This document provides a summary of Chapter 3 from the textbook. It discusses the growing political divisions in the early 1790s between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison over financial policy, demonstrating Americans sharply disagreed over the powers of the new federal government. Events at home and abroad, like the French Revolution and Jay Treaty, further divided the population. Societies opposing Washington's administration organized across the country. Tensions escalated with the Whiskey Rebellion and repressive Alien and Sedition Acts, bringing the country close to civil war, but ultimately led to Thomas Jefferson's election in 1800.

1. CHAPTER
3
The Political Crises
of the I790s
4+
v7
The ratification of the Constitution put American politics 0n a new institutional
footing. Yet within two years of the inauguration of President George Washington,
fresh divisions appeared at the national level, separating such former allies as
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. These conflicts, stemming mainly from
clashes over financial policy, showed that Americans disagreed sharply over the
legitimate powers of their new federal glvernment.
Events at home and abroad deepened the cleavage in American politics after
1791. The continuing French Revolution, initially welcomed by most Americans
as an extension of their own struggle, divided the population into those who were
horrified by the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793 and those who remained
steadfast supporters. The Jay Treaty of 1794-widely viewed as a diplomatic sur-
render to Great Britain and an attack on France-fanned political discontent. In
towns and cities across the country, popular clubs, known collectively as Democratic-
Republican societies, organized t0 zppzse the direction of Washington's administra-
tion. Popular resentment toward Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton's
fiscal program led to the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania, an immense show of
military force, and additional disaffection. Events reached a crisis when President
Washington branded the " self-created" democratic societies as improper organiza-
tions, and blamed them for fomenting the Pennsylvania uprising.
Washington's successlr, John Adams, did nothing to still the controversies.
Although a man of moderation himself, Adams found his administration increas-
ingly entangled with hardline Federalists led by Hamilton. Relations with revolu-
tionary France degenerated into a quasi-war. Federalist reaction to public criticism
prompted passage of the repressive Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798. By the end
of that year, the citizenry was edging perilously close to a civil war-or so slme
observers believed, as they listened to the vitriolic tone ofpublic debate. Yet in the
end, the turbulence led not to warfare but to the narrlw election of Thomas Jefferson
to the presidenqt.
Did the Federalists represent a "mlnlcratic," regressive force in American
politics, as their adversaries claimed? Were the emerging Republicans anything like
the French "Jacobin" revolutionaries so feared by the Federalists? Wh6t ultimately
58

2. Tlte Political Crises ofthe 1790s 59
were the major differences between the Federalists and the Republicans in the
1790s, at every level ofpolitical life? How did these differences speakto broader
social conflicts?
+DOCUMENTS
In Document 1, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton outlines his plan for sus-
taining the nation's tinancial credit. The logic behind Hamilton's scheme, along with
his calls for a national bank and for federal excise taxes, stined fears that he was trying
to elevate an American monied aristocracy consisting largely of his friends and bene-
factors. Document 2, in two pafts, features the debate over the national bank between
Hamilton and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, delivered as separate appeals to
President Washington. Outside Congress and the cabinet, opposition to Hamilton's plans
came mainly from scores of local, self-organized so-called Democratic-Republican
societies, which tried to establish themselves as independent vehicles ofpublic opinion
and reform. The societies also took strong exception to the Washington administra-
tion's foreign policy, which they believed tilted toward monarchical Britain in its war
against the newly proclaimed French revoiutionary republic-matters detailed in the
excerpts tiom the minutes of the Philadelphia society and a circular fiom the New York
group in Document 3. As the New York society's circular shows, the Federalists took
strong exception to the very idea of societies as dangerously democratic. An uprising
in Pennsylvania against the whiskey excise in 1194 led Washington to send 15,000
troops west to crush the insurgents.
Document 4 is an excerpt from the president's blanket condemnation of the
Democratic-Republican clubs as the main cause of the disorder. Popular anger at the
administration deepened the following year over the Jay Treaty, as exemplified in
Document 5, selected fiom a poem included as part of a pamphlet entitled An Emetic
for Aristocrats! By 1196, Thomas Jefferson was so offended by what he perceived as
the administration's aristocratic drift that he ran for president himself, finishing a close
second to the Federalists' candidate, Vice President John Adams. Before the campaign
began, Jefferson expressed his fears about the Federalists in an angry letter to an old
associate from the days of the Revolution, the Italian Phillip Mazzei, excerpted in
Document 6. Document 7, taken from Washington's famous farewell address (which
Washington wrote in collaboration with Hamilton) discloses the departing president's
sense of tbreboding about the nation's future.
The growing war crisis with France and then theXYZ affair in 1797-98 fed patriotic
fervor and support fbr the new Adams administration, illustrated in Docume nt 8, a Fed-
eralist cartoon about the XYZ incident. Once military hostilities with France began in
what would become known as the Quasi-War, Federalists in Congress (with Adams's
ultimate approval) passed a series of repressive measures, known collectively as the
Alien and Sedition Acts; the Sedition Act is excerpted here as Document 9. The offi-
cial crackdown on immigrants and civil liberties caused a major political explosion,
as the next two documents reveal. The Kentucky Resolutions (secretly authored by
Jefferson but presented here as Document 10 in the milder version actually passed by
the Kentucky legislature) led to a failed effort to persuade the state governments to
protest the repression and interpose between the national government and the citizenry.
Document 1l is a Federalist newspaper report on the trial of one David Brown, an un-
terrified Massachusetts critic of the administration, which detailed the mechanisms of
the Federalists' effort to stifle dissent and exposed the softs of ideas that were making
the rounds in more democratic political circles. Document l2 is a pro-Jefferson song

3. 60 Maior Problems in the EarLy RepubLic, 1787-1848
that shows how Jefferson's supporters perceived the political stakes in the election
of 1800. John Adams's bitter reaction to his def'eat for reelection, relayed in a letter
reprinted here as Document 13, contains a suggestive explanation for the changing
course of American politics.
1. Alexander Hamilton RePorts on
the Public Credit, 1790
. . States, like individuals, who observe their engagements, are respected and
trusted; while the reverse is the fate of those, who pursue an opposite conduct.
Every breach of the public engagements, whether from choice or necessity, is
in different degrees hurtful to public credit. When such a necessity does truly exist,
the evils of it are only to be palliated by a scrupulous attention, on the part of the
government, to carry the violation no farther than the necessity absolutely requires,
and to manifest, if the nature of the case admits of it, a sincere disposition to make
reparation, whenever circumstances shall permit. But with every possible mitigation,
credit must suffer, and numerous mischiefs ensue. It is therefore highly important,
when an appearance ofnecessity seems to press upon the public councils, that they
should examine well its reality, and be perfectly assured, that there is no method of
escaping from it, before they yield to its suggestions. . - . Those who are most com-
monly creditors of a nation, are, generally speaking, enlightened men; and there are
signal examples to warant a conclusion, that when a candid and fair appeal is made
to them, they will understand their true interest too well to refuse their concurrence in
such modifications of their claims, as any real necessity may demand.
While the observance of that good faith, which is the basis of public credit, is
recommended by the strongest inducements of political expediency, it is enforced by
considerations of still greater authority. There are arguments fof it, which rest on the
immutable principles of moral obligation. And in proportion as the mind is disposed
to contemplate, in the order of Providence, an intirrate connection between public
virtue and public happiness, will be its repugnancy to a violation of those principles.
This reflection derives additional strength from the nature of the debt of the
United States. It was the price of liberty. The faith of America has been repeatedly
pledged for it, and with solemnities, that give peculiar force to the obligation. . . .
Tojustify and preserve their confidence; to promote the encreasing respectabil-
ity of the American name; to answer the calls of justice; to restore landed propefiy to
its due value; to furnish new resources both to agriculture and commerce; to cement
more closely the union ofthe states; to add to their security against foreign attack;
to establish public order on the basis of an upright and liberal policy. These are the
great and invaluable ends to be secured, by a proper and adequate provision, at the
present period, for the support of public credit. . . .
It will procure to every class of the community some important advantages,
and remove some no less imporlant disadvantages.
From Alexander Hamilton, "Report Relative to a Provision in Support of the Public Credit, January 9,
1790," in Joanne B. Freeman, ecl., Alexander Hamilton: Writings (New York: Library of America, 2001),
pp.531-74.

4. The Politkal Crkes ofthe J790s 61
The advantage to the public creditors from the increased value of that part of
their property which constitutes the public debt, needs no explanation.
But there is a consequence of this, less obvious, though not less true, in which
every other citizen is interested. It is a well known fact, that in countries in which the
national debt is properly funded, and an object of established confidence, it answers
most of the purposes of money. Transfers of stock or public debt are there equivalent
to payments in specie; or in other words, stock, in the principal transactions of busi-
ness, passes current as specie. The same thing would, in all probability happen here,
under the like circumstances.
The benefits ofthis are various and obvious'
Trade is extended by it; because there is a larger capital to carry it on. . . .
The proprietors of lands would not only feel the benefit of this increase in the
value of their property, and of a more prompt and better sale, when they had occa-
sion ro sell; but the necessity of selling would be, itself, greatly diminished. . . .
It is agreed on all hands, that that part of the debt which has been contracted
abroad, and is denominated the foreign debt, ought to be provided for, according to
the precise terms of the contracts relating to it. The discussions, which can arise,
therefore, will have reference essentially to the domestic part of it, or to that which
has been contracted at home. It is to be regretted, that there is not the same unanimity
of sentiment on this part, as on the other.
The Secretary has too much deference for the opinions of every part of the
community, not to have observed one, which has, more than once, made its appear-
ance in the public prints, and which is occasionally to be met with in conversation'
It involves this question, whether a discrimination ought not to be made between
original holders ofthe public securities, and present possessors, by purchase. Those
who advocate a discrimination are for making a full provision for the securities of
the former, at their nominal value; but contend, that the latter ought to receive no
more than the cost to them, and the interest: And the idea is sometimes suggested
of making good the difference to the primitive possessor. . ' .
The Secretary, after the most mature reflection on the force of this argument,
is induced to reject the doctrine it contains, as equally unjust and impolitic, as highly
injurious, even to the original holders ofpublic securities; as ruinous to public credit.
It is inconsistent with justice, because in the first place, it is a breach of contract;
in violation of the rights of a fair purchaser.
The nature of the contract in its origin, is, that the public will pay the sum
expressed in the security, to the first holder, or his csslgn ee . The intent, in making
the security assignable, is, that the proprietor may be able to make use of his prop-
erty, by selling it for as much as it may be worth in the market, and that the buyer
may be safe in the Purchase.
Every buyer therefore stands exactly in the place of the seller, has the same right
with him to the identical sum expressed in the security, and having acquired that
right, by fair purchase, and in conformity to the original agreement and intention
of the government, his claim cannot be disputed, without manifest injustice.
That he is to be considered as a fair purchaser, results from this: Whatever neces-
sity the seller may have been under, was occasioned by the government, in not
making a proper provision for its debts. The buyer had no agency in it, and there-
fore ought not to suffer. He is not even chargeable with having taken an undue

5. oz Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
advantage. He paid what the commodity was worth in the market, and took the risks
of reimbursement upon himself. He of course gave a fair equivalent, and ought to
reap the benefit of his hazard; a hazard which was far from inconsiderable, and
which, perhaps, turned on little less than a revolution in government.
2. Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton Debate
the Constitutionality of the National Bank, l79l
Thomas Jffirson, 1791
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That "all powers
not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States or to the people." [Xth amendment.] . . .
The incorporation of a bank, and the powers assumed by this bill, have not, in
my opinion, been delegated to the United States, by the Constitution.
I. They are not among the powers specially enumerated. . . .
II. Nor are they within either of the general phrases, which are the two
following:-
1. To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States . . .
[T]hey are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but
only to lay taxes for that purpose. . . .
It was intended to lace them up straitly within the enumerated powers, and
those without which, as means, these powers could not be carried into effect. . . .
2. The second general phrase is, "to make all laws necessdry and proper for
carrying into execution the enumerated powers." But they can all be carried into
execution without a bank. A bank therefore rs not necessary, and consequently not
authorized by this phrase.
It has been urged that a bank will give great facility or convenience in the col-
lection of taxes. Suppose this were true: yet the Constitution allows only the means
which are "necessary," not those which are merely "convenient" for effecting the
enumeratedpowers....
It may be said that a bank whose bills would have a currency all over the
States, would be more convenient than one whose cunency is limited to a single
State. So it would be still more convenient that there should be a bank, whose bills
should have a currency all over the world. But it does not follow from this superior
conveniency, that there exists anywhere a power to establish such a bank; or that
the world may not go on very well without it. . . .
It must be added, however, that uniess the President's mind on a view of every-
thing which is urged for and against this bill, is tolerably clear that it is unauthorized
by the Constitutionl if the pro and the con hang so even as to balance his judgment,
a just respect for the wisdom of the legislature would naturally decide the balance
in favor of their opinion. It is chiefly for cases where they are clearly misled by
From Julian P Boyd et al., eds., The Papers ofThomas Jefferson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1950- ), vol. 19, pp. 275-82.

6. tlre Politi,al Criset of the I 7e0s 63
error, ambition, or interest, that the Constitution has placed a check in the negative
of the President.
Alexander Hamilton, 179 1
In entering upon the argument it ought to be premised, that the objections of the
Secretary of State . . . are founded on a general denial ofthe authority ofthe United
States to erect corporations. . . .
Now it appears to the Secretary of the Treasury, that this general principle is
inherent in the very definition of Government and essential to every step of the
progress to be made by that of the United States; namely-that every power vested
in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right
to employ alI the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of the
ends of such power; and which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions
specified in the constitution; or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of
political society. . . ..
The circumstances that the powers of sovereignty are in this country divided
between the National and State Governments, does not afford the distinction re-
quired. It does not follow from this, that each of the ponions of powers delegated to
the one or to the other is not sovereign with regard to its proper objects.It will only
follow from it, that each has sovereign power as to certain things, and not as Io othe r
things. To deny that the Government of the United States has sovereign power as to
its declared purposes and trusts, because its power does not extend to all cases, would
be equally to deny, that the State Governments have sovereign power in any case; be-
cause their power does not extend to every case. The tenth section of the first article
of the constitution exhibits a long list of very important things which they may not
do. And thus the United States would furnish the singular spectacle of a political
socieQ without sovereignty, or of a people governed without Sovernment. . . -
This general and indisputable principle puts at once an end to the abstract
question-Whether the United States have power to erect a corporation? That is to
say, to give alegal or artfficial capacity to one or more persons, distinct from the nat-
ural. For it is unquestionably incidenlto sovereign power to erect corporations, and
consequently to that of the United States, in relation to the objects intrusted to the
management of the government. The difference is this-where the authority of the
government is general, it can create corporations in all cases; where it is confined
to certain branches oflegislation, it can create corporations only in those cases. . . .
It is not denied, that there are implied, as well as express powers, and that the
former are as eff'ectually delegated as the iatter. . . .
Then it follows, that as a power of erecting a corporation may as well be implied
as any other thing; it may as well be employed as an instrument ot nrcan of carrying
into execution any of the specified powers, as any other instrument or mean what-
ever. The only question must be, in this as in every other case, whether the mean to
be employed, or in this instance the corporation to be erected, has a natural relation
to any of the acknowledged objects or lawful ends of the government. . . .
From Joanne B. Freeman, ed., Alexander Hamilton; Writings (New York: Library of America, 200i)
pp.613-46.

7. 64 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
A strange fallacy seems to have crept into the manner of thinking and reasoning
upon the subject. Imagination appears to have been unusually busy concerning it. An
incorporation seems to have been regarded as some great, independent, substantive
thing-as a political end of peculiar magnitude and moment; whereas it is truly to
be considered as a quality, capacity, or mean to an end. . . .
To this mode of reasoning respecting the right of employing all the means requi-
site to the execution of the specified powers of the Government, it is objected that
none but necessary and proper means are to be employed, and the Secretary of State
maintains, that no means are to be considered as necessary,but those without which
the grant of the power would be nugatory . Nay so far does he go in his restrictive in-
terpretation of the word, as even to make the case of necessity which shall warrant
the constitutional exercise of the power to depend on casual and temporary circum-
stances, an idea which alone refutes the construction. . . .
It is essential to the being of the National government, that so erroneous a con-
ception of the meaning of the word necessaryr, should be exploded.
It is certain, that neither the grammatical, nor popular sense of the term requires
that construction. According to both, necessary often means no more than needfiil,
requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive lo. It is a common mode of expression to
say, that itrs necessary for a government or a person to do this or that thing, when
nothing more is intended or understood, than that the interests of the government or
person require, or will be promoted, by the doing of this or that thing. The imagina-
tion can be at no loss for exemplifications of the use of the word in this sense.
And it is the true one in which it is to be understood as used in the constitution.
The whole turn of the clause containing it, indicates, that it was the intent of the
convention, by that clause to give a liberal latitude to the exercise of the specified
powers. The expressions have peculiar comprehensiveness. They il's-"1e make all
laws, necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and
all other powers vested by the constitution in the government of the United States,
or in any department or fficer thereof." To understand the word as the Secretary of
State does, would be to depart from its obvious and popular sense, and to give it a
restrictive operation; an idea never before entertained. It would be to give it the
same force as if the word absolutely or indispensibly had been prefixed to it.
3. The Democratic-Republican Societies
Oppose Federal Policy, L793,1794
Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, Principles, Articles, and Regulations,
Agreed upon, Drawn, and Adopted, May 30, 1793-July 31, 1794
The rights of man, the genuine objects of Society, and the legitimate principles of
Government, have been clearly developed by the successive Revolutions of Amer-
ica and France. Those events have withdrawn the veil which concealed the dignity
and the happiness of the human race, and have taught us, no longer dazzled with
From Democratic Society of Pennsylvania minutes. Reprinted by permission of Historical Society of
Pennsylvania.

8. The Political Crises of the 1790s 65
adventitious splendor, or awed by antiquated usurpation, to erect the Temple of
LIBERTy on the ruins of Palaces andThrones.
At this propitious period, when the nature of Freedom and Equality is thus prac-
tically displayed, and when their value, (best understood by those, who have paid
the price of acquiring them) is universally acknowledged, the patriotic mind will nat-
urally be solicitius [sic], by every proper precaution, to preserve and perpetuate the
Blessings which Providence hath bestowed upon our Country: For, in reviewing
the history of Nations, we find occasion to lament, that the vigilance of the People
has been too easily absorbed in victory; and that the prize which has been achieved
by the wisdom and valor of one generation, has too often been lost by the ignorance
and supineness of another.
With a view, therefore, to cultivate the just knowledge of rational Liberty, to
facilitate the enjoyment and exercise of our civil Rights, and to transmit, unim-
paired, to posterity, the giorious inheritance of afree Repttblican Government, the
Democratic Socmry of Pennsylvania is constituted and established. Unfettered by
religious or national distinctions, unbiassed by party and unmoved by ambition, this
Institution embraces the interest and invites the support of every virtuous citizen.
The public good is indeed its sole object, . . .
Civic Festival
on ye 7st of May 1794
The Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, at their meeting in the city of Philadelphia
on the 24th of April, 1794, Resolved unanimously That they would commemorate the
successes of their Republican French Brethern in a Civic Festival on the first day of
May 1194; and that to this Festival they would invite their Sister Society the German
Republican, and all other citizens who harmonized with them in sentiment. . . .
On the hrst day of May, agreeably to the aforesaid Resolution of the Democratic
Society, about Eight hundred citizens assembled at the County Seat of citn Israel
Israel, now called Democratic Hall, on the Passyunk Road. . . .
The Flags of the Sister Republics marked and ornamented the seat of festivity.
[The following toasts were drunk.]
A Revolutionary Tribunal in Great Britain:-May it give lessons of liberty to her
King, examples of Justice to her Ministry, and honesty to her corrupt Legislature . . .
The Fair Daughters of America & France:-May they ever possess virtue to
attrack merit, and sense to reward it.
The Democratic and Republic Societies of the United States:-May they pre-
serve and dessiminate their principles, undaunted by the frowns of powers, un-
contaminated by the luxury of aristocracy, till the Rights of Man shall become the
Supreme Law of every land, and their separate Fraternities be absorbed, in One
Great Democratic Society, comprehending the Human Race. . . .
May every Free Nation consider a public debt as a public curse; and may the man
who would assert a contrary opinion be considered as an enemy to his Country. . . .
Thursday, July 3lil 1794
The Society met in Special Meeting, at the University, pursuant to a public notifica-
tion for that purpose. . . .

9. 66 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
Cit'Leib offered a set of Resolutions against such opposition to the Excise or
any other law of the land, as is not warranted by the Constitution of the U.S. . . .
.Resolved, as the opinion of this Society, that in a Democracy, a majority ought
in all cases to govern; and that where a Constitution exists, which emanated from
the People, the remedies pointed out by it against unjust and oppressive laws and
bad measures, ought to be resorted to; and that every other appeal but to the Consti-
tution itself, except in cases of extremity, is improper & dangerous.
Resolved, as the opinion of this Society, that altho' we conceive Excise systems
to be oppressive, hostile to the liberties of this Country, and a nursery of vice and
sycophancy; we, notwithstanding, highly disapprove of every opposition to them,
not warranted by that frame of Government, which has received the sanction of the
People of the United States.
Resolved, that we will use our utmost efforts to effect a repeal of the Excise-
laws by Constitutional means; that we will, at all times, make legal opposition to
every measure which shall endanger the freedom of our Country,-but that we will
bear testimony against every unconstitutional attempt to prevent the execution of
any law sanctioned by the majority of the people.
The Democratic Society of the City of New-York,
Address to the Republican Citizens of the United States, May 1794
Republican Friends and Fellow-Citizens! . . .
[W]e firmly deny, that either the principles, regulations, or practice of this so-
ciety, or any of the others alluded to, as far as our knowledge and judgment extends,
can justify, in the smallest degree, any accusation made against them, or us, as sowers
of civil discord or sedition, or as promoters of feuds and broils in the community:
But that, on the contrary, we most sincerely wish for a union of sentiment through-
out the nation, onthe real principles of the constitution, and original intention of the
revolution, and for a perfect and uninterrupted peace with all nations, upon safe and
honourableterms....
Yes, Fellow-Citizens, we take a pleasure in avowing to you, that we are lovers of the
French nation, that we esteem their cause as our own, and that we are the enemies,
the avowed enemies, of him or those who dare to infringe upon the holy law of
Liberty, the sacred Rights of Man, by declaring, that we ought to be strictly neutral,
either in thought or speech, between a nation fighting for the dearest, the undeniable,
the invaluable Rights of human nature, and another nation, or nations, wickedly, but
hitherto (we thank God) vainly endeavouring to oppose her in such a virtuous, such
a glorious struggle. . . tAl very important advantage to be derived from the insti-
tutions of societies similar to ours, is the promotion of useful knowledge, and the
dissemination of political information. . . .
[I]t is in republican governments-governments instituted upon the only just and
solid principle, to promote the universal good and welfare of the people, and not to
From Democratic Society of the City of New York, circular, 'At a Meeting of the Democratic Society of
the City of New-York, on Wednesday, the 28th of May, 1794," Nerv-York Historical Society.

10. The PoLitical Crises lfthe 1790s 67
further the wicked designs and crafty intentions of men in power-governments in
which political as well as civil liberty has established its salutary and happy seat . . .
that it becomes a duty more particularly incumbent upon individuals, to acquire a
perfect knowledge of the government and political institutions of their country. . . .
4. President George Washington Attacks
"Certain Self- Created Societies,,
over the Whiskey Rebellion, 1794
Fellow Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives: . . .
when we call to mind the gracious indulgence of Heaven by which the Ameri-
can people became a nation; when we survey the general prosperity ofour country,
and look forward to the riches, power, and happiness to which it seems destined, with
the deepest regret do I announce to you that during your recess some ofthe citizens
of the United states have been found capable of insurrection. It is due, however, to
the character of our Goverrrment and to its stability, which can not be shaken by the
enemies of order, freely to unfold the course of this event.
During the session of the year 1190 itwas expedient to exercise the legislative
power granted by the Constitution of the United States "to lay and collect excises."
In a majority of the States scarcely an objection was heard to this mode of taxa-
tion. In some, indeed, alarms were at first conceived, until they were banished by
reason and patriotism. In the four western counties of pennsylvania a prejudice,
fbstered and imbittered by the artifice of men who labored for an ascendency over
the will of others by the guidance of their passions, produced symptoms of riot
and vioience.
It is well known that Congress did not hesitate to examine the complaints which
were presented, and to relieve them as far as justice dictated or general conven-
ience would permit. But the impression which this moderation made on the dis-
contented did not correspond with what it deserved. The arts of delusion were no
longer confined to the efforts ofdesigning individuals. The very forbearance to press
prosecutions was misinterpreted into a fear of urging the execution of the laws, ancl
associations ofmen began to denounce threats against the officers employed. From
a belief that by a more formal concert their operation might be defeated, certain
self-created societies assumed the tone of condemnation. Hence, while the greater
part of Pennsylvania itself were conforming themselves to the acts of excise, a few
counties were resolved to frustrate them. It is now perceived that every expectation
from the tenderness which had been hitherto pursued was unavailing, and that fur-
ther delay could only create an opinion of impotency or irresolution in the Govern-
ment. Legal process was therefore delivered to the marshal against the rioters and
delinquent distil lers.
No sooner was he understood to be engaged in this duty than the vengeance of
armed men was aimed at his person and the person and property of the inspector
From "Sixth Annual Address" (1794), in James D. Richardson, ed,., A Compitation of the Messages
and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, DC: Bureau of National Literatuie andAri,
1910), volii,
pp.154 64.

11. 68 Major Problems in the Early RepubLic, 1787-1848
of the revenue. They fired upon the marshal, arrested him, and detained him for
some time as a prisoner. He was obliged, by the jeopardy of his life, to renounce
the service of other process on the west side of the Allegheny Mountain, and a depu-
tation was afterwards sent to him to demand a surrender of that which he had
served. A numerous body repeatedly attacked the house ofthe inspector, seized his
papers of office, and finally destroyed by fire his buildings and whatsoever they
contained. Both of these officers, from ajust regard to their safety, fled to the seat
of Government, it being avowed that the motives to such outrages were to compel
the resignation of the inspector, to withstand by force of arms the authority of the
United States, and thereby to extort a repeal of the laws of excise and an alteration
in the conduct of Government. . . .
5. An Anonymous Poet Protests the Jay Treaty,1795
A Poem on Jay's Treaty
Ye Patriots true, that's brave and bold,
That stood "the times that try'd the soul;"
That guarded well the public weal,
Once more to you we now aPPeal-
Is't Britain's pow'r-e1 is it gold?
Are we conquer'd? or are we sold?
Must we submit. or war. the fate?
Or caught like fish, with gold for bait?
Shameful tho't! we hear you say,
That ruinous Treaty, signed by Jay,
Is fraught with evils, not a few;
Disgraceful to our country too.
Rouse! then ye brave, 'ere 'tis too late,
And give it, its deserved fate.
Our Nabobs they may prate and say,
'Tis a rabble-and only they,
That blames our well-beloved Jav. . . .
6. Thomas Jefferson Describes the
'Aristocratical Party," 17 96
Letter t0 Philip Maue| April24, 1796
. . . The aspect of our politics has wonderfully changed since you left us. In place of
that noble love of liberty and republican government which carried us triumphantly
through the war, an Anglican monarchical aristocratical party has sprung up, whose
From 'A Poem on Jay's Treaty," in Anonymous, An Emetic for Aristocrats! Oa A Chapter Respectittg
Gov e rno r J o hn J ay and H i s Treaty (B oston : n.p., 17 9 5), 19 -23.
From Thomas Jefferson to Phillip Mazzei, Aprrl 24, 1796, in Julian P Boyd et al., eds., The Papers
ofThomas Je.ffersdl4 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, i950- ), vol. 29, pp. 73-88.

12. The Plliticdl Crises ofthe 1790s 69
avowed object is to draw over us the substance, as they have already done the forms,
of the British government. The main body of our citizens, however, remain true to
theirrepublican principles; the whole landed interest is republican, and so is a great
mass of talents. Against us are the Executive, the Judiciary, two out of three branches
of the Legislature, all the officers of the government, all who want to be officers, all
timid men who prefer the calm of depotism to the boisterous sea of liberty, British
merchants and Americans trading on British capital, speculators and holders in the
banks and public funds, a contrivance invented for the purposes of corruption, and
for assimilating us in all things to the rotten as well as the sound parts of the English
model. It would give you a fever were I to name to you the apostates who have gone
over to these heresies, men who were Samsons in the field and Solomons in the coun-
cil, but who have had their heads shorn by the harlot England. In short, we are likely
to preserve the liberty we have obtained only by unremitting labors and perils. But
we shall preserve it; and our mass of weight and wealth on the good side is so great,
as to leave no danger that force will ever be attempted against us. we have only to
awake and snap the Lilliputian cords with which they have been entangling us dur-
ing the first sleep which succeeded our labors. . . .
7. President Washington Bids Farewell
to His Countrymerr, 1796
The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It
isjustly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice ofyour real independence, the support
of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad, of your safety, of your prosperity, of
that very liberty which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee that from dif-
f'erent causes and from different quarters much pains will be taken, many artifices
employed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth. . . .
In contemplating the causes which may disturb our union it occurs as matter of
serious concern that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties
by geographical discriminations-Nor/hetn and southern, Atlantic and. western-
whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is a real difference
of local interests and views. one of the expedients of party to acquire influence
within particular districts is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts.
You can not shield yourselves too much against the jeaiousies and heartburnings
which spring from these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other
those who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. . . .
All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associa-
tions, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control,
counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities,
are destructive of this fundamental principle and of fatal tendency. They serve to
organize faction; to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put in the place
of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party, often a small but artful and
enterprising minority of the community, and, according to the alternate triumphs of
From"FarewellAddress"(1796),inJamesD.Richardson, ed.,ACompilationoftheMessagesandpapers
ofthe Presidents (washington, DC: Bureau ofNational Literature andArt, 1910), vol. t, pp. zos-to.

13. 70 Ma.ior Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted
and incongruous projects offaction rather than the organ ofconsistent and whole-
some plans, digested by common counsels and modified by mutual interests.
However combinations or associations of the above description may now and
then answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and things to be-
come potent engines by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be
enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp for themselves the reins
of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to
unjust dominion.
As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One
method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as possible, avoiding occasions of
expense by cultivating peace, but remembering also that timely disbursements to
prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it; avoid-
ing likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense,
but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidable
wars have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burthen which
we ourselves ought to bear. . . .
Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony
with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct. . . .
In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that permanent,
inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others
should be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward
all should be cultivated. . . .
The great rule ofconduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our
commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So
far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good
faith. Here let us stop.
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the cause of which
are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise to us to
implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or
the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. . . .
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the
fbreign world, so far, I mean, as we are not at liberty to do it; for let me not be under-
stood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim
no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the best
policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense.
But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

14. political Crises ofthe t7g0s
The 7I
8.A Cartoonist Attacks the Degenerate French
over the XYZ Affair
"cinque-Tetes, or the Paris Monster," a Federalist cartoon on the XyZ affair in 179g. The
French government, headed by a tive-man consortium known as the Directory, demands
"Money. Money, Money!!" from the three American commissioners sent by President John
Adams to try to end American hostilities with France. News of the afTair inflamed pro-war
and pro-administration opinion in America. Note the depiction on the right of the French as
a bloodthirsty, poor, and degraded radical people, '"vho would give a black man-perhaps
one of the ex-slaves freed by the French republic-a place at the table for their ,,Civic
Feast." O Bettmann/Corbis.
9. Congress Cracks Down on Dissent, L79g
The Sedition Act of Jttly 14, 1798 . . .
sEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the united
States of America, in Congress assembred, That if any persons shall Lrnlawfully
combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures of
the government of the United states, which are or shall be directed by proper au-
thority, or ro impede the operation of any law of the united states, or to intimidate
or prevent any person holding a place or office in or ur-rder the government of
the
united states, from undertaking, performing or executing his trust or duty; ancl if
From 'An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled 'An Act for the Punishrlent of
Certain Crimes Agarnst the
United States."'http://wwrv.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/sedact.htm (August 6. 2006j.

15. 8..*
72 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1818
any person or persons, with intent as aforesaid, shall counsel, advise or attempt to
procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly, or combination, whether such
conspiracy, threatening, counsel, advice, or attempt shall have the proposed effect
or not, he or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on conviction,
before any court ofthe United States havingjurisdiction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment during a term
not less than six months nor exceeding five years; and further, at the discretion of
the court may be holden to find sureties for his good behaviour in such sum, and
for such time, as the said court may direct.
SEC 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter or
publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or publishing, or shall
knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any
false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the
United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President
of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the
said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into con-
tempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of
the good people of the United States, or to excite any unlawtirl combinations therein,
for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the President of
the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested
by the constitution ofthe United States, or to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law
or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against
the United States, their people or government, then such person, being thereof
convicted before any court ofthe United States havingjurisdiction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not
exceeding two years. . . .
10. The I{entucky Legislature Protests
the Repression, 1798
The l{entucky Resolutions, November 10, 1798
l. Resolved,That the several States composing, the United States of America, are
not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but
that, by a compact under the styie and title of a Constitution for the United Staies,
and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special pur-
poses-delegated to that government certain dehnite powers. reserving. each State to
itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whensoever
the general government aSSumeS undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative,
void, and of no force: that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an
integral part, its co-States forming, as to itself, the other party: that the government
created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of
the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the
Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact
From Julian P Boyd et al. eds.,The Papers ofThomas Jefferson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1950* ), vol. 30, pp. 550*56.

16. Thc P,.litirnl .risis of the l7e1s 73
among powers having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for
itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress. . . .
3. Resolved, That it is true as a general principle, and is also expressly declared
by one of the amendments to the Constitution, that "the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, or prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people"; and that no power over the freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press being delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, all lawful powers re-
specting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the States or the people;
that thus was manifested their determination to retain to themselves the right of
judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged
without lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be
separated from their use should be tolerated, rather than the use be destroyed. And
thus also they guarded against all abridgment by the United States of the freedom
of religious opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the right ofprotect-
ing the same, as this State, by a law passed on the general demand of its citizens,
had already protected them from all human restraint or interference. And that in
addition to this general principle and express declaration, another and more special
provision has been made by one of the amendments to the Constitution, which ex-
pressly declares, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom ofspeech
or of the press": thereby guarding in the same sentence, and under the same words,
the freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press: insomuch, that whatever vio-
lated either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that libels, false-
hood, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the
cognizance of federal tribunals. That, therefore, the act of Congress of the United
States, passed on the l4th day of July, 1798, intituled 'An Act in addition to the act
intituled An Act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,"
which does abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is altogether void, and
of no force.
4. Resolved, That alien friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the
iaws of the State lvherein they are: that no power over them has been delegated to
the United States, nor prohibited to the individuai States, distinct frorn their power
over citizens. And it being true as a general principle, and one of the amendments
to the Constitution having also declared, that "the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively. or to the people," the act of the Congress of the United
States, passed on the day of July, 1798, intituled "An Act concerning aliens,"
-
which assumes powers over alien friends, not delegated by the Constitution, is not
law, but is altogether void, and ofno force. . . .
8. Resolved,. . . [T]hat confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism-free
government is founded in jealousy, and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not
confidence which prescribes limited constitutions, to bind down those whom we are
obliged to trust with power: that our constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to
which, and no further, our confidence may go; and let the honest advocate of con-
fidence read the Alien and Sedition acts, and say if the Constitution has not been
wise in fixing limits to the government it created, and whether we should be wise in

17. 74 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
destroying those limits, Let him say what the government is, if it be not a tyranny,
which the men of our choice have conferred on our President, and the President of
our choice has assented to, and accepted over the friendly stranger to whom the mild
spirit of our country and its law have pledged hospitality and protection: that the men
of our choice have more respected the bare suspicion of the President, than the solid
right of innocence, the claims of justification, the sacred force of truth, and the forms
and substance of law and justice. In questions of powers, then, let no more be heard
of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Consti-
tution. That this commonwealth does therefore call on its co-States for an expression
of their sentiments on the acts concerning aliens and for the punishment of certain
crimes herein before specified, plainly declaring whether these acts are or are not
authorized by the federal compact. . . .
lI. A Federalist Newspaper Describes
the Tiial of David Brown, L799
Boston, June 17
Circuit Court.
On Monday the 10th inst., David Brown, who had pleaded gttilty to an indictment
for seditious writings and practices, was sentenced by the court to pay a fine of400
dollars, and to eighteen months imprisonment.
The indictment was lengthy. The two first counts consisted of numerous ex-
tracts from two manuscripts, written by the defendant: the contents of which he has
industriously inculcated, in different parts of the commonwealth. These writings
are replete with the most malignant and perverse misrepresentations of the views
and measures of the government of the United States. The government is repre-
sented as 'a tyrannic
'association of about five hundred out of
'five million, to engross to themselves all
'the benefit of public property, and live
'upon the ruins of the rest of the community.'
A1l the means which a vicious ingenuity could suggest, appear to have been used
by him to create discontent, and to excite among the people hatred and opposition to
their government. The last count in the indictment was for producing a label to be
painted and affixed to a pole erected at Dedham, in October last, the following words
recited in the indictment, made part of the inscription, 'No stamp act, no sedition,
no alien bill, no land tax, Downfall to the tyrants of America, peace and retirement to
the President; long live the vice president and the minority.' . . .
After the inquiry, his honor judge Chase observed to Brown that having pleaded
guilty to the indictment, and thrown himself on the mercy of the court, it became
him to conduct frankly and sincerely; and to evidence his sincerity and contrition
by disclosing to the government those who had prompted and aided him in his
From Columbian Centinel. June 17,1'799.

18. Tlte Political Crises of the 1790s 75
mischievous and dangerous pursuits and by delivering up the list of subscribers to
his pernicious writings.
He replied, that on the Monday following he would deliver to the court, in writ-
ing, some observations relative to his situation and conduct. When called to the bar
to receive sentence, he delivered in a paper in which he expresses his sorrow for
uttering his political sentiments'more especially,'he adds, 'in the way and manner I
did utter them.'By 'giving up the names,' to which the court referred, 'l shall lose,'
say he, 'all my friends.' He promises to conduct as a peaceable citizen in future, and
requests that his punishment may be wholly by imprisonment andnotby fine.
Judge Chase, previous to declaring the sentence of the court, made some very
impressive observations to Brown, on the nature, malignity, and magnitude of his
offenses and on the vicious industry with which he had circulated and inculcated
his disorganizing doctrines, and imputent falsehoods; and the very alarming and dan-
gerous excesses to which he attempted to incite the uninformed part of the commu-
nity. The court, he observed, saw no satisfactory indication of a change of disposition,
or ameliorations of temper; and found nothing disclosed in the paper delivered them
to justify the mitigation of that punishment which his very pernicious and dangerous
practices demanded. . . .
12. Thomas Jefferson's Supporters Sing
of His Victory, ca. l80l
Jffirson and Liberty
The gloomy night before us lies,
The reign of terror now is o'er,
Its gags, inquisitors and spies,
Its hordes of harpies are no more
Rejoice, Columbia's sons, rejoice
To tyrants never bend the knee
But join with heart, and soul and voice
For Jefferson and Libertv. . . .
Within its hallow'd walls immense
No hireling band shall e'er arise;
Anay'd in tyranny's defence,
To hear an injur'd people's cries.
Rejoice etc.
No lordling here with gorging jaws.
Shall wring from industry its food;
No fiery bigot's holy laws,
Lay waste our fields and streets in blood.
Rejoice etc.
From "Jefferson and Liberty," ca. 1801, http:/lsniff.numachi.com/pages/tiJEFFllB;ttJEFFllB.html (Au-
gust 6, 2006).

19. 76 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1818
Here strangers from a thousand shores
Compell'd by tyranny to roam;
Shall find, amidst abundant stores,
A nobler and a happier home,
Rejoiceetc....
From Europe's wants and woes remote
A dreary waste of waves between,
Here plenty cheers the humble cot,
And smiles on every village green.
Rejoice etc.
Here, free as air's expanded space,
To every soul and sect shall be;
That sacred privilege of our race,
The worshio of the Deitv.
Rejoice etc.
These gifts, great Liberty, are thine,
Ten thousand more we owe to thee:
Immortal may their mem'ries shine,
Who fought and died for Liberty.
Rejoice etc.
Let foes to freedom dread the name,
But should they touch the sacred tree
Twice fifty thousand swords would flame,
For Jefferson and Liberty.
Rejoiceetc....
13. John Adams Accounts for His Defeat, l80l
Letter to Beniamin Stoddert, March 31, 1801
. . . We federalists are . . . complotely and totally routed and defeated. We are not yet
attainted by act ofCongress, and, I hope, shall not fly out into rebellion. No party,
that ever existed, knew itself so little, or so vainly overrated its own influence and
popularity, as ours. None ever understood so ill the causes of its own power, or so
wantonly destroyed them. If we had been blessed with common sense, we should
not have been overthrown by Philip Freneau, Duane, Callender, Cooper, and Lyon,
or their great patron and protector. A group of fbreign liars, encouraged by a few
ambitious native gentlemen, have discomfited the education, the talents, the virtues,
and the property of the country. The reason is, we have no Americans in America.
The federalists have been no more Americans than the anties.
From John Adams to Benjamin Stoddert, March 31, 1801, in Charles Francis Adams, ed., The Works
of John Adams (Boston: Little, Brown, I 850-56), vol 9, p. s82.

20. The Political Crises ofrhe t 790s 77
sEssArs
How can we explain the intense political conflicts of the 1790s? were they, as an earlier
generation of historians posited, a result of the perennial ciash between agrarian democ-
racy and urban capitalism? Did the ideas of politics and social order embodied in the
fights over finance, foreign policy, and civil liberties defy simple social explanations?
Or were concerns about the preservation of slavery and southern power the hidden force
driving the Republican opposition, its national leadership dominated by southern slave-
holders like Jefferson and Madison?
The political culture that energized the new republic in the 1790s was an extension
of developments that occurred during the Revolution itself. In the first essay, David
Waldstreicher of Temple University examines how political rituals of the Revolution
eked out a space for both nationalism and partisanship that laid the groundwork for
future groups like the Democratic-Republican societies.
James E. Lewis Jr., who teaches at Kalamazoo cotlege, sees the partisan battles
primarily in ideological terms, pitting the friends of order and hierarchy against the
friends of liberty and equality. By focusing on the frenzy that led directly to the election
of 1800, Lewis reveals the fragility of the new nation's political institutions and shows
that both the Jeffersonians and Federaiists were driven to more extreme apprehensions
than most historians have assumed. writing in a very dillerent key, John Ashworth of the
University of Nottingham criticizes interpretations that fail to describe the parties as
diverse coalitions, emphasizes the sectional character ofthe division, and suggests that
what he calls the .Ieffersonians' "populism" was ironically bor,rnd up inextricably with
the institution of slaverv.
Public Celebrations, Print Culture,
and American Nationalism
DAVID WALDSTREICHER
Despite all the recent attention to public ritual and performance in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, the role ofcelebratory activities in the revolutionary era-
indeed, their crucial part in the invention of American nationhood-has been largely
neglected. This is somewhat surprising, especially when we consider that students
of the American Revolution have long appreciated the political importance of ritrials
for the prerevolutionary colonial resistance movement ofthe 1760s and early 1770s.
what is lacking in the historiography of the Revolution is not an appreciation of
festivity as a site of local political action, of conflict and consensus. It is rather an
understanding ofthe relationship between local street theater and the nation: a rela-
tionship that came into being through the mediation of print.
. . . I argue that American nationalism emerged from the conjunction of local
celebrations and their reproduction in the press. As the very practices of nationalism,
those celebrations and publications drew upon the politicized rituals that Britons had
been employing for more than a century. The mobilization of citizens to celebrate
"Rites of Rebellion, Rites of Assent: Celebrations, Print Culture, and the Origins of American National-
isml' JournaL of American History,82, 1995, pp. 35-61. Copyright O Organization of American Historians.
http://www.oah.org. Reprinted with permission.

21. 78 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
patriotic occasions, with the reprinting ofaccounts ofthese events, gave the abstrac-
tions ofnationalist ideology a practical sense.
As they developed after l7'7 6, these rites of celebration, publication, and repub-
lication resolved certain problems of the American revolutionary struggle. Celebra-
tions and printed accounts of them embodied and mobilized a nationalist ideology,
an ideology that made consensus the basis of patriotism. Indeed, by fostering an
idea of the nation as extralocal community and by giving ordinary people the oppor-
tunity for local expression of national feeling, this reciprocal dynamic of celebrations
and print literally and figuratively papered over the disturbing class resentments (ex-
pressed in the antiaristocratic language ofthe Revolution) that had energized much
of the populace in the first place. By the 1790s those resentments would reemerge in
festive culture, in nationalist celebrations where they were recast into national, par-
tisan political divisions. Yet during the war years, past and present divisions between
plebeians and elites were absorbed by the direct link between "the people" and the
nation whose independence they repeatedly celebrated. The local came to represent
the national while the pfesent gave proof, not of the past, but of the future. Diffused
by print, the unruly rites ofrebellion could serve as ruling rites of assent. . . .
Celebrations were not afterthoughts to independence, nor were they mere sym-
bolizations of accumulated oedipal anxieties. They were anticipated, deliberate,
necessary responses to the Declaration of Independence. By the summer of 1116,
independence had been in the air for at least a year, and the Continental Congress
had already declared a national fast day, July 20, l115.YeI on sending out the
printed declaration, the Congress did not recommend fasting, mourning, bell ring-
ing, or any other observance. Congress would not-could not-order the nation to
celebrate its own birth. Its members acted upon the assumption that the new nation
could not exist until the people spontaneously celebrated its existence, and until
evidence of this nationwide celebration appeared in print.
The Declaration of Independence signaled the ultimate rejection of England: it
thrust all grievances onto the person of the king. Consequently, its public procla-
mation set off public vilifications of the king's body. New Yorkers tore down the
equestrian statue of George III and hacked it to pieces; in other places the monarch's
picture and royal arms were ceremoniously burned. Many scholars, most notably
Winthrop Jordan, have observed in these king-killing rituals "the symbolic transfer
of sovereign power from the king to the people of the American republic." Yet
these founding rituals drew less on some "prehistoric human pasf ' of ritual murder
than on a quite historic recent past of British monarchical political culture. More-
over, this king killing was not only a murder: it was also afuneral. Llke the corpse
of Liberty after the Stamp Act, George III was "laid prostrate in the dirt," his re-
mains set afire. In Savannah he "was interred before the Court House." With their
town lit up at night in honor of the occasion, Baltimoreans saw "the effigy of our
Late King . . . carted through the Town, and committed to the flames, amidst the
acclamations of many hundreds-the just reward of a tyrant." Only "the people"
presided at such rites. At Huntington, Long Island, they took down the old liberty
pole (topped with a flag dedicated to liberty and George III) and used the materials
to fashion an effigy. This mock king sported a wooden broadsword, a blackened
face "like Dunmore's lslave] Virginia regiment," and feathers, "llke Carleton and
Johnson's savages." Fully identified with the Black and Indian allies his generals

22. The Pllitical Aises of the 1790s 79
had enlisted to fight the Americans, wrapped in the union jack, he was hung, ex-
ploded, and burned.
whether the deceased arrived dead or was killed on the spot, this was no ordi-
nary funeral: it inverted and transfbrmed the king's birthday celebration. The two
most often mentioned aspects of this independence day-the bonfires and the bells-
had been centerpieces of those festivals. unlike the Stamp Act funerals, which had
also turned funeral into festival, jubilation at the declaration rites was immediate
and continuous, not deferred until the resurrection of the past. Thus the preserva-
tion of birthday cheer at a funeral without solemnity: this death meant eternal life,
the life of a new nation and its people. A few days after New yorkers toppled the
equestrian statue of George lll-built in gratitude for the repeal of the Stamp Act-
a correspondent expressed no doubt as to the place ofthe event in history.
The fourth instant was rendered remarkabie by the most important event that ever hap-
pened to the American colonies, an event which will doubtless be celebrated through a
long succession of future ages, by anniversary commemorations, and be considered as
a grand era in the history of the American slates.
Nationhood could not fail to occur if left to the people who had demonstrated their
assent. Even ifin the present there were still thirteen "colonies," in the future there
would be independent "states." Instead of toasting the king, patriots in Boston drank
"prosperity and perpetuity to the u.s.A." New York seized the ultimate royal (once
heavenly) prerogative, declaring a jubilee-a "general jail derivery, with respect
of Debtors."
The declaration spoke for the people, or at least for their representatives. But the
newspaper texts spoke as well, in response to the people's ritualized demonstration
of their assent. Critics who rightly point out the performative nature of .,declaring
independence" and who stress the declaration as the defining moment of the Ameri-
can polity still often underestimate the mutually defining character of rhetoric and
ritual, and their joining in print, during the era of the American "founding." In one
sense, there was and is a homology, or structural parallel, between rhetoric and ritual.
Rhetoric works like ritual in that it persuades through invocation of reliable, repeated
movements. Ritual, like rhetoric, brings us into communion with the performer and
the performance. Given this structural parallel, it might be enough to consider all
ofthe Patriots' actions as rhetorical, using the Iiterary critics'model ofthe rext, or ro
talk of all their words as ritual, employing the tools of anthropologists.
To do so, however, wouid conflate and thus obscure the special conditions that
enabled this moment in history: the interplay of rhetoric and ritual, of oratory,
street theater, and print. I would suggest that if the rituals of national birth ratify
the act ofdeclaring independence, the printed descriptions ofthose rituals also had
a crucial, and not merely a supplemental, role. They too confirmed ,,the people"
as the authors of independence, if not of "the Declaration of Independence.', To
understand these links it is necessary to see newspaper accounts ofcelebrations less
as objective reportage than as pieces ofrhetoric: a genre designed to define what it
ostensibly describes. These printed accounts played a crucial role in a celebratory
political culture: the role of enacting American belonging, of fulfilling the prophe-
cies ofindependence. Reporting celebrations, they inspired new ones and thus new
reports of celebrations.

23. 80 Ltdjlr Prlblems in the Early Repuhlic. 1787-18']8
The generic newspaper accounts ofthe response to the declaration always stress
the voluble and visible assent of the people. At Easton, Pennsylvania, on July 8, the
"great number of spectators" who heard the declaration "gave their hearty assent
with three loud huzzahs, and cried out, 'M.ry Godlong preserve and unite the Free
and Independent States of America.' " The people of Trenton, New Jersey, responded
to the declaration "with a loud acclamation." The sounds and sights, as reported, con-
firmed the cross-class unity of the day. In Providence, Rhode Island, "The Declara-
tion was received with joy and applause by all ranks." The Committee of Safety in
Halifax County, North Carolina, asked both "fieeholders and Inhabitants" to attend
their public reading. This was not to be taken for granted. The shadow of the unruly
crowd hung over these ritual and rhetorical demonstrations of the new order. The
writer of an account of the celebration in Richmond, Virginia, expressed relief:
'Although there were near 1000 people present, the whole was conducted with the
utmost decorum; and the satisfaction visible in every countenance sufTiciently
evinces their determination to support [independence] with their lives and for-
tunes." In Boston, Massachusetts, "undissembled festivity cheered and brightened
every face." By contrast, pictures of the king and Tories were everywhere taken
down: their faces were not to be seen.
These rhetorical appeals to sight, to the sensory experience of seeing, can be
interpreted as one of the ways in which the newspapers successfully bridged street
theater and the act ofreading (itselfa visual experience). In this respect, printed ac-
counts acted nationally as the personal display of sentiment-the huzzah, the toast,
the beaming countenance-acted locally: both taught patriotic feeling and action
even while dernonstrating that such virtue already predominated across class bound-
aries in those places where'Joy and festivity pervaded all ranks ofpeople." Readers
as far away as Philadelphia learned that in Savannah, "a great number of people
than ever appeared on any occasion before, in this province" came out to witness
the symbolic funeral of George III. The corollary. invoked explicitly in this case,
was that America would be great among the nations.
Reports of celebrations elsewhere demonstrated the simultaneity of national
action and the pervasiveness of national sentiments. The Virginia Ga.zette of Wil-
liamsburg went to the trouble of reproducing accounts of the declaration cele-
brations fiom New York City and from Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, whiJe
the Nonvich Packet in Connecticut relayed an account that came all the way from
Williamsburg, Virginia. This pattern continued during the war years. A Charleston
paper carried an account of the Philadelphia Fourth of July celebration of 1119-
five weeks later. The Pennsyl,onia Journttl of Philadelphia reprinted descliptions
of the Fourth of July liom distant Richmond as well as nearby Trenton. The printed
description of local display was thus the perfect way to spread nationalism. The
same vehicle that reported the local and present-oriented recent past could make
the extralocal future self-evident.
Unfortunately for the Patriots, nationalist celebrations and publications alone
could not win the war for independence, much less guarantee present unity and
future glory. Charles Royster rightly observes that "many revolutionaries tried to win
independence by declaring it over and over. In the search for signs of grace, they
often convinced themselves, for a while, that words were works." They probably did
so because the decade's rvorth of politicized celebration and printed commentary

24. lhe Pal ir i;al Crises of rhe t Taus 8t
that had characterized the resistance movement made it seem as if street theater
and printed words did combine to form the most effective of political works. This
is why the ardent celebrating continued, and even escalated, after July 4, I116.
Having affirmed the righteousness of their revolution by their manner of receiving
the good news, Patriots linked an increasingly interregional war effort to their local
experiences by holding "continental" fasts and thanksgivings, by celebrating anni-
versaries of war victories and independence, and by mourning defeats and heroic
deaths. The Declaration of Independence celebrations and the Fourth of July anniver-
saries that came to follow them annually were only models for the national cele-
brations that filled the war years with sets of thirteen gunshots and lists of thirteen
toasts. More important than the speed with which the Fourth of July celebration
spread, or even the local variations in the celebrations (if these were recoverable),
is the generic quality of the commentary on the celebrations: the vagueness-the
intentional obscurity-of the printed reports. The summation of the report on the
July 4, lll7, celebration in Philadelphia proved to be typical in its guarantees:
"Every thing was conducted with the greatest order and decorum, and the face of
joy and gladness was universal." The overwhelming intent of these rites was unity.
As a result, the achievement of sameness in these rites-such as the ubiquitous use
of the number thirteen, one for each state-proved that national unity existed. And
the generic descriptions that so frustrate the scholar looking for regional variation
or local detail were chosen deliberately, for the same reason.
In a hundred birthdays and funeral rites, the Patriots built an experiential and a
discursive basis for the belief that "the nation" exists and can be spoken of, that
there is a national mind that thinks, and a national character with a virtuous heart.
Massachusetts Patriots took the lead in turning local episodes into occasions for
revolutionary-and by extension national-memory. Since 1770 they had marked
the Boston Massacre with dirges and orations on the dangers to liberty posed by a
standing (British) army. The Sons of Liberty in Boston and elsewhere kept up the
Stamp Act holidays of August 14 and March 18. The encounter at Lexington was
only the first battle to be commemorated annually. In June 1111 the Palmetto Society
of Charleston, South Carolina, established itself to commemorate the June 28, 1176,
victory at nearby Sullivan's Island. After bell ringing in the rnorning, a church
service and oration in honor of the militia, and intermittent gun blasts by the boats
in the harbor, three hundred Charlestonians headed to the fort for a dinner party.
Two other groups dined together (one at the local ltberty tree), and fireworks closed
the festivities. Likewise, as early as 1778 and 1119 the inhabitants of Bennington,
Vermont, and Saratoga, New York, sponsored civic feasts and orations that under-
scored the national significance of their local victories. Local attachments were no
prerequisite, though-American patriots as far away as St. Croix in the West Indies
celebrated the anniversary of Lexington.
More common, especially as the Continental army fared better, were the spon-
taneous rejoicings when news amived of a Patriot victory. All of Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, was illuminated the evening word came of Gen. John Burgoyne's defeat at
Saratoga in october 177'7. rn reports of such festivity, correspondents stressed the
immediacy of popular demonstration. Even more than the judicious preservation of
anniversaries, spontaneous joy revealed cross-class unity in the Continental cause.
On June 25, 1779, a citizen of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, received a personal

25. 82 Mn.jor Problems in the E'arly Republic, 1787-1848
letter from Gen. Horatio Gates, who wrote. "I do most heartily congratulate you
upon the Success of our Anns in South Carolina, which I think finishes the British
Empire in AMERICA." "Immediately," the account reads, bells began to ring, and
continued to ring all day, interspersed with the firings of cannon. This particular de-
scription, from the perspective of a gentleman, reveals the dependence of planned
festivals on the more spontaneous (and inclusive) demonstrations of assent. Only
after describing the immediate revelation of patriotic joy does the author go on to
describe the gathering at the state house of the "most respectable gentlemen . . .
whose smiling countenances evidenced the sincerity of their Hearts." The toasts
these wofihies offered were not solely for their own consumption; described as pub-
lic, they were "accompanied with three Huzzas in and out of Doors." The subjects
of the report are unquestionably members of the upper classes, but their sincere dis-
plays of patriotic emotion are ratified by the populace at large.
Who were the possessors and perfonners of political virtue? Did the people "out
of doors" have it-or merely recognize it when they saw it? Despite a consensus that
the people were the source of political legitimacy, the character and limits of popular
action remained unresolved. Two years earlier in Portsmouth, on the first anniver-
sary of the Fourth of July, a Captain Thompson had somehow succeeded in getting
"all the friends of American independency" on board his docked Continental ship.
But then who were the "large concourse of people" on the wharf who vociferously
approved the thirteen guns fired? Likewise, ifritual dinners occurred during daylight
hours, the citizens appeared to ratify the sentiments ofthe toast givers by participat-
ing in illuminations and frreworks at night. In revolutionary rhetoric and practice
there remained a vagueness, an indeterminacy about who were "the people" and who
were "the citizens," or true political actors. This contradiction would plague repub-
lican ideology for many years to come.
Diff'erent definitions both of "the people" and of citizenship coexisted uneasily
within the revolutionary alliance. Rituals and published descriptions of rituals often
expressed uncertainties about whether all the "people" were "citizens" even while
they served as the potential sites for resolving the question. Early Fourth of July
celebrations were attempts to (re)establish an organic link between elite and popu-
lace, ratifying both popular sovereignty and the most tasteful displays of patriotic
affiliation. They did this by deferring controversial questions of political participa-
tion and local control in favor of self-evident displays of national unity. The thirteen
toasts generally offered-one for every state in the new union-not only spread rev-
olutionary ideology; they also naturalized national pride. Rather than moving or-
ganically from local to national identifications, the toasts moved from the national
back to the local, making the local part of, or evidence for, the greater national entity.
Invariably, the first toasts lauded "The United States," "The Congress," the Conti-
nental army, George Washington, the holiday itself'-all national institutions. Only
afterward did they (sometimes) move on to praise "the State of New Jersey," the
"brave militia," or "our officers and privates" who lbught at the battle of Monmouth
Courthouse. In the story told by these toasts, the original source ofjoy is always
national. Local luminaries and events prove virtues epitomized by attachment to
the glory of America.
The muster of the militia on the Fourth of July, the new national holiday, pro-
vided a particularly appropriate way to ratify local leadership while nationalizing

26. The Political Crises of the 1790s 83
popular sovereignty. On the morning of Independence Day, 1119, in Boston, the
militia paraded and performed a mock engagement before "a vast concourse of spec-
tators." Afterward, one hundred Patriots ate under a tent on the Common. Again
attendance and display prove the constancy ofrevolutionary sentiments.
The spirit of the people never appeared at once more elated and firm than upon this
happy occasion: An unaffectedjoy was diffused thro' the countenances of the generality
of the citizens-intermix'd with such composule and decency as afforded a most agree-
able indication of their entire satisfaction in this glorious revolution, and that the true
republican principles were not only well understood but highly relish'd.
The ,,generality" of citizens not only comprehend republicanism but show joy on
their faces and "decency" in demeanol-4 1e1n6(4ble statement of optimism in so
large ancl troubled a city as reYolutionary Boston. Coming at a time of military set-
backs, when the sustaining virtues of the populace seemed doubtful, rhetoric here
functioned as self-fulfilling prophecy, in that its local details, such as the smiling
faces, were meant to inspire what they described. Virtue is apparent in the response
to nationalist ritual; thus virtuous patriots would be citizens devoted to the needs
of the nation.
Another way to ensure that celebration served virtue was to follow the dicta of
republican simpiicity. Sometimes this was a matter of necessity. As secretary of the
Philadelphia Council shortly after the British evacuation in 1718, Timothy Matlack
made itpublicly known that "because ofthe heat and 'scarcity'ofcandles, and other
considerations," the council suggested that residents forbear from Fourth of July
illuminations. A citizen of Newpoft, Rhode Island, reported in 1780 the thirteen gun
blasts fired by the French ships in the harbor, combined "with other such demon-
strations of joy as the embarrassed circumstances of the town would admit'" Con-
troversy attended the question whether the Continental Congress should sponsor
fireworks and festivities. William Henry Drayton urged the measure; his fellow
South Carolinian Henry Laurens argued that such "fooleries" had brought down
the republics of ancient Greece. For the most part, leaders resolved this problem by
imagining their holidays to be sacred-and thus solemn. A gentlemen in Newbury-
port, Massachusetts, wrote that the Fourth of July anniversary spurred his town to
comply with state requests and send more men off to battle. After an oration, fifty-
nine were chosen to march off in the morning; local men of property showed their
zeal by pleclging to make good on the soldiers' pay. This was evidence of true virtue
and he rejoiced: "Plato thanked heavens he was born in the age of Socrates: I give
thanks that I was born an American; that I lived in the hour of the separation of
America from Britain, and that I have seen the exertions of my country in the cause
of freedom, that rival the boasted patriotism of antiquity."
Yet the mythic "patriotism of antiquity" was not the only kind that helped
achieve American independence, and some early skeptics underscored this by re-
minding others of the time-tested relationship of celebration to crowd action and
drink. After the first Fourth of July, Continental Congress member William Williams
of Connecticut wrote home to Jonathan Trumbull, "Yesterday was in my opinion
poorly spent in celebrating the anniversary ofthe Declaration oflndependence. . . . a
great expenditure of liquor, powder etc. took up the Day and of candles thro the City
good part of the night." He added, "I suppose and I conclude much Tory unilluminated

27. 84 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
glass will want replacing." A broadside circulated in Philadelphia after the victory
at Yorktown pleaded that
those Citizens, who choose to ILLUMINATE on the GLORIOUS OCCASION, will do
it this evening at Six, and extinguish the lights at Nine o'clock. Decorum and harmony
are earnestly recommended to every Citizen and a general discountenance to the least
appearance of riot.
Patriot leaders wanted order, but they needed popular celebration and its impolite
reversals. Such expressions of praise and insult remained the main mode of distin-
guishing Whig from Tory, a distinction that itself rested on the Whig assertion of
the people's authority. At Princeton in 1778, the inhabitants were said to have found
particular pleasure in firing the thirteen cannon, "being some of the brass field-
pieces taken from General Burgoyne, one of thethree conquerors of America." Three
years after the Treaty of Paris ended the war for independence, in Northumberland
County, Pennsylvania, one could still find "Colonel JOHN BULL . . . unanimously
placed on the wheatsack."
This celebratory mode is captured h a 17'7 6 "new favorite song at the American
Camp." Sung to the tune of the "British Grenadiers," it inverts all thines British.
truly turning the world upside down.
Your dark unfathom'd Councils, our weakest Hands defeat,
Our Children rout your Armies, our Boats destroy your Fleet;
And to complete the dire Disgrace, cooped up within a Town,
You live the scorn of all our Host, the Slaves of WASHINGTON.
Great Heaven! is this the Nation, whose thundering Arms were hurl'd,
Thro Europe, Africa, India; whose Navy rul'd the World;
The lustre of your former Deeds, whole Ages of Renown,
Lost in a moment, or transferred to us and WASHINGTON.
The British past has passed from relevance. Pausing for a moment to assure the lis-
tener that freedom-not mere glory-inspires the American, the song concludes:
Proud France should view with Terror, and haughty Spain should fear,
While every warlike Nation would court Alliance here.
And his minions trembling, dismounted from his T-,
Pay homage to AMERICA and glorious WASHINGTON.
-,
This is the heady, king-killing optimism of 1776; yer with the French alliance, inrer-
national recognition reinforced these boastful wishes. As william Stinchcombe
and Beverly orlove Held have shown, elaborate celebrations of the Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, the birthday of King Louis, and the birth of the dauphin helped to
prove Americans' sincere loyalty to their new ally and to define American national
identity against a common enemy. Celebrating the alliance at Washington's camp,
"through the whole, there was a remarkable style of looks and behavior, undebauched
by British manners or British entertainments." The French ministry in America did
its part by sponsoring orations and festivities on the Fourth of July as well as on
French red-letter days. Though it required considerable ideological agility to explain
how the popish French monarchy could truly rejoice at the spectacle of the republi-
can United States (and vice versa), the symbolic and actual presence of the French

28. Thc Ptliri,,rl Ct itct of rhc l;9t)s 85
at these celebrations helped to keep the focus national and to fix the burden of
opprobrium on the common enemy, England.
French support also reinforced a key idea in the development of Amelican na-
tionalism: that the United States was at the center of a "world stage," acting out God's
plan. Here national celebration became the site of that peculiar mixing-or perhaps
we should say remixing-of Patriot politics and millennial thought. Millennial
thought in this context did not require (though it often included) belief in the coming
of God's rule on earth; rather, political millennialism was characterized by an over-
riding confidence in the future. "I congratulate you on your glorious prospects," said
David Ramsay in one of the first Fourth of July orations to be published.
When I anticipate in imagination the future glory of my country, and the illustrious fig-
ure it will soon make on the theater of the world, my heart distends with generous pride
for being an American. What a situation fbr empire ! . . . Our independence will redeem
one quarter of the globe from tyranny and oppression, and consecrate it as the chosen
seat ofTruth, Justice, Freedom, Learning, and Religion.
In newspapers, such sentimental paeans to the American future are often juxtaposed
with mock funerary annollncements like "Old England's Last Will."
Benedict Anderson. Eric Hobsbawm. and others have shown how nineteenth-
century Europeans invented traditions to fit new national mythologies. But the Amer-
ican revolutionaries already had a tradition: an English tradition ofrevelry and rights
that independence had rendered suddenly problernatic. For the American patriots
after 1776, then, the more unprecedented everything appeared, the better. Appropriat-
ing the oldest English commemorative rituals and rhetorics, celebrants of the nation
during the war struggled to keep the character of a "first celebration" by always cele-
brating the ftfttrre-a strategy that helped deflect the difficulties of a less than per-
fect present. 'A second celebration already has the character of a reification," Paul
Ricoeur tells us; communities usually celebrate the past in order to legitimate the
present. Through their celebrations of each remarkable revolutionary event, Arneri-
can nationalists repeatedly enacted the "foundin-e." In the present there was an army
to support and the class-based cultural rifts separating decorous diners from riotous
revelers. In the future there was unanimity. prosperity, nationhood-and none of these
problems. Thus the problems of the present were incidental, local, passing, past.
Political Crisis and the "Revolution" of I800
JAMES E. LEWIS, JR.
Writing to the Virginia jurist and essayist Spencer Roane in September 1819, Thomas
Jefferson described his election to the presidency as "the revolution of 1800." It
was, in Jefferson's view, "as real a revolution in the principles of our government as
that of 1776 was in its form." He considered it revolutionary even though it had been
eft'ected not "by the sword . . . but by the rational and peaceable instrument of reform,
Horn, James J., Jan Ellen Lewis, and Peter S. Onuf, eds.,The Ret'olLrtion of 1800: Democrac'-, Race.
and the Nev, Republic. pp. 3-29. O 2002. University of Virginia Press. Reprinted by pemrission.

29. 86 Major Problems in the Early Republic' 1787-1848
the suffrage of the people." In juxtaposing these two "revolutions," Jefferson also
united them; the "revolution of 1800," in his view, redeemed and extended the Revo-
lution of i776. StiU, his dichotomies-1800 vs. l'/76, principles vs. form, suffrage
vs. sword-suggest the breadth of Jefferson's definition of "revolution." They also
obscure the complexities and potentialities of the election of 1800, when a revolution
in "form" effected by the "sword" seemed to many a real possibility. . . .
The election of 1800 capped a period of intense partisan rivalry in the United
States. The Quasi-war with France, the Alien and Sedition Acts, the virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions, the expansion of the army, Fries' Rebellion, and countless
other developments fueled a sense of crisis in the United States that lasted the en-
tirety of Adams's presidency. The leaders of each party proposed dramatically differ-
ent responses to each of these developments. Throughout this crisis, party conflict
remained at a fever pitch, with effects that extended from Congress and the executive
offices to the press, the dueling ground, the meeting hall, the tavern, and the street.
Parry rivalries did notjust affect politics. They also strained and distorted business
and social relationships.
In this superheated atmosphere, the election of 1800 assumed tremendous im-
portance. Since each side believed that the other would destroy the nation if it con-
trolled the executive branch, a revolutionary result seemed possible, even likely, even
if the election itself proceeded in an unrevolutionary manner. Many Federalists
worried that a victorious Jefferson would fritter away federal power' stir up class
resentment, and bring about an alliance with France and a war against Great Britain.
Robert Goodloe Harper warned that if the Federalists lost the election, they might
.'live to see our country mourn, in blood & ashes, over the consequences." The
rumors that reached Jefferson in early 1800 said that the Federalist "eastern states
would . . . throw things into confusion, and break the Union" if a Republican won
the election. At the same time, many Republicans feared that four more years of
Federalist rule would lead to a consolidated nation, a monarchical government, and
a return-in form, if not in name-to British subjugation. Virginia governor James
Monroe considered a Republican victory essential to "secure to us forever those
liberties that were acquired by our revolution [and] which ought never to have been
put in danger." If the Republicans lost, Hamilton warned, Virginia would "resort to
the employment of physical force" to gain power.
Both Federalists and Republicans expressed doubts that there would even be an
election in the two or three years before the electors finally cast their votes in Decem-
ber 1800. Outraged by the Republican response to the Quasi-War, the expanded
army, and the Alien and Sedition Acts, Federalists calculated that their opponents
might destroy the government before the eiection could take place. Writing from
Europe in June 1798, for example, John Quincy Adams passed along a French re-
port ;that the friends of liberty in the United States. . . . lwould] probably not wait
ior the next election, but in the mean time fwould] destroy the fatal influence of the
President and Senate by a Revolution." Both Theodore Sedgwick and Fisher Ames
warned that the Republicans in the large mid-Atlantic states would attempt a mili-
pos-
tary takeover once they finished "render[ing their] militials] as formidable as
sibie, and supply[ing their] arsenals & magazines." "It is obvious to me," Ames
explained in early 1800, "that all other modes of decision will be spurned as soon
as the antis [the Republicans] think they have force on their side." Another
prospect

30. fhe Polirical Crises of the l7a0s 87
that wonied Federalists during the months before the election was Republican dis-
unionism. Virginia Republicans, in particular, emerged as committed secessionists in
Federalist correspondence. A rumor that William Branch Giles, a former Virginia
congressman, had "expressly [stated] that he desired that the Union of the States
might be severed" even crossed the Atlantic in both directions. It traveled from
Philadelphia to London in a private letter from the secretary of state to the minister to
Great Britain and returned from Berlin to Philadelphia in a letter from John Quincy
Adams to his mother.
Republicans similarly questioned whether the election would even occur. When
the Federalists were at their strongest and the Republicans at their weakest, leading
Republicans feared that their opponents would use their position to transform the
government. In October 1798 Jefferson predicted a succession of steps by which
the Federalists would establish a government that was both monarchical and aristo-
cratic. If the public tolerated the Alien and Sedition Acts, he warned, "we shall im-
mediately see attempted another act of Congress, declaring that the President shall
continue in office during life." Additional acts would complete "the transfer of the
succession to his heirs, and the establishment of the Senate for life." . . . By early
1800 it seemed possible that the Federalists would try to seize power permanently
before they lost it in the election. "The enemies of our Constitution [the Federal-
ists.l are preparing a fearful operation," Jefferson wrote his son-in-law in February.
Chaotic conditions throughout the country, and especially in Pennsylvania, appeared
"too likely to bring things to the situation they wish, when our Bonaparte [Alexander
Hamiltonl, surrounded by his comrades in arms, may step in to give us political
salvation in his way." . . .
The election of 1800 played out across a period of months, with the electors
chosen through different means and at different times in the sixteen states. Some of
these elections favored the Republicans; others favored the Federalists. Until the
end, the final outcome remained in doubt. By late November both sides recognized
that everything depended on the South Carolina legisiature's choice of electors in
early December, just one day before the electors were to cast their ballots in every
state. Even those familiar with the state's politics, much less the many interested
outsiders, found it difficult to predict how it would vote. As the Connecticut Federal-
ist Oliver Wolcott recognized, South Carolina's votes were "claimed, and expected
by both parties." Insiders asserted confidently, and contradictorily, that its votes
would be for Jefferson and Burr, for Adams and Pinckney, and even for Pinckney
and Jefferson. The legislators believed that they would decide the election, but they
could not have known just how close the votes would be in the other states (sixty-five
each for Jefferson, Burr, and Adams and sixty-four for Pinckney). Ultimately the
Republicans managed to filI all eight of the state's electoral college seats with men
who were piedged to cast one ballot for Jefferson and one for Burr. "Our Country
is yet safe," Peter Freneau, the Republican editor of the Charleston Ci4r Gazette,
announced as soon as the electors were chosen.
But Freneau began his celebration too soon. Even though the electoral votes would
not be opened and counted until I I February 1 801 , it became clear within a couple
of weeks of the voting that both Jefferson and Burr would have seventy-three votes
and that the House would have to choose between them. As late as 15 December.

31. 88 lvlajor Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
Jefferson still believed that one or more electors from Tennessee, South Carolina, or
Georgia had withheld their second ballots from Burr in order to prevent a tie. Just a
few days later, however, enough information had reached washington to dispel this
hope. By 19 December Jefferson saw no grounds fbr doubting "that there [would]
be an absolute parity between the two republican candidates." This result, he in-
formed Madison, had "produced great dismay & gloom on the republican gentle-
men here, and equal exultation in the federalists." The problem was that, while the
Republicans dominated eight of the sixteen state delegations in the House, they
needed a majority to decide the outcome. of the remaining eight states, the Federal-
ists heid six and two were evenly divided. one of the Republicans who experienced
"dismay & gloom" because of this unexpected result was virginia congressman
John Dawson. Writing to Madison, Dawson lamented the defect in the Constitution
that had made possible this outcome. In despair, he wondered: "who is to be presi-
dent? In short, what is to become of our government?"
The final siate of the election of 1800 can be divided into two phases. The first
began in mid-December 1800, when it became apparent that Jefferson and Burr
had defeated Adams and Pinckney but had tied each other, and lasted until mid-
February 1801. The second phase consisted of the actual balloting in the House
from 1 1 February to 17 February. Different options and different dangers emerged
in each phase. But, throughout, the election seemed likely to become a "revolution
in form," as one side or the other or both considered extraconstitutional means to
produce a desired outcome or prevent a dreaded result.
In the first phase, the Federalists enjoyed a wide range ofoptions, since the elec-
tion could not be decided without them. one obvious course was to acquiesce in the
popular will by voting for Jefferson as president and Burr as vice president; there
were Federalists, in and out of government, who supported this course. Another
constitutional option was to vote for Burr as president, counting on some Republi-
can congressmen to vote for their second choice. Finally, the Federalists might feign
support for Burr in order to pressure Jefferson into pledges about principles, policies,
and patronage. It was this approach that Hamilton, who considered "Burr the most
unfit man in the U.S. for the office of President," urged in a series of letters to various
Federalist congressmen. Massachusetts's Fisher Ames also advocated the tactic of
supporting Burr long enough to secure from Jefferson some sign that he would "not
countenance democratic amendmts., dependence on France, a wrangle or war with
G. Britain, plunder of the banks and [their] friends, or Madison's empiricism in
regard to trade & navy."
The Federalists did not limit themselves to constitutional measures, at least not
indisputably constitutional measures, as they weighed their options during the first
phase of the crisis, however. Some insisted that if no president was elected by the
time that Adams's administration ended on 4 March 1801, the rules of succession
would take effect, placing executive power in the hands of the president pro tem-
pore ofthe Senate or, ifnone had been chosen, the Speaker ofthe House. Since the
Federalists held a majority in both houses, either of these individuals would almost
certainly have been members of their party. . . .
[T]he Republicans either learned of or surmised every tactic that was considered
by the Federalists; they imagined many more. It occurred to them almost immediately
that the Federalists might try to obstruct a decision in order to transfer executive

32. I he Politi,al tri)?s of tlt, | 7q05 89
jwer to someone of their own choosing. As early as 15 December Jefferson had
already heard, ancl was aiready spreading, a rumor that the Federalists intended to
"let the government devolve on a President of the Senate." Over the next f'ew weeks
the Republican rumor mill added the chief justice, the secretary of state, and the
Speaker of the House to the list of Federaiists to whom power might be committed
"by a legislative act." The very thought "of creating a president by Act of Consress."
as Pennsylvania's John Beckiey put it. struck most Republicans as i-rnconstitutional
and unrepr-rblican. 'Any Larv empowering any Person to exercise the Presidency,"
Sarnuel Smith insisted, would be viewed "as an Usurpation." That the Fecleralists
might def-eat an election without any definite sense of the consequences of their ac-
tions also terrtfled Republicans. To Jeft-erson, "pret'ent[ing] an election altogether"
seemed certain to produce "a suspension of the federal government, for want of a
head." This collrse, he informed one correspondent, would "fopen] to us an abyss,
at which every sincere patriot must shudder."
Republican fears clearly exceeded Federalist plans. Many leading Republicans
worried, lbr exarnple, that the Federalists intended, by preventing a choice between
Jefferson and Burr, to fbrce an entirely new election. It seemed so obvious that such a
course could only lead to a second Republican victory that Albert Gallatin wondered:
"what interest can the Federalists have in defeating an election?" His answer-that
"they mean to usurp government"-was far more revolutionary than anything Fed-
eralists in Washington ever discussed, as far as the existing evidence shows. . . .
Republicans hoped that they could defeat Federalist plans-constitutional and
unconstitutional-through constitutional means. Reasonably confident that eight
state delegations would vote for Jefferson as president and Burr as vice president,
they tmsted that the moderate Federalists in the Maryiand, Deiaware. or Vermont
delegations would provide the decisive ninth state. . . .
[But] the correspondence of leading Republicans demonstrates that they were
[also] willing to take unconstitutional steps, if needed, to foil the unconstitutional
designs ofthe Federalists. . . .
Albert Gallatin, a leading House Republican . . . drafted his own "plan," which
Jefferson apparently approved. In an undated memorandum of late January or early
February, Galiatin examined the possible Federalist goals and weighed the various
Republican options. He enumerated three Federalist "objects"-electing Burr, forc-
ing a new election, and "assum[itgf executive power during interregnum." The first
couid "be def'eated by our own firmness," the second by the Republican-dominated
House that would meet in December and would have to certify the results of any
election. What worried Gaiiatin most was an unconstitutional assumption of power
by the Federalists. Such a course would place the party and the nation in a difficult
position. Either of the extrerne options-"total submission to usurpation on their part
or . . . usurpation on our part"-could have alarming results. He preferred a middle
course, treating the nine months until the next congressional session as an "interreg-
num" in which "the several Republican States [would] act either separately or jointly,
according to circumstances." In this period the Repubiican states would oppose
new acts "flowing immediately from the person who shall have usurped," but ac-
cept and uphold those "which [were] not immediately connected with Presidential
powers." This solution seemed saf'er than Madison's. To Gailatin, "the dangers of
civil war, of the dissolution of the Union, [and] of the stab given to our republican

33. 90 Itlnior Problems in the Earl.r' Republir. :,787-1848
institutions by any assumption of power on lthe Republicans'] part not strictly jur
tified by the forms of our Constitution, [were] the greatest" threats. A partial and
temporary acquiescence involved less risk than assuming power "by a joint act of
the two candidates." . . .
In the view of some Federalists, the acceptable outcomes of the election had
shrunk to electing Burr or going without a president. Writing to his wife after sixteen
ballots, Griswold expressed this determination very simply: "I am willing to put
the Constitution, Government, and everything which belongs to it upon the issue of
this business, and if our opponents will not take Burr, they shall take nobody."
Many of the New England Federalists in Congress insisted to the very end of the
crisis that they would "go without a Constitution and take the risk of a Civil War"
rather than elect Jefferson. Republicans actually worried less about the Federalists
abandoning the Constitution and more about their effecting some form of usurpa-
tion. They saw indications that the Federalists intended to revive the scheme of
transferring power to the president pro tempore of the Senate. This goal could no
longer be accomplished through legislation. But the Federalists could block an
election through the end of the session and then rely on the existing rules of succes-
sion. Republicans found confirmation for their f'ears when Adams called a special
session of the Senate for 4 March. This session was ostensibly necessary to confirm
the new president's cabinet appointments, but Republicans recognized that most
of the senators would be Federalists and that, with Jefferson's term as vice presi-
dent ended, they could not be prevented tiom choosing a Federalist president pro
tempore to be an interim president.
A commitment to thwarting unconstitutional usurpation by the Federalists led
the Republicans to consider unconstitutional, or at least extra-constitutional, meas-
ures of their own. ln Virginia and Pennsylvania the governors took preliminary steps
toward readying their militias to descend on Washington. Precisely what they did, or
were prepared to do, remains unclear, in part because key documents were deliber-
ately destroyed. , . . Jefferson also credited another extra-constitutional measure that
was apparently discussed by the Republicans during the House vote-the idea of a
constitutional "Convention to reorganize & amend the government." . . .
Although neither the preparations of the Pennsylvania and Virginia militias
nor the prospect of a constitutional convention appear to have had the impact that
Jefferson attributed to them, the possibility that the election of 1800 would devolve
into a "revolution in form" certainly hastened the ultimate resoiution of the crisis.
After six days of voting and thirty-five ballots, Bayard-a Federalist and the only
representative from Delaware-promised an end to the deadlock when he declared
that he would abandon Burr and support Jefferson. Bayard broke with his party in
part because he had concluded that Burr could not be elected and in part because
he believed that Jefferson had pledged himself on a few key policies. But it is also
cledr that he feared what might happen if there was no election by the House. As he
informed the governor of Delaware, he did not back down "till it was admitted on
all hands that we must risk the Constitution and a civil war or take Mr. Jefferson."
Along with the Federalist congressmen from Vermont, Maryland, and South Caro-
lina, Bayard devised a plan in which two states that had previously voted for Burr
would cast blank ballots and two states that had previously been divided would
vote for Jefferson. On l7 February, on the thirty-sixth ballot, they put this plan into

34. The Politicctl Crkes of the 1790s 91
action, with the result that ten states voted fbr Jeff'erson, four states continued to
vote for Burr, and two states did not vote.
The most significant factor in keeping the election of 1800 from taking a revolu-
tionary turn or producing a revolutionary result was the commitment of enough men
in each party to the Constitution and the Union. During the crisis over the Quasi-War
and the Alien and Sedition Acts, this commitment led Republicans such as Jefferson
and Madison to counter disunionist extremists in their own party, in part by point-
ing to the potential of the approaching election to dispel "the reign of witches." The
same commitment weighed heavily on Gallatin's mind as he drafted the blueprint for
a restrained and cautious Republican response to the threat of Federalist usurpation
in January 1801. And it produced the final resolution to the stalemate in the House. A
number of Federalist congressmen began the balloting committed, as one explained,
"to makling] a choice, and to acced[ing] to the election of Mr. Jefferson, rather than
expos[ing] the nation to the mischiefs which might result from leaving the govern-
ment without a head." Bayard, who ultimately broke the deadlock, stated flatly that
he did so because he was "perfectly resolved not to risk the constitution or a civil
war." Men of both parties trusted, correctly as it happened, in what Gallatin described
as a general "love of union and order" to preserve the Constitution. . . .
Writing to the English liberal Joseph Priestley just weeks after his election to
the presidency, Jefferson downplayed the recent "storm." "I have been, above all
things, solaced by the prospect which opened on us, in the event of a non-election
of a President," Jefferson ref'lected. "In [that] case, the federal government would
have been in the situation of a clock or watch run down." The solution was simple, in
Jeflerson's thinking. A convention "would have been on the ground in eight weeks,
would have repaired the Constitution where it was defective, and wound it up again."
For Jefferson, it was the transfer of executive dominance from the Federalists to
the Republicans that was truly revolutionary. But, for us, it is the things that might
have happened but did not, and the solutions that might have been attempted but
were not, that seem much more revolutionary. A "revolution in form"-whether
disunion or a military takeover or usurpation or a new constitutional convention-
appeared much more probable to Jefferson and his contemporaries than most ac-
counts would suggest.
Slavery, Democracy, and the Jeffersonians
JOHN ASHWORTH
Contrary to the impression presented by many of the recent works on Republican
ideology, the party that raised Jefferson to the Presidency was far from uniform in
its beliefs and principles. . . . Recent scholarship has emphasized the ideological
distance between the two major parties, but it has given too little attention to the
divisions within them and especially within the Republican party. Yet, as Richard
Ellis had shown, serious differences of opinion were visible in the Republican party
from its very inception (although their practical importance was relatively slight
From John Ashworth, "The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalis ts? I' Jorrnal of Amer-
ican studies, r8 (1984),425-35. Reprinted with the permission of cambridge university press.

35. 92 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
so long as the party was in opposition and faced with a powerful enemy). Their
presence is enough to create doubts about the possibility of some of the generaliza-
tions which historians are now offering. As Ellis has pointed out, the Madisonian
(moderate) wing of the party must be clearly distinguished from that represented by
John Taylor of Caroline. Jefferson himself was in many respects midway between
the two but it is as yet unclear how widespread and popular the specific ideas and
beliefs expressed by each of these Virginians were within the party. In short we do
not yet know where the party's ideological centre of gravity lay, even in Philadel-
phia, the federal capital, let alone within each of the states. We need to know how
typical a Jeffersonian Jefferson was. . . .
This need for qualification is apparent when we consider the extent to which
the Republicans espoused what fJoyce] Appleby terms "the principle of hope." In
her view the Jeffersonians were hopeful and optimistic about the future; the Feder-
alists, as befitted classical republicans, were not. But this is problematic. . . .
When we turn to the partisans of the 1790s, simple generalizations are still
more difficult. Even the apparently uncontentious association of Federalism with
pessimism can be seriously challenged. . . . [A]s John Zvesper points out in his
excellent study of Federalist and Republican ideology, the Federalists in the late
1780s and early '90s were both confident and optimistic. It is true that this confi-
dence was swiftly dissipated when the Republican challenge was mounted but this
is still enough to place a question mark against Appleby's assertion. When we con-
sider the Republicans the problem is still more complex. Undoubtedly Appleby's
interpretation fits Thomas Jefferson himself, and fits him well. Jefferson's optimism
does differentiate him from many classical republicans and Appleby has justly re-
emphasized this. But as far as Madison is concerned her conclusions are far less
satisfactory. For Drew McCoy has shown conclusively that Madison expected the
United States to develop, as Britain had done, a surplus population of landless
poor. This was a prospect which was most unwelcome and disturbing to him. But he
believed that at best the nation could only postpone its degeneration. In McCoy's
words, "Madison's republic was in a race against time."
It is none the less possible that Madison here was at odds with his fellow Re-
publicans. John Taylor's view was rather different. Essentially Taylor was hopeful
about American society and the American economy but with the strict proviso that
the government be conducted according to sound principles. His opinion as to the
likelihood of this varied over time; in general he was neither confident nor despair-
ing. Further research may well show that this attitude was the norm within the party
asawhole....
As many scholars have pointed out, the historiography of the early Republicans
has suffered from a major defect. Whilst many works have focussed upon ideolo-
gies and the minority of the citizens who wrote as committed partisans, others have
concentrated upon the broader changes that were taking place in American society
and in the American economy at this time. Each of these schools has enormously
advanced our understanding of the history of these years; the problem, however, is
to reconcile their separate findings. . . . Is it possible to suggest an alternative?
Clearly any such hypothesis must be highly tentative; the present state of knowl-
edge simply will not support any lrm generalizations. Yet it is surely of interest that
the Republicans drew a disproportionate amount of support from the South. In the

36. The PoliticdL Crises of the 1790s 93
words of Richard Buel "the essential division" in politics was "between a Republican
South and a Federalist New England," with the middle Atlantic states divided. There
were of course exceptions but the South undoubtedly provided the Republicans with
disproportionate electoral suppofi and with the great majority of their national leaders
and spokesmen. In addition to the three Presidents of the Virginia dynasty, men like
John Tayloq John Randolph and Nathaniel Macon were all Southerners. In this con-
nection it is instructive to consider what would have happened to American politics
from the 1790s if there had been no states south of the Mason-Dixon line. Historians
would then doubtless have recorded the successful attempt ofthe Federalist elite to
impose a republican but avowedly anti-democratic political system upon the nation.
After the turbulence which often accompanies war a regime more akin to that of the
British would have emerged. But in actuality the Republican party upset all this.
Nothing is more striking in retrospect than the willingness of Republican leaders to
take their case to the people. Jefferson himself always insisted that the Republicans
"cherished" the people while the Federalists feared or despised them. In ll8l , at a
time when the Federalists (as they would become) were fearfui of social unrest and
political upheaval, Jefferson asserted that "a little rebellion now and then is a good
thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the natural." Buel attributes
this populism to the greater security which the Southerners enjoyed in their leader-
ship roles. Ironically, "aristocratic" Southern leaders, perhaps because ofthe greater
economic homogeneity of the South, could embrace democracy in the confident
belief that their own positions would be safe.
Buel's explanation is a perceptive one. Did Southern leadership give encour-
agement and organizational support to the northern Republicans? Did it make their
views more popular and more respectable? As yet our knowledge is not sufficient to
allow a firm answer to these questions. If they can be answered in the affirmative,
however, it is difficult not to be reminded of Edmund Morgan's brilliant argument
in his book A merican Slavery, American Freedom. Here Morgan claimed that it was
in large part slavery which enabled Americans to embrace republicanism. Slavery
created a "sense of common identity" among whites and altered the relationship
between elites and masses. Because the slaveholders lived off the sweated labour
of blacks the poorer whites were their allies rather than their antagonists. Similarly
the main threat to republicanism, the fear of levelling if the poorer classes could
vote, was much diminished if not entirely removed. As Morgan puts it: 'Aristocrats
could more safely preach equality in a slave society than in a free one" since slaves
would never be permitted to form levelling mobs. The labour force in Virginia "was
composed mainly of slaves"; this was a major structural influence upon Virginian
society and it paved the way for Jefferson's celebrated eulogy of the yeoman farmer.
Morgan argues that slavery propelled Virginians and perhaps other Americans
towards republicanism. His book is concerned primarily with the period up to and
including the Declaration of Independence. Critics may reply that other nations be-
fore and since have embraced republicanism without slavery and that not all slave
societies have generated republican sentiment. It is thus difficult to argue that slavery
is either a necessary or a sulltcient condition for republicanism. But is it not possible
that Morgan's insights apply with greater force to the democratization of the repub-
lic in the half century or so after the adoption of the Federal constitution? For at
this time the United States managed this remarkable transformation without any

37. 94 Major Problems in the Early Republic, 1787-1848
major political or social upheaval. The importance of Jeffersonian ideology, the role
of Southern leaders and the importance of Southern voters in the Republican and
Jacksonian Democratic parties are all so evident as to require little comment. In the
1790s the Republicans began to popularize American politics; historians need to
ask what the precise function of American slavery was in this process.
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Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party ldeology (1978).
Ruth Bloch, Wsionary Republic: Millennial Themes in American Thought, 1756-1800
(1986).
Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamihon (2004).
Jerald Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground ofthe Founding Fathers (1970).
Noble Cunningham, The Jffirsonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organistion,
1789-1801 (1957).
Alexander De Conde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the UndeclaredWar
with France, 1791-1801 (1966).
Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic,
1788-1800 (2003).
Joseph Ellis, Passionate Sage: The Character and Life of John Adams (1993).
His Excellency : George Washington (2004).
John Ferling, John Adams: A Life (1992).
Adams v. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800 (2004).
Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (1976).
Richard Kobn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establish-
ment in America, 1783-1802 (1973).
Stephen G. Kurtz, The Presidency of JohnAdams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800
(r9s-1).
Edmund S. Morgan, The Genius of GeorgeWashington (1980).
John R. Nelson, Liberty and Property: Political Econom)' and Policymaking in the New
Nation, 1789-1 8 I 2 (1987).
Thomas R. Pangle, The Origins of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American
Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (1 983).
Jeffrey L. Pasley, "The Tyranny of Printers": Newspaper Politics in the Early American
Republic (2001).
James Roger Sharp, American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis
(1e93).
Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution
(1986).
James Morton Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition La**s and American Civil
Liberties ( I 956).
William Stinchcombe, The XYZ Affair ( 198 1).
AlfredF.Young,The Democratic Republicans of NewYork: The Origins, 1763-1797
(1966).
John Zvesper, Political Philosophy and Rhetoric: A Study of the Origins of American Political
Parties (1977).