This document discusses framing effects in politics and how they may impact politicians and citizens differently. It summarizes previous research showing that citizens are often vulnerable to framing biases in their political preferences and decision-making. The document questions whether elected officials are also susceptible to framing effects or if they are better able to avoid them due to greater political experience and sophistication. It hypothesizes that politicians will be less impacted by framing than citizens, and that susceptibility to framing will decrease as political experience and position increases. The document aims to test this by comparing how politicians and citizens respond to differently framed policy questions.

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Framing Politicians
Caleb Griffin
Political Science 410
Dr. Daniel Magleby

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Within Political Science there is a general consensus that the average voter is often
subject to framing biases (see for example: Druckman 2001, Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997,
Chong 1993, Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982, Bartells 2003, and Zoller and Feldman 1992).
Without a great deal of political sophistication, ordinary citizens seem completely unable to
counter framing effects (Druckman 2001). There is less information, however, on the ability of
politicians to successfully negotiate framing biases. Are elected officials any better at avoiding
framing effects in political decision-making than their constituents? This is an important question
to consider and one that has had little attention. If elected officials are as vulnerable to framing
effects as the general public, it raises rather serious questions about the efficacy of
representative democracy. On the other hand, if elected officials are able to avoid framing
biases then it is a reassuring sign for the representative system. I shall compare not only
elected officials with the general public, but also compare elected officials with each other based
on their level of political experience.
Framing effects are packaged in several different flavours. The first is an equivalent
frame. An equivalent framing effect occurs when different, but logically equivalent, words or
phrases cause individuals to alter their preferences (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). The second
is an issue frame. Issue framing effects refer to situations where, by emphasizing a subset of
potentially relevant considerations, individuals are led to focus on these considerations when
constructing their opinions (Druckman 2004).
Druckman’s paper is but one of the many works highlighting this problem. Framing is
critical to understand because it seems to challenge the foundational assumptions of much of
the social sciences, like the existence of coherent preferences or stable attitudes. For example,
people reject a policy program when told that it will result in 5% unemployment but prefer it
when

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told that it will result in 95% employment (I shall examine this employment scenario much more
completely later in the paper). The existence of framing effects violates a basic tenet of rational
choice theory. That is, that individuals’ preferences do not change from alternative ways of
eliciting the same preference. In this example, preferences should not depend on whether the
programs are described in terms of unemployment or employment (Druckman 2004).
There is ample evidence, however, that people’s preferences do indeed change
according to framed questions, and can actually change quite significantly (see for example
Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997, Chong 1993, Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982, Bartells
2003). This change can, in part, be explained by prospect theory. Prospect theory as proposed
by Tversky and Kahneman describes the way people chose between probabilistic alternatives
that involve risk, where the probabilities of outcomes are known. The theory states that people
make decisions based on the potential value of losses and gains rather than the final outcome
(1979). Although there are various components to prospect theory, for this paper, the “value
function” portion is most applicable. This is illustrated rather neatly by Tversky and Kahneman in
the following table:

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This hypothetical value function indicates that people naturally place higher value
on outcomes that have a possibility of gains. This predilection, however, causes people to be
more risk averse when the potential for gain seems high and more risk seeking when potentials
for losses exist. Another way to put this is that choices involving gains are often risk averse and
choices involving losses are often risk taking (Tversky & Kahneman 1979).
Also worth noting is the weighting function of prospect theory, which is represented in
this table:

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This indicates how greater weight is placed upon decisions that are seemingly certain
rather than ones that are subject to chance. As Tversky and Kahneman put it:
“In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with
outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes
to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure
losses” (1979).
Later in the paper I compare two framed questions that are fundamentally different in
risk prospects and uncertainty.
If framing is really so ubiquitous, it begs the question, then, of do people really have
political preferences? While this is not the primary focus of my paper, I think it is useful to briefly
examine this question. The answer does provide some insight into how people think about
politics. If we understand the how, then we can better examine why local elected officials might
differ in this regard. There are two broad schools of thought on this matter. The first school
adheres to an idea originally proposed by Philip Converse. He argued that nearly all citizens

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(besides a few elites) are uninformed, unconstrained, and do not possess stable political
preferences. (1964). Converse also argued that as the level of political information dropped from
the elites to the uninformed, constrainment dropped as well. This is an important point for this
paper as I use it as part of my research expectations, albeit in a slightly adulterated form (see
H1 & 2).
The second school are those who would save democratic theory by arguing that citizens
can succeed in political decision-making despite low information. They try to achieve this by
championing the use of heuristics. Heuristics, for the purposes of this paper, are simply any
information shortcut citizens use to make decisions in the absence of full information. Arthur
Lupia has argued about the effectiveness of heuristics as a decision-making process for low-
information citizens. In a well-known experiment involving voters in a California insurance
reform election, Lupia finds that access to widely available information shortcuts allows poorly
informed voters to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed voters. This finding suggests
that voters who lack what he terms“encyclopedic” information about political knowledge can
nevertheless use information shortcuts to vote as though they were well informed. In his results,
Lupia finds that most voters who used heuristics in the election would have made the same
decision had they had access to all the facts previously (1994).
Alexander Toderov has even found that heuristics can be as simple as gauging
competency from a person’s face. His experimental research shows that subjects are just as
accurate gauges of competence from a simple photograph test, as they are with a full
description of a candidate’s character (2005).In other words, based on a simple photograph
people can draw the same conclusions as they would if they had known all the information at
first.

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There has been significant disagreement, however, to Lupia’s championing of heuristics.
Richard Lau and David Redlawsk have argued that people, especially low-information voters,
actually use heuristics quite poorly. Using their “dynamic process-tracing method”, they
conclude that although heuristic use might be endemic, it actually decreases the likelihood of a
correct choice by voters. Perversely, they find that it is those who are most able to ignore
heuristics who use them most effectively- the politically sophisticated (2001).
Kuklinski and Quirk second this skepticism of the miracle of heuristics. They point out
that unlike political scientists, psychologists tend to regard heuristics as automatic, unconscious,
and frequently dysfunctional. Hence, we should expect systematic bias in heuristics
judgements. They cite four major problems with heuristics use:
1. People take their heuristics off the shelf, use them unknowingly and automatically, and rarely
worry about their accuracy.
2. People lack the contextual knowledge needed to use heuristics intelligently.
3. Usable cues are not regularly available (one needs to be paying close attention to pick up
which cues are important).
4.The structures of modern democracy give ordinary citizens almost no incentive to think
carefully about politics (1998).
If we cannot rely on heuristics as an alternative to Converse’s dire findings on the nature
of democratic systems, how are we to save democratic theory? My proposal is that a for a
representative democracy, it is more important that the representatives have stable preferences
and less important that the general citizenry do. In this paper I present a way to demonstrate
those stable preferences amongst elected officials, namely that elected officials will be able to
show preferences by better avoiding the framing biases, which ordinary citizens so are so

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helpless in dealing with. I theorize that elected officials will be superior in avoiding framing
effects than the average citizen and that that superiority will increase along the political
hierarchy, due to a rise in political sophistication across said hierarchy and a greater exposure
to cross-cutting networks (Mutz 2006).
I shall briefly define some key terms that will be used throughout the paper:
Local politicians/elected officials: For this group I have chosen to include only city council
members, mayors, and members of the state congress. For future research it might be
interesting to include national politicians as well, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Ordinary/average citizens: When I term a citizen “ordinary” or “average”, I make no reference
to a citizen’s political ability, only to the fact that they do not hold public office. Thus every citizen
that is not serving as a local representative is an “ordinary citizen” for the purposes of this
paper. Admittedly, this is a little simplistic as citizens will naturally vary in their political
sophistication. I am, however, a firm believer in the work of Philip Converse, and thus assume
that political non-attitudes are the rule amongst the vast majority of ordinary citizens (1964).
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Elected officials will show less susceptibility to framing effects than the
general citizenry.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The greater the magnitude of office, the less susceptible to framing effects.
In other words, a state-level politician will be less susceptible than a local-level politician. Based
on this hypothesis, I would predict that a national-level politician would be the least vulnerable to

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framing effects.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The greater the length of time served in office, the less vulnerable to
framing effects. I call this the experience factor. Elected officials become more familiar with
framing techniques as they serve in office, and thus the longer they serve, the more familiar
they are. This is intuitive, but it is useful to operationalize it as well.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The greater the magnitude of office, the more likely to offer counter frames.
Thus, State-level politicians are more likely to use counter frames than local politicians.
None of these hypotheses are inconsistent with current findings on framing effects, and
all are admittedly quite intuitive. I argue, however, that although one might predict these
hypotheses from previous research on framing, none of them have been actively tested yet on
the demographic I have selected. I have expanded framing theory by applying it to a different
set of actors. Heretofore, framing studies have largely been applied to the average citizen. I am
focusing instead on local elected officials. Any variance between the two sets has profound
implications for representative democracy, and thus is worth exploring.
Method for Testing
A simple yet satisfying way to test for framing effects is to offer the frames in an
interview setting. Druckman’s work is particularly helpful regarding ordinary citizens, and I plan
to extend that methodology to elected officials. The basic premise is that the interviewer will ask
several questions that have been deliberately and carefully framed. A framing effect occurs
when, compared to individuals who receive a positive frame, individuals who receive a negative
frame are significantly more likely to express a negative preference (2001). At least that’s the
first step, the equivalency frame. The second part, issue framing, occurs when individuals,

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presented with a question that has been issue-framed, are more likely to bring up
considerations regarding the issue frame than those not subject to the frame. I will be
comparing the responses of elected officials with ordinary citizens and evaluating their answers
in the context of the frames. All subjects will be asked the same questions, though differently
framed. The final question is an open-ended question, which will allow me to track the
considerations they bring up voluntarily in response to the frame. Open-ended questions will
also give subjects the opportunity to offer counter frames, which is also essential to my theory
(see H4). As stated previously, these frames will come in both the equivalent and issue variety.
Other quasi-framing techniques such as priming and media agenda-setting are also influential,
but beyond the scope of this paper.
For this paper, I limit my argument to the idea that politicians represent the elites
identified by Kinder. Elites, that by virtue of their greater political acumen are able to resist
framing effects far more effectively than the general public. In my theory, susceptibility to
framing effects is inversely correlated with the level of representation (the higher in government,
the less vulnerable to framing). Thus, I will know that my theory is incorrect if elected officials
are just as helpless at avoiding framing effects as the general public. My theory is also incorrect
if there are no significant changes between the different levels of officialdom in regard to framing
effects.
I have been using several small cities in the metropolitan area of Salt Lake City,
including Cottonwood Heights, Holladay, Midvale, and South Jordan. Of course, this means that
the overwhelming majority of my respondents are white, male, and republican. In regards to
office holding, though, there is quite an eclectic mix including mayors, city council members, and
state congress members (including the senate minority leader and speaker of the house).
My research leans heavily upon the work of previous scholars, most notably Druckman

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and also Tversky and Kahneman (for the interview format). Druckman tests 580 individuals in
his test (mostly students) by advertising and rewarding participation with a cash amount. Such a
large number is commendable, but for the purposes of this paper I am using a much smaller
pilot study. If the preliminary results confirm my hypotheses then a larger sample can be taken
in the future.
Druckman uses four randomly ordered equivalency framed questions, which he draws
from previous framing work (see Tversky and Kahneman 1987, Quattrone and Tversky 1988). I
use two of those equivalency framed questions, as I suspect that four framed questions might
lead the subject to guess that some ulterior motive or bias exists in the questions, thus altering
their responses and subsequently the results. These first two questions differ from each other in
that the first is an equivalent framed question that evaluates risk response, while the second
does not. My third question is an issue framed question in the style of Chong (1993). Here are
the questions:
1a.
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the
programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a
2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
1b.
...If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3
probability that 600 people will die.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Respondents are assigned either the positive (1a) or negatively framed (1b) question.
The outcomes to each question are the exact same, just framed differently. Tversky and

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Kahneman (1981, 1987) have tested this question (1a & 1b) on ordinary citizens, while I will be
using local elected officials.
Tversky and Kahneman find that 72% of the respondents chose program A and 28%
preferred program B in 1a, but that in 1b, only 22% opted for program A, while 78% of
respondents chose program B. Thus, individuals’ preferences change by 50% due to alternative
frames, even though the objective outcomes and their descriptions remain equivalent
(Druckman 2001). Based on my hypotheses, I predicted that local elected officials would fare
much better in resisting this equivalency frame (less than a 50% swing).
This large change in preference is explained by Tversky and Kahneman in terms of
prospect theory. If framed positively, the outcome of having 200 people saved for certain is
better than the uncertainty of saving more people based on chance. Because the gain is
perceived as being high in the positive frame, respondents prefer program A because they have
been prompted into risk aversion. The opposite is true of the negative frame. Because the
certain option has been framed negatively, there is little perceived value, and thus respondents
are prompted into risk seeking behavior.
2a.
Political decision-making often involves a considerable number of trade-offs.A program
that benefits one segment of the population may work to the disadvantage of another
segment. Policies designed to lead to higher rates of employment frequently have an
adverse effect on inflation. Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting one of
two economic policies.
If program C is adopted, 90% of the work force would be employed, while the rate of
inflation would be 12%. If program D is adopted, 95% of the work force would be
employed, while the rate of inflation would be 17%. The following table summarizes the
alternative policies and their likely consequences:
Work Force Employed Rate of Inflation
Policy (%) (%)
_______________________________________________________
Program C 90 12

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Program D 95 17
Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting program C or program D. Which
would you select?
2b.
. . . . If program C is adopted, 10% of the work force would be unemployed, while the
rate of inflation would be 12%.
If program D is adopted, 5% of the work force would be unemployed, while the rate of
inflation would be 17%.
The following table summarizes the alternative policies and their likely consequences:
Work Force Unemployed Rate of Inflation
Policy (%) (%)
_______________________________________________________
Program C 10 12
Program D 5 17
Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting program C or program D. Which
would you select?
This question is drawn directly from Quattrone and Tversky’s work (1988), and again will
help form a comparison between ordinary citizens and local elected officials. They find that in
2a, 54% of respondents opted for program C and 46% preferred program D. In 2b, 36% opted
for program C, while 64% of respondents selected program D, an 18% shift. The large
differences between the two questions in terms of the shift (50 % versus 18%) are explained by
Druckman as differences between risk (2004). Q1 has choices between certain outcomes and
possible outcomes thus promoting different responses to risk (depending on the frame). Q2 has
two outcomes that are certain and thus not responsive to risk behavior. This accounts for a
lower variance, but yet a variance still exists where none should according to a typical rational
choice model. 18% represents nearly a fifth of respondents, quite a robust number.This

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dramatic shift in preferences amongst ordinary citizens in response to a very simple framing
difference emphasizes my point made earlier about the non-attitudes of the general citizenry.
My data, provided hereafter, shows how local elected officials differ in this respect.
The third question is the issue-framed question:
3. How would you feel about the Klan publishing a newspaper or holding a rally
preaching white supremacy in your town? As an elected official would you grant them a
permit?
[Based on the considerations they raise in response to this question, one of the two
following counter frames are offered:]
3.1 Numerous courts have ruled that the U.S. Constitution ensures that the Klan has the
right to speak and hold rallies on public grounds, and that individuals have the right to
hear the Klan's message if they are interested. With that in mind, would you grant the
permit?
3.2 Many of the Klan's appearances and rallies have been marked by violent clashes
between Klan supporters and counter demonstrators who show up to protest the Klan's
racist activities. In one confrontation last October in Ohio, several bystanders were
injured by rocks thrown by Klan supporters and protesters. Usually, a large police force
is needed to control the crowds. With that in mind, would you grant the permit?
The general question is posed by Chong (1993), while the sub questions are the
work of Nelson et al. (1997). This third question is designed to measure issue framing
responses. In my research, responses were recorded specifically to see if respondents
were able to offer any considerations without prompting, and to measure their responses
to the counter frames. My hypotheses predict a greater ability of elected officials in this
area. Specifically, that local elected officials would list more considerations.
In Nelson’s work, framing significantly affected tolerance for the KKK rally, with those in

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the free speech frame expressing greater tolerance than those in the public order frame
(t69 = 1.73, p < .05). Table 5 displays the means by condition (Nelson et al. 1997).
My own results to Q3 are more qualitative as I did measure tolerance as a dependent
variable.
Results:
The first two questions in my survey are the easiest to compute. Tversky and Kahneman
find that in response to the positive frame in Q1, 72% of the respondents chose program A and
28% preferred program B. In response to a negative frame in Q1, only 22% opted for program
A, while 78% of respondents chose program B. Thus, the framing effect is 50% for this
particular question.
In Q2, the positive frame elicits a 54% selection of program C and 46% for program
D.The negative frame received 36% for program C, and 64% for program D, which gives us an
18% framing effect.
In comparison, this is what I found amongst elected officials:
In response to the positive frame in Q1, 80% of the respondents chose program A and 20%
preferred program B. In response to a negative frame in Q1, 50% opted for program A, and 50%

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of respondents chose program B. Thus, the framing effect is 30% for this particular question.
In Q2, the positive frame elicits an 80% selection of program C and 20% for program
D.The negative frame received 50% for program C, and 50% for program D, which gives us a
30% framing effect again.
In Q1 then, local elected officials were 20% better at avoiding framing effects than the
average citizen but were worse in Q2 by 12%.
It is important to note that I am just using a simple comparison of means test, comparing
Tversky and Kahneman’s results to my own. They find a framing effect of 50% and 18% for Q1
and Q2 among ordinary citizens, while I find an effect of 30% for both questions. A more
interesting result might be to compare the framing effects of the elected officials I contacted with
their constituents from the same area. That is certainly an avenue for further research. For this
paper, though, this comparison of means test indicates that the framing effect seems to differ
amongst elected officials. I acknowledge that my sample size is very poor, but the trend exists
for further study and confirmation.
Question 3 has no real comparison data. Since I focused only on elected officials, I lack
data comparing the results of Q3 with ordinary citizens. My results though are indicative of a
high level of political sophistication by local elected officials. 82% listed one of the three
relevant considerations identified by Chong (1993) without prompting. 55% brought up the free
speech consideration, 27% the legalistic consideration, and 18% raised none of the relevant
considerations.
In response to counter framing, only 36% offered the consideration prompted by the
frame. I don’t have the comparison data yet, but my expectation is that ordinary citizens will be

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much more likely to list considerations prompted by the counter frame. 82% of respondents
bringing up a consideration without prompting is an even more robust number then I expected,
and unlikely to be matched by ordinary citizens (although as stated, I lack the data to verify this).
Evaluating this question normatively, however, reveals certain trends. I recorded their
responses, and will include some here to indicate the level of expertise. Here are some of the
responses that indicate an awareness of the free speech frame. These are in response to Q3,
and without the counter frames provided (unprompted in other words):
N1: “I’d certainly be disturbed by it. But yes, they would qualify for the permit. I may disagree
with their premise but they have a right to free speech.”
N2: “Well, that’s freedom of speech. I’m personally opposed, but would uphold it
constitutionally.”
N5: “I don’t know if I would [pause] but then again I couldn’t deny the permit because some
things have to be open to the public, because they have a right to freedom of speech.”
N7: “Absolutely entitled to, even opinions you don’t like are allowed voicing.”
N10: “Personally, I would take issue, but in deference to the right of assembly I would allow it.”
These responses all indicated a personal distaste for the subject but a willingness to
uphold the proposed permit because of a deference to freedom of speech. N5 represents this
best. This official opposed it at first but then, without prompting, brought that consideration to
mind.
Here are some of the examples of a legalistic consideration being raised without
prompting to Q3:

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N6: “I would be opposed to it. (Pause) However, the ACLU would take a different view. The
courts have decided this already, so I would support the courts.
N8:“I’m personally opposed, but would grant a permit if they met all the requirements of the
permit, like public safety, the location, the permit fee, nature of the rally, whether it’s a parade or
in a pavillion etc. If they meet the requirements of the permit they have the right to hold a rally
because it’s against the law not to allow them to rally constitutionally.”
N9:“I’m trying to remember if white supremacy counts as protected speech. If it is, you’re legally
obligated to allow it. So yes.”
Interestingly enough, none of the respondents raised the public safety consideration
without prompting. Chong finds that the public safety consideration is the most common in his
research among ordinary citizens (1993). This variance suggests that public officials are more
swayed by legalistic and constitutional arguments than ordinary citizens.
Hypotheses revisited:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Elected officials will show less susceptibility to framing effects than the
general citizenry.
Using the comparison of means test, elected officials were 20% better at avoiding
framing effects in Q1 than the average citizen, but were worse in Q2 by 12%. The 12% worse
rating in Q2 is surprising and unexpected. It is unclear why they performed worse for this
second problem. The results for Q1 indicate that elected officials perform better in risk-prone
situations. A more accurate way to put this is that elected officials are more risk averse than the
general public. In Q1, a greater majority of respondents in my survey chose the risk averse
choice in both the positive and negative framed options. This suggests that elected officials are
indeed more stable in their preferences than the average citizen.

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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The greater the magnitude of office, the less susceptible to framing effects.
I did not get enough interviews with state level politicians to answer this question
definitively. My expectation remains unchanged in this category, however, based on the open-
ended responses to Q3 by the state level politicians I did interview. They raised the appropriate
considerations without prompting, indicating a high level of political sophistication.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The greater the length of time served in office, the less vulnerable to
framing effects.
I divided my respondents between those who have served less than 6 years in office,
and those who have served longer (division for convenience only). Of those who served less
than 6 years, they were evenly divided between Q1 & 2 despite framing differences. Of those
who served longer than 6 years, there was a 50% framing effect for Q1 & 2 between the two
frames. Thus there was no discernable difference in susceptibility to frames between the two
groups. This suggests that gaining political office is more important in terms of vulnerability to
framing than staying in office.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The greater the magnitude of office, the more likely to offer counter frames.
Again, I did not get enough interviews with state level politicians to answer this question
definitively. Since only 36% of respondents raised the necessary considerations when prompted
by the counter frame, it is perhaps indicative that counter framing is not as impactful as simple
positive or negative equivalent framing. Based on the results of H3, however, I now expect little
difference between the different levels of politicians.

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Concluding Remarks
My research indicates that elected officials are indeed different. But why are they
different? This opens up a large avenue of research for the future. My test was simple: to show
that there was a variance between elected officials and ordinary citizens in terms of framing, but
did not include any mechanisms for effectively explaining the variance. Further research could
focus on a greater political sophistication among elected officials, greater exposure to cross-
cutting networks (Mutz 2006), and the elite competition/rhetoric factor identified by Kinder
(1998). The implications for democracy in this country that my findings illustrate are positive.
Since elected officials are better able to avoid framing effects, they are less likely to be
manipulated by media framing techniques. They also demonstrate a greater consistency in
preferences. This is good news for voters who desire rational representatives.
Appendix
Survey Responses for Elected Officials
Model:
Name
Elected office
Years in office
Partisan I.D
Option selection
Open ended answer
Response to counter frame
Positive Frame:
N1:
Name removed for privacy reasons

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Mayor of local city
9 years in office
Republican
Positive Frame:
A & C selected
“I’d certainly be disturbed by it. But yes, they would qualify for the permit. I may disagree with
their premise but they have a right to free speech.”
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATION.
Counter Frame 3.2:
“Yes, but they’d have to pay for the police protection.”
N2:
Name removed for privacy reasons
City Councilman (District 4) of local city
4 years in Office
Independent
Positive Frame:
B & D selected
“Well, that’s freedom of speech. I’m personally opposed, but would uphold it constitutionally.”
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATION.
Counter Frame 3.2:
“I would not issue permits if I feared any violence would ensue.”
PUBLIC SAFETY CONSIDERATION
N3:
Name removed for privacy reasons
City Council Member in local city
7 years
Democrat
Positive Frame:
A & C selected
“I would highly object. No.”
Counter Frame 3.1:
“No, because I don’t think there should be full equality for everyone.”
Q: Because the Klan has an objectionable message?
A: “Exactly.”
N4:
Name removed for privacy reasons
City Council Member in local city
2 years
Republican
A & C selected
“No-one likes extremeness because it’s disruptive. It distracts everybody. It’s free speech, yes,

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but it distracts from critical issues like clean air and clean water. Most people will say free
speech, but I say it’s a distraction.”
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATION
Counter Frame 3.1:
“Well, I would want to consider legal council to see if it’s allowed. But we’d have to otherwise it
would violate the first amendment.
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATION
N5:
Name removed for privacy reasons
City Council Member in local city
7 years
Independent
A & C selected
“I don’t know if I would [pause] but then again I couldn’t deny the permit because some things
have to be open to the public, because they have a right to freedom of speech.”
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATION
Counter Frame 3.2:
“You would still have to [grant them the permit] because of freedom of speech.
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATION
Negative Frame:
N6:
Name removed for privacy reasons
Utah State Senate
27 years in office
Democrat
Negative Frame:
A & D selected
“I would be opposed to it. (Pause) However, the ACLU would take a different view. The courts
have decided this already, so I would support the courts.
LEGALISTIC CONSIDERATION
Counter Frame 3.2:
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATION.
“Yes, because of freedom of assembly, it’s a constitutional right. It would cost more to make
sure it didn’t get out of hand, but that’s the price of freedom.”
N7:
Name removed for privacy reasons
City Councilman in local city
2 years
Republican
Negative Frame:

23. 23
A & C selected
“Absolutely entitled to, even opinions you don’t like are allowed voicing.”
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATION.
Counter Frame 3.2:
“Yes, but they’d be required to pay the cost of police protection.”
N8:
Name removed for privacy reasons
City Councilman in local city
2 years
Republican
Negative Frame:
B & D selected
“I’m personally opposed, but would grant a permit if they met all the requirements of the permit,
like public safety, the location, the permit fee, nature of the rally, whether it’s a parade or in a
pavillion etc. If they meet the requirements of the permit they have the right to hold a rally
because it’s against the law not to allow them to rally constitutionally.”
LEGALISTIC CONSIDERATION
Counter Frame 3.2:
“Yes, if the city has the means to enforce public safety.”
N9:
Name removed for privacy reasons
City Councilman in local city
8 years
Republican
Negative Frame:
B & D selected
“I’m trying to remember if white supremacy counts as protected speech. If it is, you’re legally
obligated to allow it. So yes.”
LEGALISTIC CONSIDERATION
Counter Frame 3.2:
“That could be used to not do so [issue a permit] but we could make them pay for it as a permit
fee.”
N10:
Name removed for privacy reasons
Utah House of Representatives
15 years
Republican
A & C selected
“Personally, I would take issue, but in deference to the right of assembly I would allow it.”
FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATION
Counter Frame 3.2:

24. 24
“The rally has to do with the freedom of speech, but if they broke the law, they’d be arrested.
They are guaranteed freedom of speech within reason. For instance, if you yell fire in a crowded
theater, you’ll be arrested.”
N11:
Name removed for privacy reasons
City Council Member in local city
8 years
Republican
B & C selected
“I would be opposed to it because I’m in favor of equal rights...but that’s an interesting question
[long pause]. Yes, I would give them a permit because I would have to give a permit to any
other group as well.” [Never explicitly mentioned freedom of speech, but seemed to favor a sort
of equality as rationale for his argument. This doesn’t fit into the considerations I selected before
conducting this research]
Counter Frame 3.2:
“Yes” [Upon prompting, mentioned equality again]
Response Totals
Elected Officials:
Postive Frame:
N1: A & C
N2: B & D
N3: A & C
N4: A & C
N5: A & C
Free Speech Consideration: 4
Counter frame Consideration: 1 (Pub. Safety), 2 (Free Speech)
Negative Frame:
N1: A & D
N2: A & C
N3: B & D
N4: B & D
N5: A & C
N6: B & C
Legalistic Consideration: 3

25. 25
Free Speech Consideration: 2
Counter frame Consideration: 1 (Free Speech)
Preamble
Positive Frame
1a.
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the
programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a
2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
2a.
Political decision-making often involves a considerable number of trade-offs.A program
that benefits one segment of the population may work to the disadvantage of another
segment. Policies designed to lead to higher rates of employment frequently have an
adverse effect on inflation. Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting one of
two economic policies.
If program C is adopted, 90% of the work force would be employed, while the rate of
inflation would be 12%. If program D is adopted, 95% of the work force would be
employed, while the rate of inflation would be 17%. The following table summarizes the
alternative policies and their likely consequences:
Work Force Unemployed Rate of Inflation
Policy (%) (%)
_______________________________________________________
Program C 10 12
Program D 5 17
Which of the two programs would you favour?
3. How would you feel about the Klan publishing a newspaper or holding a rally
preaching white supremacy in your town? As an elected official would you grant them a
permit?

26. 26
3.1 Numerous courts have ruled that the U.S. Constitution ensures that the Klan has the
right to speak and hold rallies on public grounds, and that individuals have the right to
hear the Klan's message if they are interested. With that in mind, would you grant the
permit?
3.2 Many of the Klan's appearances and rallies have been marked by violent clashes
between Klan supporters and counter demonstrators who show up to protest the Klan's
racist activities. In one confrontation last October in Ohio, several bystanders were
injured by rocks thrown by Klan supporters and protesters. Usually, a large police force
is needed to control the crowds. With that in mind, would you grant the permit?
Preamble
Negative Frame
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is
expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been
proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the
programs are as follows:
1b....If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3
probability that 600 people will die.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Political decision-making often involves a considerable number of trade-offs.A program
that benefits one segment of the population may work to the disadvantage of another
segment. Policies designed to lead to higher rates of employment frequently have an
adverse effect on inflation. Imagine you were faced with the decision of adopting one of
two economic policies.
. . . . If program C is adopted, 10% of the work force would be unemployed, while the
rate of inflation would be 12%.
If program D is adopted, 5% of the work force would be unemployed, while the rate of
inflation would be 17%.
The following table summarizes the alternative policies and their likely consequences:
Work Force Unemployed Rate of Inflation
Policy (%) (%)
_______________________________________________________
Program C 10 12
Program D 5 17

27. 27
Which of the two programs would you favour?
3. How would you feel about the Klan publishing a newspaper or holding a rally
preaching white supremacy in your town? As an elected official would you grant them a
permit?
3.1 Numerous courts have ruled that the U.S. Constitution ensures that the Klan has the
right to speak and hold rallies on public grounds, and that individuals have the right to
hear the Klan's message if they are interested. With that in mind, would you grant the
permit?
3.2 Many of the Klan's appearances and rallies have been marked by violent clashes
between Klan supporters and counter demonstrators who show up to protest the Klan's
racist activities. In one confrontation last October in Ohio, several bystanders were
injured by rocks thrown by Klan supporters and protesters. Usually, a large police force
is needed to control the crowds. With that in mind, would you grant the permit?
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