The Competition Act aims to promote fair competition and prevent anti-competitive practices. It covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of dominant position, and mergers and acquisitions. The Competition Commission of India regulates combinations and enforces penalties for violations of the Competition Act.
The document discusses competition law in India. It provides an overview of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP Act) of 1969 and explains some of its key provisions. It then summarizes the Competition Act of 2002 which replaced the MRTP Act, outlining its three main elements of prohibiting anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and regulating combinations.
Competition and Consumer Law Update: Every cloud has a silver lining...Martyn Taylor
Overview of developments in competition, antitrust and consumer law in Australia expected over the next 12 months. The presentation covers developments at the ACCC, status of the Harper Competition Reforms, substantive competition litigation, developments under the Australian Consumer Law, and other developments to note
Guidelines are proposed for countering online hate speech without censorship:
1. Media should self-regulate and promote pluralism to reduce propaganda, while not leaving regulation to governments.
2. Mechanisms should be developed to identify early warnings of hate speech online and share best practices.
3. Victims of hate speech should never be left alone, and reporting systems put in place for victims to report safely.
Prof. Roberto Mastroianni
EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom
Policy Conference, October 29th, 2012
European Union Competencies in Respect of Media Pluralism and Media
Freedom http://cmpf.eui.eu/events/policy-conference.aspx
This document discusses the importance of transparency in media ownership for democracy. It argues that mandatory reporting requirements are needed to identify the beneficial and ultimate owners of media outlets. Such requirements should apply to broadcast, print, and online media and collect basic information on ownership structure, financial accounts, and interests in other organizations. Media regulators should collect this information and make it publicly available to ensure transparency and prevent undue concentration of media ownership and political influence. Adopting clear rules and standards on ownership transparency is crucial to guarantee media pluralism.
This document discusses hate speech on the internet. It defines hate speech and outlines international and EU laws regarding criminalization of hate speech. The Additional Protocol and Framework Decision provide measures for EU member states to criminalize public incitement of hatred and dissemination of racist materials. However, prohibiting hate speech may conflict with constitutional rights to freedom of expression. Any legal measures against hate speech must be proportionate and without prejudice to freedom of expression.
The document discusses the scope and interpretation of the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD).
1) It analyzes each of the seven criteria that define an "audiovisual media service" under the directive, such as having the principal purpose of providing programs to inform, entertain or educate the general public.
2) It examines how national regulators have interpreted ambiguous criteria, like whether video content on newspaper websites is considered ancillary or a separate service.
3) The document explores how the directive applies to new media services on converging platforms and whether traditional TV rules apply, given the directive's goal of technology neutrality.
The Alcoa case of 1945 was the first case where the Supreme Court applied the per se rule to find a violation of the Sherman Act based solely on the existence of monopoly power, without evidence of predatory behavior.
73
12. Which of the following is an example of
a vertical merger?
a. A merger between two automobile
manufacturers.
b. A merger between an automobile
manufacturer and a tire manufacturer.
c. A merger between an automobile
manufacturer and a computer software firm.
d. A merger between two tire manufacturers.
B. A vertical merger is between firms at different stages of production, such as a manufacturer and its supplier. Option B is the only example of a vertical merger.
The document provides an overview of the MRTP Act of 1969 and the current competition law scenario in India. Some key points:
- The MRTP Act of 1969 aimed to prevent concentration of economic power and restrict unfair trade practices. It established the MRTP Commission to investigate monopolistic and restrictive trade practices.
- The Act was replaced by the Competition Act of 2002, which established the Competition Commission of India. The new law expanded the scope to also cover abuse of dominance and combinations/mergers.
- Unfair trade practices under MRTP Act included misleading ads, false representations, unsafe goods. The Commission could direct discontinuation or void related agreements.
- Competition policy aims to ensure fair competition through removal
This presentation by Max HUFFMAN, Professor of Law, Indiana University, was made during the discussion “Taxi, ride-sourcing and ride-sharing services” held at the 65th meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 4 June 2018. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at http://oe.cd/2gs.
This document summarizes the Competition Act of 2002 in India. The key points are:
1. The Competition Act of 2002 replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969.
2. The objectives of the new Act are to prohibit anti-competitive agreements like cartels, abuse of dominant market positions, and regulate combinations that could reduce competition.
3. The Act covers both horizontal restraints like price fixing and output restrictions, as well as vertical restraints like exclusive dealing and price discrimination.
The Competition Act of 2002 aims to ensure fair competition in markets and protect consumer interests over firm size. It established the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to eliminate anti-competitive practices, promote competition, and regulate combinations (mergers and acquisitions). The CCI, headed by a High Court judge, may pass orders directing firms to discontinue anti-competitive agreements or practices, impose penalties up to 10% of turnover, and approve or reject combinations. Its orders are enforceable like High Court orders, and appeals go to the Supreme Court. The Competition Amendment Bill of 2007 set up the Competition Appellate Tribunal as a quasi-judicial body to hear CCI appeals.
Competition Law awareness and enforcement are increasing day by day. Long-term, sustainable growth of big organization, corporation and companies warrants attention to competition law while strategising their growth.
The document discusses competition and competition policy in India. It defines competition as situations in markets where sellers strive for buyers to achieve business goals. Competition policy aims to promote efficiency and maximize welfare. The Competition Act of 2002 established a commission to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote competition, protect consumers, and ensure freedom of trade. The Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant positions. It regulates combinations and promotes competition advocacy. The Commission has powers like issuing cease/desist orders and imposing penalties.
The Diversified Industrials Conference 11 June 2014
• Antitrust Trends in Diversified Industrials - Ros Kellaway and Lesley Farrell from Eversheds LLP
• Commercial contracting pitfalls - Tony Andrews from Doncasters. Gary Pellow & Tom Bridgford from Eversheds LLP
• Energy costs – opportunities and challenges - Nick Sturgeon from Chemical Industries Association
• M&A in Africa - Rafik Mzah from AfricInvest and Jawad Fassi-Fehri, from Eversheds LLP, Africa Group
The Competition Act 2002 establishes the Competition Commission of India to prevent anti-competitive practices. The Act aims to promote fair competition in markets while also protecting consumer interests. It prohibits anti-competitive agreements between entities, abuse of dominant market positions, and combinations that could significantly reduce competition. The Commission regulates mergers, acquisitions, and other transactions to ensure they do not harm competition in relevant markets.
Competition law and policy aims to promote fair competition in markets. The Competition Act of 2002 established the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to prevent anti-competitive practices. The CCI prohibits anti-competitive agreements between companies, abuse of dominant market positions, and regulates mergers and acquisitions. It investigates complaints and makes orders to protect competition and consumers. The objectives of the Act are to prevent anti-competitive behavior and practices, promote fair competition, protect consumer interests and ensure freedom of trade in India.
This document discusses the progression from the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act to the Competition Act, and provides details on:
- The MRTP Act focused on preventing concentration of economic power and controlling monopolies, while the Competition Act prohibits monopolistic, restrictive, and unfair trade practices with the goal of promoting competition.
- It defines monopolistic, restrictive, and unfair trade practices and provides examples. There was a need to substitute the MRTP Act due to shortcomings identified by the Raghavan Committee.
- Key factors in the progression include a shift from controlling economic power to preventing anti-competitive practices, recognition of abuse of dominant position, removal of registration requirements, and
These speaking points by Jean-Yves Art - Microsoft cover a presentation made during a roundtable discussion on Jurisdictional nexus in merger control regimes held at the 123rd meeting of the Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement on 15 June 2014. More papers, presentations and contributions from delegations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/jurisdictional-nexus-in-merger-control-regimes.htm
Presentation on The competition act(2002)satya pal
The document summarizes the key aspects of the Competition Act of 2002 in India. It discusses the objectives of eliminating anti-competitive practices and promoting fair competition. The main features covered are the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements such as cartels, abuse of dominant market positions, and regulations governing mergers and acquisitions. Enforcement is carried out by the Competition Commission of India through investigations and imposition of penalties. The act aims to protect consumer welfare and ensure fair competition in the market.
National Webinar at the Centre for Corporate and Competition Law at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad on the topic ”Abuse of Dominance in Competition Law” on 27th August, 2021 by Shri Dhanendra Kumar, 1st Chairperson, Competition Commission of India (CCI).
This document discusses competition law in India. It provides an overview of the benefits of competition as well as the evolution of competition law in India from the MRTP Act of 1970 to the current Competition Act of 2002. The Competition Act aims to promote fair competition and prevent anti-competitive practices. It covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of dominant position, and mergers and acquisitions. The Competition Commission of India regulates combinations and enforces penalties for violations of the Competition Act.
The document discusses competition law in India. It provides an overview of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP Act) of 1969 and explains some of its key provisions. It then summarizes the Competition Act of 2002 which replaced the MRTP Act, outlining its three main elements of prohibiting anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and regulating combinations.
Competition and Consumer Law Update: Every cloud has a silver lining...Martyn Taylor
Overview of developments in competition, antitrust and consumer law in Australia expected over the next 12 months. The presentation covers developments at the ACCC, status of the Harper Competition Reforms, substantive competition litigation, developments under the Australian Consumer Law, and other developments to note
Guidelines are proposed for countering online hate speech without censorship:
1. Media should self-regulate and promote pluralism to reduce propaganda, while not leaving regulation to governments.
2. Mechanisms should be developed to identify early warnings of hate speech online and share best practices.
3. Victims of hate speech should never be left alone, and reporting systems put in place for victims to report safely.
Prof. Roberto Mastroianni
EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom
Policy Conference, October 29th, 2012
European Union Competencies in Respect of Media Pluralism and Media
Freedom http://cmpf.eui.eu/events/policy-conference.aspx
This document discusses the importance of transparency in media ownership for democracy. It argues that mandatory reporting requirements are needed to identify the beneficial and ultimate owners of media outlets. Such requirements should apply to broadcast, print, and online media and collect basic information on ownership structure, financial accounts, and interests in other organizations. Media regulators should collect this information and make it publicly available to ensure transparency and prevent undue concentration of media ownership and political influence. Adopting clear rules and standards on ownership transparency is crucial to guarantee media pluralism.
This document discusses hate speech on the internet. It defines hate speech and outlines international and EU laws regarding criminalization of hate speech. The Additional Protocol and Framework Decision provide measures for EU member states to criminalize public incitement of hatred and dissemination of racist materials. However, prohibiting hate speech may conflict with constitutional rights to freedom of expression. Any legal measures against hate speech must be proportionate and without prejudice to freedom of expression.
The document discusses the scope and interpretation of the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD).
1) It analyzes each of the seven criteria that define an "audiovisual media service" under the directive, such as having the principal purpose of providing programs to inform, entertain or educate the general public.
2) It examines how national regulators have interpreted ambiguous criteria, like whether video content on newspaper websites is considered ancillary or a separate service.
3) The document explores how the directive applies to new media services on converging platforms and whether traditional TV rules apply, given the directive's goal of technology neutrality.
Standards of Entrepreneur Rights in Competition Proceedings – a Matter of Adm...Michal
The question of standards of entrepreneur rights in competition proceedings has
been for many years considered as one the most controversial issues. Its importance
has been increasing considering that the application of antitrust regulations is often
concomitant with a wide-ranging interference with the freedom of economic activity.
This interference manifests itself in cases concerning both restrictive practices and
the control of concentrations. Valuable source of inspiration for a debate on the
need to take into account numerous standards of rights in competition proceedings was the dispute over the nature of competition proceedings and fines (the
controversy around ‘a criminal law nature’ of competition cases). The jurisprudence
of Strasbourg judiciaries explicitly stresses that in the assessment of a case nature
due consideration should rather not be given to formal classifications set forth
in legal provisions but to the real nature of the case. The ECJ did not share the
assumptions adopted by the European Court of Human Rights on the legitimacy of
a wide interpretation of the “criminal charge” notion within the meaning of Article
6(1) ECHR. In the present EU jurisprudence on competition law, there have been
more and more judgments which deal with standards of rights stemming from
the ECHR. In the context of an ever growing severity of penalties, the guarantee
function of law has been gaining in importance, and hence the standards to be
respected in competition proceedings are of a bigger weight.
Major changes were brought by the entry into force, on 1 December 2009, of the
Treaty of Lisbon. The implementation of the concept aiming at an even stronger
reinforcement of the position of fundamental rights was sealed by granting the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000 the binding force by including this Charter
into the EU primary law and by defining the basis for the EU accession to the
ECHR (Article 6 TEU). The introduction of new rules of judicial cooperation in
criminal matters may contribute in future to a better dynamic of the criminalization
of the most serious violations of competition law in the EU Member States (Article
83 and following of the TFEU).
My presentation about an European Court of Justice Case about thin capitalization in UK. After analyzing the facts and the fiscal and economic aspects of the operation, the presentation gives the point of view of both the UK Government and the ECJ about the fiscal regime of Thin Cap in UK. The decision of the Court is against UK Thin Cap, since the fiscal regime represents a restriction in the freedom of establishment for non-UK resident parent companies deciding where to establish a subsidiary.
Media Regulation Booklet (OCR Media Conference 2009)rikhudson
The document discusses media regulation in the UK and Europe. It outlines key principles from the European Convention on Human Rights regarding privacy (Article 8) versus freedom of expression (Article 10), and how UK law must balance these. It also describes the voluntary Press Complaints Commission code for journalists and defines what constitutes public interest. Sample questions are provided from law exams for trainee journalists regarding defamation, privacy and legal issues around publishing photos. Finally, it discusses regulation of the internet, outlining recommendations from the Byron Review on keeping children safe online.
http://cmpf.eui.eu/events/combating-hate-speech.aspx
Giovanni Sartor
EUI - European University Institute of Florence
CIRSFID - Faculty of law, University of Bologna
March 26, 2012
Recent European Litigation on the Legality of Internet Filtering for Copyrigh...Darius Whelan
Darius Whelan
University College Cork
Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest
American University Washington College of Law
Washington, DC, August 2011
‘Reframing Libel: taking (all) rights seriously and where it leads’ presented by Professor Alastair Mullis and Dr Andrew Scott at the Reframing Libel Symposium, City University London, 4th November 2010.
The document discusses potential EU competencies and legal instruments regarding media pluralism and freedom. It finds that while the EU Treaties do not explicitly confer such competencies, provisions like Article 11 of the EU Charter and Article 10 of the ECHR establish these principles. It analyzes how various Treaty articles and directives could support pluralism and discusses establishing independent regulatory authorities or an EU agency to help monitor and set standards. In conclusion, while the EU has few direct tools now, greater clarity on competencies is needed given the importance of democratic principles like pluralism.
Contemporary media regulation key terms activityMedia Studies
This document provides a list of key terms, people, and organizations for students to research regarding contemporary media regulation. Some of the main topics included are regulation, free speech, self-regulation, censorship, influential reports on media ethics like the Leveson Report, controversial figures like Julian Assange and Wikileaks, press regulatory bodies in the UK like the PCC and ASA, critiques of the press, and theoretical perspectives on the media like the Marxist position and manufacturing consent.
Internet censorship is a controversial issue. In China, the government strictly censors the internet, blocking over 18,000 websites including Wikipedia, YouTube, and Facebook. Certain search terms are also blocked and people have been imprisoned for their anti-government online activities. While China censors the internet, Australia also engages in some level of internet censorship. There are arguments both for and against internet censorship, with concerns around restricting access to information versus protecting citizens.
The document discusses the procedural powers granted to states under the Cybercrime Convention from a human rights perspective. It notes that the convention's procedural powers restrict fundamental rights, but are subject to conditions and safeguards. Specifically, it outlines requirements from the European Convention on Human Rights that any restriction must be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary in a democratic society. It also discusses safeguards like limiting the duration and scope of surveillance, independent authorization, and oversight to prevent arbitrary application and protect human rights in the use of investigative powers against cybercrime.
International Press Institute (IPI) Senior Press Freedom Adviser Steven M. Ellis will present information related to the IPI’s current project “Strengthening Journalists’ Rights, Protections and Skills: Understanding Defamation Laws versus Press Freedom”. The project seeks to examine the effects that defamation, insult and blasphemy laws in the 28 EU member countries and five candidate countries have on the practices of journalism and the exercise of press freedom.
IPI will soon be issuing a study detailing defamation law in EU member and candidate states, examining the extent to which these laws comport with international standards and offering recommendations for potential changes. Ellis will explain to participants the purpose, history and methodology behind the forthcoming study and share details regarding planned follow-up workshops and trainings. Using specific examples from relevant countries, Ellis will also detail potential pitfalls that journalists face under national criminal and civil laws on defamation, insult and blasphemy. Participants will be given examples of types of conduct that may lead to liability, potential defences to liability, potential consequences that a finding of civil or criminal liability may carry and examples of recent legal developments. Finally, he will provide a broad overview of relevant international free expression standards in order to foster awareness among journalists of their rights in cases where national laws have not yet caught up to those standards.
The police investigated abusive tweets sent to Olympic diver Tom Daley after he came in fourth place in the synchronized diving event at the 2012 London Olympics. The tweets criticized Daley's performance and said he had let his deceased father down, who had passed away the previous year.
Perspective ECtHR - CJEU European Constitutional Dimension
Prof. dr. Dirk Voorhoof
CMPF Summer School 2013 for Journalists and Media Practitioners
http://cmpf.eui.eu/training/summer-school-2013.aspx
This document provides an overview of EU competition law. It discusses key topics including:
- The application of EU competition law to the 27 EU member states and EEA countries.
- The relevant institutions that enforce competition policy, including the European Commission.
- The objectives of competition law to protect competition in free markets and promote efficiency.
- Key aspects regulated by competition law including restrictive agreements between companies and abuse of dominant market position.
- Articles 101 and 102 of the EU Treaty which prohibit anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance.
The UK government ensures competition through bodies like the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and Competition Commission to benefit consumers. These organizations regulate mergers, monopolies, and restrictive business practices according to competition law. The OFT investigates companies while the Competition Commission reviews mergers and appeals. Regulators also oversee privatized utility industries. Firms face penalties for anti-competitive behavior from these organizations according to acts like the Competition Act.
The document discusses competition law and policy in India, noting that competition law aims to promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare by preventing anti-competitive practices like cartels and abuse of dominance, and regulating mergers and acquisitions. It also explains how various government policies around sectors like trade, industry and economic regulation should be reformed to promote more competition. The Competition Commission of India is established as the primary regulator to enforce competition law and investigate anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and mergers and acquisitions.
The UK competition policy landscape involves four main bodies: the government, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the Competition Commission, and sector regulators. The OFT ensures businesses comply with competition law while the Competition Commission reviews mergers and monopolies. Sector regulators were established to oversee privatized utilities. UK and EU competition laws prohibit anti-competitive mergers, monopolies, and restrictive business practices.
The document summarizes India's Competition Act of 2002 and outlines its objectives to promote fair competition in the market. It discusses different anti-competitive practices like cartels and abuse of dominance that the Act prohibits. It also describes the roles and powers of the Competition Commission of India in regulating combinations, enforcing the Act through penalties, and advocating for competitive markets through non-enforcement measures.
This document summarizes Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position. It defines key terms like "undertakings", "dominant position", and "substantial part of the internal market". It discusses types of competitors including actual competitors based on market share, and potential competitors. It also outlines factors that can influence competition such as barriers to entry, countervailing buyer power, and the degree of market power held by a dominant undertaking.
The document discusses European Union competition law regarding mergers. It defines different types of mergers like horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers. It explains the purpose of merger control is to maintain competition and prevent the formation of monopolies that could harm consumer welfare. Merger control evaluates whether a merger could allow the merging companies to unilaterally exercise power over the market and reduce competition. Theories of potential competitive harm from mergers include unilateral or non-coordinated effects where competition between the merging companies' products is eliminated.
This document provides an overview of European Union competition law and block exemption regulations for agreements between businesses. It discusses how to determine if an agreement violates Article 81 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which prohibits agreements that restrict competition. The document also summarizes the main categories of prohibited agreements and block exemption regulations for supply and distribution agreements and technology transfers. It concludes by explaining how businesses can evaluate the efficiencies of agreements that do not qualify for a block exemption in order to qualify for an exemption under Article 81.3 of the Treaty.
The document discusses competition law and policy in India. It provides definitions of key concepts like competition and dominant position. It describes the objectives of competition law as promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare. The Competition Act 2002 aims to prevent anti-competitive practices by firms like cartels, abuse of dominance, and regulate mergers and acquisitions. It established the Competition Commission of India as a regulatory body with quasi-judicial powers.
This document provides an overview of bid rigging and competition law in India. It defines bid rigging as competitors coordinating their bids to ensure either a higher price or lower quality wins the contract. It outlines different types of anticompetitive agreements prohibited under the Competition Act 2002 such as tie-in, exclusive distribution, and exclusive supply agreements. It also discusses the powers and duties of the Competition Commission of India in regulating combinations, inquiring into anticompetitive practices, and advocating for competition.
The document provides an overview of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It discusses the origins of the WTO in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Uruguay Round negotiations that established the WTO in 1995. It describes the WTO's functions of liberalizing trade and providing a framework for resolving trade disputes between members. The document also discusses preferential trade agreements, regional integration efforts like the European Union, and debates around issues like the environment, labor standards, and regionalism.
This document discusses various types of horizontal agreements under EU competition law. It summarizes that horizontal agreements between competitors can involve price fixing, market sharing, limiting output, or collusive tendering. It notes the key tests used to analyze these agreements, including effects on competition and market power. The document also reviews exceptions for agreements that may generate efficiencies, such as certain joint ventures, research and development collaborations, and specialization agreements, provided they do not contain hardcore restrictions like price fixing.
The document discusses competition law and policy in India. It defines competition and outlines the benefits of competition for companies, consumers, and the government. However, it notes that these benefits are lost without fair competition or if a monopoly exists. It then discusses key aspects of competition law and policy in India such as the objectives to promote economic efficiency and protect consumers, types of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance, the role and powers of the Competition Commission of India, and penalties for anti-competitive behavior.
The document summarizes China's new Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) which aims to prevent the abuse of dominant market positions, prohibit monopoly agreements, and regulate mergers and acquisitions. It notes that while the AML is still being implemented one year after taking effect, several Chinese authorities like MOFCOM, NDRC, and SAIC are responsible for its enforcement in areas like merger control, pricing issues, and agreements restricting competition. Companies doing business in China need to ensure they cooperate with investigations and comply with the AML to avoid fines or unwinding of deals, while some shortcomings of the new regime include uncertainty and possible discrimination against foreign firms.
This presentation by Damien GERADIN, Founding partner, Edge Legal Thinking was made during the discussion on "Price discrimination" held during the 126th meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 30 November 2016. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/price-discrimination.htm
This presentation by Alison Jones - King's College London, was made during a roundtable discussion on Fidelity Rebates held at the 125th meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 16 June 2014. More papers, presentations and contributions from delegations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/fidelity-rebates.htm
The document provides an overview of the Competition Act of 2002 in India. It discusses key aspects of the Act including its objectives to prevent anti-competitive practices and abuse of dominance. It outlines the prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position. It also covers the regulation of combinations or mergers and acquisitions as well as the thresholds for notification. The document proposes some amendments to the Act including increasing pre-merger consultation and notification timelines.
Mrtp to competition when the world at large is a single platform for trade an...92_neil
The document discusses the progression from the MRTP Act to the Competition Act in India. Key points include:
- The MRTP Act focused on preventing concentration of economic power and controlling monopolies and restrictive/unfair trade practices.
- The Competition Act aims to promote competition and protect consumer interests. It prohibits anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and regulates combinations.
- The Competition Commission of India was established to prevent practices having an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India. It has powers to conduct inquiries and impose penalties.
The document summarizes the basic principles of Latvian competition law. It discusses the history and objectives of competition law, which include promoting competition to lower prices and give consumers more choice. It describes the Competition Council as the authority that investigates antitrust cases and conducts market studies. The Council has broad investigative powers like dawn raids of companies. The document outlines prohibited anticompetitive agreements, like price fixing, and exemptions. It also discusses when companies can be dominant in a market and prohibited abuses of dominance.
The document summarizes several cartel enforcement cases focusing on procedural issues in proving participation in cartels and reducing fines due to procedural breaches:
1) Cases involving grocery store chains in Latvia where the competition council found clear object cases of market allocation but the Senate decision found they were generally effects cases.
2) The Pfeiderer case where the ECJ ruled national courts can assess whether disclosure of leniency applications is necessary for claimants to obtain damages for cartel harms.
3) Several cases where the General Court reduced fines or found the European Commission failed to prove cartel participation due to insufficient, unreliable, or conflicting evidence.
Competition law-review 5 mar2010 eng julija-debora.cJulija Jerneva
The document provides an overview of recent competition law developments in the EU and Latvia in 2009. It discusses cases related to horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, abuse of dominant position, and mergers. For horizontal agreements, it summarizes the Akzo, Hoechst, KME Germany, and T-Mobile Netherlands cases from the EU and several Latvian cases. For vertical agreements, it discusses the draft EU Regulation and Guidelines and the Samsung case in Latvia. For abuse of dominant position, it analyzes the Microsoft, RWE, Rambus, Intel, and several Latvian cases. It also briefly discusses some merger cases and procedural issues raised by the Intel case.
This document summarizes vertical agreements under EU competition law. It discusses that vertical restraints are generally less harmful than horizontal restraints. It outlines the de minimis rule for vertical agreements between non-competing undertakings. It also describes exceptions to Article 101(1) such as genuine agency, subcontracting, and franchise agreements. The document then discusses the Block Exemption Regulation requirements for vertical restraints to be exempt from Article 101(1), including supplier and buyer market share thresholds and prohibited hardcore restrictions. It provides details on assessing vertical agreements if they fall outside the block exemption.
This document summarizes the EU's competition law investigation and enforcement procedures. It discusses the Commission's powers to conduct inspections of companies and individuals. Companies must cooperate with investigations and are liable for non-cooperation or destruction of documents. "Dawn raids" allow surprise inspections at any time. Companies should cooperate but ensure investigations stay within scope. Privileged communications with lawyers are protected. The leniency program encourages cartel members to report illegal activities in exchange for reduced fines. Care must be taken with written and oral communications to avoid incriminating language. Multi-party agreements should not suggest price-fixing. Dominant companies must avoid anti-competitive behavior or language.
This document discusses the conditions for an exemption from the prohibition on anti-competitive agreements under Article 101(3) of the EU competition rules. It outlines the four cumulative conditions for an exemption: 1) efficiencies in production or distribution that benefit consumers; 2) consumers receiving a fair share of the benefits; 3) restrictions being indispensable to achieving the efficiencies; and 4) no elimination of competition. It provides examples of efficiencies and analyzes whether restrictions are indispensable or eliminate competition in various scenarios.
3. Ten Highest Cartel Fines Per Case Since
1969
Year Case name Amount in €
2008 Car Glass 1 383 896 000
2009 Gas 1 106 000 000
2007 Elevators and Escalators 992 312 200
2010 Airfreight 799 445 000
2001 Vitamins 790 515 000
2007 Gas Insulated Switchgear 750 712 500
2008 Candle Waxes 676 011 400
2010 LCD 648 925 000
2010 Bathroom fittings 622 250 782
2006 Butadiene Rubber/Emulsion Styrene Butadiene
Rubber
519 050 000
4. Ten Highest Cartel Fines Per Company
Since 1969
Year Case name Amount in €
2008 Saint Gobain (Car glass) 896.000.000
2009 E.ON (Gas) 553.000.000
2009 GDF Suez (Gas) 553.000.000
2001 F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG (Vitamins) 462.000.000
2007 Siemens AG (Gas insulated switchgear) 396.562.500
2008 Pilkington (Car glass) 370.000.000
2010 Ideal Standard (Bathroom fittings) 326.091.196
2007 ThyssenKrupp (Elevators and escalators) 319.779.900
2008 Sasol Ltd (Candle waxes) 318.200.000
2010 Air France / KLM (Airfreight) 310.080.000
6. §1 – The Prohibition
Rule (+ examples)
Are prohibited as incompatible with the internal market:
“all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the internal market (…)”
§2 – The Rule of
Nullity
“Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this
Article shall be automatically null and void”
§3 – The Exception
Rule
§1 may be declared inapplicable to agreements which:
1. “contribute to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,
2. allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and which do not:
1. impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which
are not indispensable;
2. afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition”
7. Basic structure of analysis of Art.101
• Agreements violating Article 101(1)
• and not capable of being exempted under Article 101(3)
• are null and void (Article 101(2))
8. Agreement:
horizontal or vertical
Step one
• Agreement?
• Between undertakings?
• Appreciable effect on trade?
• Object or effect?
Step two
• Derogations (Article 101 (3) TFEU)
• Rule of reason (incl. block
exemptions)
9. Elements (step one)
1. “Agreements”
2. Between “undertakings”
3. Which have appreciable effect on intra-state trade
4. Which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition
10. Unilateral practices/behaviour
• Unilateral action NOT prohibited under Article 101
• Unilateral action is subject to rules of competition law only
under Article 102 (abuse of dominance)
11. Mergers
• Are “worse” than agreements”
• Joint ventures between the companies (depending on the level of
integration):
• Analysed under the merger rules; or
• Analysed under the Article 101 rules
Mergers Agreements
Eliminate competition Reduce competition (preserve at
least some level of competition)
Leave permanent effect on the
market
Leave temporary effects on the
market
13. The concept of an “agreement”
• ”Agreement” widely construed
– It is sufficient if the undertakings in question should have expressed
their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market in a specific
way
» Alignment of the competition parameters available to them
• “joint intention” a legally binding agreement not necessary
– The form of no importance (oral, signed, unsigned)
– “gentlemen’s agreements”
– The agreement does not have to be exhaustive
» It is enough just to set the broad framework for the undertakings market conduct
14. • The engagement of the parties in the agreement
– It is enough to be partly engaged in the collaboration
» Breach of contract regarding parts of the agreement
– Passive “members”
– An excuse if an undertaking has been “forced” into a cartel?
• Collaboration through the establishment of a company (joint
ventures)
15. “Decisions of undertakings”
• Collusion can take place through the medium of an
association: Directly covered by art 101(1)
– Makes it possible to hold associations directly liable
• Association
widely defined
• Decision
every statement made with the object or effect of influencing the
commercial behaviour of the association’s members
– Does not have to be binding (e g recommendations)
16. “Concerted practices”
• A form of co-ordination where undertakings, without
concluding any sort of agreement or establishing a plan of
action, knowingly substitute practical co-operation between
them for the risks of competition
– This criteria avoids that situations where companies collaborate without
any kind of agreement but only on the basis of a common understand
falls outside article 101(1)
• It is contrary to the rules on competition for a producer to
co-operate with his competitors, in any way whatsoever, in
order to determine a co-operated way of action or to ensure
its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each
others conduct regarding the essential elements of that
action
– ECJ, case 48/69, ICI v Commission
17. Proving concerted practices
• Direct or indirect contact
• Meeting of minds or some kind of consensus
– Exchange of information
– Unilateral disclosure
– Public announcements
• Subsequent behaviour in the market
• Indirect evidence of intention?
18. Can a concerted practice be inferred from
circumstantial evidence alone?
• A question of the use of economic evidence in
competition cases
• Parallel market behaviour alone in itself not a
concerted practice
• BUT: It may however amount to strong evidence of
such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition
which do not correspond to the normal conditions of
the market having regard to the nature of the products,
the size and numbers of undertakings, and the volume
of the said market power
– ECJ, case 48/69, ICI v Commission
• Oligopoly markets and economic evidence
– Joint dominance
19. The distinction between “agreement” and
“concerted practices”
• Overlapping concepts
• No precise distinction
– And no use for a precise distinction
• “Concerted practice” important mainly where the
Commission or the Courts is forced to rely upon
circumstantial evidence alone
22. Single economic unit doctrine
• Two or more separate legal undertakings can be treated as on
undertaking
– if the undertakings “form an economic unit within which the subsidiary
has no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market,
and if the agreements or practices are concerned merely with the
internal allocation of tasks as between the undertakings”
» Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson
• Agreements between two undertakings within a single
economic unit not regarded as an agreement “between”
undertakings
– Escapes the prohibition in article 101(1)
23. • The rationale:
– No freedom to take decisions regarding the market
conduct
» Regarded as unilateral conduct
» May be caught by article 102 if the undertaking has a dominant
market position
– Internal allocation of functions
• The other side of the coin:
– If a subsidiary engages in anti competitive agreements
the mother company will also be regarded as part of the
agreement
24. • The test of control
– If a parent company owns more than 50% of the shares
in a subsidiary interdependency is presumed
– Minority share holdings may also give control if combined
with specific rights attached to them
– One large shareholder and many small
– Joint control (50/50)
» Jointly controlled companies must belong to a single group of
companies to be regarded as part of one economic unit
25. The parent company’s responsibility for
infringements committed by subsidiary
• Case C-97/08 Akzo Nobel NV vs. Commission
”[W]here a parent company has a 100% shareholding in a subsidiary
which has infringed the Community competition rules (…) there is a
rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise a
decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary (…) The Commission
will be able to regard the parent company as jointly and severally liable for
the payment of the fine imposed on its subsidiary”
100% (or close to) of shares in subsidiary gives rise to presumption
Parent company must show that the subsidiary acted independently on
market – difficult (impossible?)!
Maximum fine increases – 10% of group turnover
If parent company has been involved in prior cartel – increase in fine
Increased risk of being subject to specific increase for deterrence
27. Cross-border trade effect
• EU competition rules apply to practices which affect trade
between Member States
• Impact «within the internal market» («effects» doctrine)
• EU-based firms reach an anticompetitive agreement over
price/quantities on US markets – EU competition law is not applicable
• Non-EU based firms reach an anticompetitive agreement over
price/quantities on EU markets – EU competition law is applicable
29. Appreciable effect
• The stronger the market position of the undertakings concerned,
the more likely it is that an agreement or practice capable of
affecting trade between Member States can be held to do so
appreciably
• BPB Industries and British Gypsum, Case T-65/89
• BUT: appreciability requirement was also fulfilled when the sales of
the undertakings concerned accounted for about 5 % of the market
• Miller, Case 19/77
31. • “The distinction between „infringements by object‟ and
„infringements by effect‟ arises from the fact that certain forms
of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their
very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of
normal competition”
• Competition Authority v BIDS and Barry Brothers, Case C-209/07
32. Object cases
• The object-category consist of “obvious restrictions of
competition”
• European Night Services v Commission, Joined cases T-374-375/94,
384/94
• The “object” rule can be described as a presumption rule:
• if object is found, harmful effects on competition are presumed
• certain types of agreements under normal market conditions always, or
almost always, restrict competition
33. Object cases
• Horizontal agreements:
• fixing prices
• sharing markets
• limiting outputs
• Vertical agreements
• Fixed and minimum resale price maintenance
• Absolute territorial protection
• Restrictions on passive sales
• Other cases, listed in the “block exemptions”
34. Effects cases
• All cases, not falling within the “object box”
• Negative effects on competition within the relevant market are
likely to occur when:
• the parties individually or jointly have or obtain some degree of market
power and
• the agreement contributes to the creation, maintenance or
strengthening of that market power or allows the parties to exploit such
market power.
36. Economic theory usage
• How can the agreement hinder competition?
• Is collusion likely to occur on a given market?
• Is cooperation between competitors likely to succeed or fail?
Will it be easy or difficult?
37. The prisoners’ dilemma
Prisoner A
Prisoner B
Remain silent Confess
Remain silent 0, 0 25, 15
Confess 15, 25 20, 20
Firm A
Firm B
Collude Cheat
Collude 20, 20 15, 22
Cheat 22, 15 17, 17
38. The prisoners’ dilemma
• Prerequisites for a successful cartel and what complicates the
cartel?
• The problem of cheating?
• Efficiency, savings from the horizontal cooperation
39. What complicates collusion?
• Demand side
• Elastic demand (can the cartel set higher prices?)
• Balancing buyer power?
• Differentiated (vs homogenous products)
• Demand booms as a characteristics of the market)
• Non-stable demand
40. What complicates collusion?
• Supply side
• Low seller concentration
• Existence of competitors with elastic supply
• Ease of entry
• Cost assymmetries between cartel members
• Prior collusion history on the market (more attention from competition
authorities)
41. Need for the possibility of high gains
• Elastic and constant demand
• Potential fines? (active/inactive competition authorities)
• Members want and can cheat without being detected
42. Organisation
• Need to meet, agree
• Need to communicate regularly
• Many competitors vs “few” competitors
• Reinhard Selton, the Nobel prize winner in “Four are few and six are
many”:
• Profitable to collude if less than 5 cartel members
• More attractive to cheat if more than 5 cartel members