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CIFOR's REDD+ research
This document summarizes several studies and analyses related to REDD+ programs: - An analysis of 13 national REDD+ programs found that the 6 most successful cases had access to performance-based finance and strong national ownership. Countries without performance-based funding could still succeed if external commitment was high. - A study of 6 countries and 23 subnational REDD+ initiatives involving 190 villages and 4,500 households found a mix of forest interventions being used, with enabling conditions and incentives being more common than disincentives. - Another study found knowledge of and participation in REDD+ initiatives increasing among villages, women's groups, and households from 2010 to 2014.
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CIFOR's REDD+ research
- 1. CIFOR’S REDD+ Research LouisVerchot
- 2. A NATURAL EVOLUTONFOR REDD+ The Gartner hype cycle: How do technology firms look at these things? Early inception Quick, cheap, and easy COP21 decisions? Finance fails to materialize No new projects 2015-2020 experiences? Post-2020
- 3. Seeing REDD+ throughthe lens of 4 I’s Political Econom y lens
- 4. 6 countries havecomprehensive policies targeting transformational change for REDD+: Brazil, DRC, Guyana, Indonesia, Tanzania and Vietnam. The critical issues that hinder countries in achieving REDD+ are related to policy implementation: lack of grievance procedures and lack of operationalized financial systems. Analysis Of 13 National REDD+ Programs
- 5. Of the sixsuccessful cases three have access to performance-based finance for REDD+. Availability of performance based funds has a positive impact when it is combined with strong national ownership of the REDD+ process. Analysis Of 13 National REDD+ Programs
- 6. In cases wherenational ownership is low, (donors or other external agencies dominate the REDD+ policy processes) countries can achieve the outcome without performance-based funding. Where REDD+ commitment is externally driven, non-performance- based funding has an effect equal to that of performance-based funding. Analysis Of 13 National REDD+ Programs
- 7. 6 countries -23 subnational REDD+ initiatives 190 villages – 4,500 households
- 8. Mix of forestinterventions at sampled sites Brazil Peru Cameroon Tanzania Indonesia Vietnam 010203040506070 enabling conditions disincentives incentives #interventions
- 9. Local participation inREDD+ Villages Women'sgroups Households 050100 Knowledge of REDD+ initiative 2010 2014 %respondents Villages Women'sgroups Households 050100 Participation in REDD+ initiative
- 10. Multiple levels ofgovernance REDD+ is now moving toward “nested, jurisdictional” and other “national” approaches REDD+ requires coordination across levels: finance and benefit sharing, carbon monitoring and verification systems, land tenure and titling policies, safeguards, and so on. All of this requires integrating notions of power: Despite diverse legal and decentralization systems , powerful actors with a stake in deforestation often figure out how to get their way –using or circumventing the rules. Most (REDD+ and REDD-like) efforts are trying to change the behavior of the weaker actors. Political will and coalitions for change are indispensable for advancing REDD+ and low emissions development.
- 11.
- 12. mapping deforestation driversat sub-national scale De Sy et al. 2015
- 13. 2008 2012 2009 CIFOR’s edited volumeson REDD 2015
Editor's Notes
- #2 Layout: Title Slide Variation: none <number>
- #3 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hype-Cycle-General.png <number>
- #4 How the 4 I’s hinder or enable change Institutions Formal power rests with ‘stickiest’ organisations – those with enough influence to resist change E.g. colonial rules new institutions and actors are often ignored or remain isolated E.g. Ministries for natural resources Interests State’s interest in social and economic welfare can fall short if not autonomous from interests that drive deforestation and degradation rent seeking, fraud, collusion and corruption practices in the bureaucratic system Ideas discourse affects policy making it frames the problem and presents limited choices of ‘reasonable’ or ‘possible’ REDD+ benefits for those who contribute to efficiency and effectiveness, versus benefits for those who have moral rights based on equity considerations Information Facts are selected, interpreted, and put in context in ways that reflect the interests of the information provider reference level setting (from Maria‘s slides) Maria: the 4 Is is not a method but it is a political economy lens on the underlying problem, or if you want to say so, a baseline study combined with a theory of change in REDD+ terms <number>
- #8 <number>
- #9 In absence of a substantial funding stream to pay the opportunity costs of forest conservation (via conditional rewards), REDD+ cannot compete with conversion of forest to other uses. Many REDD+ initiatives are actually a continuation of pre-existing ICDPs operating at the same site. That is why what is now called “REDD+ on the ground” is dominated by classic forest interventions: enabling conditions (tenure clarification, environmental education), disincentives (e.g. environmental fines), incentives (livelihood enhancements that are only in some cases conditional) <number>
- #10 Improved local knowledge of initiatives – especially among women’s groups and households at the study sites – but participation in REDD+ still lacking, especially among women <number>