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*[ AUDITING MOBILE APPLICATIONS ]




Author: Jose Selvi
Date: 30/Jun/2011
$ WHOIS JSELVI



                 Jose Selvi
         http://twitter.com/JoseSelvi

   jselvi@s21sec.com     jselvi@pentester.es
http://www.s21sec.com http://www.pentester.es
INDEX

        Apps Revolution

        Divide & Conquer (D&C)

        Mobile Networking

        Server Side

        Client Side

        What’s Up with WhatsApp
APPS REVOLUTION




                  Pág. 5
“OLD SCHOOL” APPS
“OLD SCHOOL” APPS
WEBSITE FEVER
WEBSITE FEVER
WEBSITE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
APPLICATIONS EVOLUTION 2010
DIVIDE & CONQUER (D&C)

AND MORE




                         Pág. 5
MOBILE LAB
MOBILE LAB




     CLIENT
MOBILE LAB




              SERVER


     CLIENT
MOBILE LAB




              SERVER


     CLIENT
MOBILE LAB

                           NETWORK
          CLIENT                          SERVER




  Phone full control   Some ways        We CAN’T change
                                        the server
  SW full control      We’re able to
                       control the      We CAN’T have a
                       network          look to the
  We’re able to
                                        software
  change config and
  software             Sometimes hard
                       and expensive    Black Box Testing
JAILBREAK / ROOTING

 Sometimes emulator r00lz!
 • Android Emulator (SDK)
 • iOS Simulator (SDK)

 But sometimes not...

 We don’t have full built-in control
 Maybe we should...
 • iOS Jailbreak
 • Android Rooting
MOBILE NETWORKING




                    Pág. 5
MULTI-CHANNEL!
MOBILE LAB
MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE

  msf auxiliary(fakedns) >
     [*] DNS bypass domain api.facebook.com resolved 66.220.146.36
     [*] DNS bypass domain iphone.facebook.com resolved 66.220.153.30
     [*] DNS bypass domain m.facebook.com resolved 66.220.158.26
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                     10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20




                       20.20.20.20   DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




                 ¿whois www.google.com?


 IP: 20.20.20.10                                        10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20




                                          20.20.20.20   DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                                10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20



                       ¿whois www.google.com?




                        20.20.20.20             DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                           10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20



                                     ¿whois www.google.com?




                       20.20.20.20        DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                               10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20



                                     www.google.com = 74.125.39.104




                       20.20.20.20            DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                                        10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20



                       www.google.com = 74.125.39.104




                         20.20.20.20                    DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




                 www.google.com = 74.125.39.104


 IP: 20.20.20.10                                         10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20




                                           20.20.20.20   DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                     10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20




                       20.20.20.20   DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                     10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20




                       20.20.20.20   DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




                 ¿whois api.facebook.com?


 IP: 20.20.20.10                                          10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20




                                            20.20.20.20   DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                                  10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20



                       ¿whois api.facebook.com?




                        20.20.20.20               DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                                        10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20



                       api.facebook.com = 20.20.20.20




                       20.20.20.20                      DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




                 api.facebook.com = 20.20.20.20


 IP: 20.20.20.10                                           10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20




                                             20.20.20.20   DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                     10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20




                       20.20.20.20   DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS




 IP: 20.20.20.10                     10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0
 GW: 20.20.20.1
 DNS: 20.20.20.20


                       PROXY



                       20.20.20.20   DNS SERVER
REDIRECT TRICK




 IP: 20.20.20.10                     10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0   20.20.20.20
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8




                       PROXY
REDIRECT TRICK




 IP: 20.20.20.10                     10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0   20.20.20.20
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8




                       PROXY
REDIRECT TRICK




 IP: 20.20.20.10                     10.10.10.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0   20.20.20.20
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8




                       PROXY
SSL/HTTPS




                       PROXY
 IP: 20.20.20.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0           10.10.10.10
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS




                       PROXY
 IP: 20.20.20.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0           CERT
                                 10.10.10.10
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure



                                     SERVER

                                      PUB    PRIV

              CA
        PUB        PRIV




                                  CLIENT
                                   PUB
                                    PUB
                                     PUB
                                       PUB
                                       CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                     SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                PUB   PRIV
                         INFO CERT




 CLIENT
       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB
           CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                     SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                    PRIV
                         INFO CERT




                           PUB


 CLIENT
       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB
           CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                     SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                    PRIV
                         INFO CERT




                           PUB


 CLIENT
       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB
           CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                     SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                    PRIV
                         INFO CERT




                           PUB


 CLIENT                  DIGEST


       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB
           CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                        SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                       PRIV

                   DIGEST   INFO CERT




                              PUB


 CLIENT                     DIGEST


       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB
           CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                         SERVER
       CA
 PUB          PRIV                           PRIV
             SIGNED DIGEST   INFO CERT




                               PUB


 CLIENT                      DIGEST


       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB
           CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                        SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                       PRIV
                          INFO CERT




                             PUB


 CLIENT                    DIGEST

                        SIGNED DIGEST
       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB
           CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                        SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                       PRIV
                          INFO CERT




                            PUB


 CLIENT                    DIGEST

                        SIGNED DIGEST
       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB
           CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                              SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                             PRIV
                                  INFO CERT




                                    PUB


 CLIENT
       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB          DIGEST
           CA1
                  SIGNED DIGEST
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                              SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                             PRIV
                                  INFO CERT




                                    PUB


 CLIENT
       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB          DIGEST
           CA1
                        DIGEST’
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure


                                              SERVER
       CA
 PUB             PRIV                             PRIV
                                  INFO CERT




                                    PUB


 CLIENT
       PUB
        PUB
         PUB
           PUB          DIGEST
           CA1
                        DIGEST’
Real Certificate Sample
SSL/HTTPS




                       PROXY
 IP: 20.20.20.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0           10.10.10.10
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS




                       PROXY
 IP: 20.20.20.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0           CERT
                                 10.10.10.10
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS




                         PROXY
 IP: 20.20.20.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0   FAKE
                                 CERT
                                   10.10.10.10
                       CERT
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8



                       FAKE
                        CA
SSL/HTTPS




                         PROXY
 IP: 20.20.20.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0   FAKE
                                 CERT
                                   10.10.10.10
                       CERT
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS




                         PROXY
 IP: 20.20.20.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0   FAKE
                                 CERT
                                   10.10.10.10
                       CERT
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS




                         PROXY
 IP: 20.20.20.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0   FAKE
                                 CERT
                                   10.10.10.10
                       CERT
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS




                         PROXY
 IP: 20.20.20.10
 MASK: 255.255.255.0   FAKE
                                 CERT
                                   10.10.10.10
                       CERT
 GW: 20.20.20.20
 DNS: 8.8.8.8
IMPORT CERTIFICATES


iPhone / iPad
 • Export from proxy (Burp, ...) o built (openssl, ...).
 • iPhone Configuration Utility



Android
• Only VPN certs, not Web.
• Hard...
• Still Working...
BINGO!
SERVER SIDE




              Pág. 5
AS USUAL...

 Browser
 Nessus
 Qualys
 SQLMap
 Metasploit
 Backtrack
 ...

 Of course, your brain!
CLIENT SIDE




              Pág. 5
iOS BINARY FORMAT
iOS BINARY FORMAT
iOS BINARY FORMAT
iOS BINARY FORMAT
iOS BINARY FORMAT
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT




App.java
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT




App.java   App.class
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT




App.java   App.class    App.dex
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT




App.java   App.class    App.dex
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT




App.java   App.class    App.dex
PUT ALL TOGETHER!
Man-in-the-

     CRACKING VERIFYCERT
certificados como válidos), algo que evidentemente no podrá hacer un atacante que no
tuviera previo control de la máquina pero que nos situa en la posición de un intruso que
haya comprometido previamente el NOC de Good. En esta ocasión, dado que no se ha
conseguido vulnerar los certificados SSL, NO bastaría con el compromiso de algunos de
los routers internmedios, como SI ocurría en el caso anterior.




                                                                              www.s21sec.c
WHAT’S UP WITH WHATSAPP?




                       Pág. 5
WHAT’S UP WITH WHATSAPP?




                       Pág. 5
KNOWN WHATSAPP ISSUES

 Unencrypted Traffic
 • But using 443 tcp port...

 Storing ALL conversation FOREVER

 Storing GPS position!
 • WTF!!
 • Why??!!

 Much more...



 Great research from SecurityByDefault guys!
WHATSAPP HIJACKING
ALERT! SPAM!




               SEC-560:
       Network Penetration Testing
          and Ethical Hacking
THANKS! QUESTIONS?



                Jose Selvi
        http://twitter.com/JoseSelvi

   jselvi@s21sec.com     jselvi@pentester.es
http://www.s21sec.com http://www.pentester.es
*[ THANKS! SEE YOU! ]




            Pág. 7

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Auditing Mobile Apps

  • 1. *[ AUDITING MOBILE APPLICATIONS ] Author: Jose Selvi Date: 30/Jun/2011
  • 2. $ WHOIS JSELVI Jose Selvi http://twitter.com/JoseSelvi jselvi@s21sec.com jselvi@pentester.es http://www.s21sec.com http://www.pentester.es
  • 3. INDEX Apps Revolution Divide & Conquer (D&C) Mobile Networking Server Side Client Side What’s Up with WhatsApp
  • 4. APPS REVOLUTION Pág. 5
  • 16. DIVIDE & CONQUER (D&C) AND MORE Pág. 5
  • 18. MOBILE LAB CLIENT
  • 19. MOBILE LAB SERVER CLIENT
  • 20. MOBILE LAB SERVER CLIENT
  • 21. MOBILE LAB NETWORK CLIENT SERVER Phone full control Some ways We CAN’T change the server SW full control We’re able to control the We CAN’T have a network look to the We’re able to software change config and software Sometimes hard and expensive Black Box Testing
  • 22. JAILBREAK / ROOTING Sometimes emulator r00lz! • Android Emulator (SDK) • iOS Simulator (SDK) But sometimes not... We don’t have full built-in control Maybe we should... • iOS Jailbreak • Android Rooting
  • 23. MOBILE NETWORKING Pág. 5
  • 26. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE msf auxiliary(fakedns) > [*] DNS bypass domain api.facebook.com resolved 66.220.146.36 [*] DNS bypass domain iphone.facebook.com resolved 66.220.153.30 [*] DNS bypass domain m.facebook.com resolved 66.220.158.26
  • 27. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 28. “FAKE” DNS ¿whois www.google.com? IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 29. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 ¿whois www.google.com? 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 30. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 ¿whois www.google.com? 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 31. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 www.google.com = 74.125.39.104 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 32. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 www.google.com = 74.125.39.104 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 33. “FAKE” DNS www.google.com = 74.125.39.104 IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 34. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 35. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 36. “FAKE” DNS ¿whois api.facebook.com? IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 37. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 ¿whois api.facebook.com? 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 38. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 api.facebook.com = 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 39. “FAKE” DNS api.facebook.com = 20.20.20.20 IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 40. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 41. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 PROXY 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 42. REDIRECT TRICK IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 20.20.20.20 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 PROXY
  • 43. REDIRECT TRICK IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 20.20.20.20 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 PROXY
  • 44. REDIRECT TRICK IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 20.20.20.20 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 PROXY
  • 45. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 46. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 CERT 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 47. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER PUB PRIV CA PUB PRIV CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 48. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PUB PRIV INFO CERT CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 49. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 50. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 51. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 52. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV DIGEST INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 53. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV SIGNED DIGEST INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 54. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST SIGNED DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 55. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST SIGNED DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 56. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB DIGEST CA1 SIGNED DIGEST
  • 57. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB DIGEST CA1 DIGEST’
  • 58. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB DIGEST CA1 DIGEST’
  • 60. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 61. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 CERT 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 62. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 FAKE CA
  • 63. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 64. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 65. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 66. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 67. IMPORT CERTIFICATES iPhone / iPad • Export from proxy (Burp, ...) o built (openssl, ...). • iPhone Configuration Utility Android • Only VPN certs, not Web. • Hard... • Still Working...
  • 69. SERVER SIDE Pág. 5
  • 70. AS USUAL... Browser Nessus Qualys SQLMap Metasploit Backtrack ... Of course, your brain!
  • 71. CLIENT SIDE Pág. 5
  • 80. ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class App.dex
  • 81. ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class App.dex
  • 82. ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class App.dex
  • 84. Man-in-the- CRACKING VERIFYCERT certificados como válidos), algo que evidentemente no podrá hacer un atacante que no tuviera previo control de la máquina pero que nos situa en la posición de un intruso que haya comprometido previamente el NOC de Good. En esta ocasión, dado que no se ha conseguido vulnerar los certificados SSL, NO bastaría con el compromiso de algunos de los routers internmedios, como SI ocurría en el caso anterior. www.s21sec.c
  • 85. WHAT’S UP WITH WHATSAPP? Pág. 5
  • 86. WHAT’S UP WITH WHATSAPP? Pág. 5
  • 87. KNOWN WHATSAPP ISSUES Unencrypted Traffic • But using 443 tcp port... Storing ALL conversation FOREVER Storing GPS position! • WTF!! • Why??!! Much more... Great research from SecurityByDefault guys!
  • 89. ALERT! SPAM! SEC-560: Network Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking
  • 90. THANKS! QUESTIONS? Jose Selvi http://twitter.com/JoseSelvi jselvi@s21sec.com jselvi@pentester.es http://www.s21sec.com http://www.pentester.es
  • 91. *[ THANKS! SEE YOU! ] Pág. 7