General Ziaul Haq as viewed by Pakistan Army Generals and officers

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DOI:
10.13140/RG.2.2.36236.54403
Pakistan Army
Generals Views on

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General Zia Chief
of Pakistan Army
About the Author
Agha H. Amin , Retired Tank corps major who
served in five tank regiments and commanded an
independent tank squadron and served in various

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staff , instructional and research assignments.
Presently heads think tank Centre for Study of
Intelligence Operations. Editor in Chief of monthly
Intelligence Review and monthly Military and
Security Review. In his Pakistan Army tenure he
wrote three original tactical papers on
Reconnaissance Troops Tactical handling,
Reconnaissance support group , and RFS Concept.
His writings were published in Pakistan Armys
prime journals , Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel
Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta.
His recommendations regarding bifurcation of
officer corps into command and staff cadre
advanced in 1998 were later accepted. In addition
his recommendation of grouping various corps into
army commands advanced in an article published in
Citadel Journal in 1998 were accepted in 2005 or
so. Wrote Pakistan Armys first tactical paper on
Tactical handling of Reconnaissance Troop in 1986
which is now being incorporated in Pakistan Armys
most important general staff publication " The
Armored Regiment in Battle". Wrote The Essential
Clausewitz in 1993, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 in
1998 , Pakistan Army till 1965 in 1999
,Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan
and Pakistan (2010) ,Taliban War in Afghanistan
(2009). Served as Assistant Editor of Defence

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Journal ,Executive Editor of globe and Founder
Editor of Journal of Afghanistan Studies .
An associate of the think tanks ORBAT and
Alexandrian Defense group. Expert in social impact
and environmental assessment carried out various
LARP surveys for Asian Bank and World Bank
projects. He has lectured at various think tanks and
organisations worldwide and shares his knowledge
without any honorarium and at zero financial
benefits. Carried out various oil and gas and power
transmission line surveys in West Asia. One time
Assistant Editor Defence Journal , Executive Editor
Globe, Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies
Feedback is welcome at e mail address
L19aircraft@gmail.com
Presently heading Centre for Study of Intelligence
Operations which he founded in early 2010 and
editing Intelligence Review, Indian Military Review
and Journal of Book Reviews.

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Pakistan Army
Generals Views on
General Zia Chief
of Pakistan Army
Major A.H Amin (Retired)
These are excerpts from various interviews
conducted by this scribe :--
Maj Gen Hidayatullah
Khan Niazi, SJ
QUESTION

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WHAT ARE YOUR
IMPRESSIONS ABOUT
ZIA AS YOU SAW HIM
IN YOUR ARMY
TENURE?
Firstly, as a man Zia was honest, God-fearing
and kind hearted. He offered his prayers five
times a day. On the other hand I make no
hesitation in stating that Zia institutionalized
corruption. He gave many corrupt people like Air
Chief Anwar Shamim three to four extensions.
Personally Zia was not corrupt but he tolerated
corruption, sheltered corrupt people and
conveniently ignored their activities. Perhaps he
thought it politically expedient to do so. As a
man Zia was clean, intensely devoted to his
mother but as a head of state and army chief he
damaged institutions. It was simply impossible
humanly to be effective as a president and army

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chief. Thus the country as well as the army
suffered.
QUESTION
WHAT WAS THE
INFLUENCE OF ZIA’S
ONE MAN RULE ON THE
PAKISTAN ARMY IN
THE PERIOD 1976-88?
Personal likes and dislikes became the most
important factor in promotion.

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Institutions outwardly improved but quality of
soldiering deteriorated in essence.
Outwardly the army was more educated but
inwardly lacked the qualitative steel grit and
determination of the 1965 era.
Since Zia’s foremost priority was political
survival, politics got greater attention at the
expense of the army.

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QUESTION
What were your
impressions about Zia

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as you saw him in the
Army tenure?
I had not intimately known him before he
became the Chief of the Army Staff but from his
conduct during the Divisional Commanders
Conferences, he appeared to me an incompetent
and low grade officer. In one of the Division
Commanders promotion conferences, I even saw
him sleeping with his mouth open. He surpassed
all limits of sycophancy when meeting the Prime
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While in uniform, he
used to bow when shaking hands with Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto. I remember my old Brigade
Commander, Brigadier Hayat, with whom I
served as his Brigade Major, once told me that
he had written in Major Zia ul Haq’s ACR when
he served under his command, “Not fit to go
beyond the rank of a Major”. It is an irony of
fate that a person of such a calibre had ruled
Pakistan for a long period of eleven years till he
was finally killed in an air crash.

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Major General Naseer
ullah Khan Babar , SJ
and Bar
QUESTION
Why did Mr Bhutto
select Zia as a coas?
There were a number of reasons and these
were discussed with me personally by Mr
Bhutto, while in detention at Murree. One was
the pretended humility and this disarmed Mr
Bhutto into the belief that he would pose no
threat to the nascent democracy. Secondly, his
performance when he invited Mr Bhutto to the
centenary celebrations of 11 cavalry at Kharian.

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He took pains to ascertain Mr Bhutto's tailor in
Karachi (Hamid Khan) and had a Blue Patrols as
Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps.
On entering the room, Mr Bhutto found a
suitcase on his bed and on inquiry was told that
it contained the Blue Patrol. The next day, Mr
Bhutto was requested to climb a tank and
engage a target. Quite obviously the target was
hit. Then was his performance while on
deputation in Jordan, where he killed a large
number of Palestinians (Black September), Mr
Bhutto was led to the belief that if he was so
loyal to Jordan, he would be even more loyal to
Pakistan.
His prime performance came at Multan, where
he invited Mr Bhutto as Colonel-in-Chief. After
the function, when Mr Bhutto had barely
returned to Mr Sadiq Qureshi's house, when he
was informed that General Zia requested to
meet him. Mr Bhutto was surprised, having met
him in the mess a little earlier. However, he
called him into Mr Sadiq Qureshi’s study/library.
Gen Zia on entrance went round the Almirah,

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looking for something and on inquiry he
revealed that he was looking for a copy of the
Holy Quran.
On finding a copy he placed his hand on and
addressing Mr Bhutto he said, “You are the
saviour of Pakistan and we owe it to you to be
totally loyal to you”. Then was the fact that
there was little to pick and choose amongst the
other aspirants. The only other suitable
candidate was General Majeed Malik who was
Mr Bhutto’s favourite as a sound professional.
Unfortunately was involved in the International
Hotel Scandal where he was caught with
Mustafa Khar. He was sent as Ambassador to
Libya. Finally, of course was the American angle.
They had picked Zia as suitable material at Fort
Leavenworth, followed his career progress and
possibly lobbied in his favour.
They made it known to friends months in
advance that he would be appointed coas. Zia’s
obsequeous behaviour made Mr Bhutto think
that he was a non-political man. Pakistani
democracy was at an infant stage and could not

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afford an Army Chief with political ambitions.
Then there was not much choice. Gen Sharif was
considered politically unreliable since he had
been very close to Ayub Khan. Jillani had no
command experience and was the head of isi.
Akbar Khan had not performed well as a goc 12
Division in Kashmir in 1971 war. Gen Aftab and
AB Awan had no command potential and were
not suitable.
44. How would Mr z.a Bhutto have behaved had
he been in power when the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan?
Mr Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan
resistance in 1973. He had the foresight and
vision to do it. As a matter of fact we created
the organisational network which was used by
Zia and the usa to oppose the Soviets.
Zia had a short term vision and ignored the
political angle of organising an Afghan
government in exile with ulterior aims of
gobbling us aid. Had Mr Bhutto been in chair he

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would not have deliberately neglected the
political angle like Zia.
Even Daud was convinced by Mr Bhutto in 1976
and said “Pakistan and Afghanistan are in the
same boat. If it is the threat from the North
(ussr) it is Afghanistan today and Pakistan
tomorrow. If it is the threat from the South
(India) it is Pakistan today and Afghanistan
tomorrow”. You see after 1971 Indian
strategists had placed Pakistan and Afghanistan
in the same category as the next target. Mr
Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan
resistance for reasons discussed earlier.
However, being a political animal, he also
continued with a political alternative/solution.
In November 1976, in consultation with the
resistance leadership two individuals, namely
Wakil Azam Shinwari and Yunus Khugiani were
selected to proceed to Rome and request King
Zahir to return and as his father had done
earlier, to lead a movement into Afghanistan.
The caveat was that Zahir Shah could return as
a constitutional monarch under the Constitution
drafted by Mr Musa Shafiq, a former Prime

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Minister and the mentor/founder of the Hizb in
Afghanistan.
However, Zahir Shah indicated that he was
willing to play his role but he would first visit
Saadat (Egypt), then visit the Shah of Iran and
finally arrive in Pakistan. Mr Bhutto was
confident that King Zahir Shah could act as a
rallying point and play his historical role. Events,
however, took a different turn and martial law
was imposed in Pakistan. The other aspect was
the negotiations with Sardar Daud. Even Daud
as earlier discussed had accepted the Durand
Line in 1976 and wanted peace with Pakistan.
QUESTION --How
would you assess Zia’s
Afghan policy?
It was based on sheer opportunism and
personal interest. Initially, he lacked the vision

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and, therefore, suspended financing the
movement. This resulted in break-up of
movement from one to seven groups — each
leader fending for himself. Secondly, when the
Soviet invasion took place he did not form a
government in exile, which could gain
experience during the Jehad and be available
when the Geneva talks took place.
Also all the us/Saudi and other assistance would
have been routed through institutional
organisations (Ministries) rather than
individuals and would have prevented heart
burning and divisive tendencies.
Finally, he opposed the Geneva talks and
visualised only a military solution - the bane of
all our subsequent military leadership — Hamid
Gul, Beg etc. We were very deliberate. Every
resistance is based on a political centre, a
hierarchy, like the DeGaulle government in exile,
the Algerian and Yugoslav Government in exile
etc. Zia deliberately kept the Afghan Mujahideen
divided into various groups in order to ensure
that the bulk of the us aid could be embezzled.

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The future events thus led to the post-1988 civil
war in Afghanistan.
Brig Muhammad Taj, SJ
& Bar
QUESTION
HOW WOULD YOU
ASSESS ZIA AS A MAN
AND THE INFLUENCE
THAT HE HAD DURING
HIS 11-YEAR-OLD
STINT AS ARMY CHIEF?

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I believe he followed double standards
throughout his tenure. He said one thing and did
quite the opposite to remain in power. The
Afghan war, however, provided him with
opportunities to prolong his rule.
QUESTION
IT HAS BEEN SAID
THAT ZIA
DELIBERATELY
PROMOTED
RELATIVELY
SPINELESS PEOPLE IN
ORDER TO

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STRENGTHEN HIS GRIP
ON THE ARMY. HOW
FAR IS THIS
ASSERTION CORRECT
OR INCORRECT?
This allegation is correct to some extent but this
is precisely what every military dictator would
do to strengthen his position.