Risk and Resistance Risk Acceptance and Protesting Beha.docx

Risk and Resistance: Risk Acceptance and Protesting Behavior
in Democratic and
Non-Democratic Countries
Abstract
Kam’s (2012) theoretical framework argues that risk-accepting
individuals participate in politics
because they enjoy exciting and novel activities. Given that
nondemocracies are more repressive
than democracies, how might individuals’ acceptance of risk
and system of government influence
the decision to protest? Using data from the 2005-2014 World
Values Survey, I find that highly risk-
accepting individuals in democratic countries are much more
likely to report a willingness to
participate in future political boycotts than their less risk-
accepting counterparts. Substantively, the
results indicate that highly risk-accepting individuals are 52%
and 41% more likely to boycott in

median democratic countries compared to other members of
society depending on whether one
uses Freedom House or Polity IV scores. Further, I find no
evidence that risk acceptance influences
demonstrating or petitioning. Low risk-accepting individuals are
more hesitant in their willingness to
risk life and limb by challenging the status quo in democratic
and non-democratic countries.
2
1 Introduction
Why are some citizens willing to protest their government while
others passively turn a blind eye
and abstain? Scholars offer three schools of thought regarding
individual protest behavior. The first,
disaffected radicalism, argues that protesters are unsatisfied
with or alienated from traditional
representative channels (Gurr 1970). Second, strategic resource
scholars suggest that protests are a
function of civic expression rather than disaffection with the

political process (Inglehart 1977; 1997).
A third school argues the decision to protest is dependent upon
the context of the political
environment rather than any generalizable motivation.
Scholars dedicate a plethora of resources to better understand
why individuals participate in
politics generally, and protests specifically, because political
participation increases democratic
satisfaction (Anderson et al. 2005; Blais & Gélineau 2007) and
political equality (Rosenstone &
Hansen 1993). Further, protests are often successful, lead to
political change, and allow citizens to
express their grievances and policy preferences to political
elites (Celestino & Gleditsch 2013;
Hooghe & Marien 2014; Stephan & Chenoweth 2008). By
considering additional explanations of
protest behavior, scholars can better understand how and why
some governments are more
responsive to citizen preferences than others.
Psychology scholars offer valuable insight into this debate by
considering individuals’ risk
acceptance, defined as the extent to which individuals seek out
risky behaviors and uncertain

outcomes (Ehrlich & Maestas 2010; Weber, Blais, & Betz
2002). Risk-accepting individuals are
generally comfortable with uncertainty (Ehrlich & Maestas
2010; Levy 2003) and they are more likely
to pursue exciting activities compared to other members of
society (Kam 2012; Zuckerman 1979;
3
2007). An important missing link in the literature is how risk
acceptance influences protesting
behavior in different political systems.1
I use the 2005 to 2014 World Values Survey to test whether and
how risk acceptance
influences the propensity to protest in democratic and non-
democratic countries. I consider two
important research questions: (1) do the risk accepting protest at
different rates in democratic and
non-democratic countries? (2) does increasing political
freedoms motivate or repel participation for
the risk accepting? I measure democracy and nondemocracy
using the Polity IV and Freedom House
scores. The findings indicate that risk acceptance is a robust
predictor of protest activity, but the

substantive findings are limited to only boycotting. Highly risk-
accepting individuals are not only
much more likely to participate in boycotts than low risk-
accepting individuals, they are also more
likely to report a willingness to boycott in countries with more
freedom. On the other hand, the
findings also suggest that the risk accepting do not provide any
more internal pressure on non-
democratic regimes than low risk-accepting individuals.
Nondemocracies, therefore may continue to
harbor undemocratic principles or, at a minimum, quell any
such rebellion beforehand with impunity.
The willingness of the risk accepting to participate in protests is
an important theoretical and
practical implication that furthers scholarly understanding of
the causal mechanisms associated with
individual protesting behavior. Supplementary analyses lend
support to the following proposed
causal mechanisms: risk-accepting individuals participate in
politics because they find it novel and
exciting (Kam 2012), democracies have higher rates of political
participation compared to
nondemocracies (Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2010), and
democracies respond to protestors in

1 By protest behavior I mean demonstrating, boycotting, and
petitioning. By political systems I
mean democracies and nondemocracies. I use political systems
and regimes interchangeably
throughout the remainder of the paper.
4
systematically different ways compared to non-democratic
regimes (Davenport 1999; Poe et al.
1999).
2 Risk Acceptance and General Protest Participation
Political scholars find strong evidence that risk acceptance
influences American political participation
(Kam 2012) and candidate vote choice (Kam & Simas 2012).
However, little work has considered the
role of risk acceptance at the international level. To develop a
broader theory of protesting behavior
between countries, we must first determine whether the risk
accepting are generally more likely to
protest in countries outside of the United States. The causal
mechanisms for these studies are three-

fold; risk-accepting individuals participate in politics because
they find it exciting, novel, and an
opportunity to challenge the political status quo (Ehrlich &
Maestas 2010; Kam 2012; Kam & Simas
2012; Levy 2003). While countries vary in their political
institutions and citizens vary in their degree
of participation around the world (Dalton, van Sickle, &
Weldon 2010), it does not strain credulity to
assume that the causal mechanisms of risk acceptance and
participation in the United States are any
different outside of the United States. Indeed, risk-accepting
individuals are generally comfortable
with uncertainty (Ehrlich & Maestas 2010; Levy 2003) and may
be more likely to challenge the status
quo and accept losses (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) that may
arise from protesting.
Following the work of Kam (2012), I argue the risk accepting
generally participate in politics
because they find it exciting, novel, and an opportunity to
challenge the political status quo. While I
argue the causal mechanisms of risk acceptance and protesting
are the same across countries, the
institutional and political differences between countries
introduces several important theoretical

5
caveats beyond what can be studied in the United States. One
such caveat is the role of political
freedoms and liberties.
3 Risk Acceptance, Political Freedom, and Protesting Behavior
An interesting paradox in the literature finds that those who are
the most satisfied with democracy
are also the most likely to engage in political protests against
the government (Dalton, van Sickle,
and Weldon 2010; Passini and Morselli 2011; Przeworski et al.
2000; Vanhuysse 2006). Explanations
for this paradox include growing economic conditions and
positive life satisfaction that allow
democratic citizens more resources to protest their government
(Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon
2010), civic duty minded citizens that are willing to challenge
authority (Passini and Morselli 2011),
and a desire for social change (Moscovici, 1976; Nemeth,
2003). If individuals are more likely to
protest in democracies compared to nondemocracies, then the
influence of risk acceptance may

further enhance the democratic protesting paradox. In other
words, the risk accepting may be even
more likely to protest in democracies compared to their less
risk-accepting counterparts. On the
other hand, while the risk accepting may participate in politics
at higher rates than other members
of society (Kam 2012), the repressive policies in
nondemocracies may discourage participation for
high and low risk-accepting individuals.
4 Government Institutions and Political Freedom
Protestors achieve their goals by making threats against the
government and disrupting the political
environment (DeNardo 1985; Piven & Cloward 1977).
Governments have four potential responses
to protests. They can: (1) concede to the demands of challengers
without repression, (2) repress the
6
challengers without concessions, (3) tolerate the challenge
without concession or repression, or (4)
repress the challenges but grant concessions (Franklin 2009).

Protesters win concessions when
governments concede to their demands, while repressions are
the negative consequences
governments enact in response to protests. I focus on the
theoretical implications of concessions
and repressions on the decision to protest.
I identify three important factors why we may observe different
protesting behavior from the
risk accepting in democratic and non-democratic countries.
First, government responses to
protesting are systematically different between democracies and
nondemocracies. Scholars find that
higher levels of democracy lead to lower levels of political
repression and higher levels of
government concession (Davenport 1995; Henderson 1991). In
other words, democracies inherently
respond to the wishes of its citizens. In democracies, the risk
accepting (1) may overestimate the
chance of concessions or (2) have greater confidence that the
government will not respond with
repressions. Conversely, non-democratic countries are more
likely to “subjugate citizens to prevent
any kind of threat” (Regan & Henderson 2002 p. 3).
Nondemocracies provide few rights and are less

beholden to institutional constraints which, in turn, enables
their leaders to repress impending
threats (Davenport 1999; Poe et al. 1999). In nondemocracies,
the risk accepting (1) may
underestimate the chance of repressions or (2) overestimate the
chance of concession. Second,
elected political elites are constrained by democratic principles
that unelected leaders need not
follow. Indeed, democratic voters may punish elected leaders in
future elections (Gartner & Regan
1996). This suggests greater uncertainty when protesting in
nondemocracies, as non-democratic
leaders are less likely to grant concessions to their citizens and
more likely to repress those who
engage in protests (Davenport 1995; Henderson 1991). Protests
are far more likely to take place in
7
democracies than nondemocracies (Przeworski et al. 2000), in
part because democracies “allow their
citizens greater freedoms of expression” (Vanhuysse 2006 p. 1).
Finally, democratic citizens possess

numerous avenues to influence their government that non-
democratic citizens do not have, such as
voting, petitioning, attending rallies and meetings, and writing
letters. These additional avenues
minimize the use of violent methods by citizens against the
government (Regan & Henderson 2002).
These additional avenues are further magnified in electoral
authoritarian regimes. While electoral
authoritarian regimes conduct elections, they often limit the
number of parties, use voter
intimidation tactics, and may go to the extreme of manipulating
election results (Schedler 2013). In
these electoral authoritarian regimes, elections are symbolic.
Differences in granting government concessions, use of
government constraint in democratic
systems, and manipulation of electoral institutions by
authoritarian non-democratic regimes
suggests citizens may approach political participation in
general, and protesting specifically, in
systematically varying ways depending upon the country in
which they live. On the one hand, the
risk accepting, compared to other members of society, may be
more likely to protest in
nondemocracies because it provides an opportunity to challenge

the status quo. On the other hand,
the lack of government concessions in nondemocracies may
deter participation because the risk
accepting may view protesting as a futile endeavor. However,
theory would suggest that their higher
willingness to challenge the status quo and accept losses, and
their comfortability with uncertainty
may lead the risk accepting to protest at higher rates than other
members of society. While I make
no directional hypothesis concerning participation, we should
expect varying relationships between
risk acceptance and protesting behavior depending on country
freedoms and liberties. This leads to
the following hypothesis: Political freedoms influence
protesting activity for the risk accepting.
8
5 Data and Method of Analysis
I test the hypothesis using 2005-2014 data from the World
Values Survey (WVS), which has a large
sample size (N= 91,204) over multiple years. The WVS contains
a variety of political systems,

geographic regions, and control variables that scholars find
influence protest behavior (Blais 2006;
Kam 2012; Lijphart 2012; Norris, Walgrave, & Van Aelst
2005). More importantly for the present
analysis, the WVS provides a multiple item index of risk
behavior.
The WVS asks respondents “Have you ever participated in a
peaceful and lawful
demonstration?”, “Have you ever participated in a political
boycott?”, and “Have you ever signed a
petition?”2 Although I make no hypotheses differentiating
between boycotts, demonstrations, or
signing petitions, the literature indicates substantive differences
between the three activities (Norris,
Walgrave, & Van Aelst 2005). We should expect different
substantive participation rates for these
protest activities, and the inclusion of Risk Acceptance may
further exaggerate the differences.
Demonstrate, Boycott, and Petition are three-point scales coded
0 if respondents said they would
“never do this,” 1 if they “might do this,” and 2 if they “have
done this.” Because the dependent
variables are categorical, I use a two-level multinomial logit
generalized structural equation model

set to countries as the first stage and individuals as the second
to test the hypothesis.
I measure risk acceptance using a similar approach to that used
previously by other scholars
(Berinsky & Lewis 2007; Freese 2004; Hoyle et al. 2002; Kam
2012; Miller 2000). Kam (2012) uses the
following statements in her risk scale: “I like new and exciting
experiences, even if I have to break
the rules” and “In general, how easy or difficult is it for you to
accept taking risks?” Similarly, the
2 Respondents can choose from “I would never do this”
(boycott= 63.67%, demonstrate= 48.81%,
petition= 43.55%), “I might do this” (boycott= 28.58%,
demonstrate= 35.71%, petition= 29.32%), or
“I have done this” (boycott= 7.75%, demonstrate= 15.48%,
petition= 27.13%).
9
WVS includes an 8-item index about risk-accepting, risk-
seeking, and risk-tolerant attitudes.3 For
example, the WVS asks respondents whether “Adventure and
taking risks are important to this
person; to have an exciting life” and “It is important to this
person to have a good time; to “spoil”

oneself.” These questions capture favorability towards risk
similar to Kam’s measure. Responses
range from “very much like me” to “not at all like me.” I code
Risk Acceptance as a 41-point scale
where 0 is “not at all like me” and 40 is “very much like me.”
Higher values represent a greater
acceptance of risk (m= 18, s.d.= 5) I correlate Risk Acceptance
with Age (-0.31, p< .001), Sex (-0.13,
p< .001), and Education (0.11, p< .001) as an initial test of the
validity and reliability of the current
measure. The correlations are statistically significant and in the
expected direction. The older and
female populations are less likely to identify as risk accepting,
while the higher educated are more
likely (Weber, Blais, & Betz 2002).
I use the Freedom House Index and Polity IV scores to code
country freedoms. I include an
interaction between Risk Acceptance x Polity in the models.
While Polity is a common measure of
institutional freedoms often used in the literature (Kapstein &
Converse 2008), I also include an
interaction term between Freedom House x Risk Acceptance,
which includes more detailed measures

of civil rights and liberties.4 Table A-2 in the Appendix
includes a detailed listing of each country used
in the analysis.5
3 I use risk acceptance, risk seeking, and risk tolerance
interchangeably.
4 See John Högström’s (2013) analysis about the differences
between Freedom House and Polity IV
scores.
5 I exclude Armenia, Burkina Faso, Libya, Pakistan, Singapore,
and Tunisia because of inconclusive
or contradictory measures between POLITY IV and Freedom
House. Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia,
Czech Republic, Croatia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Puerto Rico, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, and Tanzania
are excluded because there are no
risk scores for these countries. Andorra, Hong Kong, Palestine,
Serbia, Uganda, and Venezuela are
10
I also include theoretically important control variables in the
models. These factors are social
structures, motivational attitudes, government support, political
behaviors, and economic
satisfaction. The protest literature often finds that Education,
Employment, Political Interest, Social

Trust, Party Member, and Labor Member have a positive effect
on protesting, and that Age, Sex,
Religiosity, Ideology, and Government Confidence have a
negative effect (Norris, Walgrave, & Van
Aelst 2005). Recent literature also finds a strong positive
correlation between economic happiness
and protest behavior (Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2010;
Quaranta 2016). A detailed coding of all
control variables is available in the Appendix.
6 Findings
I use a two-level multinomial logit generalized structural
equation model set to countries in the first
stage and individuals in the second with “never do” as the
baseline (comparison) group in the
analyses that follow. I begin the analysis by considering the
direct role of Risk Acceptance on Might
Demonstrate (b= 0.0013, p= .50; b= -0.0091, p= .48) in Table 1,
Might Boycott (b= 0.0021, p< .001;
b= 0.0209, p< .001) in Table 2, and Might Petition (b= -0.0040,
p< .10; b= -0.0040, p< .10) in Table 3
without interaction terms. Surprisingly, Risk Acceptance has
little positive or statistically significant
direct effect on demonstrating and petitioning. Risk Acceptance

does however, have a direct positive
and statistically significant effect on Might Boycott. This is
somewhat inconsistent with previous
findings in the American literature that finds a direct
relationship between high risk acceptance and
political participation (Kam 2012). One explanation for this
finding may be that previous studies have
excluded because there is not a POLITY IV and/or Freedom
House score. Belarus, China, Taiwan,
Finland, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Uzbekistan are
excluded due to a lack of observations.
11
not looked at the role of risk acceptance on more “costly” forms
of political participation such as
protesting, or that variations in country-level risk acceptance
behaviors may result in null direct
relationships.
I include an interaction term between risk acceptance, Freedom
House, and Polity IV scores
on “Might Demonstrate” in the second and fourth columns of
Table 1. The findings indicate a positive

and statistically significant effect for Risk Acceptance x
Freedom House (b= 0.0012, p< .05) and Risk
Acceptance x Polity IV (b= 0.0010, p< .05) on “Might
Demonstrate”, controlling for all other factors
in the model. The coefficient for Risk Acceptance is the effect
of risk acceptance on Might
Demonstrate for nondemocracies (i.e., when Freedom House or
Polity IV are equal to 0), while the
interaction tells us the differences in the effects of risk
acceptance for non-democratic and
democratic countries.
12
Table 1 Two-Level Generalized Structural Equation Model
Multinomial Logit of the Effect of Risk
Acceptance on “Might Demonstrate” by System of Government
2005-2014
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
Freedom House Polity IV
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
Risk Acceptance

Risk Acceptance x Freedom House ---------- 0.0012* ----------
----------
---------- (0.0006) ---------- ----------
Risk Acceptance x Polity IV ---------- ---------- ----------
0.0010*
---------- ---------- ---------- (0.0005)
Freedom House 0.2645*** 0.2433*** ---------- ----------
(0.0308) (0.0325) ---------- ----------
Polity IV ---------- ---------- 0.1070*** 0.0879***
---------- ---------- (0.0138) (0.0163)
Risk Acceptance 0.0013 -0.0091 0.0014 -0.0158#
(0.0020) (0.0060) (0.0020) (0.0083)
Social Structure
Age -0.0139*** -0.0138*** -0.0140*** -0.0139***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Sex -0.1034*** -0.1027*** -0.1029*** -0.1023***
(0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0180)
Education 0.0804*** 0.0804*** 0.0803*** 0.0803***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0185)
Employment 0.1025*** 0.1014*** 0.1025*** 0.1018***
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185)
Religiosity 0.0087* 0.0093* 0.0087* 0.0093*
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Motivational Attitudes
Ideology -0.0376*** -0.0375*** -0.0377*** -0.0377***
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Political Interest 0.3493*** 0.3494*** 0.3487***
0.3489***
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Systems Support
Government Confidence 0.0108 0.0105 0.0110 0.0105
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105)
Social Trust 0.0869*** 0.0866*** 0.0855*** 0.0851***
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217)
Political Behavior
Party Member 0.1444*** 0.1449*** 0.1464*** 0.1463***

(0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0404)
Labor Member 0.2197*** 0.2204*** 0.2209*** 0.2217***
(0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399)
Table Continued
13
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
Economic Satisfaction
Life Satisfaction -0.0446** -0.0145** -0.0141** -0.0141**
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Life Choice 0.0016 0.0017 0.0012 0.0014
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041)
GDP 8.77e-06 8.63e-06 7.42e-06 7.30e-06
(5.57e-06) (5.57e-06) (5.59e-06) (5.59e-06)
Constant -1.1476*** -0.9528*** -1.6286*** -1.3061***
N 75,455 75,455 75,455 75,455
_____________________________________________________
_________________________
Notes: Table entry is the multinomial regression coefficient set
to the country and individual level of analysis. Dependent

variable is scaled as 0
(Never Do); 1 (Might Do); 2 (Have Done) with baseline
category “Never Do.” ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; #p<.10,
two-tailed.
I graph the results from Table 1 in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure
1 presents the marginal effects
of Risk Acceptance and Freedom House on “Might
Demonstrate.” We can clearly see that while
moving from the lowest freedom score (2) to the highest
freedom score (12) increases the probability
of participation by a substantively and statistically significant
margin, the differences between low
risk-accepting and high risk-accepting individuals are
statistically insignificant. The risk accepting in
countries with the highest freedom score (12) report a
willingness to demonstrate at ~40% compared
to only ~20% in countries with the lowest freedom score (2). In
other words, the out-group effects
of risk acceptance are much stronger than the in-group effects.
The low risk accepting are 19% more
likely to report a willingness that they “Might Demonstrate”
compared to the most risk accepting in
countries with the highest freedom score (49.1% to 39.8%),
although these results are statistically

insignificant. Figure 2 paints a similar picture. Figure 2
presents the marginal effects of Risk
Acceptance and Polity IV on “Might Demonstrate.” Once again,
moving from the lowest freedom
14
score (2) to the highest freedom score (12) increases the
probability of participation by a
substantively and statistically significant margin (16.6% to
32%), however the differences between
low risk-accepting and high risk-accepting individuals are
statistically insignificant. According to the
Polity IV scores, the low risk accepting are 15% more likely to
report a willingness that they “Might
Demonstrate” compared to the most risk accepting in countries
with the highest freedom score
(41.7% to 35.4%), although these results are statistically
insignificant. These results indicate that
while there is a statistically significant effect between risk
acceptance and system of government,
there is little substantive difference between high and low risk
acceptance scores.

Figure 1
Next, I include an interaction term between risk acceptance,
Freedom House, and Polity IV
scores on “Might Boycott” in the second and fourth columns of
Table 2. The findings indicate a
positive and statistically significant effect for Risk Acceptance
x Freedom House (b= 0.0014, p< .05)
15
and Risk Acceptance x Polity IV (b= 0.0011, p< .05) on “Might
Boycott”, controlling for all other factors
in the model. Again, the coefficient for Risk Acceptance is the
effect of risk acceptance on Might
Boycott for nondemocracies (i.e., when Freedom House or
Polity IV are equal to 0), while the
interaction tells us the differences in the effects of risk
acceptance for non-democratic and
democratic countries.
Figure 2

I graph the results from Table 2 in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
Figure 3 presents the marginal effects
of Risk Acceptance x Freedom House on “Might Boycott.”
Moving from the lowest freedom score (2)
to the highest freedom score (12) increases the probability of
participation by a substantively and
statistically significant margin. Further, the difference between
participation rates for low and high
risk-accepting individuals is substantively and statistically
significant (p< .05). The most risk accepting
are 52% more likely to report a willingness that they “Might
Boycott” compared to the least risk
16
accepting in countries with a median (7) freedom score (20.6%
to 31.4%). In countries with the lowest
freedom score (2), the most risk accepting are 41% more likely
to report a willingness that they
“Might Boycott” compared to the least risk accepting, but the
difference is statistically insignificant
(12.6% to 17.8%). In countries with the highest freedom score
(12), the most risk accepting are 16%

more likely to report a willingness that they “Might Boycott”
compared to the least risk accepting,
but this difference is also statistically insignificant (29% to
33.8%).
Acceptance on “Might Boycott” by System of Government
2005-2014
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
Risk Acceptance
Risk Acceptance x Freedom House ---------- 0.0014* ----------
----------
---------- (0.0007) ---------- ----------
0.0011*
---------- ---------- ---------- (0.0005)
Freedom House 0.1691*** 0.1444*** ---------- ----------
(0.0312) (0.0332) ---------- ----------
Polity IV ---------- ---------- 0.0629*** 0.0427*
---------- ---------- (0.0137) (0.0168)
Risk Acceptance 0.0208*** 0.0082 0.0209*** 0.0022
(0.0021) (0.0066) (0.0021) (0.0095)
Social Structure
Age -0.0105*** -0.0103*** -0.0105*** -0.0104***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Sex -0.1712*** -0.1704*** -0.1709*** -0.1703***

(0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186)
Education 0.0795*** 0.0795*** 0.0795*** 0.0794***
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Employment 0.0917*** 0.0902*** 0.0917*** 0.0907***
(0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192)
Religiosity -0.0134*** -0.0128** -0.0134*** -0.0130**
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Table Continued
17
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
Ideology -0.0400*** -0.0400*** -0.0400*** -0.0401***
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
0.3687***
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106)
Systems Support
Government Confidence -0.0561*** -0.0564*** -0.0558*** -
0.0563***
(0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110)
Social Trust 0.1725*** 0.1725*** 0.1712*** 0.1711***
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220)
Political Behavior

Party Member 0.0234 0.0231 0.0244 0.0239
(0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0393)
Labor Member 0.1627*** 0.1635*** 0.1631*** 0.1640***
(0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0386)
Life Satisfaction -0.0187*** -0.0187*** -0.0185*** -
0.0185***
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Life Choice -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0043
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
GDP -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001**
(5.50e-06) (5.50e-06) (5.52e-06) (5.52e-06)
Constant -1.2371*** -0.9993*** -1.4815*** -1.1295***
N 75,455 75,455 75,455 75,455
_____________________________________________________
_________________________
two-tailed.
Figure 4 presents the marginal effects of Risk Acceptance x
Polity IV on “Might Boycott.” While
the relationship is similar to the Freedom House scores (Figure
3), there are substantive differences
between the two measures. Figure 4 indicates that moving from
the lowest (0) to the highest (40)

risk-acceptance score increases the marginal probability of
reporting “Might Boycott” from 26.4% to
34.9% in countries with the highest Polity IV score (20). This
represents a substantively and
statistically significant increase of 32% in the most democratic
countries (p< .05). Figure 4 also
18
indicates that moving from the lowest (0) to the highest (40)
risk-acceptance score increases the
marginal probability of reporting “Might Boycott” from 21% to
29.7% in countries with a median
Polity IV score (10). This represents a substantively and
statistically significant increase of 41% in
median democratic countries (p< .05). Similar to Figure 3, there
is no difference between reporting
“Might Boycott” in the least democratic countries (16% to
17.6%).
Figure 3
The overall results for demonstrating and boycotting paint an
interesting picture. Democratic

risk-accepting citizens are much more likely to protest than
their non-democratic counterparts, as
evidenced by the increasing “steps” of the marginal effect
ladder in Figures 1-4. The slopes for the
risk accepting, however, indicate a more nuanced relationship
between protesting and system of
government. The little to no substantive or statistical difference
between low and high risk-accepting
individuals is unsurprising given the repressive nature of non-
democratic regimes (Davenport 1995;
Henderson 1991; Regan & Henderson 2002). In other words, the
risk accepting may be more likely
19
to protest their government, but they are not political kamikazes
willing to risk life and limb for futile
endeavors in non-democratic countries that may use lethal force
to quell such an uprising. A similar
relationship exists in highly democratic countries.
The overlap in confidence intervals for demonstrating in
democracies also suggests that the
risk accepting are no more likely to participate compared to

other members of society. This is
perhaps the most surprising result of all the findings. Given that
the risk accepting are more likely to
participate in politics (Kam 2012), are more comfortable with
uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky
1979), and more likely to challenge the status quo (Kam &
Simas 2012), theory would suggest that
we see an increase in demonstration participation between the
high and low risk accepting in
democratic countries. One explanation may be the wording of
the question in the World Values
Survey, “attending a peaceful/lawful demonstration” may not
invoke enough uncertainty if one
participates in the action. Peaceful/lawful demonstrations may
suggest that even the least risk-
accepting members of society are not concerned about potential
negative consequences that may
arise from participation. In other words, attending a
peaceful/lawful demonstration may not be a
“risky” proposition. Therefore, we must accept part of the null
hypothesis for demonstrating.

20
Figure 4
The boycotting results provide the most compelling and
extensive evidence that the risk
accepting are the most likely to protest. While there is not a
statistically significant difference
between the low and high risk accepting in non-democratic
countries, the risk accepting are much
more likely to boycott in countries with a median or high
democracy score compared to other
members of society. The Freedom House scores indicate a 52%
increase in the willingness to boycott
in median democratic countries. The Polity IV scores indicate a
41% increase in the willingness to
boycott in median democratic countries and a 32% increase in
the most democratic countries. In
contrast to the demonstrating findings, the boycott findings
indicate strong evidence to reject the
null hypothesis.
I also include an interaction term between risk acceptance,
Freedom House, and Polity IV

scores on “Might Petition” in the second and fourth columns of
Table 3. The findings indicate a
negative and statistically insignificant effect for Risk
Acceptance x Freedom House (b= -0.0003) and a
21
positive and statistically insignificant effect for Risk
Acceptance x Polity IV (b= 0.0004) on “Might
Petition”, controlling for all other factors in the model. This
indicates risk acceptance has a null direct
effect on willingness to petition and by system of government.
The null results for risk acceptance
on petitioning is somewhat surprising given Kam’s (2012)
findings to the contrary in the United
States. However, these results may differ for a couple of
reasons. First, Kam’s (2012) analysis focuses
solely on American petitioning behavior. Second, the current
analysis also considers multiple points
in time, government structures, and economic satisfaction.
Indeed, Dalton (2016) finds systematic
differences in participation rates between the United States and
other Western democracies. These
findings also indicate that we must accept the null hypothesis

for risk acceptance and petitioning.
Finally, I include an economic model of risk acceptance on the
dependent variables. I include
these models to account for the possibility that the protesting
effects are due to economic rather
than political factors (Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2010;
Quaranta 2016). Table A4 in the appendix
indicates that there is little to no evidence that economic factors
motivate the risk accepting to
protest. The findings indicate that Risk Acceptance x Life
Satisfaction and Risk Acceptance x Life
Choice are statistically insignificant predictors of demonstrating
(b= 0.0002, p= .83; b= 0.0001, p=
.85), boycotting (b= 0.0003, p= .69; b= 0.0014, p= .06), and
petitioning (b= -0.0003, p= .72; b= -0.0004,
p= .57). These results further strengthen the findings that there
is an institutional, rather than
economical, effect of risk acceptance on protest behavior.
22

Acceptance on “Might Petition” by System of Government
2005-2014
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
Risk Acceptance
Risk Acceptance x Freedom House ---------- -0.0003 ----------
----------
---------- (0.0007) ---------- ----------
0.0004
---------- ---------- ---------- (0.0005)
Freedom House 0.2015*** 0.2069*** ---------- ----------
(0.0299) (0.0321) ---------- ----------
Polity IV ---------- ---------- 0.0723*** 0.0644***
---------- ---------- (0.0134) (0.0162)
Risk Acceptance -0.0040# -0.0003 -0.0040# -0.0107
(0.0022) (0.0063) (0.0021) (0.0087)
Social Structure
Age -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** -0.0105***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Sex -0.1054*** -0.1057*** -0.1048*** -0.1047***
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201)
Education 0.0911*** 0.0911*** 0.0910*** 0.0910***
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051)
Employment 0.1019*** 0.1021*** 0.1022*** 0.1019***
(0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206)
Religiosity -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0019
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045)

Ideology -0.0134** -0.0134** -0.0135** -0.0135**
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
0.3512***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113)
Systems Support
Government Confidence 0.0007 0.0009 0.0012 0.0010
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0115)
Social Trust 0.0516* 0.0515* 0.0495* 0.0492#
(0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253)
Table Continued
23
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
_____________________________________________________
___________________________
Political Behavior
Party Member 0.1304** 0.1306** 0.1320** 0.1317**
(0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0443)
Labor Member 0.1865*** 0.1865*** 0.1872*** 0.1877***
(0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0446) (0.0446)

Life Satisfaction -0.0091# -0.0091# -0.0087# -0.0087#
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Life Choice 0.0065 0.0065 0.0062 0.0063
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044)
GDP -3.28-06 -3.39e-06 -4.40e-06 -4.57e-06
(7.45e-06) (7.45e-06) (7.51e-06) (7.51e-06)
Constant -1.3732*** -1.4423*** -1.6293*** -1.5016***
N 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000
_____________________________________________________
_________________________
two-tailed.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
Countries vary in their type of government and their citizens’
attitudes towards risk acceptance.6
And, as the results in the present paper suggest, this variation in
risk acceptance and type of
government matters for protest participation. I argue that this
relationship is understood based on
a psychological predisposition to accept risk and the potential
consequences that may stem from
protest participation, such as government concession or

repression. I find that risk acceptance and
system of government predict protesting behavior. However, the
substantive effects are limited to
political boycotts. The Freedom House scores indicate a 52%
increase, while the Polity IV scores
indicate a 41% increase in the willingness to boycott in median
democratic countries for the most
6 Georgia has the lowest mean risk acceptance score of 14.8
compared to Nigeria (21.6) and South
Africa (21.5), representing more than one full standard
deviation.
24
risk-accepting members of society. Further, the Polity IV scores
indicate a 32% increase in the most
democratic countries. Additional analyses of economic
satisfaction indicate that the risk accepting
are not motivated by economic factors. These findings are
dependent upon some interesting caveats.
First, Polity IV scores provide a more robust relationship
between risk acceptance and boycotting.
Second, risk acceptance has a statistically significant but

substantively insignificant effect on
demonstrating. Finally, risk acceptance seems to have no effect
on petitioning. While previous
studies find strong relationships between risk acceptance and
political participation (Kam 2012),
candidate selection (Kam & Simas 2012; Tomz and van
Houweling 2009), and political ambition
(Maestas et al. 2006), the results in the present paper present a
more nuanced and limited effect of
risk acceptance on nontraditional political behaviors at the
international level. Indeed, the findings
indicate that protest participation may be motivated by factors
other than one’s psychological
predisposition to risk. These findings further indicate that, for
the risk accepting, there are protest
participation weaknesses in democracies and nondemocracies.
Curiously, while democratic citizens have
other avenues to participate in politics and challenge their
government, citizens in nondemocracies may only
be able to influence their government through protests. This is
especially true in electoral authoritarian
regimes that have symbolic elections (Schedler 2013). In
electoral authoritarian regimes we would expect
individuals to protest because other avenues are either

unavailable or ineffective. And yet, the differences
between the high and low risk accepting protest behaviors are
null in nondemocracies. The risk accepting are
more likely to protest in democracies compared to other
members of society, but the behavior is limited in
scope to boycotts. Either the low risk accepting in democracies
abstain from demonstrating and petitioning
because they view the activity as futile, or the high risk
accepting abstain because they view protesting as
exciting and hopelessly futile.
25
Ultimately, there is a systematic difference in providing
alternative methods to express grievances
with political elites between democratic and non-democratic
countries, and in the case of boycotting, the high
risk accepting are more likely than the low risk accepting to
participate using the available methods. It should
come as little surprise, then, that non-democratic governments
enforce repressive policies with
impunity given that the effectiveness of protesting is contingent
upon citizen participation. Countries

with large risk-accepting populations may be more resilient in
their pursuit of government
accountability. The findings suggest, theoretically, that
countries with low risk-accepting populations
may provide democratic and non-democratic governments more
flexibility and stability to enact
repressive policies because most individuals are not willing to
risk the consequences of defiance.
These findings suggest a broader and interesting consequence of
risk acceptance studies.
Indeed, while risk acceptance may influence a plethora of
economic (Kahneman and Tversky 1979),
political (Kam 2012; Kam & Simas 2012; Tomz and van
Houweling 2009), and social (Gardner &
Steinberg 2005; Lupton 1993) decisions, these studies are
conducted in the relatively safe confines
of countries that are beholden to democratic principles. Once
we consider more extreme costs to
participation, such as execution, torture, and imprisonment,
there may be vast weaknesses in the
scholarly risk acceptance argument within broader society.

26
Appendix
Table A1 8-Question Scale of Risk Acceptance Questions
_____________________________________________________
____________________________
Question 1: It is important to this person to think up new ideas
and be creative; to do things one’s
own way.
Question 2: It is important to this person to be rich; to have a
lot of money and expensive things.
Question 3: Living in secure surroundings is important to this
person; to avoid anything that might
be dangerous.
Question 4: It is important to this person to have a good time; to
“spoil” oneself.
Question 5: Being very successful is important to this person; to
have people recognize one’s
achievements.
Question 6: Adventure and taking risks are important to this
person; to have an exciting life.
Question 7: It is important to this person to always behave
properly; to avoid doing anything

people would say is wrong
Question 8: Tradition is important to this person; to follow the
customs handed down by one’s
religion or family.
_____________________________________________________
_________________________
Respondents can choose from “Very Much Like Me”; “Like
Me”; “Somewhat Like Me”; “A Little Like Me”; “Not Like
Me”; “Not at All
Like Me”.
27
Table A2 List of Democratic and Non-Democratic Countries
2005-2014
_____________________________________________________
____________________________
COUNTRY Year(s) Democracy Nondemocracy N
Argentina 2006, 2013 X 1,992
Australia 2012 X 1,447
Azerbaijan 2011 X 1,002
Brazil 2006 X 1,493
Bulgaria 2005 X 942
Canada 2006 X 2,143
Chile 2006, 2011 X 1,883
Colombia 2012 X 1,506

Cyprus 2011 X 993
Ecuador 2013 X 1,201
Egypt 2013 X 4,549
Estonia 2011 X 1,509
Ethiopia 2007 X 1,481
France 2006 X 995
Georgia 2009, 2014 X 2,641
Germany 2006, 2013 X 4,043
Ghana 2007, 2012 X 3,065
Great Britain 2005 X 1,036
Hungary 2009 X 1,003
India 2006, 2014 X 3,146
Indonesia 2006 X 1,944
Iraq 2012 X 1,187
Japan 2010 X 2,201
Kazakhstan 2011 X 1,500
Kyrgyzstan 2011 X 1,497
Lebanon 2013 X 1,177
Malaysia 2006, 2012 X 2,501
Mali 2007 X 1,407
Mexico 2012 X 1,996
Moldova 2006 X 1,028
Morocco 2007, 2011 X 2,182
Netherlands 2006, 2012 X 2,859
New Zealand 2011 X 815
Nigeria 2011 X 1,759
Norway 2007 X 1,019
Peru 2012 X 1,158
Philippines 2012 X 1,199
Table A3 Cont’d
28

_____________________________________________________
____________________________
COUNTRY Year(s) Democracy Nondemocracy N
Poland 2012 X 950
Romania 2012 X 1,439
Rwanda 2012 X 2,936
Slovenia 2011 X 1,054
South Africa 2013 X 3,481
South Korea 2010 X 1,182
Spain 2007, 2011 X 2,357
Sweden 2006, 2011 X 2,197
Switzerland 2007 X 1,233
Thailand 2007, 2013 X 2,721
Trinidad and Tobago 2006, 2011 X 1,981
Turkey 2007, 2011 X 2,876
Ukraine 2006, 2011 X 2,467
United States 2006, 2011 X 3,408
Uruguay 2006, 2011 X 1,980
Yemen 2014 X 929
Zambia 2007 X 1,452
Zimbabwe 2012 X 1,500
Total 2005-2014 43 13 101,642
_____________________________________________________
____________________________
Notes: Country regimes are determined using the Freedom
House Index and Polity IV scores. Democratic countries require
a score of
“7 or better in the Electoral Process subcategory and an overall
political rights score of 20 or better” (p. 3) and a democracy
classification from POLITY IV.

29
Table A3 Control Variable Coding
Freedom: A twelve-point scale reverse coded where 0 is low
levels of rights and liberties and 12 is
high levels of rights and liberties.
Polity IV: A twenty-point scale reverse coded where 0 is low
political freedoms and 20 is high levels
of political freedoms.
Bicameral: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the country has a
bicameral legislature and 0
otherwise.
GDP: The per capita GDP for each country.
Population Density: The population per square kilometer for
each country.
Political Interest: A four-point scale coded 0 for individuals
with the lowest interest in politics to 3
for those with the highest level.
Employment: A dichotomous variable where 1 is for individuals
who are employed and 0 otherwise.
Education: A eight-point scale where 1 is for those who lack an
elementary education and 8 is for
people who earned a university degree or higher.

Age: Age in years.
Sex: A dichotomous variable coded 1 for women and 0 for men.
Year: A dichotomous variable for 2005-2014. Excluded year is
2008 and 2014 for each survey wave.
_____________________________________________________
____________________________
Table A4 Two-Level Generalized Structural Equation Model
Multinomial Logit of the Effect of Risk Acceptance on Might
Protest by
Economic Satisfaction 2005-2014
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
__
Demonstrate Boycott Petition
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
__
Risk Acceptance
Risk Acceptance x Life Satisfaction 0.0002 ---------- 0.0003
---------- -0.0003 ----------
(0.0008) ---------- (0.0008) ---------- (0.0009) ----------
Risk Acceptance x Life Choice ---------- 0.0001 ----------

0.0014# ---------- -0.0004
---------- (0.0007) ---------- (0.0008) ---------- (0.0009)
Life Satisfaction -0.0168 -0.0139** -0.0245 -0.0183*** -
0.0028 -0.0085#
(0.0150) (0.0046) (0.0162) (0.0048) (0.0165) (0.0050)
Life Choice 0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0040 -0.0302* 0.0068
0.0147
(0.0040) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0044) (0.0147)
Risk Acceptance 0.0006 0.0008 0.0189*** 0.0117* -
0.0019 -0.0009
(0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0054)
Social Structure
Age -0.0139*** -0.0139*** -0.0104*** -0.0104*** -
0.0104*** -0.0104***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Sex -0.1022*** -0.1022*** -0.1706*** -0.1706*** -
0.1042*** -0.1041***
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0201) (0.0201)
Education 0.0805*** 0.0805*** 0.0796*** 0.0795***
0.0912*** 0.0912***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0051)
Employment 0.1041*** 0.1041*** 0.0926*** 0.0924***
0.1032*** 0.1033***
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0206) (0.0206)
Religiosity 0.0077# 0.0077# -0.0141*** -0.0139*** -0.0032
-0.0032
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Ideology -0.0379*** -0.0379*** -0.0403*** -0.0404*** -
0.0137** -0.0136**
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0043)
0.3688*** 0.3513*** 0.3512***
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0113) (0.0113)
Table Continued

31
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
__
Demonstrate Boycott Petition
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
__
Systems Support
Government Confidence 0.0122 0.0122 -0.0550*** -
0.0552*** 0.0025 0.0025
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Social Trust 0.0817*** 0.0817*** 0.1684*** 0.1690***
0.0457# 0.0456#
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0253) (0.0253)
Political Behavior
Party Member 0.1440*** 0.1442*** 0.0233 0.0237
0.1302** 0.1298**
(0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0442) (0.0442)
Labor Member 0.2162*** 0.2161*** 0.1604*** 0.1602***
0.1829*** 0.1831***
(0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0446) (0.0446)
GDP 0.00001* 0.00001* -0.00001* -0.00001* 5.02e-06
4.98e-06
(5.54e-06) (5.54e-06) (5.47e-06) (5.47e-06) (7.36e-06)
(7.36e-06)
Constant -0.3736* -0.3767*** -0.7180*** -0.5872*** -
0.8557*** -0.8720***

N 75,455 75,455 75,455 75,455 75,000 75,000
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
__
variable is scaled as 0 (Never Do); 1 (Might Do); 2 (Have Done)
with baseline
two-tailed.
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of Nonviolent Conflict.” International Security 33(1): 7-44.
Vanhuysse, Pieter. 2006. Divide and Pacify: Strategic Social
Policies and Political Protest in Post-
Communist Democracies. Budapest and New York: Central
European University Press.
Weber, Elke U., Ann-Renee Blais, and Nancy E. Betz. 2002. A
Domain-specific Risk-attitude
Scale: Measuring Risk Perceptions and Risk Behaviors. Journal
of Behavioral Decision
Making 15: 263-290.
36
Zuckerman, Marvin. 1979. Sensation Seeking: Beyond the
Optimal Level of Arousal. Hillsdale, NJ:
John Wiley & Sons.

Zuckerman, Marvin. 2007. Sensation Seeking and Risky
Behavior. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Theory Rubric
1. Is there a hypothesis and theory?
2. Are there citations?
3. Can you identify the research question and variables?
4. What are the causal mechanisms?
5. Is it well thought out? Does it make sense?

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