Today, I was lucky enough to participate in the CIGRE Canada panel on Network Resiliency. The presentations were thoughtful and led to interesting questions from the floor. Here is the presentation I delivered, let me know if you would to talk about how your organisation should grapple with Resiliency.

1. CIGRÉ Canada Panel Session - “What is Network Resiliency?”
Vancouver, BC - Wednesday, October 19th, 2016
Presented by Marc Brunet-Watson, P. Eng
Director – Power Networks - PSC North America
The Business Case for Resiliency

2. I won’t be talking technology
 Understanding Resiliency
 What is holding back investment?
 Quantifying benefits of resiliency

3. Trying to define resiliency
 Preparing for and adapting to changing conditions
– Resiliency time frames can vary from seconds to decades
– Planning horizons are becoming blurred
 Withstanding and rapidly recovering from disruption
– Deliberate attack (PG&E transformers, Ukraine SCADA hack)
– Naturally occurring events (weather, earthquake)
– Regulation, technology, etc…
 One measure of the resilience of any system is the speed
and return to equilibrium following a disturbance
– Time (before, initiation, duration)
– Severity
 Resilience is a trajectory

4. Reliability versus Resiliency
 They are not the same thing
– The difference increases with system complexity
 Reliability is a measure of service
– Focuses on impact to grid
– Service standard is explicit and inflexible
 Resiliency is related to risks & consequences
– Considers impacts beyond the grid
– Service standard is flexible and poorly defined
Direct recovery
Regulated Cap Ex
Destruction
& Mayhem
Some direct recovery
Regulated Op Ex
Cost recovery at risk
Societal impact and
regulated revenue
 Managing risk is different than eliminating it

5. Will the two Rs converge?
Likelihood/
probability
Consequences
Events
impacting
RELIABILITY
(today)
Events
impacting
RESILIENCE
(today)
Events impacting
RELIABILITY and
RESILIENCE
(future)
Aging infrastructure
Higher asset utilisation
Storm severity and frequency
Physical and cyber attacks

6. Resiliency is multi-faceted
 Transmission networks have inherent resiliency due to N-1-1, N-2, etc
 Network operators have been managing risk forever
 Resiliency planning requires a systems based approach
From Sandia National Laboratories Report SAND2014-18019, “Conceptual Framework for Developing
Resilience Metrics for the Electricity, Oil, and Gas Sectors in the United States”, September 2015
Operations
Planning
Prepare  Withstand  Adapt  Recover  REPEAT

7.  Natural disaster
 Severe weather
 Geomagnetic storms
 Cyber/physical attack
 EMP
 System topology
 Geography
 Asset condition
 Security culture
 Health and safety
 Basic service interruption
 Macro-economic
 Reputational
 Fiscal impact
ASSESS
DESCRIBE
QUANTIFY
You get the consequences you don’t pay for!

8. Network resiliency tool kit
Operational preparedness
•Peak readiness
•Mobile plant and stockpiles
•Restoration strategies
•Forecasting
•Standby crews and gensets
•Real time situational awareness
Hardening
•N-1-1, N-2, N-3
•Line route diversity
•Islanding
•Undergrounding cables
•Increased standards
Technology
•Micro grid
•Controllable DER
•Fault detection
•Self healing

9. Resiliency spending to date
 Operational preparedness is a mature component of resiliency
– Increasing prevalence of real-time tools
– Focus is on Adapt and Recover
 Hardening is occurring – often in response to major events
– Québec and Ontario post 1998 ice-storm
• Higher standards, new equipment  big spend
– Superstorm Sandy 2012
• Undergrounding and path diversity from Southern US right up to Ontario
 Technology based resiliency spending has been held back – why?
– Mostly pilot and demonstration projects as technology trials
– No large scale integration as part of Business As Usual

10. Regulated cost recovery is made for reliability
 Asset owners expect a fair return on capital in exchange for economic regulation
 Regulators have required service guarantees under an agreed framework (load
growth forecast, reliability criteria)
– High probability, low impact disturbances
 Postage stamp tariff
– Uniform service for all whether it is wanted or not
 What about High Impact, Low Probability Events?
– Who benefits and do they care?
 Little incentive for resiliency based technology spend

11. Quantifying the benefits of resiliency
 Total Benefits = Avoided grid costs + Avoided societal costs + Societal benefits
 Apply the resiliency toolkit: Operations, Hardening, Technology
 Solutions must be customised to the specific threats and vulnerabilities that have
been identified
 Determine the level of resiliency you want and can afford – Value of lost load
– Duration and frequency of outages
– Breakdown by customer segment
– Quantify societal costs – human toll, property destruction, etc
 Benefits have to be valued by someone!

12. Positive externalities of a more resilient system
 Improved Emergency Response
– Avoided death and injury
– Responding where/when needed
 Minimised productivity loss
– Less upset to supply chains
 Increased energy efficiency
 Reduced client-side expenditure
– Less need for backup gensets, back-up feeders, etc
 Attractive to investment
– Companies value uninterrupted supply
Cost
Benefits
to grid
Societal benefits
(externalities)

13. Look for partners
 Sensitive loads may need better quality of service than reliability
standards provide
 Regional development agencies may wish to attract industry that
can be supplied by weak grids if strong micro grids and controllable
DER are deployed
 University campuses and hospitals really don’t like to be interrupted
 Resiliency is conferred

14. And once you’ve got it…
 Resiliency driven investments in micro grid and DER can be made
available for reliability based needs
– Easing peak congestion
– Deferring transmission investment
– Increasing asset utilisation
 Could it eventually be tariff neutral?

15. Thank you