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Risk Mitigation Consulting Inc.
Intelligence and Analysis Division
WHITE PAPER SERIES
INTENT
This white paper is designed to provide analysis of relevant, publicly available information on
threat and hazard events/trends and their potential impacts to the interests of the United States,
both at home and abroad. This product is not intended to be an all-encompassing assessment
of the subject.
Boko Haram: An Examination of
Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability
1
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Boko Haram: An Examination of
Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability
Boko Haram: An Examination of Terrorist
Resiliency and Adaptability
Introduction
The terrorist organization Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, more commonly known as
Boko Haram, may be overlooked when considering modern terrorist threats. Some have claimed
Boko Haram is defeated and no longer poses a threat to the region, pointing to the abandonment
of earlier territory claimed by the group. However, Boko Haram has been an active, destructive
terrorist group within Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon since 2009. Though they no longer
hold territory, their tactics and goals have adapted over time and proven resilient in the face of
counterterrorism efforts.
Boko Haram has undergone several evolutions in recent years. Initially focused on opposing
Western education when it was founded in 2002, the founder created a religious complex with the
goal of educating and creating an Islamic caliphate. Later, in 2009, the group began military
operations. It was officially designated a terrorist group by the United States in 2013. A year later,
Boko Haram declared a caliphate in areas it controlled. However, by March 2015, Boko Haram
had lost all the towns under its control. At this point, local government began claiming the group
was “defeated.” However, Boko Haram continued to carry out attacks, and it declared allegiance
to the Islamic State in 2015, rebranding itself as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province. U.S.
intelligence officials have estimated that there are currently between four and six thousand hard-
core militants, while other analysts say the group’s membership could be three times that.1, 2
Who is Boko Haram
Boko Haram is an Islamist militant group based in Nigeria’s northeast. Mohammed Yusuf, an
influential Islamist cleric from Borno State, created the group in 2002. The overarching aim of the
group is to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state with sharia criminal courts. While Boko Haram
has been unable to establish this state, they have successfully carried out a variety of terrorist
attacks throughout Nigeria and its neighboring states.2
Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam which makes it "haram", or forbidden, for Muslims to
take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society. This includes voting
in elections, wearing shirts and pants, or receiving a secular education. Boko Haram regards the
Nigerian state as being run by non-believers (regardless of whether the president is Muslim or not),
and the group has extended its military campaign by targeting neighboring states. Yusuf criticized
northern Muslims for participating in what he saw as an illegitimate, non-Islamic state.1,2
The group's official name, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, means "People Committed
to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". Residents of Maiduguri, where the group
had its headquarters, dubbed it Boko Haram. Loosely translated from the region's language, this
means "Western education is forbidden".1
2
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White Paper Series
Boko Haram: An Examination of
Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability
Motivation
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, analysts believe that Boko Haram emerged as a
consequence of deep religious and ethnic cleavages that have long troubled Nigeria. During their
nearly half century of rule, the British merged various territories and peoples that had little in
common other than geographic proximity. Nigeria comprises nearly 350 ethnic groups. At the
same time, the country is roughly split between the Muslim-dominated north and Christian-
dominated south. Some analysts have observed that Nigeria’s record of political corruption and
inequality has also contributed to the group’s rise. Despite being Africa’s biggest economy and
home to a wealth of natural resources, Nigeria has one of the continent’s poorest populations.
Against this background, Yusuf formed Boko Haram. He set up a religious complex, which
included a mosque and an Islamic school. However, Boko Haram’s political goal was to create an
Islamic state, and the school became a recruiting ground for jihadis.1, 2
Split
In 2009, government forces killed more than eight hundred people, including many suspected
Boko Haram members. During this time, Yusuf, the group’s founder, was murdered while in police
custody. Boko Haram splintered into at least two factions following Yusuf’s death. Abubakar
Shekau heads one faction, which appears to remain focused on fighting the Nigerian government
in the northeast. Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Yusuf’s son, has led a second faction, which has the same
ultimate goals, but a less strict view of apostasy. Despite the internal divide, the group overall
remains active.2
Technical Defeat
In December 2015, the newly-elected Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, had declared the
“technical defeat” of Boko Haram. In December 2016, he repeated the same words during a
national broadcast celebrating the capture of “Camp Zairo,” the group’s operational headquarters
in Sambisa Forest in North-East Nigeria. Since then, the concept of “technical defeat” has been
part of the official government discourse in their claim to victory over Boko Haram.3
At that time, the Nigerian military had succeeded in pushing Boko Haram fighters out of urban
areas and large swathes of territory spanning about 14 local government areas, eliminating the
fundamentalist Islamic state Boko Haram had hoped to create. The terrorist group was also
prevented from launching the large-scale attacks it used to; at present, it is largely confined to the
fringes of Sambisa Forest and the Lake Chad area. However, stopping Boko Haram from claiming
territory and forcing a change in types of attacks does not mean the group is defeated. As evidenced
by their continued attacks, Boko Haram was able to adapt, changing their tactics and goals.3
Tactics
Many of the group’s activities are those typically associated with terrorism, including suicide
bombings, kidnappings, and destruction of property, particularly schools. In recent years, the group
has increased attacks on soft targets (relatively unprotected places) and used more women and
children as suicide bombers. Beyond Nigeria, the group is most active in northern Cameroon,
Chad, and Niger. The group’s most well know attack occurred in April 2014, when Boko Haram
3
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White Paper Series
Boko Haram: An Examination of
Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability
drew international condemnation by abducting more than 200 schoolgirls from Chibok town in
Borno state.1, 2
During 2014, Boko Haram began attempting to hold territory, aiming to create a caliphate.
However, all land held by the group was taken back by Nigerian military forces by the end of
2015. Following the loss of their previously held territory and an increase in attacks by government
forces, Boko Haram appears to have changed its strategy to become more mobile, adopting hit-
and-run tactics instead of engaging in face-to-face confrontations with the heavily armed Nigerian
troops. By hiding among locals within communities or in the forest, the group has become more
elusive, relying on the element of surprise to attack both soft and military targets.3
Boko Haram still launches attacks on soft targets in cities, mostly through suicide missions, raids,
and abductions. They have attacked Internally Displaced Persons’ camps in cities and civilians in
public spaces, in addition to ambushing soldiers and overrunning multiple barracks. A majority of
the recent attacks have targeted civilian populations in Borno State, and the fact that the terrorists
can still invade cities and launch attacks shows that they are yet to be defeated. Despite being
pushed into remote areas, Boko Haram will likely continue to disrupt the region’s development
for some time.2, 3
Response
In May 2013, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in the three northern states
where Boko Haram was strongest - Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. In 2013, the United States
officially identified Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Nigeria has sought military
support from its neighbors, who increasingly suffered attacks during Boko Haram’s surge of
activity. Since 2015, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have deployed thousands of troops as part of a
multinational force authorized by the African Union. Following the 2014 Chibok schoolgirl
abductions, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States pledged additional assistance,
including equipment and intelligence support. U.S. assistance totaled more than $400 million by
early 2016. Most recently, the United States has continued to sell arms and aircraft to Nigeria in
support of its counterterrorism efforts.1, 2
Conclusion
Boko Haram remains a threat to Africa’s most populous country, fueling instability across the
Lake Chad Basin. The terrorist organization has displaced millions and put them at risk of
starvation, jeopardized education and health services, stalled humanitarian aid efforts, and
undercut government authority in Nigeria and abroad. Amnesty International has estimated that
some 2,000 children remain in the group’s captivity. Boko Haram has been linked to the deaths of
more than 37,000 people since 2011, according to Council on Foreign Relation’s Nigeria Security
Tracker, which monitors political violence in the country. About half of those killed were
suspected Boko Haram militants, while roughly 45% were civilians and 5% were security forces.1,2
Boko Haram has outlived other militant groups in northern Nigeria and has built a presence in
neighboring states where it has carried out attacks and has recruited fighters. The group has a force
of thousands of men (CIA officials have estimated around 9,000) and cells that specialize in
4
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White Paper Series
Boko Haram: An Examination of
Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability
bombings. Through raids on military bases and banks, the group has gained control of vast amounts
of weapons and money.1
Like many other terrorist groups, conventional definitions of ‘defeat’ cannot accurately depict
conditions on the ground. Boko Haram does not need to achieve its ultimate goal of establishing
its own state to be successful. If the group continues to locally attack and disrupt the “illegitimate”
Nigerian government, they will succeed in spreading terror, gaining renown, and attracting
recruits. Though the territory once held by the group has since been reclaimed, Boko Haram has
successfully adapted, living in the fringes of forests and carrying out attacks on soft targets. Boko
Haram has shown that it does not need to hold territory to present a credible threat to the region.
Despite international efforts to fight and eliminate the group, Boko Haram has amassed weapons,
money, and thousands of fighters. They will continue to recruit and adapt, fighting, by any means
necessary, what they see as an illegitimate Nigerian state.
Source List
1. “Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamist group?” BBC News. 24 November 2016.
2. Nigeria’s Battle With Boko Haram. Council on Foreign Relations. 8 August 2018.
3. Boko Haram and the Concept of Technical Defeat. Azeez Olaniyan. 18 September 2018.

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Boko Haram - An Examination of Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability 02 November 2018

  • 1. www.RiskMitigationConsulting.com Risk Mitigation Consulting Inc. Intelligence and Analysis Division WHITE PAPER SERIES INTENT This white paper is designed to provide analysis of relevant, publicly available information on threat and hazard events/trends and their potential impacts to the interests of the United States, both at home and abroad. This product is not intended to be an all-encompassing assessment of the subject. Boko Haram: An Examination of Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability
  • 2. 1 www.RiskMitigationConsulting.com White Paper Series Boko Haram: An Examination of Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability Boko Haram: An Examination of Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability Introduction The terrorist organization Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, more commonly known as Boko Haram, may be overlooked when considering modern terrorist threats. Some have claimed Boko Haram is defeated and no longer poses a threat to the region, pointing to the abandonment of earlier territory claimed by the group. However, Boko Haram has been an active, destructive terrorist group within Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon since 2009. Though they no longer hold territory, their tactics and goals have adapted over time and proven resilient in the face of counterterrorism efforts. Boko Haram has undergone several evolutions in recent years. Initially focused on opposing Western education when it was founded in 2002, the founder created a religious complex with the goal of educating and creating an Islamic caliphate. Later, in 2009, the group began military operations. It was officially designated a terrorist group by the United States in 2013. A year later, Boko Haram declared a caliphate in areas it controlled. However, by March 2015, Boko Haram had lost all the towns under its control. At this point, local government began claiming the group was “defeated.” However, Boko Haram continued to carry out attacks, and it declared allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015, rebranding itself as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province. U.S. intelligence officials have estimated that there are currently between four and six thousand hard- core militants, while other analysts say the group’s membership could be three times that.1, 2 Who is Boko Haram Boko Haram is an Islamist militant group based in Nigeria’s northeast. Mohammed Yusuf, an influential Islamist cleric from Borno State, created the group in 2002. The overarching aim of the group is to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state with sharia criminal courts. While Boko Haram has been unable to establish this state, they have successfully carried out a variety of terrorist attacks throughout Nigeria and its neighboring states.2 Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam which makes it "haram", or forbidden, for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with Western society. This includes voting in elections, wearing shirts and pants, or receiving a secular education. Boko Haram regards the Nigerian state as being run by non-believers (regardless of whether the president is Muslim or not), and the group has extended its military campaign by targeting neighboring states. Yusuf criticized northern Muslims for participating in what he saw as an illegitimate, non-Islamic state.1,2 The group's official name, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". Residents of Maiduguri, where the group had its headquarters, dubbed it Boko Haram. Loosely translated from the region's language, this means "Western education is forbidden".1
  • 3. 2 www.RiskMitigationConsulting.com White Paper Series Boko Haram: An Examination of Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability Motivation According to the Council on Foreign Relations, analysts believe that Boko Haram emerged as a consequence of deep religious and ethnic cleavages that have long troubled Nigeria. During their nearly half century of rule, the British merged various territories and peoples that had little in common other than geographic proximity. Nigeria comprises nearly 350 ethnic groups. At the same time, the country is roughly split between the Muslim-dominated north and Christian- dominated south. Some analysts have observed that Nigeria’s record of political corruption and inequality has also contributed to the group’s rise. Despite being Africa’s biggest economy and home to a wealth of natural resources, Nigeria has one of the continent’s poorest populations. Against this background, Yusuf formed Boko Haram. He set up a religious complex, which included a mosque and an Islamic school. However, Boko Haram’s political goal was to create an Islamic state, and the school became a recruiting ground for jihadis.1, 2 Split In 2009, government forces killed more than eight hundred people, including many suspected Boko Haram members. During this time, Yusuf, the group’s founder, was murdered while in police custody. Boko Haram splintered into at least two factions following Yusuf’s death. Abubakar Shekau heads one faction, which appears to remain focused on fighting the Nigerian government in the northeast. Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Yusuf’s son, has led a second faction, which has the same ultimate goals, but a less strict view of apostasy. Despite the internal divide, the group overall remains active.2 Technical Defeat In December 2015, the newly-elected Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, had declared the “technical defeat” of Boko Haram. In December 2016, he repeated the same words during a national broadcast celebrating the capture of “Camp Zairo,” the group’s operational headquarters in Sambisa Forest in North-East Nigeria. Since then, the concept of “technical defeat” has been part of the official government discourse in their claim to victory over Boko Haram.3 At that time, the Nigerian military had succeeded in pushing Boko Haram fighters out of urban areas and large swathes of territory spanning about 14 local government areas, eliminating the fundamentalist Islamic state Boko Haram had hoped to create. The terrorist group was also prevented from launching the large-scale attacks it used to; at present, it is largely confined to the fringes of Sambisa Forest and the Lake Chad area. However, stopping Boko Haram from claiming territory and forcing a change in types of attacks does not mean the group is defeated. As evidenced by their continued attacks, Boko Haram was able to adapt, changing their tactics and goals.3 Tactics Many of the group’s activities are those typically associated with terrorism, including suicide bombings, kidnappings, and destruction of property, particularly schools. In recent years, the group has increased attacks on soft targets (relatively unprotected places) and used more women and children as suicide bombers. Beyond Nigeria, the group is most active in northern Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The group’s most well know attack occurred in April 2014, when Boko Haram
  • 4. 3 www.RiskMitigationConsulting.com White Paper Series Boko Haram: An Examination of Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability drew international condemnation by abducting more than 200 schoolgirls from Chibok town in Borno state.1, 2 During 2014, Boko Haram began attempting to hold territory, aiming to create a caliphate. However, all land held by the group was taken back by Nigerian military forces by the end of 2015. Following the loss of their previously held territory and an increase in attacks by government forces, Boko Haram appears to have changed its strategy to become more mobile, adopting hit- and-run tactics instead of engaging in face-to-face confrontations with the heavily armed Nigerian troops. By hiding among locals within communities or in the forest, the group has become more elusive, relying on the element of surprise to attack both soft and military targets.3 Boko Haram still launches attacks on soft targets in cities, mostly through suicide missions, raids, and abductions. They have attacked Internally Displaced Persons’ camps in cities and civilians in public spaces, in addition to ambushing soldiers and overrunning multiple barracks. A majority of the recent attacks have targeted civilian populations in Borno State, and the fact that the terrorists can still invade cities and launch attacks shows that they are yet to be defeated. Despite being pushed into remote areas, Boko Haram will likely continue to disrupt the region’s development for some time.2, 3 Response In May 2013, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in the three northern states where Boko Haram was strongest - Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. In 2013, the United States officially identified Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Nigeria has sought military support from its neighbors, who increasingly suffered attacks during Boko Haram’s surge of activity. Since 2015, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have deployed thousands of troops as part of a multinational force authorized by the African Union. Following the 2014 Chibok schoolgirl abductions, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States pledged additional assistance, including equipment and intelligence support. U.S. assistance totaled more than $400 million by early 2016. Most recently, the United States has continued to sell arms and aircraft to Nigeria in support of its counterterrorism efforts.1, 2 Conclusion Boko Haram remains a threat to Africa’s most populous country, fueling instability across the Lake Chad Basin. The terrorist organization has displaced millions and put them at risk of starvation, jeopardized education and health services, stalled humanitarian aid efforts, and undercut government authority in Nigeria and abroad. Amnesty International has estimated that some 2,000 children remain in the group’s captivity. Boko Haram has been linked to the deaths of more than 37,000 people since 2011, according to Council on Foreign Relation’s Nigeria Security Tracker, which monitors political violence in the country. About half of those killed were suspected Boko Haram militants, while roughly 45% were civilians and 5% were security forces.1,2 Boko Haram has outlived other militant groups in northern Nigeria and has built a presence in neighboring states where it has carried out attacks and has recruited fighters. The group has a force of thousands of men (CIA officials have estimated around 9,000) and cells that specialize in
  • 5. 4 www.RiskMitigationConsulting.com White Paper Series Boko Haram: An Examination of Terrorist Resiliency and Adaptability bombings. Through raids on military bases and banks, the group has gained control of vast amounts of weapons and money.1 Like many other terrorist groups, conventional definitions of ‘defeat’ cannot accurately depict conditions on the ground. Boko Haram does not need to achieve its ultimate goal of establishing its own state to be successful. If the group continues to locally attack and disrupt the “illegitimate” Nigerian government, they will succeed in spreading terror, gaining renown, and attracting recruits. Though the territory once held by the group has since been reclaimed, Boko Haram has successfully adapted, living in the fringes of forests and carrying out attacks on soft targets. Boko Haram has shown that it does not need to hold territory to present a credible threat to the region. Despite international efforts to fight and eliminate the group, Boko Haram has amassed weapons, money, and thousands of fighters. They will continue to recruit and adapt, fighting, by any means necessary, what they see as an illegitimate Nigerian state. Source List 1. “Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamist group?” BBC News. 24 November 2016. 2. Nigeria’s Battle With Boko Haram. Council on Foreign Relations. 8 August 2018. 3. Boko Haram and the Concept of Technical Defeat. Azeez Olaniyan. 18 September 2018.