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Civilian OPSEC in Cyberspace
Petr Špiřík
About
The course
Methods and techniques for
monitoring, surveillance and
profiling of cyberspace activities
are here to stay.
This workshop goal is to educate
people operating in above-
average risk situations in
cyberspace and to arm them
against malicious actors abusing
these options.
Petr Špiřík
Cyber security, privacy, counter-
surveillance and threat
intelligence. This is what I like.
Network security, incident
response, security architecture
and design. This is what I do.
Education and the power of
knowledge. This is what I trust.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Audience
I want to
• Do independent journalism in Russia
• Buy and sell drugs online
• Perform cutting edge research in China
• Watch porn in UAE
• Live my life without fear – whether I am gay, woman, black or radical
anarchist
Good. Welcome.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Course management
There are eight building blocks, one for each defined subtopic
One block aims at 45/15 minutes of content/chill out time format
At all time, the parking lot is here to capture questions and pain points
Questions, concerns and requests for rewind/fast forward are
welcome.
Participation is not only welcome – it is essential for meeting the
objectives of this course.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Agenda
Problem
0900 Cyberspace basics
1000 Self-profiling
1100 Threat actors
1200 Attack vectors
Solution
1400 Risk Management
1500 Ways of OPSEC
1600 Tools of OPSEC
1700 Summary & Feedback
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Cyberspace Basics
“Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of
legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught
mathematical concepts... A graphic representation of data abstracted
from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable
complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters
and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding.” (Neuromancer,
1984)
“The environment formed by physical and non-physical components,
characterized by the use of computers and the electro-magnetic
spectrum, to store, modify, and exchange data using computer
networks.” (Tallinn Manual, 2013)
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
What is OPSEC, anyway?
OPSEC stands for OPerations SECurity
OPSEC usually refers to clandestine, covert or otherwise sensitive
operations and the need to keep them that way.
OPSEC is the way of behaving, acting and operating that provides
increased security and privacy.
OPSEC often aims at reducing your footprint and achieving low profile.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Cyber Terrain (courtesy of Shawn Riley)
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Scary model
Network Access
Networks Physics, real world, cables
Internet
Protocols Rules and laws of the Internet
Transport
Computer Hardware, processing of data
Application
Human Human-Computer interface, software
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Flow of Operation in Cyberspace
Me
Computer
interface
My
computer
My ISP Another ISP
Yet another
ISP
Datacenter
Target
server
Target
service
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Flow explained - 1
Me -> My Computer
Who else has access to my
computer?
How secure is my computer?
My computer uses DNS and other
protocols. What does this mean?
If I do not control my computer,
every other step is compromised.
My Computer -> My ISP
Where do I connect?
Who else has access to the router
I use?
How secure is this router?
How much do I trust my ISP?
Countermeasures against
untrustworthy connection and
ISP exist.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Intermission
Addressing
Everything connected to the
network has address, IP address.
Addressing is hierarchical.
There are rules for address
allocation.
Addresses can be manipulated.
Domain Name Service
IP addresses are not human-
friendly.
Names are better.
DNS is protocol and service
allowing to use google.com
instead of 173.194.122.3
Names can be manipulated.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Flow explained - 2
ISP -> Datacenter
ISPs and datacenters are subject
to laws of the country the reside
in. Does this affect me?
There are usually more ISPs in the
way, forming a chain.
ISPs & datacenters have
employees.
These hops multiply the problem.
Target Server -> Target Service
Who administers the target
server?
How secure is the target service
against other users, attackers,
administrators?
It is very hard to exercise security
at the target end of connection.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Why does it matter?
Models are good.
Models allow us to split complex problem into sum of easier
challenges.
Understanding the environment is critical
• Cyberspace is heterogeneous environment
• There is no end-to end control
• What happens if any of the nodes is compromised
We don’t need to understand technical details for self-defense.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Digital Footprint
Whenever you operate in cyberspace, you leave traces.
Lockard’s exchange principle still applies.
The good thing – you can modify your traces more easily in cyberspace.
The bad thing – it is significantly harder to remove your traces
completely.
The very bad thing – time does not help.
Digital footprint is close to eternal. What you once put in the system
remains there forever.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Heterogeneous environment
Cyberspace is subject to three points of view simultaneously at any
given time.
Physical. Data in cables have physical representation. Monitors emit in
visible spectrum.
Logical. Data are logically structured and encoded. Protocols and
transformation apply.
Legal. Cables, servers, computers and people exist in some jurisdiction,
are subject to this jurisdiction and the jurisdictions can conflict. There is
nothing like no-ones land.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Control and Trust
Control
Limited.
End-to-end control is hard and/or
expensive to achieve.
It is easy to lose control and hard
to regain it.
“I bought my computer and no
one else ever touched it. It is
under my control.”
Trust
Trust is essential to our society –
and to cyberspace as well.
There are different trust models.
Trust is cheap complement to
control.
Trust but verify.
“I trust my ISP not to spy on me.”
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Immutable Laws Of Security (by Microsoft)
#1: If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your
computer…
#2: If a bad guy can alter the OS on your computer…
#3: If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer…
#4: If you allow a bad guy to run active content in your website…
… it is not yours anymore.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Self-profiling
There is no silver bullet.
Journalist, drug smuggler, student or scientist have different needs.
This block is activity driven with the outcomes of
• Defined assets you use in your daily routine
• Services and tools that are important to you
• What is important to you
This profile is called the attack surface.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
CIA triad
All recognized assets, whether logical or physical are subject to CIA
triad of Confidentiality, Availability and Integrity.
These aspects represent what is important to you.
“I do not want anyone else being able to read or modify my emails.
Losing them is not a big deal to me.” I value Confidentiality and
Integrity, while I do not care about Availability.
“My website is public. It must be up all time and its content must be
exactly like I want it.” Availability and Integrity is important, but
Confidentiality does not even apply.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Assets
This one is easy.
Write down all your cyberspace related devices and what do you use
them for
• Smartphone (phone calls, navigation, internet access)
• Laptop (school work, online games, Facebook, movies, photos)
• Lab computer (research projects, foreign universities data access)
• Credit card (paying online, ATM withdrawals)
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Services
Still easy.
What services do you use and how important are these for you. Write
them down.
• Email (how many of these)
• Facebook (or other social media)
• Google documents (fun, work, school)
• Dropbox (or other file sharing platform)
• Website
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Crown Jewels
Time to think.
What is important to you? What matters the most? What part of your
life could suffer a lot? Use the CIA triad classification.
• Lose all my data stored in cloud
• Lose my emails
• Have my emails stolen
• Get shamed publicly
• Lose money
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
“Stuff”
There are necessarily data that you did not include in Assets, Services
or Crown jewels sections.
This is ok.
These are the data you have, but do not care that much about.
It is good and important to be aware of them, but right now – let’s put
them aside.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Asset Management
Assets, services and crown jewels can be also seen as
• Physical assets
• Logical assets
• Priority assets
Writing them down in structured manner serves many purposes
• Visibility (you can manage only what you know about)
• Attack surface deconstruction (this might allow for some easy wins)
• Prioritization for defense (Crown jewels vs. “stuff”)
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Threat actors
“You Don’t Have a Malware Problem. You Have an Adversary Problem.”
(CrowdStrike)
Does it matter who is after you?
Are you suspicious of government? Ours or THEIRS?
Scared by neo-Nazis? Classroom bullies?
Afraid of criminals?
Yes, it does matter. Different threat actors have different motivation
and different capabilities. Your defense should differ as well.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Government
Profile
Law enforcement, government
bodies, intelligence agencies,
military.
Professionals working 8-17, with
unlimited budget and options not
available to anyone else.
Significant difference goes
whether they are domestic or
foreign.
Motivation
Defined by political agenda and
legal system. Highly predictable.
Capability
Usually top tier.
Objectives
Surveillance, law enforcement
objectives, intelligence and
counterintelligence.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
hacktivists
Profile
“For cause” groups. Far right, far
left, extremists, political
organizations.
White-media.info, Anonymous –
just to name a few.
Motivation
The critical aspect of each
hacktivist group.
Capability
Wildly varied.
Objectives
Usually attention whores, thriving
for media coverage and publicity.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Criminals
Profile
Traditional organized crime as well
as freelancing dog soldiers
(Hidden Lynx) are already strongly
established.
Driven by money, you can find all
sorts of talents – from retarded
drive-by shooters to skilled
operatives.
Motivation
Money. Financial profit. Very
predictable with parallels to
standard crime and business.
Capability
Adequate to their selected career.
There is room for everyone.
Objectives
Data theft, ransom, outsourcing.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Lonewolfs (aka Jerks)
Profile
Someone you pissed of at work.
Someone you broke up with.
Someone randomly evil.
Motivation
Unpredictable.
Capability
Varied, usually low.
Objectives
Acts of damage and destruction,
not predictable.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Now what?
Activity. More writing.
Who are you afraid the most?
What crown jewels of yours are they after?
Why do you think you are their target?
Who do you fear the least?
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Attack Vectors
Threat actors have their tools of trade ready.
They target the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of your assets.
We will cover different points of view and classification of the attacks,
allowing us to understand the attack vector.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Legal
Most often domain of Government threat actors.
Confidentiality is the main target.
Can be long-term (mass surveillance) or short term (investigation).
You can become victim as collateral damage (police raid at datacenter)
or as direct target.
It is critical to understand legal framework applicable – at least to the
extent of your rights and risks.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Legal - Examples
Surveillance
Some form of surveillance is
already at place (CCTV), other
might be deployed upon request
at your ISP.
The entities implementing
surveillance act with the power of
administrator.
Law Enforcement Hit
Your laptop might be confiscated
for investigation.
Your server might be taken into
custody.
It might be targeted against you or
you might be just drive-by victim.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Social Engineering
By far the most prevalent type of attack – or at least frequent
complementing factor. Mostly used by criminal threat actors.
People are prone to trust others, believe in fairy tales and get abused
for it.
It is no surprise – skilled social engineer is con artist doing it for living.
His victim is most likely experiencing it for the first time.
Social engineering attack might resemble boxing match between
Rocky Balboa and Justin Bieber.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Social - Examples
Phishing
It looks like legitimate email.
It looks like your e-banking site.
It offers money or tries to help
you.
It might as well be just an illusion
set up by an attacker.
Identity Theft
Friend request on Facebook.
You know the name, you
recognize the photo, you shared
the class two years ago.
It might as well be persona crafted
from publicly available sources.
Like other social networks.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Physical
Did someone have access to your computer? It is not your computer
anymore.
Are you operating in environment, that is controlled by someone else?
How much do you trust them?
Targeted attacks against you are rare as they scale poorly.
Prepared traps against anyone coming in are common as they scale
decently.
Physical attacks are used by all actors, based on opportunity.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Logical - Examples
Man-in-the-Middle
When the attacker is able to gain
control of a point in the flow of
information and manipulate it, we
speak about MitM attack.
Redirecting traffic, intercepting
data or terminating and
reestablishing sessions all fall into
MitM category.
Password chaining
“Did you forget your password?
Enter your email address and we
will reset it for you.”
What happens if one of your
accounts is compromised?
Can the attacker use it for gaining
access to other accounts?
Think email-PayPal link.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Physical - Examples
Rogue Access Point
Remember the flow?
What if the “Café 99 – PUBLIC”
Wi-Fi access point is not set up by
the kind owner of Café 99, but by
the attacker?
What communication is the
attacker able to intercept?
Keylogger
Police officer arrested you for
minor offense and inspected your
computer.
Nothing else happened, all
charges dropped.
How do you know, your keyboard
is not richer of hardware
keylogger?
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Logical
Broad category, where software attacks in forms of malware meet with
manipulating the flow of data.
Specific aspect of logical attacks is identification of more complex
structure and attacking weak point, traversing further once successful.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Profiling
Profiling can be perceived
as reconnaissance stage
to real attack or attack
against privacy itself.
Using publicly available
information and
analyzing them can lead
to results beyond
intuitive expectation.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Human error
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Risk management
We manage risks all the time – by taking decisions.
Problem is, people are bad at risk analysis and they decide based on
feelings, not facts.
Risk management is about tradeoffs.
Risk management is mix of science, statistics, crystal ball estimates,
decision making, strategy and personal preferences.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Terminology
Threat. Theft of data. Arrest. Public shaming.
Vulnerability. Unpatched system. Existence of sensitive data.
Risk. Likelihood that Threat will exploit Vulnerability into Incident.
Incident. My data got stolen. My computer got confiscated.
Impact. Loss of money. Arrest and prison. Loss of job.
Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) = Asset Value (AV) x Exposure Factor (EF)
Annualized loss Expectancy (ALE) = Annualized Rate of Occurrence
(ARO) x SLE
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Risk Register
Now we create risk register. This is supposed to be brainstorming and
just writing down everything.
Identify threats and record respective risks with expected likelihood of
occurrence. It is ok to have empty fields now.
Focus on crown jewels, services and assets identified earlier.
Use low, medium, high as quantifiers for probability and impact.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Risk Vulnerability Probability Impact Risk mitigation
Loss of travel
photos
Stored in Picasa Low Medium
PayPal
compromised
Low High
Risk Analysis
Risk register is just first step.
Once ready, it is important to go through all the risks one by one and
re-evaluate the risks.
The proper way is to assign absolute values in percentage for likelihood.
The “good enough” way is to stay with relative values of low, medium,
high.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Impact Analysis
Now go through the risk register again and focus on impact.
Preferred way is to have the impact explained in monetary value.
“Good enough” is still using the low, medium, high.
Think about collateral damage.
We can add the CIA classification to the risk register, to make it more
detailed.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Risk Mitigation Strategies
Accept the risk. Do nothing.
Transfer the risk. Your problem, not mine.
Reduce the risk. I quit Facebook.
Reduce impact. I don’t send nude pictures over email.
Plan for recovery. I back up my data.
These are general classes of risk mitigation strategies. Implementation
and specific ways how to do it will be part of the next block.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Risk Management Plan
Now we have all we need to form our risk management plan.
The first question is – how big is your risk appetite. Are you risk taker or
risk averse? How much do you value security, as expressed in money or
effort required?
Risk management plan focus on selecting the generic risk management
strategies.
You can start by accepting the risk of everything with probability and
impact being medium or lower.
Then go for easy wins as they are obvious.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Ways of OPSEC
OPSEC stands for being able to use cyberspace (Availability) while
maintaining Confidentiality and Integrity.
You can go for anything between easy wins and clandestine operations
within own infrastructure with advanced deception.
Higher levels of OPSEC represent significant mental effort and stress
and are unrealistic to maintain over long period of time.
Absolute key for OPSEC is to set it to the level you are comfortable and
able to maintain.
Let risk management plan be your guide.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Faces of OPSEC
Average Joe. You chose to blend in. Do what everyone else does, keep
low profile, do not draw attention and be able to deny everything. You
are aware of what you are doing. This is the suggested way for
amateurs.
Ninja. You chose to be invisible. No one is allowed to know what you
are doing, or even that you are doing it. You might need your own
secure infrastructure, skill and paranoia.
Agent Smith. Deception all the way. You have multiple personalities
and instead of leaving no traces you leave false ones. Don’t do this.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Problem with Deception
Not only you leave traces, you leave multiple sets of them.
This increases the chance to slip up significantly.
To create and maintain reliable fake identity you need to invest time
close to your real life to it.
In long term operations, this increases stress as well as likelihood of
getting your cover blown significantly.
Against unskilled adversary, this is waste of effort, against skilled one –
you are going to fail.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Control your Environment - EASY
Your assets are yours to control.
Make sure they are not compromised, perform full factory reset when
in doubt.
Control what others sharing your environment and assets can do with
them and limit it to the minimum.
Using pirated software is equivalent of taking random pill from random
stranger in the street and swallowing it. If you allow anyone to install
software on your computer, it is not your computer anymore.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Control Your Attack Surface - EASY
By now you should have quite good visibility and understanding of your
attack surface.
Reducing it by removing unneeded services should be the first step.
Controlling how you use the rest should be the second.
Think about what data you create and store and where.
Think about what privileges you grant to new smartphone app.
When using multiple devices in sync – aren’t you creating unwanted
chain of accounts?
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Password Hierarchy - EASY
“Have one password for each service, complex and change them
regularly.”
No. This is unrealistic to maintain and security practice that is not
maintained is actually worse than no practice at all.
Set up password hierarchy instead with limited number of strong
passwords and change them when in doubt of compromise.
Create rules for yourself and stick to them.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Password Hierarchy - Example
Password tier Password Where to use it
Master password ForestBr33dsThousANDbees! Only for password safe. Never use
it online, never use it in unsecure
environment. When compromised,
everything is compromised.
Main password HowChic4g0FITSKangaroo Main email, important accounts,
monetary services. Compromise
could lead to significant harm.
Regular password TrentMercuryHarris0n# Majority of services I care about.
Social media, paid access to Netflix.
Compromise would be annoying
but not critical.
Garbage password HelloDummy One-time passwords required for
shopping, online registration, sites
that I do not care about. I do not
care about compromise.CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Two-Factor Authentication - Easy
Three factors of authentication
• Something you know. Password.
• Something you have. Smartphone.
• Something you are. Fingerprint.
Combination of different factors creates multi-factor authentication. It
is much stronger than just the sum. Example: Password + SMS
Combination of same factors does not create multi-factor
authentication. Example: Password1 + Password2
Use it whenever possible and you care about the result.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Encryption - Easy
Data at Rest
File encryption, hard drive
encryption.
The purpose here is to prevent
attacker who successfully steals
your data to be able to use them.
Also for preventing of gaining
evidence.
Data at motion
VPN, secure shell, tunneling.
Basic technique to create reliable
environment over untrusted
environment.
If both ends are reliable, the
connection can be considered
trusted.
Best for preventing interception.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Private Internet Use - Medium
Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Example of encryption at motion.
Creates tunnel between two
endpoints. Communication is
encrypted and resilient against
MitM attacks.
Also allows to modify the network
trace.
TOR
Onion network. Decentralized
network within Internet. Best for
free speech practitioners,
journalists, drug dealers and
criminals.
Allows entry to darkweb and hides
your network trace completely.
It can also draw attention.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Plausible Deniability - Medium
“You have no proof I did this on intent.”
“I forgot the password.”
“I did not instructed anyone to commit crime.”
Plausible deniability comes in handy when dealing with law
enforcement. It is strategy prepared for the case when your cover
blows up.
The point is to be able deny connection between you and evidence in a
way, that is not challengeable.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Control Your Service Providers - Medium
Unless you are big enterprise or government, you can hardly affect the
way your service provider does business.
You can select service provider that better suits your needs.
For OPSEC purposes you can go with the biggest one (Google,
Microsoft) to blend in – or search for shady providers (offshore, secure
hostings) designed to deliver security and risk them being honeypots or
amateurs.
Selection of service provider is both function of reason and trust.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Covert Communication Channels - Hard
“Canary in a coal mine”
In 2013, Apple put into their privacy statement warrant canary. They
claimed that they never exposed their customers’ privacy to
government. In future, if this sentence disappears from this annual
report, it will mean something changed. This will work even if
government prohibits Apple to tell anything.
Lorem Ipsum and Google translate
In 2014, the effect of using capitalization of Lorem Ipsum phrase in
Google translate was discovered that could lead to sending covert
messages using just Lorem Ipsum phrases.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Secure Infrastructure - Hard
If you want to be extra secure, building your own anonymous and
private infrastructure might be the only way. It is harder than you think.
Money. If you are afraid of government actors, you must use
anonymous currency. Obtain it. Bitcoins, prepaid cards.
ISP. Which ISP will accept anonymous currency and not ask questions?
Server. Can you administer secure server so it does not get breached?
Set up. You must set it up when nothing goes on and securely.
Use. Have plan how to use it in secure way so you don’t blow yourself.
Maintain. Be prepared to monitor it, maintain it and renew it.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Tools of OPSEC
OPSEC is not about tools, software or equipment, but about
understanding, behavioral changes and informed decision making.
Tools can help, but technology is and never should be viewed as
omnipotent solution.
Open source available tools follow.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Keepass Password Safe
One of many software tools for managing passwords.
Using strong encryption, KeePass provides reasonable security and
allows easy management of stored passwords, including their
generation.
Available in portable version.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Truecrypt 7.1a
Encryption
TrueCrypt can provide both
encryption into file containers as
well as full hard drive encryption.
Be careful to use 7.1a version, the
newest one is not trustworthy.
Plausible Deniability
To achieve plausible deniability,
TrueCrypt offers the option of
creating hidden partition.
When forced to give away
password to your system, you can
open up the one that does not
contain sensitive data.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Off The Record (OTR)
Simple plugin for instant messaging communication.
Once you establish secure communication with your counterpart by
confirming keys, your communication will be encrypted.
Works best with jabber or google talk protocol as implemented in
pidgin application.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
TOR Browser
Tor network was discussed earlier, Tor browser or Torplugin are
available for download from Tor project website.
Strong organization is behind Tor project now – it has US army origins
(created and released to public in order to blend in) but now it is
maintained independently.
Monitoring Tor site is worth the time as any new threats to Tor security
are discussed and dealt with openly.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Live Kali/Tails Linux
Kali is the new BackTrack. It is toolbox with security and offense in
mind.
Linux distribution designed for offensive security, penetration testing,
forensics investigation – any ideas what does this mean?
Tails is Linux distribution designed for anonymous use of Internet.
Lightweight, slick and easy to use for anyone.
Learning to use them at the user level might be fun and useful in the
future.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Summary
The way forward is through understanding, rational thinking and good
decision making.
Know yourself.
Know your enemies.
Plan ahead.
Follow the plan.
Enjoy and have fun.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Feedback
This workshop is in early beta and you are the test subjects.
Feedback is essential for me to improve it.
What will follow is three-steps process:
1. Freeform discussion now, impressions. Now.
2. Structured feedback with questions. In 3 days.
3. Long-term feedback with different questions. In 3 months.
I will really appreciate your time you dedicate to the feedback.
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
Thank you!
Petr Špiřík
petr.spirik@gmail.com
@HidenatNet
http://www.slideshare.net/zapp0/civilian-opsec-in-cyberspace
CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík

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Civilian OPSEC in cyberspace

  • 1. Civilian OPSEC in Cyberspace Petr Špiřík
  • 2. About The course Methods and techniques for monitoring, surveillance and profiling of cyberspace activities are here to stay. This workshop goal is to educate people operating in above- average risk situations in cyberspace and to arm them against malicious actors abusing these options. Petr Špiřík Cyber security, privacy, counter- surveillance and threat intelligence. This is what I like. Network security, incident response, security architecture and design. This is what I do. Education and the power of knowledge. This is what I trust. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 3. Audience I want to • Do independent journalism in Russia • Buy and sell drugs online • Perform cutting edge research in China • Watch porn in UAE • Live my life without fear – whether I am gay, woman, black or radical anarchist Good. Welcome. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 4. Course management There are eight building blocks, one for each defined subtopic One block aims at 45/15 minutes of content/chill out time format At all time, the parking lot is here to capture questions and pain points Questions, concerns and requests for rewind/fast forward are welcome. Participation is not only welcome – it is essential for meeting the objectives of this course. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 5. Agenda Problem 0900 Cyberspace basics 1000 Self-profiling 1100 Threat actors 1200 Attack vectors Solution 1400 Risk Management 1500 Ways of OPSEC 1600 Tools of OPSEC 1700 Summary & Feedback CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 6. Cyberspace Basics “Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts... A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding.” (Neuromancer, 1984) “The environment formed by physical and non-physical components, characterized by the use of computers and the electro-magnetic spectrum, to store, modify, and exchange data using computer networks.” (Tallinn Manual, 2013) CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 7. What is OPSEC, anyway? OPSEC stands for OPerations SECurity OPSEC usually refers to clandestine, covert or otherwise sensitive operations and the need to keep them that way. OPSEC is the way of behaving, acting and operating that provides increased security and privacy. OPSEC often aims at reducing your footprint and achieving low profile. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 8. Cyber Terrain (courtesy of Shawn Riley) CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 9. Scary model Network Access Networks Physics, real world, cables Internet Protocols Rules and laws of the Internet Transport Computer Hardware, processing of data Application Human Human-Computer interface, software CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 10. Flow of Operation in Cyberspace Me Computer interface My computer My ISP Another ISP Yet another ISP Datacenter Target server Target service CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 11. Flow explained - 1 Me -> My Computer Who else has access to my computer? How secure is my computer? My computer uses DNS and other protocols. What does this mean? If I do not control my computer, every other step is compromised. My Computer -> My ISP Where do I connect? Who else has access to the router I use? How secure is this router? How much do I trust my ISP? Countermeasures against untrustworthy connection and ISP exist. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 12. Intermission Addressing Everything connected to the network has address, IP address. Addressing is hierarchical. There are rules for address allocation. Addresses can be manipulated. Domain Name Service IP addresses are not human- friendly. Names are better. DNS is protocol and service allowing to use google.com instead of 173.194.122.3 Names can be manipulated. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 13. Flow explained - 2 ISP -> Datacenter ISPs and datacenters are subject to laws of the country the reside in. Does this affect me? There are usually more ISPs in the way, forming a chain. ISPs & datacenters have employees. These hops multiply the problem. Target Server -> Target Service Who administers the target server? How secure is the target service against other users, attackers, administrators? It is very hard to exercise security at the target end of connection. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 14. Why does it matter? Models are good. Models allow us to split complex problem into sum of easier challenges. Understanding the environment is critical • Cyberspace is heterogeneous environment • There is no end-to end control • What happens if any of the nodes is compromised We don’t need to understand technical details for self-defense. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 15. Digital Footprint Whenever you operate in cyberspace, you leave traces. Lockard’s exchange principle still applies. The good thing – you can modify your traces more easily in cyberspace. The bad thing – it is significantly harder to remove your traces completely. The very bad thing – time does not help. Digital footprint is close to eternal. What you once put in the system remains there forever. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 16. Heterogeneous environment Cyberspace is subject to three points of view simultaneously at any given time. Physical. Data in cables have physical representation. Monitors emit in visible spectrum. Logical. Data are logically structured and encoded. Protocols and transformation apply. Legal. Cables, servers, computers and people exist in some jurisdiction, are subject to this jurisdiction and the jurisdictions can conflict. There is nothing like no-ones land. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 17. Control and Trust Control Limited. End-to-end control is hard and/or expensive to achieve. It is easy to lose control and hard to regain it. “I bought my computer and no one else ever touched it. It is under my control.” Trust Trust is essential to our society – and to cyberspace as well. There are different trust models. Trust is cheap complement to control. Trust but verify. “I trust my ISP not to spy on me.” CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 18. Immutable Laws Of Security (by Microsoft) #1: If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your computer… #2: If a bad guy can alter the OS on your computer… #3: If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer… #4: If you allow a bad guy to run active content in your website… … it is not yours anymore. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 19. Self-profiling There is no silver bullet. Journalist, drug smuggler, student or scientist have different needs. This block is activity driven with the outcomes of • Defined assets you use in your daily routine • Services and tools that are important to you • What is important to you This profile is called the attack surface. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 20. CIA triad All recognized assets, whether logical or physical are subject to CIA triad of Confidentiality, Availability and Integrity. These aspects represent what is important to you. “I do not want anyone else being able to read or modify my emails. Losing them is not a big deal to me.” I value Confidentiality and Integrity, while I do not care about Availability. “My website is public. It must be up all time and its content must be exactly like I want it.” Availability and Integrity is important, but Confidentiality does not even apply. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 21. Assets This one is easy. Write down all your cyberspace related devices and what do you use them for • Smartphone (phone calls, navigation, internet access) • Laptop (school work, online games, Facebook, movies, photos) • Lab computer (research projects, foreign universities data access) • Credit card (paying online, ATM withdrawals) CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 22. Services Still easy. What services do you use and how important are these for you. Write them down. • Email (how many of these) • Facebook (or other social media) • Google documents (fun, work, school) • Dropbox (or other file sharing platform) • Website CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 23. Crown Jewels Time to think. What is important to you? What matters the most? What part of your life could suffer a lot? Use the CIA triad classification. • Lose all my data stored in cloud • Lose my emails • Have my emails stolen • Get shamed publicly • Lose money CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 24. “Stuff” There are necessarily data that you did not include in Assets, Services or Crown jewels sections. This is ok. These are the data you have, but do not care that much about. It is good and important to be aware of them, but right now – let’s put them aside. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 25. Asset Management Assets, services and crown jewels can be also seen as • Physical assets • Logical assets • Priority assets Writing them down in structured manner serves many purposes • Visibility (you can manage only what you know about) • Attack surface deconstruction (this might allow for some easy wins) • Prioritization for defense (Crown jewels vs. “stuff”) CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 26. Threat actors “You Don’t Have a Malware Problem. You Have an Adversary Problem.” (CrowdStrike) Does it matter who is after you? Are you suspicious of government? Ours or THEIRS? Scared by neo-Nazis? Classroom bullies? Afraid of criminals? Yes, it does matter. Different threat actors have different motivation and different capabilities. Your defense should differ as well. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 27. Government Profile Law enforcement, government bodies, intelligence agencies, military. Professionals working 8-17, with unlimited budget and options not available to anyone else. Significant difference goes whether they are domestic or foreign. Motivation Defined by political agenda and legal system. Highly predictable. Capability Usually top tier. Objectives Surveillance, law enforcement objectives, intelligence and counterintelligence. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 28. hacktivists Profile “For cause” groups. Far right, far left, extremists, political organizations. White-media.info, Anonymous – just to name a few. Motivation The critical aspect of each hacktivist group. Capability Wildly varied. Objectives Usually attention whores, thriving for media coverage and publicity. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 29. Criminals Profile Traditional organized crime as well as freelancing dog soldiers (Hidden Lynx) are already strongly established. Driven by money, you can find all sorts of talents – from retarded drive-by shooters to skilled operatives. Motivation Money. Financial profit. Very predictable with parallels to standard crime and business. Capability Adequate to their selected career. There is room for everyone. Objectives Data theft, ransom, outsourcing. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 30. Lonewolfs (aka Jerks) Profile Someone you pissed of at work. Someone you broke up with. Someone randomly evil. Motivation Unpredictable. Capability Varied, usually low. Objectives Acts of damage and destruction, not predictable. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 31. Now what? Activity. More writing. Who are you afraid the most? What crown jewels of yours are they after? Why do you think you are their target? Who do you fear the least? CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 32. Attack Vectors Threat actors have their tools of trade ready. They target the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of your assets. We will cover different points of view and classification of the attacks, allowing us to understand the attack vector. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 33. Legal Most often domain of Government threat actors. Confidentiality is the main target. Can be long-term (mass surveillance) or short term (investigation). You can become victim as collateral damage (police raid at datacenter) or as direct target. It is critical to understand legal framework applicable – at least to the extent of your rights and risks. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 34. Legal - Examples Surveillance Some form of surveillance is already at place (CCTV), other might be deployed upon request at your ISP. The entities implementing surveillance act with the power of administrator. Law Enforcement Hit Your laptop might be confiscated for investigation. Your server might be taken into custody. It might be targeted against you or you might be just drive-by victim. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 35. Social Engineering By far the most prevalent type of attack – or at least frequent complementing factor. Mostly used by criminal threat actors. People are prone to trust others, believe in fairy tales and get abused for it. It is no surprise – skilled social engineer is con artist doing it for living. His victim is most likely experiencing it for the first time. Social engineering attack might resemble boxing match between Rocky Balboa and Justin Bieber. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 36. Social - Examples Phishing It looks like legitimate email. It looks like your e-banking site. It offers money or tries to help you. It might as well be just an illusion set up by an attacker. Identity Theft Friend request on Facebook. You know the name, you recognize the photo, you shared the class two years ago. It might as well be persona crafted from publicly available sources. Like other social networks. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 37. Physical Did someone have access to your computer? It is not your computer anymore. Are you operating in environment, that is controlled by someone else? How much do you trust them? Targeted attacks against you are rare as they scale poorly. Prepared traps against anyone coming in are common as they scale decently. Physical attacks are used by all actors, based on opportunity. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 38. Logical - Examples Man-in-the-Middle When the attacker is able to gain control of a point in the flow of information and manipulate it, we speak about MitM attack. Redirecting traffic, intercepting data or terminating and reestablishing sessions all fall into MitM category. Password chaining “Did you forget your password? Enter your email address and we will reset it for you.” What happens if one of your accounts is compromised? Can the attacker use it for gaining access to other accounts? Think email-PayPal link. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 39. Physical - Examples Rogue Access Point Remember the flow? What if the “Café 99 – PUBLIC” Wi-Fi access point is not set up by the kind owner of Café 99, but by the attacker? What communication is the attacker able to intercept? Keylogger Police officer arrested you for minor offense and inspected your computer. Nothing else happened, all charges dropped. How do you know, your keyboard is not richer of hardware keylogger? CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 40. Logical Broad category, where software attacks in forms of malware meet with manipulating the flow of data. Specific aspect of logical attacks is identification of more complex structure and attacking weak point, traversing further once successful. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 41. Profiling Profiling can be perceived as reconnaissance stage to real attack or attack against privacy itself. Using publicly available information and analyzing them can lead to results beyond intuitive expectation. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 42. Human error CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 43. Risk management We manage risks all the time – by taking decisions. Problem is, people are bad at risk analysis and they decide based on feelings, not facts. Risk management is about tradeoffs. Risk management is mix of science, statistics, crystal ball estimates, decision making, strategy and personal preferences. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 44. Terminology Threat. Theft of data. Arrest. Public shaming. Vulnerability. Unpatched system. Existence of sensitive data. Risk. Likelihood that Threat will exploit Vulnerability into Incident. Incident. My data got stolen. My computer got confiscated. Impact. Loss of money. Arrest and prison. Loss of job. Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) = Asset Value (AV) x Exposure Factor (EF) Annualized loss Expectancy (ALE) = Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO) x SLE CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 45. Risk Register Now we create risk register. This is supposed to be brainstorming and just writing down everything. Identify threats and record respective risks with expected likelihood of occurrence. It is ok to have empty fields now. Focus on crown jewels, services and assets identified earlier. Use low, medium, high as quantifiers for probability and impact. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík Risk Vulnerability Probability Impact Risk mitigation Loss of travel photos Stored in Picasa Low Medium PayPal compromised Low High
  • 46. Risk Analysis Risk register is just first step. Once ready, it is important to go through all the risks one by one and re-evaluate the risks. The proper way is to assign absolute values in percentage for likelihood. The “good enough” way is to stay with relative values of low, medium, high. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 47. Impact Analysis Now go through the risk register again and focus on impact. Preferred way is to have the impact explained in monetary value. “Good enough” is still using the low, medium, high. Think about collateral damage. We can add the CIA classification to the risk register, to make it more detailed. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 48. Risk Mitigation Strategies Accept the risk. Do nothing. Transfer the risk. Your problem, not mine. Reduce the risk. I quit Facebook. Reduce impact. I don’t send nude pictures over email. Plan for recovery. I back up my data. These are general classes of risk mitigation strategies. Implementation and specific ways how to do it will be part of the next block. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 49. Risk Management Plan Now we have all we need to form our risk management plan. The first question is – how big is your risk appetite. Are you risk taker or risk averse? How much do you value security, as expressed in money or effort required? Risk management plan focus on selecting the generic risk management strategies. You can start by accepting the risk of everything with probability and impact being medium or lower. Then go for easy wins as they are obvious. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 50. Ways of OPSEC OPSEC stands for being able to use cyberspace (Availability) while maintaining Confidentiality and Integrity. You can go for anything between easy wins and clandestine operations within own infrastructure with advanced deception. Higher levels of OPSEC represent significant mental effort and stress and are unrealistic to maintain over long period of time. Absolute key for OPSEC is to set it to the level you are comfortable and able to maintain. Let risk management plan be your guide. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 51. Faces of OPSEC Average Joe. You chose to blend in. Do what everyone else does, keep low profile, do not draw attention and be able to deny everything. You are aware of what you are doing. This is the suggested way for amateurs. Ninja. You chose to be invisible. No one is allowed to know what you are doing, or even that you are doing it. You might need your own secure infrastructure, skill and paranoia. Agent Smith. Deception all the way. You have multiple personalities and instead of leaving no traces you leave false ones. Don’t do this. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 52. Problem with Deception Not only you leave traces, you leave multiple sets of them. This increases the chance to slip up significantly. To create and maintain reliable fake identity you need to invest time close to your real life to it. In long term operations, this increases stress as well as likelihood of getting your cover blown significantly. Against unskilled adversary, this is waste of effort, against skilled one – you are going to fail. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 53. Control your Environment - EASY Your assets are yours to control. Make sure they are not compromised, perform full factory reset when in doubt. Control what others sharing your environment and assets can do with them and limit it to the minimum. Using pirated software is equivalent of taking random pill from random stranger in the street and swallowing it. If you allow anyone to install software on your computer, it is not your computer anymore. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 54. Control Your Attack Surface - EASY By now you should have quite good visibility and understanding of your attack surface. Reducing it by removing unneeded services should be the first step. Controlling how you use the rest should be the second. Think about what data you create and store and where. Think about what privileges you grant to new smartphone app. When using multiple devices in sync – aren’t you creating unwanted chain of accounts? CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 55. Password Hierarchy - EASY “Have one password for each service, complex and change them regularly.” No. This is unrealistic to maintain and security practice that is not maintained is actually worse than no practice at all. Set up password hierarchy instead with limited number of strong passwords and change them when in doubt of compromise. Create rules for yourself and stick to them. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 56. Password Hierarchy - Example Password tier Password Where to use it Master password ForestBr33dsThousANDbees! Only for password safe. Never use it online, never use it in unsecure environment. When compromised, everything is compromised. Main password HowChic4g0FITSKangaroo Main email, important accounts, monetary services. Compromise could lead to significant harm. Regular password TrentMercuryHarris0n# Majority of services I care about. Social media, paid access to Netflix. Compromise would be annoying but not critical. Garbage password HelloDummy One-time passwords required for shopping, online registration, sites that I do not care about. I do not care about compromise.CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 57. Two-Factor Authentication - Easy Three factors of authentication • Something you know. Password. • Something you have. Smartphone. • Something you are. Fingerprint. Combination of different factors creates multi-factor authentication. It is much stronger than just the sum. Example: Password + SMS Combination of same factors does not create multi-factor authentication. Example: Password1 + Password2 Use it whenever possible and you care about the result. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 58. Encryption - Easy Data at Rest File encryption, hard drive encryption. The purpose here is to prevent attacker who successfully steals your data to be able to use them. Also for preventing of gaining evidence. Data at motion VPN, secure shell, tunneling. Basic technique to create reliable environment over untrusted environment. If both ends are reliable, the connection can be considered trusted. Best for preventing interception. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 59. Private Internet Use - Medium Virtual Private Network (VPN) Example of encryption at motion. Creates tunnel between two endpoints. Communication is encrypted and resilient against MitM attacks. Also allows to modify the network trace. TOR Onion network. Decentralized network within Internet. Best for free speech practitioners, journalists, drug dealers and criminals. Allows entry to darkweb and hides your network trace completely. It can also draw attention. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 60. Plausible Deniability - Medium “You have no proof I did this on intent.” “I forgot the password.” “I did not instructed anyone to commit crime.” Plausible deniability comes in handy when dealing with law enforcement. It is strategy prepared for the case when your cover blows up. The point is to be able deny connection between you and evidence in a way, that is not challengeable. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 61. Control Your Service Providers - Medium Unless you are big enterprise or government, you can hardly affect the way your service provider does business. You can select service provider that better suits your needs. For OPSEC purposes you can go with the biggest one (Google, Microsoft) to blend in – or search for shady providers (offshore, secure hostings) designed to deliver security and risk them being honeypots or amateurs. Selection of service provider is both function of reason and trust. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 62. Covert Communication Channels - Hard “Canary in a coal mine” In 2013, Apple put into their privacy statement warrant canary. They claimed that they never exposed their customers’ privacy to government. In future, if this sentence disappears from this annual report, it will mean something changed. This will work even if government prohibits Apple to tell anything. Lorem Ipsum and Google translate In 2014, the effect of using capitalization of Lorem Ipsum phrase in Google translate was discovered that could lead to sending covert messages using just Lorem Ipsum phrases. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 63. Secure Infrastructure - Hard If you want to be extra secure, building your own anonymous and private infrastructure might be the only way. It is harder than you think. Money. If you are afraid of government actors, you must use anonymous currency. Obtain it. Bitcoins, prepaid cards. ISP. Which ISP will accept anonymous currency and not ask questions? Server. Can you administer secure server so it does not get breached? Set up. You must set it up when nothing goes on and securely. Use. Have plan how to use it in secure way so you don’t blow yourself. Maintain. Be prepared to monitor it, maintain it and renew it. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 64. Tools of OPSEC OPSEC is not about tools, software or equipment, but about understanding, behavioral changes and informed decision making. Tools can help, but technology is and never should be viewed as omnipotent solution. Open source available tools follow. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 65. Keepass Password Safe One of many software tools for managing passwords. Using strong encryption, KeePass provides reasonable security and allows easy management of stored passwords, including their generation. Available in portable version. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 66. Truecrypt 7.1a Encryption TrueCrypt can provide both encryption into file containers as well as full hard drive encryption. Be careful to use 7.1a version, the newest one is not trustworthy. Plausible Deniability To achieve plausible deniability, TrueCrypt offers the option of creating hidden partition. When forced to give away password to your system, you can open up the one that does not contain sensitive data. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 67. Off The Record (OTR) Simple plugin for instant messaging communication. Once you establish secure communication with your counterpart by confirming keys, your communication will be encrypted. Works best with jabber or google talk protocol as implemented in pidgin application. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 68. TOR Browser Tor network was discussed earlier, Tor browser or Torplugin are available for download from Tor project website. Strong organization is behind Tor project now – it has US army origins (created and released to public in order to blend in) but now it is maintained independently. Monitoring Tor site is worth the time as any new threats to Tor security are discussed and dealt with openly. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 69. Live Kali/Tails Linux Kali is the new BackTrack. It is toolbox with security and offense in mind. Linux distribution designed for offensive security, penetration testing, forensics investigation – any ideas what does this mean? Tails is Linux distribution designed for anonymous use of Internet. Lightweight, slick and easy to use for anyone. Learning to use them at the user level might be fun and useful in the future. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 70. Summary The way forward is through understanding, rational thinking and good decision making. Know yourself. Know your enemies. Plan ahead. Follow the plan. Enjoy and have fun. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík
  • 71. Feedback This workshop is in early beta and you are the test subjects. Feedback is essential for me to improve it. What will follow is three-steps process: 1. Freeform discussion now, impressions. Now. 2. Structured feedback with questions. In 3 days. 3. Long-term feedback with different questions. In 3 months. I will really appreciate your time you dedicate to the feedback. CC-BY-SA • Petr Špiřík

Editor's Notes

  1. 45+ minutes expected Theory mostly Goal is to build common terminology and reference environment
  2. 45+ minutes expected Theory mostly Goal is to build common terminology and reference environment
  3. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20141007190806-36149934--cyber-terrain-a-model-for-increased-understanding-of-cyber-activity?trk=prof-post
  4. https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh278941.aspx
  5. 30+ minutes Activity mostly Goal is to have written inputs for further stages (especially Risk management)
  6. 30+ minutes Theory mostly Goal is to build understanding why different attackers require different approach to defense. Fun and cool part, entertaining to regain attention.
  7. 30+ minutes Theory mostly Goal is to build understanding why different attackers require different approach to defense. Fun and cool part, entertaining to regain attention.
  8. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Not exhaustive, rather working with examples What are the vulnerabilities in current cyberspace, human behavior and protocols How the attackers are using them What different types of attacks can be employed The goal is to provide information what it is that we want to protect against
  9. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Not exhaustive, rather working with examples What are the vulnerabilities in current cyberspace, human behavior and protocols How the attackers are using them What different types of attacks can be employed The goal is to provide information what it is that we want to protect against
  10. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Not exhaustive, rather working with examples What are the vulnerabilities in current cyberspace, human behavior and protocols How the attackers are using them What different types of attacks can be employed The goal is to provide information what it is that we want to protect against
  11. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Not exhaustive, rather working with examples What are the vulnerabilities in current cyberspace, human behavior and protocols How the attackers are using them What different types of attacks can be employed The goal is to provide information what it is that we want to protect against
  12. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Not exhaustive, rather working with examples What are the vulnerabilities in current cyberspace, human behavior and protocols How the attackers are using them What different types of attacks can be employed The goal is to provide information what it is that we want to protect against
  13. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Not exhaustive, rather working with examples What are the vulnerabilities in current cyberspace, human behavior and protocols How the attackers are using them What different types of attacks can be employed The goal is to provide information what it is that we want to protect against
  14. 45+ minutes Mix of theory and activity Explain risk management in simplified form and build up risk management plan
  15. 45+ minutes Mix of theory and activity Explain risk management in simplified form and build up risk management plan
  16. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  17. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  18. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  19. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  20. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  21. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  22. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  23. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  24. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  25. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  26. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice http://www.computerworld.com/article/2485677/security0/apple-brings--warrant-canary--into-patriot-act-info-request-coal-mine.html http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/08/lorem-ipsum-of-good-evil-google-china/
  27. 45+ minutes Theory mostly Behavioral changes, principles and OPSEC practice
  28. 30+ minutes Theory mostly Specific tools to implement OPSEC strategy, focus on open source
  29. http://keepass.info/
  30. https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/
  31. https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en
  32. https://www.kali.org/downloads/ https://tails.boum.org/
  33. 30+ minutes Summary and start of feedback session Longer in evolutionary versions of workshop