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University of Cagliari                                      Department of Electric and
                                                              Electronic Engineering




    A modular architecture for the
   analysis of HTTP payloads based
        on Multiple Classifiers
       Davide Ariu                                           Giorgio Giacinto
davide.ariu@diee.unica.it                                 giacinto@diee.unica.it




                             Napoli, 17 Giugno 2011

                                                                  This research was sponsored by the 
             Pattern Recognition and Applications Group           Autonomous Region of Sardinia through a grant 
    Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it                            financed with the ”Sardinia PO FSE 2007‐2013” 
                                                                  funds and provided according to the L.R. 7/2007 
Outline
•  Motivations
•  The proposed system
•  Experimental Setup and Results

•  Conclusions




          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                       2
The objective
Design of an anomaly based
Intrusion Detection System
for the protection of
Web Servers and Applications.
The HTTP traffic toward the web
servers is inspected by a
multiple classifier system.


         Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                      3
Why Web Applications?




         Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                      4
Why Anomaly Detection?




         Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                      5
A legitimate Payload...

GET /pra/ita/home.php HTTP/1.1
Host: prag.diee.unica.it
Accept: text/*, text/html
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0




          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                       6
A legitimate Payload...
                       Request Line

GET /pra/ita/home.php HTTP/1.1
Host: prag.diee.unica.it
Accept: text/*, text/html
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0




          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                       7
A legitimate Payload...
                       Request Line

GET /pra/ita/home.php HTTP/1.1
Host: prag.diee.unica.it
Accept: text/*, text/html
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0
                    Request Headers




          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                       8
...and some attacks
•  Long Request Buffer Overflow
 HEAD / aaaaaaa…aaaaaaaaaaaa



•  URL Decoding Error
 GET /d/winnt/sys32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
 Host: www
 Connection: close



          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                       9
Why Payload Analysis?
•  Detection of Web-based attacks based
   on the
  –  Analysis of the Request-Line
     •  Allows detecting only attacks that exploit
        input-validation flows
        e.g. Spectrogram ([Song,2009]), HMM-Web
        ([Corona,2009])

  –  HTTP Payload Analysis
     •  Takes into account the whole HTTP-request,
        and thus it can (in principle) detect any
        kind of attack


          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                       10
SOA - Payload Analysis
•  Payl [Wang,2004]
  –  n-grams to represent byte statistics

•  McPAD [Perdisci,2009]
  –  Ensemble of one-class SVM trained on ν-grams

•  Spectrogram [Wang,2009]
  –  Ensemble of Markov Chains to analyze the request-Line

•  HMMPayl [Ariu,2011]
  –  Ensemble of HMM to analyze sequences of bytes from
     the whole payload
          None of the above techniques
    represented the structure of the payload
           Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
  Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                          11
The proposed system
                              Basic Idea
•  We propose to take into account the
   structure of HTTP payloads
    – For each line of the payload, an
      ensemble of HMM is used to model the
      sequences of bytes.
  – The final decision is obtained by
    using the HMM outputs as features.
    The payload is thus classified by a
    one-class classifier trained on the
    outputs of the HMM ensembles.

          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                       12
The proposed system
                                        A scheme

                                              HMM Ensemble 
        HTTP Payload 
                                                  Request‐Line 
                                                                           IDS 
                                              HMM Ensemble 
GET /pra/index.php HTTP/1.1
                    Accept‐Language 
                                                                   0.62 
Host: prag.diee.unica.it
                                           ‐1 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
                                                                Output Score  
                                                                           One‐Class 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
                HMM Ensemble         0.53                      or 
                                                                           Classifier 
                                                      Host                              Class‐Label 
                                                                   0.34 
                                              HMM Ensemble         0.49 
                                                   User‐Agent 

                                              HMM Ensemble 
                                                Accept‐Encoding 




                Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
       Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                                                            13
Missing Features
•  Each request typically does not
   contain all the headers
  –  Training phase: the value of the
     feature related to a missing header has
     been set to the average value
  –  Testing phase: the value of the feature
     related to a missing header has been
     set to -1




          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                       14
Experimental Setup - 1
•  2 Datasets of                       Real legitimate
   traffic
  –  DIEE, collected at the University of
     Cagliari
  –  GT, collected at Georgia Tech




          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                         15
Experimental Setup - 2 
•  3 Datasets of   Real Attacks
  – Generic, 66 Attacks
  – Shell-code, 11 Attacks
  – XSS-SQL Injection,38 Attacks


•  Training: 1 day of traffic
•  Test: the remaining traffic plus
   attacks
  – K-fold CV

                                      16 
Experimental Setup - 3
•  4 One-class classification algorithms
   with default setting of parameters
  –  Gauss - Gaussian distribution
  –  Mog – Mixture of Gaussians
  –  Parzen – Parzen density estimator
  –  SVM – SVM with RBF Kernel


•  Performance evaluated using the                     Partial
   AUC
  –  Computed in the FP range [0,0.1]
  –  Normalized dividing by 0.1
          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                            17
Experimental Results
    Partial AUC – DIEE Dataset




         Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                      18
Experimental Results
Multiple HMM – DIEE Dataset – Shellcode Attacks




          Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
 Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                       19
Experimental Results
         Partial AUC – GT Dataset




         Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                      20
Experimental Results
   Comparison with similar IDS




         Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                      21
Computational Cost




         Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                      22
Conclusions
•  We proposed an anomaly based IDS for the
   protection of Web-Servers and Web-
   Applications
•  We exploited the MCS paradigm
  –  To analyze the structure of the HTTP payload
  –  By combining the outputs through a One-class
     classifier

•  Compared to similar systems, our propoal
  –  Provides high performance in attack detection
  –  Is fast


           Pattern Recognition and Applications Group
  Group    http://prag.diee.unica.it
                                                        23
Thank You!
          

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Ariu - Workshop on Multiple Classifier Systems - 2011

  • 1. University of Cagliari Department of Electric and Electronic Engineering A modular architecture for the analysis of HTTP payloads based on Multiple Classifiers Davide Ariu Giorgio Giacinto davide.ariu@diee.unica.it giacinto@diee.unica.it Napoli, 17 Giugno 2011 This research was sponsored by the  Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Autonomous Region of Sardinia through a grant  Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it financed with the ”Sardinia PO FSE 2007‐2013”  funds and provided according to the L.R. 7/2007 
  • 2. Outline •  Motivations •  The proposed system •  Experimental Setup and Results •  Conclusions Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 2
  • 3. The objective Design of an anomaly based Intrusion Detection System for the protection of Web Servers and Applications. The HTTP traffic toward the web servers is inspected by a multiple classifier system. Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 3
  • 4. Why Web Applications? Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 4
  • 5. Why Anomaly Detection? Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 5
  • 6. A legitimate Payload... GET /pra/ita/home.php HTTP/1.1 Host: prag.diee.unica.it Accept: text/*, text/html User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 6
  • 7. A legitimate Payload... Request Line GET /pra/ita/home.php HTTP/1.1 Host: prag.diee.unica.it Accept: text/*, text/html User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 7
  • 8. A legitimate Payload... Request Line GET /pra/ita/home.php HTTP/1.1 Host: prag.diee.unica.it Accept: text/*, text/html User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 Request Headers Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 8
  • 9. ...and some attacks •  Long Request Buffer Overflow HEAD / aaaaaaa…aaaaaaaaaaaa •  URL Decoding Error GET /d/winnt/sys32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0 Host: www Connection: close Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 9
  • 10. Why Payload Analysis? •  Detection of Web-based attacks based on the –  Analysis of the Request-Line •  Allows detecting only attacks that exploit input-validation flows e.g. Spectrogram ([Song,2009]), HMM-Web ([Corona,2009]) –  HTTP Payload Analysis •  Takes into account the whole HTTP-request, and thus it can (in principle) detect any kind of attack Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 10
  • 11. SOA - Payload Analysis •  Payl [Wang,2004] –  n-grams to represent byte statistics •  McPAD [Perdisci,2009] –  Ensemble of one-class SVM trained on ν-grams •  Spectrogram [Wang,2009] –  Ensemble of Markov Chains to analyze the request-Line •  HMMPayl [Ariu,2011] –  Ensemble of HMM to analyze sequences of bytes from the whole payload None of the above techniques represented the structure of the payload Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 11
  • 12. The proposed system Basic Idea •  We propose to take into account the structure of HTTP payloads – For each line of the payload, an ensemble of HMM is used to model the sequences of bytes. – The final decision is obtained by using the HMM outputs as features. The payload is thus classified by a one-class classifier trained on the outputs of the HMM ensembles. Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 12
  • 13. The proposed system A scheme HMM Ensemble  HTTP Payload  Request‐Line  IDS  HMM Ensemble  GET /pra/index.php HTTP/1.1 Accept‐Language  0.62  Host: prag.diee.unica.it ‐1  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 Output Score   One‐Class  Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate HMM Ensemble  0.53  or  Classifier  Host  Class‐Label  0.34  HMM Ensemble  0.49  User‐Agent  HMM Ensemble  Accept‐Encoding  Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 13
  • 14. Missing Features •  Each request typically does not contain all the headers –  Training phase: the value of the feature related to a missing header has been set to the average value –  Testing phase: the value of the feature related to a missing header has been set to -1 Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 14
  • 15. Experimental Setup - 1 •  2 Datasets of Real legitimate traffic –  DIEE, collected at the University of Cagliari –  GT, collected at Georgia Tech Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 15
  • 16. Experimental Setup - 2  •  3 Datasets of Real Attacks – Generic, 66 Attacks – Shell-code, 11 Attacks – XSS-SQL Injection,38 Attacks •  Training: 1 day of traffic •  Test: the remaining traffic plus attacks – K-fold CV 16 
  • 17. Experimental Setup - 3 •  4 One-class classification algorithms with default setting of parameters –  Gauss - Gaussian distribution –  Mog – Mixture of Gaussians –  Parzen – Parzen density estimator –  SVM – SVM with RBF Kernel •  Performance evaluated using the Partial AUC –  Computed in the FP range [0,0.1] –  Normalized dividing by 0.1 Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 17
  • 18. Experimental Results Partial AUC – DIEE Dataset Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 18
  • 19. Experimental Results Multiple HMM – DIEE Dataset – Shellcode Attacks Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 19
  • 20. Experimental Results Partial AUC – GT Dataset Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 20
  • 21. Experimental Results Comparison with similar IDS Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 21
  • 22. Computational Cost Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 22
  • 23. Conclusions •  We proposed an anomaly based IDS for the protection of Web-Servers and Web- Applications •  We exploited the MCS paradigm –  To analyze the structure of the HTTP payload –  By combining the outputs through a One-class classifier •  Compared to similar systems, our propoal –  Provides high performance in attack detection –  Is fast Pattern Recognition and Applications Group Group  http://prag.diee.unica.it 23