CLINICAL CASE STUDYThis is a new feature for this class. Towards.docx

CLINICAL CASE STUDY
This is a new feature for this class. Towards the end of the
semester, I would give you a clinical scenario and I will like for
you to write a 2-3 page summary of your assessment, diagnosis
and treatment recommendation. This needs to include the
following:
a. The methods and strategies you would use in order to perform
the initial assessment. In other words, I want to know how you
arrived to the diagnosis and what processes you used.
b. Which diagnoses would you consider? You should have a
primary diagnosis, but perhaps there may be other possible
diagnoses you may want to rule/out or consider.
c. What is your case formulation? That is more comprehensive
than just the diagnosis. For example let’s say you are
considering ‘Major Depression” as a Diagnosis. Your case
formulation may be something like this: “this patient has
suffered significant recent loses in his life, and in the context of
possible biological vulnerabilities (ie; history of maternal
depression) and limited psychological resources he has
developed a depressive condition”.
d. What is your treatment plan? Nothing extensive here but it
has to make sense. Don’t just put things in there to make sure
you cover all bases.
e. What else would you have liked to know about this patient,
which was not given to you in the case scenario, and you think
it may have been very useful in order to reach a diagnosis and
develop a treatment plan? For example, the patient with
depression has complained primarily of fatigue, mild dizziness
and difficulties concentrating. Perhaps you may want to rule out

a medical condition (anemia) and you may want to have this
patient be medically evaluated.
This is not a difficult task, but requires a little thinking from
your part. As long as you are “in the ball park” for the
diagnosis, you will be fine. The important point is that I need
you to show me you know how to do the assessment, followed
by a diagnosis, good case formulation and a reasonable
treatment plan. Don’t write more than 3 pages (about 1000-1200
words). You will have this task towards the end of the semester
(see schedule below) and it will be worth a total of 10 points.
As with any other assignments, this is your own work, not a
team effort. Sharing or copying another student’s work will
result in a failing grade for the class.
This is the format I would like for all to follow, again PLEASE
follow directions. If you do not follow these directions, I will
not accept your work.
This should not be a difficult assignment. I am not looking for a
“perfect” diagnosis or treatment plan. Basically, if you are in
the “Ball –Park” you are good!
I would like for you show me HOW YOU ARE APPLYING THE
KNOWLEDGE YOU ARE OBTAINING IN CLASS. Like
always, if you wait for the last minute, you may not be able to
do the work you are capable of doing.
OK, here is the format.
The FIRST thing you would do:
Title of the Assignment and your name (Title Page).
EXAMPLE: Clinical Case Assignment

Mr. John Doe
The SECOND thing you would do: On the second page, I would
like for you to LIST your answers to the 5 topics above. This
means short summary for each five topics like this::
EXAMPLE:
1. Methods and Strategies: This means the types of assessments
or procedure you would use to get information on the patient.
For example: Interview patient, review record, MRI, etc.
2. Diagnosis: Here you will put your primary diagnosis for
example:
Generalized Anxiety Disorder.
In addition, I would like you to add any other
Diagnoses to consider:
Panic Disorder, Simple Phobia, etc.
3 Case Formulation: (I want a couple of sentences at most).
For Example: “ The patient’s anxiety is present in
multiple settings and situations, following a period of intense
stress. This anxiety has significantly impacted her social and
professional functioning, leading her to seek help”.
4- Treatment Plan: Here I want you to list the types of
treatment or interventions you would recommend (try to be as
specific as possible). Make sure the treatment you recommend
are treatments that typically are used for the diagnosis you gave
to your patient. In other words, think about it and just don’t
throw everything in there:
Example:
a. Relaxation Training
b. Insight-oriented Therapy

c. SSRI’s
5 What Else I would like to know: Here you will add any other
information you would like to know about your patient, which
may help you to formulate a proper diagnosis and treatment
plan.
Example:
a. Medical history
b. Drug screen.
c. Interview family members
The Third thing you would do:
On the third page, I would like for you to expand on the topics
above, telling me for example how you arrived to the diagnosis
and what other diagnoses you would consider and why; what is
your treatment plan and reasons for it, what else you would like
to do or know and/or or any other aspect you think is important
for me to know. Please no more than 4 or 5 paragraphs.
I want you to relax, you are in control in this assignment, you
need TO DEDICATE a little time and thought and you will be
fine
Turn it in ON THE DUE DATE, AND YOU ARE DONE!
Ok here is the clinical case:
Clarisse is a 26 years old white single female, who comes to see
you to get help with her “bad mood”. She heard you are “very
good Psychologist” and wants to try therapy.

On your initial interview, you observe she is a very attractive
female, perhaps too seductively dressed for a doctor’s office.
However, she was pleasant and engaging and did not appear in
obvious distress.
She tells you she has been “feeling down” for a while. You
asked her to be more specific and she says that as long as she
can remember, she has been unhappy. When she was teenager
she had a tough time, she was rebellious, experimented with
drugs, did bad in school and had multiple sexual partners. She
says things got better and eventually went to college and
graduated from a nursing program.
She is however, unhappy. She complaints about men, and
expressed remorse over her history of “failed relationships”.
She tends to idealize men and then despises and hates them. Her
anger is a problematic issue with her and often she feels out of
control. She explains that things typically start really good and
she often thinks the guy is the “best in the world”, but soon she
begins to feel “empty” and develops very strong jealousy
feelings, which end up destroying the relationship. She further
confesses to you, she “get crazy when that happens and in a
couple of occasions she has become violent with her boyfriends.
She says she has “low self-esteem” and at times she “is not even
sure who she is”. This has been going on for years now and she
can’t get out of this pattern.
She reported a history of conflict with her parents and rarely
talks to them these days. In fact, she says she has had a history
of ongoing interpersonal conflicts with people in her life. She
would like to “feel normal” and be happy, but she does not
know how to do so.
The History and Statm of

General Systems Theory
LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY*
Center for Theoretical Biology,
Stote University of New York ot Buffalo
HISTORICAL PRELUDE
In order to evaluate the modern "systems approach," it is
advisable
to look at the systems idea not as an ephemeral fashion or
recent technique,
but in the context of the history of ideas. (For an introduction
and a survey
of the field see [15], with an extensive bibliography and
Suggestions for
Further Reading in the various topics of general systems
theory.)
In a certain sense it can be said that the notion of system is as
old as
European philosophy. If we try to define the central motif in the
birth of
philosophical-scientific thinking with the Ionian pre-Socratics
of the sixth
century B.C., one way to spell it out would be as follows. Man
in early cul-
ture, and even primitives of today, experience themselves as
being "thrown"
into a hostile world, governed by chaotic and incomprehensible
demonic
forces which, at best, may be propitiated or influenced by way
of magical
practices. Philosophy and its descendant, science, was born
when the early

Greeks learned to consider or find, in the experienced world, an
order or
kosmos which was intelligible and, hence, controllable by
thought and
rational action.
One formulation of this cosmic order was the Aristotelian world
view
with its holistic and telelogical notions. Aristotle's statement,
"The whole is
more than the sum of its parts," is a definition of the basic
system problem
which is still valid. Aristotelian teleology was eliminated in the
later develop-
ment of Western science, but the problems contained in it, such
as the
order and goal-directedness of living systems, were negated and
by-passed
rather than solved. Hence, the basic system is still not obsolete.
A more detailed investigation would enumerate a long array of
thinkers
who, in one way or another, contributed notions to what
nowadays we call
systems theory. If we speak of hierarchic order, we use a term
introduced
by the Christian mystic, Dionysius the Aeropagite, although he
was specu-
* This article is reprinted, with permission, from George J. Kiir,
ed., Trends in General
Systems Theory (New York: Wiley-lnterscience, 1972).
407

408 Academy of Management Journal December
lating about the choirs of angels and the organism of the
Church. Nicholas
of Cusa [5], that profound thinker of the fifteenth century,
linking Medieval
mysticism with the first beginnings of modern science,
introduced the notion
of the coincidentia oppositorum, the opposition or, indeed, fight
among the
parts within a whole which, nevertheless, forms a unity of
higher order.
Leibniz's hierarchy of monads looks quite like that of modern
systems; his
mathesis universalis presages an expanded mathematics which
is not limited
to quantitative or numerical expressions and is able to formalize
all con-
ceptual thinking. Hegel and Marx emphasized the dialectic
structure of
thought and of the universe it produces: the deep insight that no
proposition
can exhaust reality but only approaches its coincidence of
opposites by
the dialectic process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Gustav
Fechner,
known as the author of the psychophysical law, elaborated in
the way of
the nature philosophers of the nineteenth century
supraindividual organi-
zations of higher order than the usual objects of observation; for
example,
life communities and the entire earth, thus romantically
anticipating the
ecosystems of modern parlance. Incidentally, the present writer

wrote a
doctoral thesis on this topic in 1925.
Even such a rapid and superficial survey as the preceding one
tends
to show that the problems with which we are nowadays
concerned under
the term "system" were not "born yesterday" out of current
questions of
mathematics, science, and technology. Rather, they are a
contemporary
expression of perennial problems which have been recognized
for centuries
and discussed in the language available at the time.
One way to circumscribe the Scientific Revolution of the
sixteenth-
seventeenth centuries is to say that it replaced the descriptive-
metaphysical
conception of the universe epitomized in Aristotle's doctrine by
the mathe-
matical-positivistic or Galilean conception. That Is, the vision
of the world
as a telelogical cosmos was replaced by the description of
events in causal,
mathematical laws.
We say "replaced," not "eliminated," for the Aristotelian dictum
of
the whole that is more than its parts still remained. We must
strongly empha-
size that order or organization of a whole or system,
transcending its parts
when these are considered in isolation, is nothing metaphysical,
not an
anthropomorphic superstition or a philosophical speculation; it

is a fact
of observation encountered whenever we look at a living
organism, a social
group, or even an atom.
Science, however, was not well prepared to deal with this
problem.
The second maxim of Descartes' Discours de la Methode was
"to break
down every problem into as many separate simple elements as
might be
possible." This, similarly formulated by Galileo as the
"resolutive" method,
was the conceptual "paradigm" [35] of science from its
foundation to
1S72 The History and Status of General Systems Theory 409
modern laboratory work: that is, to resolve and reduce complex
phenomena
into elementary parts and processes.
This method worked admirably well insofar as observed events
were
apt to be split into isolable causal chains, that is, relations
between two
or a few variables. It was at the root of the enormous success of
physics
and the consequent technology. But questions of many-variable
problems
always remained. This was the case even in the three-body
problem of
mechanics; the situation was aggravated when the organization
of the living

organism or even of the atom, beyond the simplest proton-
electron system
of hydrogen, was concerned.
Two principal ideas were advanced in order to deal with the
problem
of order or organization. One was the comparison with man-
made machines;
the other was to conceive of order as a product of chance. The
first was
epitomized by Descartes' bete machine, later expanded to the
homme
machine of Lamettrie. The other is expressed by the Darwinian
idea of
natural selection. Again, both ideas were highly successful. The
theory of
the living organism as a machine in its various disguises—from
a mechani-
cal machine or clockwork in the early explanations of the
iatrophysicists of
the seventeenth century, to later conceptions of the organism as
a caloric,
chemodynamic, cellular, and cybernetic machine [13] provided
explanations
of biological phenomena from the gross level of the physiology
of organs
down to the submicroscopic structures and enzymatic processes
in the cell.
Similarly, organismic order as a product of random events
embraced an
enormous number of facts under the title of "synthetic theory of
evolution"
including molecular genetics and biology.
Nothwithstanding the singular success achieved in the
explanation of

ever more and finer life processes, basic questions remained
unanswered.
Descartes' "animal machine" was a fair enough principle to
explain the
admirable order of processes found in the living organism. But
then, accord-
ing to Descartes, the "machine" had God for its creator. The
evolution of
machines by events at random rather appears to be self-
contradictory.
Wristwatches or nylon stockings are not as a rule found in
nature as products
of chance processes, and certainly the mitochondrial "machines"
of en-
zymatic organization in even the simplest cell or nucleoprotein
molecules
are incomparably more complex than a watch or the simple
polymers which
form synthetic fibers. "Surival of the fittest" (or "differential
reproduction"
in modern terminology) seems to lead to a circuitous argument.
Self-
maintaining systems must exist before they can enter into
competition,
which leaves systems with higher selective value or differential
reproduction
predominant. That self-maintenance, however, is the
explicandum; it is not
provided by the ordinary laws of physics. Rather, the second
law of thermo-
dynamics prescribes that ordered systems in which irreversible
processes
take place tend toward most probable states and, hence, toward
destruction
of existing order and ultimate decay [16].

Thus neovitalistic currents, represented by Driesch, Bergson,
and
others, reappeared around the turn of the present century,
advancing quite
legitimate arguments which were based essentially on the limits
of possible
regulations in a "machine," of evolution by random events, and
on the
goal-directed ness of action. They were able, however, to refer
only to the
old Aristotelian "entelechy" under new names and descriptions,
that is, a
supernatural, organizing principle or "factor."
Thus the "fight on the concept of organism in the first decades
of the
twentieth century," as Woodger [56] nicely put it, indicated
increasing
doubts regarding the "paradigm" of classical science, that is, the
explana-
tion of complex phenomena in terms of isolable elements. This
was ex-
pressed in the question of "organization" found in every living
system; in
the question whether "random mutations cum natural selection
provide all
the answers to the phenomena of evolution" [32] and thus of the
organization
of living things; and in the question of goal-directedness, which
may be
denied but in some way or other still raises its ugly head.

These problems were in no way limited to biology. Psychology,
in
gestalt theory, similarly and even earlier posed the question that
psycho-
logical wholes (e.g., perceived gestalten) are not resolvable into
elementary
units such as punctual sensations and excitations in the retina.
At the same
time sociology [49, 50] came to the conclusion that
physicalistic theories,
modeled according to the Newtonian paradigm or the like, were
unsatis-
factory. Even the atom appeared as a minute "organism" to
Whitehead.
FOUNDATIONS OF GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY
In the late 192O's von Bertalanffy wrote:
Since the fundamental character of the living thing is its
organization, the cus-
tomary investigation of the single parts and processes cannot
provide a complete
explanation of the vital phenomena. This investigation gives us
no inforrnation
about the coordination of parts and processes. Thus the chief
task of bioiogy
must be to discover the laws of biological systems (at all levels
of organization).
We believe that the attempts to find a foundation for theoretjcal
biology point at
a fundamental change in the world picture. This view,
considered as a method
of investigation, we shall call "organismio biotogy" and, as an
attempt at an
explanation, "f/ie system theory of the organism" [7, pp. 64 ff.,
190, 46, con-

densed].
Recognized "as something new in biological literature" [43], the
organ-
ismic program became widely accepted. This was the germ of
what later
became known as general systems theory. If the term
"organism" in the
above statements Is replaced by other "organized entities," such
as social
groups, personality, or technological devices, this is the
program of systems
theory.
The Aristotelian dictum of the whole being more than its parts,
which
was neglected by the mechanistic conception, on the one hand,
and which
led to a vitalistic demonology, on the other, has a simple and
even trivial
1972 The History and Status ot General Systems Theory 411
answer—trivial, that is, in principle, but posing innumerable
problems in
its elaboration:
The properties and modes of action of higher ieveis are not
expiicabie by the
summation of the properties and modes of action of their
components taken in
Isolation, if, however, we i<now the ensemble of the
components and the relations
existing between them, then the higher ieveis are derivabie from

the components
[10, p. 148].
Many (including recent) discussions of the Aristotelian paradox
and of
reductionism have added nothing to these statements: in order to
under-
stand an organized whole we must know both the parts and the
relations
between them.
This, however, defines the trouble. For "normal" science in
Thomas
Kuhn's sense, that Is, science as conventionally practiced, was
little adapted
to deal with "relations" in systems. As Weaver [51] said in a
well-known
statement, classical science was concerned with one-way
causality or rela-
tions between two variables, such as the attraction of the sun
and a planet,
but even the three-body problem of mechanics (and the
corresponding
problems in atomic physics) permits no closed solution by
analytical
methods of classical mechanics. Also, there were descriptions
of "unorga-
nized complexity" in terms of statistics whose paradigm is the
second law
of thermodynamics. However, increasing with the progress of
observation
and experiment, there loomed the problem of "organized
complexity," that
is, of interrelations between many but not infinitely many
components.

Here is the reason why, even though the problems of "system"
were
ancient and had been known for many centuries, they remained
"philo-
sophical" and did not become a "science." This was so because
mathe-
matical techniques were lacking and the problems required a
new epis-
temology; the whole force of "classical" science and its success
over the
centuries militated against any change in the fundamental
paradigm of
one-way causality and resolution into elementary units.
The quest for a new "gestalt mathematics" was repeatedly raised
a
considerable time ago, in which not the notion of quantity but
rather that
of relations, that is, of form and order, would be fundamental
[10, p. 159 f.].
However, this demand became realizable only with new
developments.
The notion of general systems theory was first formulated by
von
Bertalanffy, orally in the 193O's and in various publications
after World War
II:
There exist modeis, principles and laws that apply to
generalized systems or
their subclasses irrespective of their particular kind, the nature
of the component
elements, and the relations or "forces" between them. We
postulate a new dis-
cipline called General System Theory. General System Theory

is a logico-
mathematical field whose task is the formulation and derivation
of those general
principles that are applicable to "systems" in general. In this
way, exact formu-
iations of terms such as wholeness and sum, differentiation,
progressive mechani-
zation, centralization, hierarchial order, finality and
equifinality, etc., become
possible, terms which occur in all sciences dealing with
"systems" and imply
their logical homology (von Bertalanffy, 1947, 1955; reprinted
in [15, pp 32 253]
412 Academy of t/lanagement Journal December
The proposal of general systems theory had precursors as well,
as
independent simultaneous promoters. Kohler came near to
generalizing
gestalt theory into general systems theory [33]. Although Lotka
did
not use the term "general system theory," his discussion of
systems of
simultaneous differential equations [39] remained basic for
subsequent
"dynamical" system theory. Volterra's equations [21], originally
developed
for the competition of species, are applicable to generalized
kinetics and
dynamics. Ashby, in his early work [1], independently used the
same system
equations as von Bertalanffy employed, although deriving
different con-

sequences.
Von Bertalanffy outlined "dynamical" system theory (see the
section
on Systems Science), and gave mathematical descriptions of
system prop-
perties (such as wholeness, sum, growth, competition,
allometry, mechani-
zation, centralization, finality, and equifinality), derived from
the system
description by simultaneous differential equations. Being a
practicing
biologist, he was particularly interested in developing the
theory of "open
systems," that is, systems exchanging matter with environment
as every
"living" system does. Such theory did not then exist in physical
chemistry.
The theory of open systems stands in manifold relationships
with chemical
kinetics in its biological, theoretical, and technological aspects,
and with
the thermodynamics of irreversible processes, and provides
explanations
for many special problems in biochemistry, physiology, general
biology,
and related areas. It is correct to say that, apart from control
theory and
the application of feedback models, the theory of
Fliessgleichgewicht and
open systems [8, 12] is the part of general systems theory most
widely
applied in physical chemistry, biophysics, simulation of
biological processes,
physiology, pharmacodynamics, and so forth [15]. The forecast
also proved

to be correct that the basic areas of physiology, that is,
metabolism, excita-
tion, and morphogenesis (more specifically, the theory of
regulation, cell
permeability, growth, sensory excitation, electrical stimulation,
center
function, etc.), would "fuse into an integrated theoretical field
under the
guidance of the concept of open system" [6, Vol. II, pp. 49 ff.;
also 15, p.
137 f.].
The intuitive choice of the open system as a general system
model
was a correct one. Not only from the physical viewpoint is the
"open sys-
tem" the more general case (because closed systems can always
be obtained
from open ones by equating transport variables to zero); it also
is the
general case mathematically because the system of simultaneous
differen-
tial equations (equations of motion) used for description in
dynamical system
theory is the general form from which the description of closed
systems
derives by the introduction of additional constraints (e.g.,
conservation of
mass in a closed chemical system) (cf. [46], p. 80 f.).
At first the project was considered to be fantastic. A well-
known ecolo-
gist, for example, was "hushed into awed silence" by the
preposterous

1972 The History and Status of General Systems Theory 413
claim that general system theory constituted a new realm of
science [24],
not foreseeing that it would become a legitimate field and the
subject of
university instruction within some 15 years.
Many objections were raised against Its feasibility and
legitimacy [17].
It was not understood then that the exploration of properties,
models, and
laws of "systems" is not a hunt for superficial analogies, but
rather poses
basic and difficult problems which are partly still unsolved [10,
p. 200 f.].
According to the program, "system laws" manifest themselves
as
analogies or "logical homologies" of laws that are formally
identical but
pertain to quite different phenomena or even appear in different
disciplines.
This was shown by von Bertalanffy in examples which were
chosen as
intentionally simple illustrations, but the same principle applies
to more
sophisticated cases, such as the following:
It is a striking fact that biological systems as diverse as the
central nervous
system, and the biochemical regulatory network in cells should
be strictly ana-
logous. . . . It is all the more remarkable when it is realized that
this particular

analogy between different systems at different levels of
biological organization
is but one member of a large class of such analogies [45].
It appeared that a number of researchers, working independently
and
in different fields, had arrived at similar conclusions. For
example, Boulding
wrote to the present author:
I seem to have come to much the same conclusions as you have
reached, though
approaching it from the direction of economics and the social
sciences rather
than from biology—that there is a body of what I have been
cailing "general
empirical theory," or "gerieral system theory" in your excellent
terminology,
which is of wide applicability in many different disciplines [15,
p. 14; cf. 18].
This spreading Interest led to the foundation of the Society for
General
Systems Research (initially named the Society for the
Advancement of
General System Theory), an affiliate of the American
Association for the
Advancement of Science. The formation of numerous local
groups, the task
group on "General Systems Theory and Psychiatry" in the
American Psy-
chiatric Association, and many similar working groups, both in
the United
States and in Europe, followed, as well as various meetings and
publica-
tions. The program of the Society formulated in 1954 may be

quoted
because it remains valid as a research program in general
systems theory:
Major functions are to: (1) investigate the isomorphy of
concepts, laws, and
models in various fields, and to help in useful transfers from
one field to another;
(2) encourage the development of adequate theoretical models
in the fieids which
lack them; (3) minin:iize the duplication of theoretical effort in
different fields;
(4) promote the unity of science through improving
communication among
speciaiists.
In the meantime a different development had taken place.
Starting
from the development of self-directing missiles, automation and
computer
technology, and inspired by Wiener's work, the cybernetic
movement be-
came ever more influential. Although the starting point
(technology versus
basic science, especially biology) and the basic model (feedback
circuit
versus dynamic system of interactions) were different, there was
a com-
munality of interest in problems of organization and
teleological behavior.
Cybernetics too challenged the "mechanistic" conception that

the universe
was based on the "operation of anonymous particles at random"
and
emphasized "the search for new approaches, for new and more
compre-
hensive concepts, and for methods capable of dealing with the
large wholes
of organisms and personalities" [25]. Although it is incorrect to
describe
modern systems theory as "springing out of the last war effort"
[19]—in fact,
it had roots quite different from military hardware and reiated
technological
developments—cybernetics and related approaches were
independent
developments which showed many parailelisms with general
system theory.
TRENDS IN GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY
This brief historical survey cannot attempt to review the many
recent
deveiopments in general systems theory and the systems
approach. For a
critical discussion of the various approaches see [30, pp. 97 ff.]
and [27,
Book II].
With the increasing expansion of systems thinking and studies,
the
definition of general systems theory came under renewed
scrutiny. Some
indication as to its meaning and scope may therefore be
pertinent. The
term "general system theory" was introduced by the present
author, delib-

berately, in a catholic sense. One may, of course, limit it to its
"technical"
meaning in the sense of mathematical theory (as is frequently
done), but
this appears unadvisable because there are many "system"
problems ask-
ing for "theory" which is not presently available in
mathematical terms.
So the name "general systems theory" may be used broadly, in a
way similar
to our speaking of the "theory of evolution," which comprises
about every-
thing ranging from fossil digging and anatomy to the
mathematical theory
of selection; or "behavior theory," which extends from bird
watching to
sophisticated neurophysiological theories. It is the introduction
of a new
paradigm that matters.
Systems Science: Mathematical Systems Theory
Broadly speaking, three main aspects can be indicated which are
not
separable in content but are distinguishable in intention. The
first may be
circumscribed as systems science, that is, scientific exploration
and theory
of "systems" in the various sciences (e.g., physics, biology,
psychology,
social sciences), and general systems theory as the doctrine of
principles
applying to all (or defined subclasses of) systems.
Entities of an essentially new sort are entering the sphere of
scientific

thought. Classical science in its various disciplines, such as
chemistry,
biology, psychology, or the social sciences, tried to isolate the
elements of
the observed universes—chemical compounds and enzymes,
cells, ele-
mentary sensations, freely competing individuals, or whatever
eise may be
the case—in the expectation that by putting them together
again, con-
ceptually or experimentally, the whole or system—cell, mind,
society-
would result and would be intelligible. We have learned,
however, that for
an understanding not only the elements but their interrelations
as weil are
required—say, the interplay of enzymes in a cell, the
interactions of many
conscious and unconscious processes in the personality, the
structure and
dynamics of social systems, and so forth. Such problems appear
even in
physics, for example, in the interaction of many generalized
"forces" and
"fluxes" (irreversible thermodynamics; cf. Onsager reciprocal
relations),
or in the development of nuclear physics, which "requires much
experi-
mental work, as well as the development of additional powerful
methods for
the handling of systems with many, but not infinitely many,

particles" [23].
This requires, first, the exploration of the many systems in our
observed
universe in their own right and specificities. Second, it turns out
that there
are general aspects, correspondences, and isomorphisms
common to "sys-
tems." This is the domain of general systems theory. Indeed,
such paral-
lelisms or isomorphisms appear (sometimes surprisingly) in
otherwise
totally different "systems."
General systems theory, then, consists of the scientific
exploration of
"wholes" and "wholeness" which, not so long ago, were
considered to be
metaphysical notions transcending the boundaries of science.
Novel con-
cepts, methods, and mathematical fields have deveioped to deal
with them.
At the same time, the interdisciplinary nature of concepts,
models, and
principles applying to "systems" provides a possible approach
toward the
unification of science.
The goal obviously is to develop general systems theory in
mathe-
matical terms (a "logico-mathematical field," as this author
wrote in the
early statement cited in the section on Foundations of General
System
Theory) because mathematics is the exact language permitting
rigorous
deductions and confirmation (or refusal) of theory.

Mathematical systems
theory has become an extensive and rapidly growing fieid.
"System" being
a new "paradigm" (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn), contrasting to
the pre-
dominant, elementalistic approach and conceptions, it is not
surprising
that a variety of approaches have developed, differing in
emphasis, focus
of interest, mathematical techniques, and other respects. These
elucidate
different aspects, properties and principles of what is comprised
under the
term "system," and thus serve different purposes of theoretical
or practical
nature. The fact that "system theories" by various authors look
rather dif-
ferent is, therefore, not an embarrassment or the result of
confusion, but
rather a healthy development in a new and growing field, and
indicates
presumably necessary and complementary aspects of the
problem. The
existence of different descriptions is nothing extraordinary and
is often
encountered In mathematics and science, from the geometrical
or analytical
description of a curve to the equivalence of classical
thermodynamics and
statistical mechanics to that of wave mechanics and particle
physics. Dif-

ferent and partly opposing approaches should, however, tend
toward further
integration, in the sense that one is a special case within
another, or that
they can be shown to be equivalent or complementary. Such
developments
are, in fact, taking place.
System-theoretical approaches include general system theory (in
the
narrower sense), cybernetics, theory of automata, control
theory, informa-
tion theory, set, graph and network theory, relational
mathematics, game
and decision theory, computerization and simulation, and so
forth. The
somewhat loose term "approaches" is used deliberately because
the list
contains rather different things, for example, models (such as
those of
open system, feedback, logical automaton), mathematical
techniques (e.g.,
theory of differential equations, computer methods, set, graph
theory), and
newly formed concepts or parameters (information, rational
game, decision,
etc.). These approaches concur, however, in that, in one way or
the other,
they relate to "system problems," that is, problems of
interrelations within
a superordinate "whole." Of course, these are not isolated but
frequently
overlap, and the same problem can be treated mathematically in
different
ways. Certain typical ways of describing "systems" can be
indicated; their

elaboration is due, on the one hand, to theoretical problems of
"systems"
as such and in relation to other disciplines, and, on the other
hand, to
problems of the technology of control and communication.
No mathematical development or comprehensive review can be
given
here. The following remarks, however, may convey some
intuitive under-
standing of the various approaches and the way in which they
relate to
each other.
It is generally agreed that "system" is a model of general nature,
that
is, a conceptual analog of certain rather universal traits of
observed entities.
The use of models or analog constructs is the general procedure
of science
(and even of everyday cognition), as it is also the principle of
analog simu-
lation by computer. The difference from conventional
disciplines is not
essential but lies rather in the degree of generality (or
abstraction): "system"
refers to very general characteristics partaken by a large class
of entities
conventionally treated in different disciplines. Hence the
interdisciplinary
nature of general systems theory; at the same time, its
statements pertain
to formal or structural commonalities abstracting from the
"nature of ele-
ments and forces in the system" with which the special sciences
(and

explanations in these) are concerned. In other words, system-
theoretical
arguments pertain to, and have predictive value, inasmuch as
such general
structures are concerned. Such "explanation in principle" may
have con-
siderable predictive value; for specific explanation, introduction
of the
special system conditions is naturally required.
,
'972 The History and Status of Generai Systems Theory 417
A system may be defined as a set of elements standing in
interrelation
among themselves and with the environment. This can be
expressed mathe-
matically in different ways. Several typical ways of system
description can
be indicated.
One approach or group of investigations may, somewhat
loosely, be
circumscribed as axiomatic, inasmuch as the focus of interest is
a rigorous
definition of system and the derivation, by modern methods of
mathematics
and logic, of its implications. Among other examples are the
system descrip-
tions by Mesarovic [41], Maccia and Maccia [40], Beier and
Laue
[4] (set theory), Ashby [2] (state-determined systems), and Klir
[30] (UC = set

of all couplings between the elements and the elements and
environment;
ST = set of all states and ali transitions between states).
Dynamical system theory is concerned with the changes of
systems in
time. There are two principal ways of description: internal and
external [47].
Internal description or "classical" system theory (foundations in
[9;
11; and 15, pp. 54 ff.]; comprehensive presentation in [46]; an
excellent
introduction into dynamical system theory and the theory of
open systems,
following the line of the present author, in [3]) defines a system
by a set of n
measures, called state variables. Analytically, their change in
time is typically
expressed by a set of n simultaneous, first-order differential
equations:
^ = / i ( O i , O2 , 0»). (1.1)
These are called dynamical equations or equations of motion.
The set
of differential equations permits a formal expression of system
properties,
such as wholeness and sum, stability, mechanization, growth,
competition,'
final and equifinal behavior and others [9, 11, 15]. The behavior
of the sys-
tem is described by the theory of differential equations
(ordinary, first-order,
if the definition of the system by Eq. 1.1 is accepted), which is
a well-known

and highly developed field of mathematics. However, as was
mentioned
previously, system considerations pose quite definite problems.
For example,
the theory of stability has developed only recently in
conjunction with'
problems of control (and system): the Liapunov (t1918)
functions date from
1892 (in Russian; 1907 in French), but their significance was
recognized only
recently, especially through the work of mathematicians of the
U.S.S.R.
Geometrically, the change of the system is expressed by the
trajectories
that the state variables traverse in the state space, that is, the n-
dimensional
space of possible location of these variables. Three types of
behavior may
be distinguished and defined as follows:
1. A trajectory is called asymptotically stable if all trajectories
suffi-
ciently close to it att = to approach it asymptotically when
2. A trajectory is called neutrally stable if all trajectories
sufficiently
close to it at f = 0 remain close to it for all later time but do not
necessarily
approach it asymptotically.

3. A trajectory is called unstable if the trajectories close to it at
f = 0
do not remain close to it as f—>oo.
These correspond to solutions approaching a time-independent
state
(equilibrium, steady state), periodic solutions, and divergent
solutions,
respectively.
A time-independent state,
f,(Qi, Q2 Qn) = O, (1.2)
can be considered as a trajectory degenerated into a single
point. Then,
readily visualizable in two-dimensional projection, the
trajectories may
converge toward a stable node represented by the equilibrium
point, may
approach it as a stable focus in damped oscillations, or may
cycle around
it in undamped oscillations (stable solutions). Or else, they may
diverge
from an unstable node, wander away from an unstable focus in
oscillations,
or from a saddle point (unstable solutions).
A central notion of dynamical theory is that of stability, that is,
the
response of a system to perturbation. The concept of stability
originates
in mechanics (a rigid body is in stable equilibrium if it returns
to its original
position after sufficently small displacement; a motion is stable
if insensi-
tive to small perturbations), and is generalized to the "motions"

of state
variables of a system. This question is related to that of the
existence of
equilibrium states. Stability can be analyzed, therefore, by
explicit solution
of the differential equations describing the system (so-called
indirect
method, based essentially on discussion of the eigenwerte Xi of
Eq. 1.1). In
the case of nonlinear systems, these equations have to be
linearized by
development into Taylor series and retention of the first term.
Linearization,
however, pertains only to stability in the vicinity of
equilibrium. But stability
arguments without actual solution of the differential equations
(direct
method) and for nonlinear systems are possible by introduction
of so-called
Liapunov functions; these are essentially generalized energy
functions, the
sign of which indicates whether or not an equilibrium is
asymptotically
stable [28, 36].
Here the relation of dynamical system theory to control theory
becomes
apparent; control means essentially that a system which is not
asymptotic-
ally stable is made so by incorporating a controller,
counteracting the
motion of the system away from the stable state. For this reason
the theory
of stability in internal description or dynamical system theory
converges
with the theory of (linear) control or feedback systems in

external descrip-
tion (see below; cf. [48]).
^^^^ ^''^ History and Status of Generai Systems Theory 419
Description by ordinary differential equations (Eq. 1.1)
abstracts from
variations of the state variables in space which would be
expressed by
partial differential equations. Such field equations are, however,
more diffi-
cu t to handle Ways of overcoming this difficulty are to assume
complete
stirring, so that distribution is homogeneous within the volume
considered-
or to assume the existence of compartments to which
homogeneous dis-
In external description, the system is considered as a "black
box"-
Its relations to the environment and other systems are presented
graphically
m b ock and flow diagrams. The system description is given in
terms of
inputs and outputs (Klemmenverhalten in German terminology);
its general
I Z ^ ' l'T% "̂"'̂ ''°"' ""̂'̂ '̂̂^ '"P"* ^ ^ t T
gy) g
IZm^'n l'T% ^""'^''°"' ""̂ '̂ '̂̂ ^ '"P"* ^"^ °"̂ P"t- Typically, these
are
assumed to be linear and are represented by discrete sets of
values (cf

yes-no decisions in information theory, Turing machine). This
is the language
r l ^ m ^^'^^"^'^Sy' ^^^^'•"^' description, typically, is given in
terms of
S n ^ ^ t h - ' ' ^ ^ " (exchange of information between system
and environment
and within the system) and control of the system's function with
respect to
environment (feedback), to use Wiener's definition of
cybernetics
As mentioned, internal and external descriptions largely
coincide with
descriptions by continuous or discrete functions. These are two
"languages"
adapted to their respective purposes. Empirically, there is an
obvious con-
trast between regulations due to the free interplay of forces
within a
dynamical system, and regulations due to constraints imposed
by structural
feedback mechanisms [15], for example, the "dynamic"
regulations in a
chem.ca system or in the network of reactions in a cell on the
one hand
and contro by mechanisms such as a thermostat or homeostatic
nervous
circuit on the other. Formally, however, the two "languages" are
related
and in certain cases demonstrably translatable. For example, an
input-output
function can (under certain conditions) be developed as a linear
nth-orSer
f f n l n ' .^.""^ ' ° " ' ^"^ *^^ ^^'""^ °f *^« '^«^^ ^ « " be
considered as
oZXr"^nir'"T"''' """" *'''^ P'̂ '̂̂ '̂ "̂ ^̂ "'"9 ^̂ '"̂ '"̂ '"definite,formal

translation" from one language into the other is possible.
In certain cases-for example, the two-factor theory of nerve
excita-
tion (in terms of "excitatory and inhibitory factors" or
"substances") and
network theory (McCulloch nets of "neurons")-description in
dynamfcal
system theory by continuous functions and description in
automata theory
by digital analogs can be shown to be equivalent [45]. Similarly
predator-
prey systems, usually described dynamically by Volterra
equations, can also
be expressed m terms of cybernetic feedback circuits [55].
These are two-
variable systems. Whether a similar "translation" can be
effectuated °n
many-variables systems remains (in the present writer's opinion)
to be seen.
Internal description is essentially "structural," that is, it tries to
describe
the systems' behavior in terms of state variables and their
interdependence.
External description is "functional"; the system's behavior is
described in
terms of Its interaction with the environment.
As this sketchy survey shows, considerable progress has been
made
in mathematical systems theory since the program was

enunciated and
inaugurated some 25 years ago. A variety of approaches, which,
however,
are connected with each other, have been developed.
Today mathematical system theory is a rapidly growing field,
but it is
natural that basic problems, such as those of hierarchical order
[53], are
approached only slowly and presumably will need novel ideas
and theories.
"Verbal" descriptions and models (e.g., [20; 31; 42; 52]), are
not expendable.
Problems must be intuitively "seen" and recognized before they
can be
formalized mathematically. Otherwise, mathematical formalism
may impede
rather than expedite the exploration of very "real" problems.
A strong system-theoretical movement has developed in
psychiatry,
largely through the efforts of Gray [26]. The same is true of the
behavioral
sciences [20] and also of certain areas in which such a
development was
quite unexpected, at least by the present writer—for example,
theoretica
geography [29]. Sociology was stated as being essentially "a
science of
social systems" [14]; not foreseen was, for instance, the close
parallelism
of general system theory with French structuralism (e.g., Piaget,
Levy-
Strauss; cf. [37]) and the influence exerted on American
functionalism in
sociology ([22]: see especially pp. 2, 96, 141).

Systems Technology
The second realm of general systems theory is systems
technology,
that is, the problems arising in modern technology and society,
including
both "hardware" (control technology, automation,
computerization, etc.)
and "software" (application of system concepts and theory in
social, eco-
logical, economical, etc., problems). We can only allude to the
vast realm
of techniques, models, mathematical approaches, and so forth,
summarized
as systems engineering or under similar denominations, in order
to place
it into the perspective of the present study.
Modern technology and society have become so complex that
the
traditional branches of technology are no longer sufficient;
approaches
of a holistic or systems, and generalist and interdisciplinary,
nature became
necessary. This is true in many ways. Modern engineering
includes fields
such as circuit theory, cybernetics as the study of
"communication and
control" (Wiener [54]), and computer techniques for handling
"systems"
of a complexity unamenable to classical methods of
mathematics. Systems
of many levels ask for scientific control: ecosystems, the
disturbance of
which results in pressing problems like pollution; formal

organizations like
bureaucracies, educational institutions, or armies;
socioeconomic systems,
with their grave problems of international relations, politics,
and deterrence.
Irrespective of the questions of how far scientific understanding
(contrasted
to the admission of irrationality of cultural and historical
events) is possible,
and to what extent scientific control is feasible or even
desirable, there can
be no dispute that these are essentially "system" problems, that
is, prob-
lems involving interrelations of a great number of "variables."
The same
applies to narrower objectives in industry, commerce, and
armament.
The technological demands have led to novel conceptions and
disci-
plines, some displaying great originality and introducing new
basic notions
such as control and information theory, game, decision theory,
the theory
of circuits, of queuing and others. Again it transpired that
concepts and
models (such as feedback, information, control, stability,
circuits) which
originated in certain specified fields of technology have a much
broader
significance, are of an interdisciplinary nature, and are

independent of
their special realizations, as exemplified by isomorphic
feedback models
in mechanical, hydrodynamic, electrical, biological and other
systems. Simi-
larly, developments originating in pure and in applied science
converge,
as in dynamical system theory and control theory. Again, there
is a spectrum
ranging from highly sophisticated mathematical theory to
computer simula-
tion to more or less informal discussion of system problems.
Systems Philosophy
Third, there is the realm of systems philosophy [38], that is, the
re-
orientation of thought and world view following the
introduction of "system"
as a new scientific paradigm (in contrast to the analytic,
mechanistic, linear-
causal paradigm of classical science). Like very scientific
theory of broader
scope, general systems theory has its "metascientific" or
philosophical
aspects. The concept of "system" constitutes a new "paradigm,"
in Thomas
Kuhn's phrase, or a new "philosophy of nature," in the present
writer's [14]
words, contrasting the "blind laws of nature" of the mechanistic
world view
and the world process as a Shakespearean tale told by an idiot,
with an
organismic outlook of the "world as a great organization."
First, we must find out the "nature of the beast": what is meant

by
"system," and how systems are realized at the various levels of
the world
of observation. This is systems ontology.
What is to be defined and described as system is not a question
with
an obvious or trivial answer. It will be readily agreed that a
galaxy, a dog,
a cell, and an atom are "systems." But in what sense and what
respects
can we speak of an animal or a human society, personality,
language,
mathematics, and so forth as "systems"?
We may first distinguish real systems, that is, entities perceived
in or
inferred from observation and existing independently of an
observer. On
the other hand, there are conceptual systems, such as logic or
mathematics,
which essentially are symbolic constructs (but also including,
e.g., music);
with abstracted systems (science) [42] as a subclass, that is,
conceptual
systems corresponding with reality. However, the distinction is
by no means
as sharp as it would appear.
Apart from philosophical interpretation (which would take us
into the

question of metaphysical realism, idealism, phenomenalism,
etc.) we would
consider as "objects" (which partly are "real systems") entities
given by
perception because they are discrete in space and time. We do
not doubt
that a pebble, a table, an automobile, an animal, or a star (and
in a somewhat
different sense an atom, a molecule, and a planetary system) are
"real"
and existent independently of observation. Perception, however,
is not a
reliable guide. Following it, we "see" the sun revolving around
the earth,
and certainly do not see that a solid piece of matter like a stone
"really"
is mostly empty space with minute centers of energy dispersed
in astro-
nomical distances. The spatial boundaries of even what appears
to be an
obvious object or "thing" actually are indistinct. From a crystal
consisting
of molecules, valences stick out, as it were, into the
surrounding space;
the spatial boundaries of a cell or an organism are equally vague
because
it maintains itself in a flow of molecules entering and leaving,
and it is
difficult to tell just what belongs to the "living system" and
what does not.
Ultimately all boundaries are dynamic rather than spatial.
Hence an object (and in particular a system) is definable only
by its
cohesion in a broad sense, that is, the interactions of the
component ele-

ments. In this sense an ecosystem or social system is just as
"real" as an
individual plant, animal, or human being, and indeed problems
like pollution
as a disturbance of the ecosystem, or social problems strikingly
demon-
strate their "reality." Interactions (or, more generally,
interrelations),
however, are never directly seen or perceived; they are
conceptual con-
structs. The same is true even of the objects of our everyday
world, which by
no means are simply "given" as sense data or simple perceptions
but also
are constructs based on innate or learned categories, the
concordance of
different senses, previous experience, learning processes,
naming (i.e.,
symbolic processes), etc. all of which largely determine what
we actually
"see" or perceive [cf. 34]. Thus the distinction between "real"
objects and
systems as given in observation and "conceptual" constructs and
systems
cannot be drawn in any common-sense way.
These are profound problems which can only be indicated in
this
context. The question for general systems theory is what
statements can
be made regarding material systems, informational systems,
conceptual
systems, and other types—questions which are far from being
satisfactorily
answered at the present time.

'972 The History and Status of Generai Systems Theory 423
This leads to systems epistemology. As is apparent from the
preceding
this is profoundly different from the epistemology of logical
positivism or
empiricism, even though it shares the same scientific attitude.
The epis-
temology (and metaphysics) of logical positivism was
determined by the
ideas of physicalism, atomism, and the "camera theory" of
knowledge.
These, in view of present-day knowledge, are obsolete. As
against physi-
calism and reductionism, the problems and modes of thought
occurring
in the biological, behavioral and social sciences require equal
considera-
tion, and simple "reduction" to the elementary particles and
conventional
laws of physics does not appear feasible. Compared to the
analytical pro-
cedure of classical science, with resolution into component
elements and
one-way or linear causality as the basic category, the
investigation of
organized wholes of many variables requires new categories of
interaction,
transaction, organization, teleology, and so forth, with many
problems
arising for epistemology, mathematical models and techniques.
Furthermore,
perception is not a reflection of "real things" (whatever their
metaphysical

status), and knowledge not a simple approximation to "truth" or
"reality."
It is an interaction between knower and known, and thus
dependent on a
multiplicity of factors of a biological, psychological, cultural,
and linguistic
nature. Physics itself teaches that there are no ultimate entities
like cor-
puscles or waves existing independently of the observer. This
leads to a
"perspective" philosophy in which physics, although its
achievements in
its own and related fields are fully acknowledged, is not a
monopolistic way
of knowledge. As opposed to reductionism and theories
declaring that
reality is "nothing but" (a heap of physical particles, genes,
reflexes, drives,
or whatever the case may be), we see sicence as one of the
"perspectives"
that man, with his biological, cultural, and linguistic
endowment and bond-
age, has created to deal with the universe into which he is
"thrown," or
rather to which he is adapted owning to evolution and history.
The third part of systems philosophy is concerned with the
relations
of man and his world, or what is termed values in philosophical
parlance.
If reality is a hierarchy of organized wholes, the image of man
will be dif-
ferent from what it is in a world of physical particles governed
by chance
events as the ultimate and only "true" reality. Rather, the world
of symbols,

values, social entities and cultures is something very "real"; and
its embed-
dedness in a cosmic order of hierarchies tends to bridge the gulf
between
C. P. Snow's "two cultures" of science and the humanities,
technology and
history, natural and social sciences, or in whatever way the
antithesis is
formulated.
This humanistic concern of general systems theory, as this
writer
understands it, marks a difference to mechanistically oriented
system
theorists speaking solely in terms of mathematics, feedback, and
technology
and so giving rise to the fear that systems theory is indeed the
ultimate step
toward the mechanization and devaluation of man and toward
technocratic
society. While understanding and emphasizing the role of
mathematics and
of pure and applied science, this writer does not see that the
humanistic
aspects can be evaded unless general systems theory is limited
to a re-
stricted and fractional vision.
Thus there is indeed a great and perhaps puzzling multiplicity
of
approaches and trends in general systems theory. This is

understandably
uncomfortable to him who wants a neat formalism, to the
textbook writer
and the dogmatist. It is, however, quite natural in the history of
ideas and
of science, and particularly in the beginning of a new
development. Different
models and theories may be apt to render different aspects and
so are com-
plementary. On the other hand, future developments will
undoubtedly lead
to further unification.
General systems theory is, as emphasized, a model of certain
general
aspects of reality. But it is also a way of seeing things which
were previously
overlooked or bypassed, and in this sense is a methodological
maxim. And
like every scientific theory of broader compass, it is connected
with, and
tries to give its answer to perennial problems of philosophy.
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12. Bertalanffy, L. von, Biophysiif des Fiiessgleichgewichts.
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Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1953. Revised edition with W. Beier
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13. Bertaianffy, L. von, "Zur Geschichte theoretischer Modelle
in der Bioiogie." Studium
Generate, Vol. 8, pp. 290-298, 1965.
14. Bertalanffy, L. von, Robots, Men and Minds. New York:
George Braziller, 1967.
15. Bertalanffy, L. von, Generai System Theory. Foundations,
Deveiopment, Appiications
New York: George Braziller, 1968.
16. Bertalanffy, L. von, "Chance or Law." In Beyond
Reductionism, A. Koestler and J. R
Smythies (Editors). New York: Hutchlnson, 1969.

17. Bertalanffy, L. von, C. G. Hempel, R. E. Bass, and H. Jonas,
"General System Theory:
A New Approach to Unity of Science." Human Bioiogy, Voi.
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18. Bouiding, K. E., The image. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1965.
19. Buckley, W., Sociology and Modern Systems Theory.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
ri3ll 1 9Q/
20. Buckley, W. (Editor), Modern Systems Research for the
Behavioral Scientist A Source-
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21. D'Ancona, V., Der Kampf ums Dasein. In Abhandiungen zur
exakten Bioiogie L von
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22. Demerath, N. J., Ill, and R. A. Peterson (Editors), System,
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Reader on Contemporary Socioiogical Theory and the Debate
over Functionaiism New
York: Free Press, 1967.
23. De-Shalit, A., "Remarks on Nuclear Structure, " Science.
Vol. 153, pp. 1063-1067, 1966.
24. Egler, F. E., "Bertalanffian Organismicism," Ecoiogy, Vol.
34, pp. 443-446, 1953.
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McCulloch and N Wiener
"Teleological Mechanisms." Annais of the New York Academy

of Sciences Voi 5o'
Art. 4, pp. 187-278, October 1948. , . ou,
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Systems Theory and Psychiatry
Boston: Little Brown, 1968.
27. Gray, W., and N. Rizzo (Editors), Unity Through Diversity,
Festschrift in Honor of Ludwig
von Bertaianffy. Espec. Book II: General and Open Systems,
and Book IV- General
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Breach, 1971.
28. Hahn, W., Theory and Appiication of Liapunov's Direct
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Prentice-Hall, 1963. . • ••
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30. Klir, G. J., An Approach to Generai Systems Theory. New
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1969.
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Berlin: Duncker and Humblot
1968.
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1962.
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Direct Method. New York: Academic
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37. Laszio, E., "Systems and Structures—Toward Bio-sociai
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Genera/ Systems in the
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40. Maccia, E. S., and G. S. Maccia, Development of
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The Ohio State Research
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Systems Theory, M. D. Mesarovic (Editor), pp. 1-24, New
York: Wiley, 1964.
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Stabiiity Theory and its Applica-
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47. Rosen, R., "A Survey of Dynamical Descriptions of System
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and Open Systems. New
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48. Schwarz, H., Einfuhrung in die moderne Systemtheorie.
Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1969.
49. Sorokin, P. A., Contemporary Socioiogical Theories 0928).
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books, 1964.
50. Sorokin, P. A., Socioiogical Theories of Today. New York:
Harper & Row, 1966.
51. Weaver, W., "Science and Complexity." American Scientist,
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52. Weiss, P. A., "Life, Order and Understanding." The
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53. Whyte, L. L, A. G. Wilson, and D. Wilson (Editors),
Hierarchical Structures. New York:
American Elsevier, 1969.
54. Wiener, N., Cybernetics, New York: Wiley, 1948.
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pp. 347-373, 1970.
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and Kegan Paul, 1929; New
York: Humanities Press, 1967.
VOUM«2
April 1956
Management
Science
SYSTEVIS THEORY—THE SKELETON OF SCIENCE

KENNETH E. BOULDING
University of Michigan
General Systems Theoryi is a name which has come into use to
describe a level
of theoretical model-building which lies somewhere between the
highly generai-
iwd constructions of pure mathematics and the specific theories
of the specialized
diaaplines. Mathematics attempts to organize highly general
relationships into a
coherent system, a system however which does not have any
necessary connec-
tions with the "real" world around us. It studies all thinkable
relationships
abstracted from any concrete situation or body of empirical
knowledge. It is not
even confined to "quantitative" relationships narrowly
defined—indeed, the
developments of a mathematira of quality and structure is
akeady on the way,
even though it is not as far advanced as the "classical"
mathematics of quantity
mi number. Neverthelras because in a sense mathematics
contains aU theories
itcontaiifflnone;itisthelanguageof theory,butitdoesnotgive us the
content. At
the other extreme we have the separate disciplines and sciences,
with their
separate bodies of theory. Each discipline corresponds to a
certain segment of
the empirical world, and each develops theories which have
particular appli-
cability to its own empirical s^ment. Physics, Chemistry,

Biology, Psychology,
Sociology, Economics and so on all carve out for themselves
certain elements of
the experience of man and develop theories and patterns of
activity (research)
which yield satisfaction in understanding, and which are
appropriate to their
^>ecial s^ments.
In recent years increasing need has been felt for a body of
systematic theo-
retical constructs which will discuss the general relationships of
the empirical
world. Tlus is the quest of General Sj^tems Theory. It does not
seek, of course,
to establidi a single, self-contained "general theory of
practically everything"
whidi will replace all the special theories of particular
disciplines. Such a theory
woidd be almost without content, for we always pay for
generality by sacrificing
c(mtent, and all we can say about practically everything is
ahnost nothing.
Somefl^ere however between the specific that has no meaning
and the general
that has no content there must be, for each purpose and at each
level of abstrac-
* The same and many of the ideas are to be credited to L. von
Bertalanffy, who is not,
however, to be held accountable for the ideas of the present
author 1 For a general discus-
sion of BertalanCPy's ideas see General System Theory: A New
Approach to Unity of Science
Bumm Biology, Dec., 1961, Vol. 23, p. 303-361.

197
198 KENNETH
tion, an optimum d^ree of graier^ty. It is the contention of the
General Systems
Theorists that this optimum degree of generality in theory is not
always reached
by the particular sciences. The objectives of General Systems
Theory then can
be set out with vajrjdng degrees a! ambition and confidence. At
a low level of
ambition but with a high degree d confidence it aims to point
out similarities
in the theoretical constructions of different disciplines, where
these exist, and to
develop theoretical models having applicability to at least two
different fields of
study. At a higher level of ambition, but with perhaps a lower
degree of confidence
it hopes to develop something like a "spectrum" of theories—a
system of systems
which may perform the function of a "gestalt" in theoretical
construction. Such
"gestalts" in special fields have been of great value in directing
research towards
the gaps which they reveal. Thus the periodic table of elements
in chemistry
directed research for many decades towards the discovery of
unknown elements to
fill gaps in the table until the table was completely filled.
Similarly a "system of
systems" might be of value in directing the attention of theorists
towards gaps

in theoretical models, and might even be of value in pointing
towards methods
of filling them.
The need for general systems theory is accentuated by the
prraent sociological
situation in science. Knowledge is not something which exists
and grows in the
abstract. It is a function of human organisms and of social
organization. Knowl-
edge, that is to say, is always what somebody knows: the most
perfect transcript
of knowledge in writing is not knowledge if nobody knows it.
Knowledge however
grows by the receipt of meaningful information—that is, by the
intake of mes-
sages by a knower which are capable of reorganizing his
knowledge. We will
quietly duck the question as to what reorganizations constitute
"growth" of
knowledge by defining "semantic growth" of knowledge as
those reorganizations
which can profitably be talked about, in writing or speech, by
the Right People.
Science, that is to say, is what can be talked about profitably by
scientists in
their role as scientists. The crisis of science today arises
because of the increasing
difiiculty of such profitable talk among scientists as a whole.
Specialization has
outrun Trade, commimication between the disciples becomes
increasingly
difficult, and the Republic of Learning is breaking up into
isolated subcultures
with only tenuous lines of communication between them—a
situation which

threatens intellectual civil war. The reason for this breakup in
the body of knowl-
edge is that in the course of specialization the receptors of
information themselves
become specialized. Hence physicists only talk to physicists,
economists to
economists—^worse still, nuclear physicists only talk to nuclear
physicists and
econometricians to econometricians/One wonders sometimes if
science will not
grind to a stop in an assemblage of walled-in hermits, «kch
mumbling to himself
words in a private language that only he can understand. In
these days the arts
may have beaten the sciences to this desert of mutual
unintelligibility, but that
may be merely because the swift intuitions of art reach the
future faster than the
plodding leg work of the scientist. The more science breaks into
sub-groui», and
Hie less communication is possible among the discipline,
however, the greater
chance tliere is that the total growth of knowledge is being
slowed down by the
GENERAL SYSTEMS THEOKT 1 9 9
loss of relevant communications. The spread of specialized
deafness means that
Bommae who ought to know something that someone else
knows isn't able to
find it out for lack of generalized ears.
It is one of the main objectives of General Systems Theory to

develop these
generalized ears, and by developing a framework of general
theory to enable one
specialist to catch relevant communications from others. Thus
the economist
who realizes the strong formal similarity between utility theory
in economics
and field theory in physics' is probably in a better position to
learn from the
physicists than one who does not. SimUarly a speciaUst who
works with the
growth concept^whether the crystallographer, the virologist, the
cytologist,
the physiologist, the psychologist, the sociologist or the
economist—will be more
serisitive to the contributions of other fields if he is aware of
the many simi-
larities of the growth process in widely different empirical
fields.
There is not much doubt about the demand for general systems
theory under
one brand name or another. It is a little more embarrassing to
inquire into the
supply. Does any of it exist, and if so where? What is the
chance of getting more
of it, and if so, how? The situation might be described as
promising and in fer-
ment, though it is not wholly clear what is being promised or
brewed. Something
which might be called an "interdisciplinary movement" has been
abroad for
sorne time. The first signs of this are usually the development
of hybrid dis-
ciplines. Thus physical chemistry emerged in the third quarter
of the nineteenth

century, social psychology in the second quarter of the
twentieth. In the physical
and biological sciences the list of hybrid disciplines is now
quite long—bio-
physics, biochemistry, astrophysics are all well established. In
the social sciences
social anthropology is fairly well established, economic
psychology and economic
sociology are just b^inning. There are signs, even, that PoUtical
Economy,
.which died in infancy some hundred years ago, may have a re-
birth.
In recent years there has been an additional development of
great interest
in tiie form of "multisexual" interdisciplines. The hybrid
disciplines, as their
hyphenated names indicate, come from two respectable and
honest academic
parents. The newer interdisciplines have a much more varied
and occasionally
even obscure ancestry, and result from the reorganization of
material from many
different fields of study. Cybernetics, for instance, comes out of
electrical engi-
neering, neurophysiology, physics, biology, with even a dash of
economics.
Information theory, which originated in communications
engineering, has
irnportant applications in many fields stretching from biology to
the social
sciences. Organization theory com^ out of economics,
sociology, engineering,
physiolt^y, and Management Science itself is an equally
multidisciplinary
product.

On the more empirical and practical side the interdisciplinary
movement is
reflected in the development <rf interdepartmental institutes of
many kinds.
Some of these find their basis of unity in the empirical field
which they study,
such as institutes of industrial relations, of public
administration, of international
•See A. G. Pikler, Utility Theorira in Field Physics and
Mathematical Economics,
BriiMh Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1965, Vol. 6, pp.
47 and 303.
2 0 0 KENNETH BOTTU>ING
affairs, and so on. O^ers are organized uitnmd the application d
a common
methodol<^y to many different fields and problems, such as the
Survey Research
Center and the Group Dynamics Center at the University of
Michigan. Even
more important than these viable developments, periiaps,
though harder to
perceive and identify, is a growing dissatisfaction in many
departments, espe-
cially at the level of graduate study, wilii the existing
traditional theoretical back-
grounds for the empirical studio which form the major part of
the output of
Ph.D. theses. To take but a single example from the field with
which I am most
familiar. It is traditional for studies of labor relations, money

and banking, and
foreign investment to come out of departments of economics.
Many of the needed
theoretical models and frameworks in these fields, however, do
not come out of
"economic theory" as this is usually taught, but from sociology,
social psy-
chology, and cultural anthropology. Students in the deptartment
of economics
however rarely get a chance to become acquainted with these
theoretical models,
which may be relevant to their studies, and they become
impatient with eco-
nomic theory, much of which may not be relevant.
It is clear that there is a good deal of interdisciplinary
excitement abroad. If
this excitement is to be productive, however, it must operate
within a certain
framework of coherence. It is all too easy for the
interdisciplinary to degenerate
into the undisciplined. If the interdisciplinary movement,
therefore, is not to
lose that sense of form and structure which is the "discipline"
involved in the
various separate disciplines, it should develop a structure of its
own. This I
conceive to be the great task of general systems theory. For the
rest of this
paper, therefore, I propose to look at some possible ways in
which general
systems theory might be structured.
Two possible approaches to the organization of general ssrstems
theory suggest
themselves, which are to be thought of as complementary rather

than competi-
tive, or at least as two roads each of which is worth exploring.
The first approach
is to look over the empirical universe and to pick out certain
general phenomena
which are found in many different disciplines, and to seek to
build up general
theoretical models relevant to these phenomena. The second
approach is to
arrange the empirical fields in a hierarchy of complexity of
organization of their
basic "individual" or unit of behavior, and to try to develop a
level of abstrac-
tion appropriate to each.
Some examples of the first approach will ^rve to clarify it,
without pretending
to be exhaustive. In almost all disciplines, for instance, we find
examples of
populations—aggr^ates of individuals conformir^ to a common
definition, to
which individuals are added (bom) and subtracted (die) and in
which the age
of the individual is a relevant and identifiable variable. These
populations exhibit
dynamic movements of their own, which can frequently be
draroribed by fairly
simple systems of difference equations. The populations of
different species also
exhibit dynamic interactions among themselves, as in the theory
of Volterra.
Models of population change and interaction cut across a great
many different
fields—ecological ^stems in biology, capital theory in
economics which deals
with populations of "goods," social ecology, and even certain

problans of sta-
GENERAL ST8TEH8 THEOBT 201
tifltical mechanics. In aU these fields population change, both
in absolute numbers
and m structure, can be discussed in terms of birth and survival
functions re-
latog numbers of births and of deaths in specific age groups to
various aspects
<rf the ^yBtem. In all these fields the interaction of population
can be discussed in
terms of competitive, complementary, or parasitic relationships
among popula-
tions of different species, whether the species consist of
animals, commodities
social classes or molecules.
Another phenomenon of ahnost universal significance for aU
disciplines is that
of the mteraction of an "individual" of some kind with its
environment. Every
disciphne studies some kind of "individual"-electron, atom,
molecule, crystal
virus, ceU, plant, animal, man, family, tribe, state, church, firm,
corporation
umvermty, and so on. Each of these individuals exhibits
"behavior," action or
change, and this behavior is considered to be related in some
way to the en-
vironment of the individual—that is, with other individuals with
which it comes
mto contact or into some relationship. Each individual is
thought of as consisting

of a structure or complex of individuals of the order
immediately below it-*toms
are an arrar^ement of protons and electrons, molecules of
atoms, cells of mole-
cules, plants, animals and men of ceUs, social organizations of
men. The "be-
havior" of each individual is "explained" by the structure and
arrangement of
t i e lower individuals of which it is composed, or by certain
principles of equi-
libnum or homeostaais according to which certain "states" of
the individual are
"preferred." Behavior is described in terms of the restoration of
these preferred
states when they are disturbed by change in the environment.
Another phenomenon of universal significance is growth.
Growth theory is in
a sense a subdivision of the theory of individual "behavior,"
growth being one
important aspect of behavior. Nevertheless there are important
differences
between equilibrium theoiy and growth theory, which perhaps
warrant giving
growth theory a special cat^ory. There is hardly a science in
which the growth
phenomenon does not have some importance, and t h o u ^ there
is a great differ-
ence in complexity between the growth of crystals, embryos,
and societies,
many of the principles and concepts which are important at the
lower levels are
also iUuminating at higher levels. Some growth phenomena can
be dealt with in
terms of relatively simple population models, the solution of
which yields growth

curves of angle variables. At the more complex levels structural
problems be-
come dominant and the complex interrelationships between
growth and form
are the focus of interest. All growth phenomena are sufficiently
aUke however to
suggest that a general theory of growth is by no means an
impossibility.'
Another aspect of the theory of the individual and also of
interrelationships
among individuals which migjit be singled out for special
treatment is the theory
of information and communication. The information concept as
developed by
Shaonori has had interesting applications outside its original
field of electrical
engineCTing. I t is not adequate, of course, to deal with
problems involving the
semantic level oi communication. At the biol<^cal level
however the informa-
• 8ee "Towards a General Theory of Growth" by K. E. Boulding,
Canadian Journal of
Economics and PoliHeal Sdenee, 19 Aug. 1963, 326-340.
2 0 2 KENNETH BOX7LDING
tion concept may serve to develop general notions of
structuredness and abstract
measures of organization which give us, as it were, a third basic
dimension beyond
mass and energy. Communication and information processes are
found in a wide

variety of empirical situations, and are unquestionably essential
in the develop-
ment of organization, both in the biological and the social
world.
The% various approaches to general systems through various
aspects of the
empirical world may lead ultimately to something like a general
field theory of
the djmamics of action and interaction. This, however, is a long
way ahead.
A second possible approach to general systems theory is
through the arrange-
ment of theoretical systems and constructs in a hierarchy of
complexity, roughly
corresponding to the complexity of the "individuals" of the
various empirical
fields. This approach is more systematic than the first, leading
towards a "system
of sjTstems." It may not replace the first entirely, however, as
there may always
be important theoretical concepts and constructs lying outside
the systematic
framework. I suggest below a possible arrangement of "levels"
of theoretical
discourse.
(i) The first level is that of the static structure. It might be
called the level
of frameiDwks. This is the geography and anatomy of the
universe— t̂ he patterns
of electrons around a nucleus, the pattern of atoms in a
molecular formula, the
arratLgement of atoms in a crystal, the anatomy of the gene, the
cell, the plant,

the animal, the mapping of the earth, the solar system, the
astronomical universe.
The accurate description of these frameworks is the beginning
of organized
theoretical knowledge in almost any field, for without accuracy
in this descrip-
tion of static relationships no accurate functional or dynamic
theory is possible.
Thus the Copemican revolution was really the discovery of a
new static frame-
work for the solar system which permitted a simpler description
of its dynamics.
(ii) The next level of systematic analysis is that of the simple
dynamic Bystem
with predetermined, necessary motions. This might be called the
level of clock-
works. The solar system itself is of course the great clock of the
universe from
man's point of view, and the deliciously exact predictions of the
astronomers are
a testimony to the excellence of the clock which they study.
Simple machines
such as the lever and the pulley, even quite complicated
machines Uke steam
engines and dynamos fall mostly under this category. The
greater part of the
theoretical structure of physics, chemistry, and even of
economics falls into this
category. Two special cases might be noted. Simple equilibrium
systems really
fall into the dynamic category, as every equilibrium system
must be considered
as a limiting case of a djmamic sjrstem, and its stability carmot
be determined
except from the properties of its parent dynamic system.

Stochastic dynamic
systems leading to equilibria, for all their complexity, also fall
into this group of
systems; such is the modem view of the atom and even of the
molecule, each
position or part of the system being given with a certain d^ree
of probability,
the whole nevertheless exhibiting a determinate structure. Two
tjrpes of ana-
lytical method are important here, which we may call, with the
usage of the
economists, comparative statics and tme dynamics. In
comparative statics we
compare two equilibrium positions of the system under different
values for the
GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY 2 0 3
baac parameters. These equilibrium positions are usually
expressed as the solu-
tion of a ret of simultaneous equations. The method of
comparative statics is to
compare the solutions when the parameters of the equations are
changed. Most
simple mechanical problems are solved in this way. In tme
dynamics on the
other hand we exhibit the system as a set of difference or
differential equations,
yiiach are then solved in the form of an explicit function of
each variable with
time. Such a system may reach a position of stationary
equilibrium, or it may
not—tJiere are plenty of examples of explosive dynamic
systems, a very simple

one being the growth of a sum at compound interest! Most
physical and chemical
reactions and most social systems do in fact exhibit a tendency
to equilibrium-
otherwise the world would have exploded or imploded long ago.
Cm) The next level is that of the control mechanism or
cybemetic system,
which might be nicknamed the level of the thermostat. This
differs from the simple
stable equilibrium system mainly in the fact that the
transmission and interpre-
tation of information is an essential part of the system. As a
result of this the
equilibrium position is not merely determined by the equations
of the system,
but the system will move to the maintenance of any given
equilibrium, within
limits. Thus the thermc^tat will maintain any temperature at
which it can be
set; the equilibrium temperature of the system is not determined
solely by its
equatioris. The trick here of course is that the essential variable
of the dynamic
system is the difference between an "observed" or "recorded"
value of the main-
tained variable and its "ideal" value. If this difference is not
zero the system
moves so as to diminish it; thus the fumace sends up heat when
the temperature
as recorded is "too cold" and is tumed off when the recorded
temperature is
"too hot." The homeostasis model, which is of such importance
in physiology,
is an example of a cybemetic mechanism, and such mechanisms
exist through the

whole empirical world of the biologist and the social scientist.
(iv) The fourth level is that of the "open system," or self-
maintaining stmc-
ture. This is the level at which life begins to differentiate itself
from not-life:
it might be called the level of the ceU. Something like an open
system exists, of
course, even in physico-chemical equilibrium systems; atomic
stmctures main-
tain themselves in the midst of a throughput of electrons,
molecular structures
maintain themselves in the midst of a throughput of atoms.
Flames and rivers
likewise are essentially open systems of a very simple kind. As
we pass up the
scale of complexity of organization towards living systems,
however, the property
of self-maintenance of stmcture in the midst of a throughput of
material becomes
of dominant importance. An atom or a molecule can presumably
exist without
throughput: the existence of even the simplest living organism
is inconceivable
without ingestion, excretion and metabolic exchange. Closely
connected with
the property of self-maintenance is the property of self-
reproduction. It may be,
indeed, that self-reproduction is a more primitive or "lower
level" system than
the open system, and that the gene and the vims, for instance,
may be able to
reproduce themselves without being open systems. It is not
perhaps an important
quKition at what point in the scale of increasing complexity
"life" begins. What is

clear, however, is that by the time we have got to systems which
both reproduce
KENNETH BOULDmO
themselves and maintain themselves in the midst of a
throughput of material
and energy, we have sometJiing to which it would be hard to
deny the title of
"life."
(v) The fifth level m i ^ t be called the genetic-societal level; it
is typified by
the plant, and it dominates the empirical world of the botanist.
The outstanding
characteristics of these ^stems are first, a division of labor
among cells to form a
cell-society with differentiated and mutually dependent parts
(roots, leaves,
seeds, etc.), and %cond, a sharp differentiation between tiie
genotype and the
phenotype, araociated with the phenomenon of equifinal OT
"blueprinted"
growth. At this level there are no highly specialized sense
organs and information
receptors are diffuse and incapable of much throughput of
information— ît is
doubtful whether a tree can distinguish much more than light
from dark, long
daj!^ from short days, cold from hot.
(vi) As we move upward from the plant world towards the
animal kingdom
we gradually pass over into a new level, the "animal" level,

characterized by
increased mobility, teleological behavior, and self-awareness.
Here we have the
development of specialized information-receptors (eyes, ears,
etc.) leading to an
enormous increase in the intake of information; we have also a
great develop-
ment of nervous systems, leading ultimately to the brain, as an
organizer of the
information intake into a knowledge stmcture or "image".
Increasingly as we
ascend the scale of animal life, behavior is response not to a
specific stimulus but
to an "image" or knowledge stmcture or view of the
environment as a whole.
This image is of course determined ultimately by information
received into the
organism; the relation between the receipt of information and
the building
up of an image however is exceedingly complex. It is not a
simple piling up or
accumulation of information received, although this frequently
happens, but a
structuring of information into something essentially different
from the informa-
tion it^lf. After the i m ^ e stmcture is well established most
information re-
ceived produces very little change in the image— ît goes
through the loose stmc-
ture, as it were, without hitting it, much as a sub-atomic particle
might go
through an atom without hitting anything. Sometimes however
the information
is "captured" by the image and added to it, and sometimes the
information
hits some kind of a "nucleus" of the image and a reorganization

t a k ^ place,
with far reaching and radical changes in behavior in apparent
response to what
seems like a very small stimulus. The difficulties in the
prediction of the behavior
of these systems arises largely because of this intervention of
the i m a ^ between
the stimulus and the r^ponse.
(vii) The next level is the "human" level, that is of the
individual human
being considered as a system. In addition to all, or nearly all, of
the characteris-
tics of animal systems man possesses self consciousnras, which
is something
different from mere awareness. His image, beades being much
more complex
than that even of the higher animals, has a self-reflexive
quality—^he not
only knows, but knows that he knows. This property is probably
bound up with
the phenomenon of language and symbolism. It is the capacity
for speech— t̂ he
ability to produce, absorb, and interpret symbola, as oppmed to
mere signs like
GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY 2 0 5
the warning cry of an animal—which most clearly marks man
off from his
humbler brethren. Man is distii^uished from the animals also by
a much more
elaborate image of time and relationship; man is probably the
only organiza-

tion that knows that it dies, that contemplates in its behavior a
whole life span,
and more than a life span. Man exists not only in time and space
but in history
and his behavior is profoundly affected by his view of the time
process in which
he stands.
(viii) Because of the vital importance for the individual man of
symbolic
images and behavior based on them it is not easy to separate
clearly the level
of the individual human organism from the next level, that of
social organiza-
tions. In spite of the occasional stories of feral children raised
by animals, man
isolated from his fellows is practicaUy unknown. So essential is
the symboUc image
in human behavior that one suspects that a truly isolated man
would not be
"human" in the usually accepted sense, though he would be
potentially human.
Nevertheless it is convenient for some purposes to distinguish
the individual
human as a system from the social systems which surround him,
and in this
sense social organizations may be said to constitute another
level of organization.
The unit of such systems is not perhaps the person—the
individual human as
such—but the "role"—that part of the person which is concemed
with the
organization or situation in question, and it is tempting to
define social organiza-
tions, or almost any social system, as a set of roles tied tc^ether
with channels of

communication. The interrelations of the role and the person
however can never
be completely neglected—a square person in a round role may
become a Uttle
rounder, but he also makes the role squarer, and the perception
of a role is
affected by the personalities of those who have occupied it in
the past. At this
level we must concem om^lves with the content and meaning of
messages,
the nature and dimensions of value systems, the transcription of
images into a
historical record, the subtle symbolizations of art, music, and
poetry, and the
complex gamut of human emotion. The empirical universe here
is human life
and society in all its complexity and richness.
(ix) To complete the stmcture of systems we should add a final
turret for
transcendental systems, even if we may be accused at this point
of having built
Babel to the clouds. There are however the ultimates and
absolutes and the
in^icapable unknowable, and they also exhibit systematic
stmcture and rela-
tionship. It will be a sad day for man when nobody is allowed to
ask questions
that do not have any answers.
One advantage of exhibiting a hierarchy of systems in this way
is that it gives
us some idea of the present gaps in both theoretical and
empirical knowledge.
Adequate theoretical models extend up to about the fourth level,
and not much

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