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Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
CLASS 2016
Protection of real time industrial communication protocols and its technical impacts
Márcio Santos
SIEMENS
19.05.2016
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Who we are?
SIEMENS
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Global presence
Close to customers all over the world
3
29%
21%
Share
of total
worldwide
€21.7 billion
73,500
Americas
36%
28%
Share
of total
worldwide
€27.6 billion
98,800
Europe (excluding Germany), CIS,
Africa, Middle East15%
33%
Share
of total
worldwide
€11.2 billion
114,000
Germany
20%
18%
Share
of total
worldwide
€15.1 billion
61,500
Asia, Australia
Revenue by customer location Employees as of September 30, 2015
All figures refer to continuing operations. CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
Today Mid term – 2020
Electrification
Automation
Digitalization
Market development (illustrative)
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
168 years of innovation
Milestones
2015
Somatom Force
2010
Biograph
mMR
2013
PLM Software
1881
Electric streetcar
1985
ICE –
top speed
300 km/h
1988
Megabit
chip
1962
Thyristors
for energy
transmission
1974
Computed
tomography
scanner
1847
Werner von Siemens
founds the company
1847
Pointer
telegraph
1879
Electric train
1866
Dynamo
1840
1881
Telephone
switchboard
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
1959
Simatic (electronic
automation)
1953
High-purity
silicon
1965
Integrated circuit
1958
Heart
pacemaker
1935
Coaxial
cable
1924
Traffic
light
2009
World record
gas turbine,
370 MW
2000
Wind turbine
rotor blades
in one cast
2000
syngo
user interface
1939
Electron
microscope
4
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Brazil presence
Close to customers in a continental country
At present, Siemens employs more than 7,000
employees in Brazil, with 12 manufacturing facilities, 7
R&D centers and 13 regional offices.
5
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
110 years of innovations
Milestones
1867 1905 1922 1939 1955 1983 2005 2007 2009 2012 2013 2015 2016 2020
1867
Supply and installation of a
telegraph line between Rio de
Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul.
1905
Founding of Cia. Brazileira de
Eletricidade Siemens-
Schuckertwerke,
in Rio de Janeiro.
1922
Installation of Brazil's 1st automatic
telephone office in Porto Alegre.
1939
Siemens inaugurates in São Paulo
the 1st transformer plant in Brazil.
1955
Installation of Brazil's 1st
automatic telephone office in
Porto Alegre.
1983
Installation of the first of 18
generator rotors at the Itaipu
Hydroelectric Power Plant/
2005
Siemens celebrates its 100th
anniversary in Brazil.
2007
Siemens inaugurates the largest Latin
American energy equipment plant in
Jundiai (São Paulo). 2009
Siemens’ first train
modernization and assembly
center of Latin America, in
Cabreúva (São Paulo).
2012
Siemens inaugurates its diagnostic
imaging equipment plant in Joinville
2013
Production and installation of
Siemens' first wind turbines in
Brazil (Trairi, Ceará).
2015
Siemens celebrates its 110th
anniversary in Brazil
2016
Siemens Foundation celebrates its 30th
anniversary
6
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Power Generation Services
Flat and market driven organization along the value chain will capture growth
opportunitiesDivisions(GlobalP&L)
1) Commonwealth of Independent States
Managing Board
Market
Americas
Global
Healthcare
Middle
East, CIS1)
Asia,
Australia
Europe,
Africa
Financial
Services
Power
and Gas
Wind
Power and
Renewables
MobilityEnergy
Management
Building
Technologies
Digital Factory Process
Industries
and Drives
Healthcare
Separately
managed
Corporate CoreCorporate Services
PG
MOPS
WP
EM BT DF PD HC SFS
Go-to-market
7
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Motivation: Real time protocols VS Security
frameworks?
Protection of real time industrial communication protocols
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communication
Vulnerability disclosures are headline news
9
Industrial Communications do not have any kind
of self protection, says hacker during international
Hacker Conference
Hacking the Grid in 5 steps
Hackers exploit SCADA holes to take full control of
critical infrastructure
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communication
5 Simple steps for a successful attack
Control System
Discrete and analog
signals
SCADA Server
Invader
Switch
Now I know:
- The temperature value
- The communication relation
Give me the temperature
The temperature is 35
Give me the temperature
The temperature is 35
Now I´m the Man-In-The-Middle
- I can change the temperature
1. Gain network access
2. Sniffer the network packets
3. Discovery the communication relations
4. Redirect the communication traffic
5. Be happy and be ethical
Man-in-the middle attack in 5 simple steps
Powered by
10
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communication
Important questions regarding industrial communication
Control System
Discrete and analog
signals
SCADA Server
Invader
Switch
Give me the temperature
The temperature is 35
Give me the temperature
The temperature is 35
1. No network access protection?
2. No data confidentially?
3. No data integrity?
4. No user authentication?
5. Is such configuration common?
5 important questions in this case:
Powered by
11
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
What is it?
Real Time Control
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Home Example
Reservoir level control
Time(s)
Level (L)
Maximum level
Minimum level
Valve
Opened
Valve
Closed
Reaction
Time
Reaction
Time
Ops!!!
Houston, we have a problem!
13
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Example
From discrete signals to intelligent field devices
A long time ago Not so long time ago Now and in the future
14
16 bit control
Discrete and analog
signals
Backplane
I/O
Discrete and analog
signals
32 bit control
Industrial
RS-485 Bus
Communication
Processors
64 bit control
Ethernet Bus
Intelligent field
devices
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Application Layer
HTTP SNMP Socket
IP
TCP/UDP
Industrial Communications Vs Real Time Control
How does it work using Ethernet networks?
Sensor system
PLCPC
SNMP/OPC server
Field DevicesPC
Internet Explorer
Real-time
Communication
Ethernet
PLC
Ethernet
Cable
ASIC/FPGA
15
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Sync
1 ms
1 µs
Several cycles
frozen on the
oscilloscope
Industrial Communications Vs Real Time Control
What are the influences of the network latency in control system?
1 µs jitter
16
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
Differente solutions for different challenges for different factories
- Real time
- Determinism
TCP/IP
Até 31.25 msUp to 250 ms
Real-time Isochronous real-time
10 ms 100ms 10ms
Cycle time
1 ms
ApplicationCommunication
Layers
Performance reservesProduction Line
Tool Machine
Print Machines
Packing Machines
Storage & Logistics
Press
Robot
Layer 2
17
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
How to protect real time industrial networks?
Industrial Communications
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
The Defense in Depth Concept in Detail
DCS/
SCADA*
*DCS: Distributed Control System
SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Potential
Attack
Plant Security
Physical Security
• Physical access to facilities and equipment
Policies & procedures
• Security management processes
• Operational Guidelines
• Business Continuity Management &
Disaster Recovery
Network Security
Security cells & DMZ
• Secure architecture based on network segmentation
Firewalls and VPN
• Implementation of Firewalls as the only access
point to a security cell
System Integrity
System hardening
• Adapting system to be secure by default
User Account Management
• Access control based on user rights and privileges
Patch Management
• Regular implementation of patches and updates
Malware detection and prevention
• Anti Virus and Whitelisting
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
Protection of real time networks (based on layers 3/4)
Typical Layer 3/4 network
PLC
Firewall
Trusted network
Untrusted network
192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3
192.168.0.1
Expected cycle time: 10~20ms
Firewall rules:
Firewall considerations:
- Typical latency: 0.5ms~5ms
- Usually statefull firewall
- Usually only supports layer 3/4 rules
Has the firewall significative influences in the
cycle time and in the system functionality?
No at all in this case!!!
Direction Source Destination Port
Ext->Int 192.168.0.1 192.268.0.2 502
Ext->Int 192.168.0.1 192.268.0.3 502
20
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
Protection of real time networks (based on layers 3/4)
Typical Layer 3/4 network
21
Firewall
Trusted network
Untrusted network
Firewall overall performance depends on:
- Hardware or software implementation
- Others embedded functionalities (VPN, Router)
- Costs (High-End vs Low-End solution)
Source: DataCenters Firewall Comparative Analysis – NSS Labs – 2013
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
Protection of real time networks (based on layers 3/4)
DPI (Data Package Inspection) Firewall
Firewall rules (Layer 3/4):
Direction Source Destination Port
Ext->Int 192.168.0.1 192.268.0.2 502
Ext->Int 192.168.0.1 192.268.0.3 502
Firewall rules (Layer 7):
Destination Register Read Write
192.168.0.2 50001 Allow Allow
192.168.0.3 50001 Allow Deny
Firewall considerations:
-The firewall must be able to recognize and interpret the frames,
applying additional rules protection
- Theoretically more time processing, but not so critical considering
the expected cycle time
Firewall
Trusted network
Untrusted network
192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3
Expected cycle time: 10~20ms
22
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
Protection of real time networks (based on layer 2)
23
Typical Layer 2 network
PLC
Firewall
Trusted network
Untrusted network
192.168.0.1
08-01-E1-00-FF-01
Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms
Firewall rules:
Firewall considerations:
- Typical latency: 0.5ms~5ms
- Must to support layer 2 rules
Has the firewall significative influences in the
cycle time and in the system functionality?
For sure!!!
Direction Source Destination
Service
Type
Ext->Int 08-01-E1-00-FF-01 08-01-E1-00-FF-02 ????
Ext->Int 08-01-E1-00-FF-01 08-01-E1-00-FF-03 ????
192.168.0.2
08-01-E1-00-FF-02
192.168.0.3
08-01-E1-00-FF-03
This kind of
solution is not
feasible nowadays
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
Protection of real time networks (based on layer 2)
24
Typical Layer 2 network
Firewall Challenges:
- Unaccepted latency
- Device replacement restrictions
- Dynamics firewall rules
- No DPI due to complex semantics
So, it´s not possible to have a secure
environment with industrial control systems due
to performance and functionality restrictions?
Yes, it is possible, but you have to design it
properly!!!
Firewall
Trusted network
Untrusted network
Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms
192.168.0.2
08-01-E1-00-FF-02
192.168.0.3
08-01-E1-00-FF-03
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
ISA-99/IEC-62443 protection recommendations (for all kind of networks)
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Secure Automation Cell
Industrial Communications
ISA-99/IEC-62443 protection recommendations (for all kind of networks)
26
Untrusted network
Trusted network
PLC
Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms
Firewall
Unsecure Environment
Benefits
- No influences in the internal and high performing communications
- No restrictions in the control system functionalities
- External access can be controlled in the perimeter protection
- Can be used for monitoring system and engineering system
- Even engineering functions based, on layer 2, can be used in this
case
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Secure Automation Cell
Industrial Communications
ISA-99/IEC-62443 protection recommendations (cell to cell communication)
Trusted network
PLC
Internal Communications
- Reliable
- High performance
- Without restrictions
Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms
Firewall
Secure Automation Cell
Trusted network
Internal Communications
- Reliable
- High performance
- Without restrictions
Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms
PLCFirewall
27
Untrusted network
Expected cycle time:
10~1000ms
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
OPC UA - Unified Architecture
Industrial Communications
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
OPC UA – The first industrial protocol with enhanced security functions
29
OPC History - success story
Benefits of OPC UA
- Open connectivity
- Plug-and-Play
- Interfaces available from multiple
vendors
- Easy to use
- Secure by birth
- Independent of HW/SW platform
- Can be implemented in small devices
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
OPC UA – The first industrial protocol with enhanced security functions
30
Platform Independence
OPC UA is designed to be independent of the platform
Using SOAP/XML over HTTP, OPC UA can be deployed on Linux, Windows XP Embedded, VxWorks, Mac, Windows
7 and Classical Windows platforms.
Access via Firewalls and across the Internet
OPC UA uses message based security which means messages can be relayed through HTTP, UA TCP port or
any other single port available.
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
OPC UA – The first industrial protocol with enhanced security functions
OPC UA
Client
u@#r**ss0+Hello
Public key of the server certificate
Encryption
Private key of the server certificate
Decryption
Hello
HiHi j4#€*s@0+
Decryption
Private key of the client certificate Public key of the client certificate
Encryption
OPC UA
Server
Sequence of encrypted communication
Server and client encrypt their messages using the public keys of the partners. These then decrypt the message
again with their private keys
31
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
OPC UA + PROFINET
The backbone of Industry 4.0
Industrial Communications
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Digital Enterprise
The practical way to Industry 4.0
33
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Expected cycle time:
10~1000ms
Industrial Communications
OPC UA + PROFINET – The Best in class combination
Secure Automation Cell
Trusted network
PLC
Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms
Secure Automation Cell
Trusted network
Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms
PLC
Intelligent Field Devices
- PROFINET I/O Devices
- OPC UA Servers
- OPC UA Clients
Intelligent Field Devices
- PROFINET I/O Devices
- OPC UA Servers
- OPC UA Clients
Intelligent Controllers
- PROFINET I/O Controllers
- OPC UA Servers
- OPC UA Clients
Intelligent Controllers
- PROFINET I/O Controllers
- OPC UA Servers
- OPC UA Clients
Untrusted network
Corporate Level
Others Secure
Automation Cells
Firewall Firewall
34
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
OPC UA + PROFINET In Action – ICS Village – CLASS 2016
PLC Firewall
Access
Point
Firewall
Access
Point
SCADA SERVER
Firewall
OPC UA SERVER
DMZ BUS
Process BUS
Corporate BUS
OPC UA CLIENT
35
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Summary
Industrial Communications
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Industrial Communications
Summary for
Overall cycle time and system functionality must be taken into account while design cyber security
systems
PROFINET is the market leader industrial automation protocol based on Ethernet network. Achieving
cycles times of 31.25µs with 1µs jitter
OPC UA is a trend setter protocol in terms of automation connectivity (non real time) and it has
embedded cyber security mechanisms
+
PROFINET + OPC UA is the best in class combination driving perfect solutions for real time
applications and connectivity in the whole factory.
This combination makes possible to create high flexible automation networks without compromising
the cyber security aspects
37
Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved.
Márcio Santos
Technical Consultant
SIEMENS Brazil
Phone: +55(11) 9 7244-0552
E-Mail: marcio.santos@siemens.com
Visit us during the CLASS 2016 and take advantage to see a real
control system in action and its protection layers provided by
different vendors.
Thank you for your attention!
5/27/2016

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CLASS 2016 - Palestra Márcio Santos

  • 1. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. CLASS 2016 Protection of real time industrial communication protocols and its technical impacts Márcio Santos SIEMENS 19.05.2016
  • 2. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Who we are? SIEMENS
  • 3. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Global presence Close to customers all over the world 3 29% 21% Share of total worldwide €21.7 billion 73,500 Americas 36% 28% Share of total worldwide €27.6 billion 98,800 Europe (excluding Germany), CIS, Africa, Middle East15% 33% Share of total worldwide €11.2 billion 114,000 Germany 20% 18% Share of total worldwide €15.1 billion 61,500 Asia, Australia Revenue by customer location Employees as of September 30, 2015 All figures refer to continuing operations. CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States Today Mid term – 2020 Electrification Automation Digitalization Market development (illustrative)
  • 4. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. 168 years of innovation Milestones 2015 Somatom Force 2010 Biograph mMR 2013 PLM Software 1881 Electric streetcar 1985 ICE – top speed 300 km/h 1988 Megabit chip 1962 Thyristors for energy transmission 1974 Computed tomography scanner 1847 Werner von Siemens founds the company 1847 Pointer telegraph 1879 Electric train 1866 Dynamo 1840 1881 Telephone switchboard 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1959 Simatic (electronic automation) 1953 High-purity silicon 1965 Integrated circuit 1958 Heart pacemaker 1935 Coaxial cable 1924 Traffic light 2009 World record gas turbine, 370 MW 2000 Wind turbine rotor blades in one cast 2000 syngo user interface 1939 Electron microscope 4
  • 5. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Brazil presence Close to customers in a continental country At present, Siemens employs more than 7,000 employees in Brazil, with 12 manufacturing facilities, 7 R&D centers and 13 regional offices. 5
  • 6. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. 110 years of innovations Milestones 1867 1905 1922 1939 1955 1983 2005 2007 2009 2012 2013 2015 2016 2020 1867 Supply and installation of a telegraph line between Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul. 1905 Founding of Cia. Brazileira de Eletricidade Siemens- Schuckertwerke, in Rio de Janeiro. 1922 Installation of Brazil's 1st automatic telephone office in Porto Alegre. 1939 Siemens inaugurates in São Paulo the 1st transformer plant in Brazil. 1955 Installation of Brazil's 1st automatic telephone office in Porto Alegre. 1983 Installation of the first of 18 generator rotors at the Itaipu Hydroelectric Power Plant/ 2005 Siemens celebrates its 100th anniversary in Brazil. 2007 Siemens inaugurates the largest Latin American energy equipment plant in Jundiai (São Paulo). 2009 Siemens’ first train modernization and assembly center of Latin America, in Cabreúva (São Paulo). 2012 Siemens inaugurates its diagnostic imaging equipment plant in Joinville 2013 Production and installation of Siemens' first wind turbines in Brazil (Trairi, Ceará). 2015 Siemens celebrates its 110th anniversary in Brazil 2016 Siemens Foundation celebrates its 30th anniversary 6
  • 7. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Power Generation Services Flat and market driven organization along the value chain will capture growth opportunitiesDivisions(GlobalP&L) 1) Commonwealth of Independent States Managing Board Market Americas Global Healthcare Middle East, CIS1) Asia, Australia Europe, Africa Financial Services Power and Gas Wind Power and Renewables MobilityEnergy Management Building Technologies Digital Factory Process Industries and Drives Healthcare Separately managed Corporate CoreCorporate Services PG MOPS WP EM BT DF PD HC SFS Go-to-market 7
  • 8. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Motivation: Real time protocols VS Security frameworks? Protection of real time industrial communication protocols
  • 9. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communication Vulnerability disclosures are headline news 9 Industrial Communications do not have any kind of self protection, says hacker during international Hacker Conference Hacking the Grid in 5 steps Hackers exploit SCADA holes to take full control of critical infrastructure
  • 10. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communication 5 Simple steps for a successful attack Control System Discrete and analog signals SCADA Server Invader Switch Now I know: - The temperature value - The communication relation Give me the temperature The temperature is 35 Give me the temperature The temperature is 35 Now I´m the Man-In-The-Middle - I can change the temperature 1. Gain network access 2. Sniffer the network packets 3. Discovery the communication relations 4. Redirect the communication traffic 5. Be happy and be ethical Man-in-the middle attack in 5 simple steps Powered by 10
  • 11. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communication Important questions regarding industrial communication Control System Discrete and analog signals SCADA Server Invader Switch Give me the temperature The temperature is 35 Give me the temperature The temperature is 35 1. No network access protection? 2. No data confidentially? 3. No data integrity? 4. No user authentication? 5. Is such configuration common? 5 important questions in this case: Powered by 11
  • 12. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. What is it? Real Time Control
  • 13. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Home Example Reservoir level control Time(s) Level (L) Maximum level Minimum level Valve Opened Valve Closed Reaction Time Reaction Time Ops!!! Houston, we have a problem! 13
  • 14. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Example From discrete signals to intelligent field devices A long time ago Not so long time ago Now and in the future 14 16 bit control Discrete and analog signals Backplane I/O Discrete and analog signals 32 bit control Industrial RS-485 Bus Communication Processors 64 bit control Ethernet Bus Intelligent field devices
  • 15. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Application Layer HTTP SNMP Socket IP TCP/UDP Industrial Communications Vs Real Time Control How does it work using Ethernet networks? Sensor system PLCPC SNMP/OPC server Field DevicesPC Internet Explorer Real-time Communication Ethernet PLC Ethernet Cable ASIC/FPGA 15
  • 16. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Sync 1 ms 1 µs Several cycles frozen on the oscilloscope Industrial Communications Vs Real Time Control What are the influences of the network latency in control system? 1 µs jitter 16
  • 17. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications Differente solutions for different challenges for different factories - Real time - Determinism TCP/IP Até 31.25 msUp to 250 ms Real-time Isochronous real-time 10 ms 100ms 10ms Cycle time 1 ms ApplicationCommunication Layers Performance reservesProduction Line Tool Machine Print Machines Packing Machines Storage & Logistics Press Robot Layer 2 17
  • 18. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. How to protect real time industrial networks? Industrial Communications
  • 19. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications The Defense in Depth Concept in Detail DCS/ SCADA* *DCS: Distributed Control System SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Potential Attack Plant Security Physical Security • Physical access to facilities and equipment Policies & procedures • Security management processes • Operational Guidelines • Business Continuity Management & Disaster Recovery Network Security Security cells & DMZ • Secure architecture based on network segmentation Firewalls and VPN • Implementation of Firewalls as the only access point to a security cell System Integrity System hardening • Adapting system to be secure by default User Account Management • Access control based on user rights and privileges Patch Management • Regular implementation of patches and updates Malware detection and prevention • Anti Virus and Whitelisting
  • 20. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications Protection of real time networks (based on layers 3/4) Typical Layer 3/4 network PLC Firewall Trusted network Untrusted network 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.1 Expected cycle time: 10~20ms Firewall rules: Firewall considerations: - Typical latency: 0.5ms~5ms - Usually statefull firewall - Usually only supports layer 3/4 rules Has the firewall significative influences in the cycle time and in the system functionality? No at all in this case!!! Direction Source Destination Port Ext->Int 192.168.0.1 192.268.0.2 502 Ext->Int 192.168.0.1 192.268.0.3 502 20
  • 21. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications Protection of real time networks (based on layers 3/4) Typical Layer 3/4 network 21 Firewall Trusted network Untrusted network Firewall overall performance depends on: - Hardware or software implementation - Others embedded functionalities (VPN, Router) - Costs (High-End vs Low-End solution) Source: DataCenters Firewall Comparative Analysis – NSS Labs – 2013
  • 22. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications Protection of real time networks (based on layers 3/4) DPI (Data Package Inspection) Firewall Firewall rules (Layer 3/4): Direction Source Destination Port Ext->Int 192.168.0.1 192.268.0.2 502 Ext->Int 192.168.0.1 192.268.0.3 502 Firewall rules (Layer 7): Destination Register Read Write 192.168.0.2 50001 Allow Allow 192.168.0.3 50001 Allow Deny Firewall considerations: -The firewall must be able to recognize and interpret the frames, applying additional rules protection - Theoretically more time processing, but not so critical considering the expected cycle time Firewall Trusted network Untrusted network 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3 Expected cycle time: 10~20ms 22
  • 23. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications Protection of real time networks (based on layer 2) 23 Typical Layer 2 network PLC Firewall Trusted network Untrusted network 192.168.0.1 08-01-E1-00-FF-01 Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms Firewall rules: Firewall considerations: - Typical latency: 0.5ms~5ms - Must to support layer 2 rules Has the firewall significative influences in the cycle time and in the system functionality? For sure!!! Direction Source Destination Service Type Ext->Int 08-01-E1-00-FF-01 08-01-E1-00-FF-02 ???? Ext->Int 08-01-E1-00-FF-01 08-01-E1-00-FF-03 ???? 192.168.0.2 08-01-E1-00-FF-02 192.168.0.3 08-01-E1-00-FF-03 This kind of solution is not feasible nowadays
  • 24. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications Protection of real time networks (based on layer 2) 24 Typical Layer 2 network Firewall Challenges: - Unaccepted latency - Device replacement restrictions - Dynamics firewall rules - No DPI due to complex semantics So, it´s not possible to have a secure environment with industrial control systems due to performance and functionality restrictions? Yes, it is possible, but you have to design it properly!!! Firewall Trusted network Untrusted network Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms 192.168.0.2 08-01-E1-00-FF-02 192.168.0.3 08-01-E1-00-FF-03
  • 25. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications ISA-99/IEC-62443 protection recommendations (for all kind of networks)
  • 26. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Secure Automation Cell Industrial Communications ISA-99/IEC-62443 protection recommendations (for all kind of networks) 26 Untrusted network Trusted network PLC Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms Firewall Unsecure Environment Benefits - No influences in the internal and high performing communications - No restrictions in the control system functionalities - External access can be controlled in the perimeter protection - Can be used for monitoring system and engineering system - Even engineering functions based, on layer 2, can be used in this case
  • 27. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Secure Automation Cell Industrial Communications ISA-99/IEC-62443 protection recommendations (cell to cell communication) Trusted network PLC Internal Communications - Reliable - High performance - Without restrictions Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms Firewall Secure Automation Cell Trusted network Internal Communications - Reliable - High performance - Without restrictions Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms PLCFirewall 27 Untrusted network Expected cycle time: 10~1000ms
  • 28. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. OPC UA - Unified Architecture Industrial Communications
  • 29. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications OPC UA – The first industrial protocol with enhanced security functions 29 OPC History - success story Benefits of OPC UA - Open connectivity - Plug-and-Play - Interfaces available from multiple vendors - Easy to use - Secure by birth - Independent of HW/SW platform - Can be implemented in small devices
  • 30. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications OPC UA – The first industrial protocol with enhanced security functions 30 Platform Independence OPC UA is designed to be independent of the platform Using SOAP/XML over HTTP, OPC UA can be deployed on Linux, Windows XP Embedded, VxWorks, Mac, Windows 7 and Classical Windows platforms. Access via Firewalls and across the Internet OPC UA uses message based security which means messages can be relayed through HTTP, UA TCP port or any other single port available.
  • 31. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications OPC UA – The first industrial protocol with enhanced security functions OPC UA Client u@#r**ss0+Hello Public key of the server certificate Encryption Private key of the server certificate Decryption Hello HiHi j4#€*s@0+ Decryption Private key of the client certificate Public key of the client certificate Encryption OPC UA Server Sequence of encrypted communication Server and client encrypt their messages using the public keys of the partners. These then decrypt the message again with their private keys 31
  • 32. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. OPC UA + PROFINET The backbone of Industry 4.0 Industrial Communications
  • 33. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Digital Enterprise The practical way to Industry 4.0 33
  • 34. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Expected cycle time: 10~1000ms Industrial Communications OPC UA + PROFINET – The Best in class combination Secure Automation Cell Trusted network PLC Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms Secure Automation Cell Trusted network Expected cycle time: 31.25µs~1ms PLC Intelligent Field Devices - PROFINET I/O Devices - OPC UA Servers - OPC UA Clients Intelligent Field Devices - PROFINET I/O Devices - OPC UA Servers - OPC UA Clients Intelligent Controllers - PROFINET I/O Controllers - OPC UA Servers - OPC UA Clients Intelligent Controllers - PROFINET I/O Controllers - OPC UA Servers - OPC UA Clients Untrusted network Corporate Level Others Secure Automation Cells Firewall Firewall 34
  • 35. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications OPC UA + PROFINET In Action – ICS Village – CLASS 2016 PLC Firewall Access Point Firewall Access Point SCADA SERVER Firewall OPC UA SERVER DMZ BUS Process BUS Corporate BUS OPC UA CLIENT 35
  • 36. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Summary Industrial Communications
  • 37. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Industrial Communications Summary for Overall cycle time and system functionality must be taken into account while design cyber security systems PROFINET is the market leader industrial automation protocol based on Ethernet network. Achieving cycles times of 31.25µs with 1µs jitter OPC UA is a trend setter protocol in terms of automation connectivity (non real time) and it has embedded cyber security mechanisms + PROFINET + OPC UA is the best in class combination driving perfect solutions for real time applications and connectivity in the whole factory. This combination makes possible to create high flexible automation networks without compromising the cyber security aspects 37
  • 38. Unrestricted / © Siemens AG 2016. All Rights Reserved. Márcio Santos Technical Consultant SIEMENS Brazil Phone: +55(11) 9 7244-0552 E-Mail: marcio.santos@siemens.com Visit us during the CLASS 2016 and take advantage to see a real control system in action and its protection layers provided by different vendors. Thank you for your attention! 5/27/2016