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Sino-US Relations in the 21st Century: Is a Sino-US War Possible?Bright Mhango
This paper grapples with this question and concludes that war between the two can break out even tonight if certain conditions are met. However, for now, with China’s military not advanced enough, any war would have to be started by the US. And it so happens that the US actually has enough motives to engage China before it fully modernizes but cannot just do so from the blue. The US is thus trying to force China to give it the reason to justify a war to its increasingly war skeptical allies and domestic publics.
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Running head DATA MINING 1DATA MINING4Assignment 2 Inter.docxcharisellington63520
Running head: DATA MINING 1
DATA MINING 4
Assignment 2: International Insecurity and the Use of Force
Due Week 6 and worth 200 points
Incorporate the professor’s feedback from Assignment 1 in order to proficiently develop Assignment 2.
Use scholarly journal articles and/or Strayer academic databases to complete additional research on your selected topic. Use the major international political event that you selected for Assignment 1 in order to complete this assignment.
Use the basic outline below to draft your paper. Organize your responses to each question (except Question 5) under the following section headings:
•Part II: International Insecurity and the Use of Force of [Name of Select Major International Event]
•The Media, the People, and Public Opinion (for Question 1)
•The Impact of Foreign Policies (for Question 2)
•International Insecurity (for Question 3)
•Use of Force (for Question 4)
Write a four to six (4-6) page paper in which you separate the content into sections:
1.Explain the fundamental manner in which transnational actors, interest groups, public opinion, and the media have influenced your chosen event. Provide relevant examples of such influence in action to support your response.
2.Discuss which foreign policies developed by the main participants played a role in your chosen event. Evaluate the extent to which the chosen policies impacted your chosen event. Provide examples of the impact to support your rationale.
3.Analyze the key role(s) that international insecurity played in the development of your chosen event. Provide a rationale for your response.
4.Analyze whether or not the use of force concept was used in your chosen event. Argue whether or not the use or non-use of force concept was justified. Provide examples where force was used to support your rationale.
5.Use at least three (3) additional quality references. Note: Wikipedia and other Websites do not qualify as academic resources.
Your assignment must follow these formatting requirements:
•Be typed, double spaced, using Times New Roman font (size 12), with one-inch margins on all sides; citations and references must follow APA or school-specific format. Check with your professor for any additional instructions.
•Include a cover page containing the title of the assignment, the student’s name, the professor’s name, the course title, and the date. The cover page and the reference page are not included in the required assignment page length.
The specific course learning outcomes associated with this assignment are:
•Evaluate the theories and systems of international politics.
•Analyze how international politics influences the various levels of public administration and its effects on groups and individuals.
•Differentiate among international conflict, security, terrorism, military force, weapons of mass destruction, and their effects on war and peace.
•Analyze the major developments in international politics and how they have evolved.Use technology and i.
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1. AMERICAN
AID
TO
PAKISTAN
IS
DOOMED
TO
FAIL
THE
PARADOXICAL
ATTITUDES
OF
THE
U.S.
POLICY
ELITE
TOWARDS
AID
CONDITIONALITY
AND
ITS
IMPACT
Alicia
Mollaun
alicia.mollaun@anu.edu.au
2. U.S.
Aid
to
Pakistan
2001
2002
2010
Military
Aid
0
US$1.7
billion
US$2.5
billion
Economic
Aid
US$46
million
US$228
million
US$1.9
billion
Total
US$46
million
US$1.9
billion
US$4.4
billion
3. U.S.
Aid
to
Pakistan
• Today,
economic
and
military
aid
heavily
condiEoned
• Military
and
economic
aid
condiEoned
on
Pakistan
meeEng
security
outcomes
including
on
:
• Dismantling
supplier
networks
relaEng
to
the
acquisiEon
of
nuclear
weapons-‐related
materials;
• Ceasing
support
for
terrorist
and
extremist
groups;
• PrevenEng
AQ,
Taliban
and
LeT
from
operaEng
in
Pakistan;
• Strengthening
CT
and
AML
laws;
and
• Ensuring
the
security
forces
of
Pakistan
are
not
materially
and
substanEally
subverEng
the
poliEcal
or
judicial
processes
of
Pakistan.
• U.S.
also
condiEons
aid
to
achieve
economic
reform
4. Research
Gap
and
Question
• Breadth
of
literature
on
economic
condiEonality
(poliEcal
economy,
development
economics
and
poliEcal
science).
• Gap:
security
condiEonality,
security
condiEons
on
economic
aid;
elite
a[tudes
(donor
and
recipient)
towards
condiEons.
Few
in-‐depth
case
studies.
• This
research:
• Case
study
–
U.S.
aid
to
Pakistan
post
9/11
• Elite
a[tudes
towards
economic
and
security
condiEonality
• Elite
a[tudes
towards
economic
condiEonality
and
economic
reform
• Elite
a[tudes
towards
aid
and
foreign
policy
leverage.
5. Research
Design
• 38
‘policy
elite’
interviewed
in
Washington
D.C.
and
New
York
in
March
2012.
• Policy
elite:
• Academics:
Georgetown,
JHU,
Columbia,
NYU
• Think-‐tanks:
Brookings,
AtlanEc
Council,
New
America,
CGD,
AEI…
• Bureaucrats:
State,
USAID,
Senate
and
House
Foreign
Affairs
• IFIs:
World
Bank,
IMF
• Semi-‐Structured
Interviews.
• Also
interviewing
Pakistani
elite
6. Attitudes
towards
conditionality
A6tudes
towards
security
and
economic
condi?onality
Number
of
Responses
(%)
Agree
–
Security
Agree
–
Economic
17
(59%)
Agree
–
Security
Disagree
–
Economic
4
(14%)
Disagree
–
Security
Agree
–
Economic
1
(3%)
Disagree
–
Security
Disagree
–
Economic
5
(17%)
Agree
–
Economic
Silent
on
Security
1
(3%)
Disagree
-‐
Economic
Silent
on
Security
1
(3%)
Agree
–
Security
Silent
on
Economic
0
Disagree
–Security
Silent
on
Economic
0
Sample
Size
=
29
7. Attitudes
towards
conditionality
• Why
do
the
elite
support
condiEons?
• (a)
Concerns
about
Pakistan
• (b)
DomesEc
poliEcs
in
the
U.S.
• But
what
about
that
minority
that
don't
support
condiEons?
• (a)
It
doesn't
work
• (b)
It
is
counter-‐producEve
(an
irritant).
8. Attitudes
towards
conditions
and
economic
reform
Number
of
Responses
(%)
CondiEonality
can
achieve
economic
reform
7
(35%)
CondiEonality
cannot
achieve
economic
reform
13
(65%)
9. Attitudes
towards
conditions
and
economic
reform
• CondiEons
don’t
achieve
economic
reform.
Why?
• (a)
Pakistan
actually
has
more
leverage
• Pakistan’s
importance
vis-‐à-‐vis
‘war
on
terror’
and
war
in
Afghanistan
• (b)
Pakistan's
problems
too
deep-‐rooted
• poliEcal,
vested
interests
• However,
the
minority
believe
that
condiEons
can
achieve
economic
reform.
• Success
of
mulElateral
aid
condiEonality
rather
than
bilateral
condiEons
10. Attitudes
towards
aid
and
foreign
policy
leverage
• Majority
believe
aid
can’t
achieve
leverage
over
foreign
policy.
Why?
• (a)
credibility
of
U.S.
demands
• (b)
conflicEng
goals
• (c)
the
size
of
the
U.S.
aid
program
• (d)
Pakistan
vs.
U.S.
leverage
• (e)
trust
• (f)
strategic
calculus
Number
of
responses
(%)
Aid
can
achieve
foreign
policy
leverage
5
(17%)
Aid
can
achieve
foreign
policy
leverage
(but
the
U.S.
has
lost
its
leverage)
10
(33%)
Aid
cannot
achieve
foreign
policy
leverage
15
(50%)
11. Attitudes
towards
aid
and
foreign
policy
leverage
• Minority
argue
that
aid
could
achieve
leverage:
• (a)
through
military
aid
during
Pakistan’s
military
rule
immediately
aqer
9/11
• (b)
through
provision
of
military
equipment.
BUT
–
with
Pakistan’s
civilian
government,
it
is
much
more
difficult
to
achieve
aid
through
either
economic
or
military
assistance.
12. The
Paradox
Condi?onal
approach
works
Condi?onal
approach
does
not
work
Total
Support
condiEonal
approach
11
12
23
Do
not
support
condiEonal
approach
4
2
6
Total
15
14
29
13. The
Paradox
The
U.S.
elite
support
a
condiEonal
approach
but
don’t
think
it
works.
14. Why
do
conditions
persist?
• For
signaling
reasons
DomesEc
InternaEonal
(Pakistan)
• Domes?c:
•
CondiEons
for
U.S.
audience
–
makes
aid
to
Pakistan
more
poliEcally
palatable
in
the
U.S.
• Interna?onal
(Pakistan):
• U.S.
long-‐term
commitment
to
Pakistan
• U.S.
focus
on
civilian
issues,
not
just
security/strategic
issues
• Problems
• U.S.
is
not
credible
in
its
condiEons
• U.S.
doesn’t
trust
Pakistan
• Given
the
need
for
signaling,
and
the
U.S
strategic
need
for
Pakistan’s
cooperaEon,
condiEonal
aid
is
given
• Despite
negaEve
percepEons
of
the
uElity
of
condiEonality
15. Conclusion
• Academic
studies
skepEcal
of
condiEonality,
yet
it
sEll
persists.
• This
paradox
is
exemplified
in
the
views
of
the
U.S.
elite
towards
the
imposiEon
of
condiEonality
on
American
aid.
• This
research
sheds
light
on
why
condiEonality
persists
• Aid
may
be
condiEonal
for
domesEc
poliEcal
reasons
• CondiEonality
has
a
signaling
role
• Aid
has
to
be
given
–
aid
has
to
be
condiEonal
• Aid
remains
condiEonal
even
if
condiEons
don’t
influence
• Ongoing
research
will
explore
the
percepEons
of
the
Pakistani
elite
towards
condiEonality