30
CHAPTER




Government
    And
Market Failure
PUBLIC GOODS
Rivalry & Excludability
(Chapter 5)
Private Goods
Divisibility
Demand Curve is Horizontal Summation
Public Goods


  Indivisibility
DEMAND FOR A PUBLIC GOOD
Problems of Revealing Preferences

              Adams’          Benson’s       Collective
            Willingness      Willingness Willingness
Quantity   to pay (price)   to pay (price) to pay (price)


   1       Exclusion Principle
             does not apply
DEMAND FOR A PUBLIC GOOD
Problems of Revealing Preferences

              Adams’           Benson’s       Collective
            Willingness       Willingness Willingness
Quantity   to pay (price)    to pay (price) to pay (price)


   1           $4           + $5          = $9
DEMAND FOR A PUBLIC GOOD
Problems of Revealing Preferences

              Adams’           Benson’s       Collective
            Willingness       Willingness Willingness
Quantity   to pay (price)    to pay (price) to pay (price)


   1           $4           + $5          = $9
   2            3           + 4           = 7
DEMAND FOR A PUBLIC GOOD
Problems of Revealing Preferences

              Adams’           Benson’s       Collective
            Willingness       Willingness Willingness
Quantity   to pay (price)    to pay (price) to pay (price)


   1           $4           + $5          = $9
   2            3           + 4           = 7
   3            2           + 3           = 5
DEMAND FOR A PUBLIC GOOD
Problems of Revealing Preferences

              Adams’           Benson’s       Collective
            Willingness       Willingness Willingness
Quantity   to pay (price)    to pay (price) to pay (price)


   1           $4           + $5          = $9
   2            3           + 4           = 7
   3            2           + 3           = 5
   4            1           + 2           = 3
DEMAND FOR A PUBLIC GOOD
Problems of Revealing Preferences

              Adams’           Benson’s       Collective
            Willingness       Willingness Willingness
Quantity   to pay (price)    to pay (price) to pay (price)


   1           $4           + $5          = $9
   2            3           + 4           = 7
   3            2           + 3           = 5
   4            1           + 2           = 3
   5            0           + 1           = 1
OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF A PUBLIC GOOD
 P
$9

 7

 5                      Adams’
                       willingness
 3                        to pay

 1
                          D1
                                   Q
     0   1   2   3    4        5
OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF A PUBLIC GOOD
 P
$9

 7                     Benson’s
                      willingness
                         to pay
 5

 3
                          D2
 1
                          D1
                                   Q
     0   1   2   3    4        5
OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF A PUBLIC GOOD
  P
                     When vertically
$9                    added equals
                        collective
 7                     willingness
                          to pay
 5

 3
                             D2
 1                                DC
                             D1
                                      Q
     0   1    2    3     4        5
OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF A PUBLIC GOOD
 P
$9                              S

 7
                      The public good’s
                        marginal cost
 5
                       as shown by S


 3

 1                               DC

                                    Q
     0   1   2   3    4        5
OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF A PUBLIC GOOD
 P
$9                              S

 7                         Yields the
                      optimum amount
                      of the public good
 5
                      MB = MC
 3

 1                               DC

                                    Q
     0   1   2   3     4       5
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Marginal Cost = Marginal Benefit Rule

Externalities
Spillover Costs
              Overallocation
Spillover Benefits
              Underallocation
SPILLOVER COSTS AND BENEFITS
P                                   St
     Spillover
      costs
                                    S




                                    D
                   Overallocation


0        Q0   Qe                    Q
SPILLOVER COSTS AND BENEFITS
P                                    St


                          Spillover
                          Benefits


                                     Dt

                                     D
                   Underallocation


0        Qe   Q0                         Q
SPILLOVER COSTS AND BENEFITS
Individual Bargaining –
    Coase Theorem
 Liability Rules and
     Lawsuits
Government Intervention
   Direct Controls
   Specific Taxes
   Subsidies and
     Government Provision
CORRECTING SPILLOVER COSTS
      P                                      St
              Spillover
               costs
                                             S




TAX
                            Overallocation
                              Corrected
                                             D

      0           Q0   Qe                    Q
CORRECTING SPILLOVER BENFITS
P


                              S

                            Spillover
                            Benefits

                               Dt

    Underallocation           D

0                 Qe   Q0           Q
CORRECTING SPILLOVER BENFITS
P Correcting by Subsidy to Consumers


                              S
                             Subsidy to
                             consumer
                             increases
                              demand



                                Dt

    Underallocation            D
      Corrected

0                 Qe   Q0            Q
CORRECTING SPILLOVER BENFITS
P Correcting by Subsidy to Producers
        Subsidy to                 St
        producers
        increases
          supply
                                           S’t




                         Underallocation
                           Corrected
                                           D

0           Qe      Q0                      Q
A MARKET-BASED APPROACH
      TO SPILLOVER COSTS
The Tragedy of the Commons
A Market for Externality Rights
  •Operation of the Market
  •Advantages
                                       D 2004           S = Supply of
                                                             pollution
                                                             rights
    Price per pollution right




                                $200


                                $100
                                                                      D 2012

                                                  500     750   1000
                                       Quantity of pollution rights
SOCIETY’S OPTIMAL AMOUNT
  OF EXTERNALITY REDUCTION
Application of MC = MB
  Rule
MC, MB Equilibrium
Optimal Reduction of an
  Externality
Shifts in the Curves
           Graphically…
SOCIETY’S OPTIMAL AMOUNT
                                          OF EXTERNALITY REDUCTION
Society’s marginal benefit and marginal                                            MC
      cost of pollution abatement

                                              Socially optimum
                                                 amount of
                                                  pollution
                                                 abatement




                                                                                   MB

                                          0                             Q1
                                                   Amount of pollution abatement
RECYCLING
Market for Recyclable
 Inputs
Policy
  •Demand Incentives
  •Supply Incentives
Global Warming Theory
RECYCLING
Information Failures
Asymmetric Information
Inadequate information …
   about sellers
   about buyers
Moral Hazard Problem
Adverse Selection Problem
 •Workplace Safety
cost-benefit analysis
  marginal-cost – marginal-benefit rule
  externalities
  Coase theorem
  tragedy of the commons
  market for externality rights
  optimal reduction of an externality
  asymmetric information
  moral hazard problem
  adverse selection problem
Copyright McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2005   BACK   END
Public Choice Theory
          And
The Economics of Taxation
               Chapter 31

AP Micro Government and Market Failure

  • 1.
    30 CHAPTER Government And Market Failure
  • 2.
    PUBLIC GOODS Rivalry &Excludability (Chapter 5) Private Goods Divisibility Demand Curve is Horizontal Summation Public Goods Indivisibility
  • 3.
    DEMAND FOR APUBLIC GOOD Problems of Revealing Preferences Adams’ Benson’s Collective Willingness Willingness Willingness Quantity to pay (price) to pay (price) to pay (price) 1 Exclusion Principle does not apply
  • 4.
    DEMAND FOR APUBLIC GOOD Problems of Revealing Preferences Adams’ Benson’s Collective Willingness Willingness Willingness Quantity to pay (price) to pay (price) to pay (price) 1 $4 + $5 = $9
  • 5.
    DEMAND FOR APUBLIC GOOD Problems of Revealing Preferences Adams’ Benson’s Collective Willingness Willingness Willingness Quantity to pay (price) to pay (price) to pay (price) 1 $4 + $5 = $9 2 3 + 4 = 7
  • 6.
    DEMAND FOR APUBLIC GOOD Problems of Revealing Preferences Adams’ Benson’s Collective Willingness Willingness Willingness Quantity to pay (price) to pay (price) to pay (price) 1 $4 + $5 = $9 2 3 + 4 = 7 3 2 + 3 = 5
  • 7.
    DEMAND FOR APUBLIC GOOD Problems of Revealing Preferences Adams’ Benson’s Collective Willingness Willingness Willingness Quantity to pay (price) to pay (price) to pay (price) 1 $4 + $5 = $9 2 3 + 4 = 7 3 2 + 3 = 5 4 1 + 2 = 3
  • 8.
    DEMAND FOR APUBLIC GOOD Problems of Revealing Preferences Adams’ Benson’s Collective Willingness Willingness Willingness Quantity to pay (price) to pay (price) to pay (price) 1 $4 + $5 = $9 2 3 + 4 = 7 3 2 + 3 = 5 4 1 + 2 = 3 5 0 + 1 = 1
  • 9.
    OPTIMAL AMOUNT OFA PUBLIC GOOD P $9 7 5 Adams’ willingness 3 to pay 1 D1 Q 0 1 2 3 4 5
  • 10.
    OPTIMAL AMOUNT OFA PUBLIC GOOD P $9 7 Benson’s willingness to pay 5 3 D2 1 D1 Q 0 1 2 3 4 5
  • 11.
    OPTIMAL AMOUNT OFA PUBLIC GOOD P When vertically $9 added equals collective 7 willingness to pay 5 3 D2 1 DC D1 Q 0 1 2 3 4 5
  • 12.
    OPTIMAL AMOUNT OFA PUBLIC GOOD P $9 S 7 The public good’s marginal cost 5 as shown by S 3 1 DC Q 0 1 2 3 4 5
  • 13.
    OPTIMAL AMOUNT OFA PUBLIC GOOD P $9 S 7 Yields the optimum amount of the public good 5 MB = MC 3 1 DC Q 0 1 2 3 4 5
  • 14.
    COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS Marginal Cost= Marginal Benefit Rule Externalities Spillover Costs Overallocation Spillover Benefits Underallocation
  • 15.
    SPILLOVER COSTS ANDBENEFITS P St Spillover costs S D Overallocation 0 Q0 Qe Q
  • 16.
    SPILLOVER COSTS ANDBENEFITS P St Spillover Benefits Dt D Underallocation 0 Qe Q0 Q
  • 17.
    SPILLOVER COSTS ANDBENEFITS Individual Bargaining – Coase Theorem Liability Rules and Lawsuits Government Intervention Direct Controls Specific Taxes Subsidies and Government Provision
  • 18.
    CORRECTING SPILLOVER COSTS P St Spillover costs S TAX Overallocation Corrected D 0 Q0 Qe Q
  • 19.
    CORRECTING SPILLOVER BENFITS P S Spillover Benefits Dt Underallocation D 0 Qe Q0 Q
  • 20.
    CORRECTING SPILLOVER BENFITS PCorrecting by Subsidy to Consumers S Subsidy to consumer increases demand Dt Underallocation D Corrected 0 Qe Q0 Q
  • 21.
    CORRECTING SPILLOVER BENFITS PCorrecting by Subsidy to Producers Subsidy to St producers increases supply S’t Underallocation Corrected D 0 Qe Q0 Q
  • 22.
    A MARKET-BASED APPROACH TO SPILLOVER COSTS The Tragedy of the Commons A Market for Externality Rights •Operation of the Market •Advantages D 2004 S = Supply of pollution rights Price per pollution right $200 $100 D 2012 500 750 1000 Quantity of pollution rights
  • 23.
    SOCIETY’S OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF EXTERNALITY REDUCTION Application of MC = MB Rule MC, MB Equilibrium Optimal Reduction of an Externality Shifts in the Curves Graphically…
  • 24.
    SOCIETY’S OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF EXTERNALITY REDUCTION Society’s marginal benefit and marginal MC cost of pollution abatement Socially optimum amount of pollution abatement MB 0 Q1 Amount of pollution abatement
  • 25.
    RECYCLING Market for Recyclable Inputs Policy •Demand Incentives •Supply Incentives Global Warming Theory
  • 26.
    RECYCLING Information Failures Asymmetric Information Inadequateinformation … about sellers about buyers Moral Hazard Problem Adverse Selection Problem •Workplace Safety
  • 27.
    cost-benefit analysis marginal-cost – marginal-benefit rule externalities Coase theorem tragedy of the commons market for externality rights optimal reduction of an externality asymmetric information moral hazard problem adverse selection problem Copyright McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2005 BACK END
  • 28.
    Public Choice Theory And The Economics of Taxation Chapter 31