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1. A CRITIQUE OF MORAL RELATIVISM:
Definition, Refutation, Movtivations, Consequences
Moral relativism, as a widespread social phonomenon, invites critique. In philosophy, a
critique is an articulation of limits: the subjection of a phenomenon to a stringent examination of
its scope, operational field, function in its field, difference from other phenomena, and
operational results.
In general, moral relativism could arise only in a culture in which the individual
conscience is the final, if not the first, arbiter of moral judgment. In effect, this imports that it
could arise only in Western civilization. For conscience was first experienced (as syneidēsis) by
the ancient Greeks; was deepened and grounded (as conscientia) by Christianity; became
widespread with the spread of Protestantism and post-Tridentine Catholicism; and became
vulnerable to relativism with the triumph of modernity.1
Psychologically, modernity is primarily
the loss of the automaticity of community; and the quest for community is its challenge.2
The
isolate soul, subject to forces that he does not understand, feels the need to protect the inviolable
sphere of his own moral agency, asserts his uniqueness over against the other, deems oppressive
the voice of moral authority, and takes self-assertion to be dignity.3
The pubertal and adolescent
mind--and those fixated in it--is especially vigorous in this regard.
The aim of this article is to critique the conscience that accepts moral relativism. It falls
into four parts: definition, refutation, motivation, and social consequences (especially a new and
dangerous one).
I. Definition
Moral relativism is the opinion that universal moral principles are either impossible or
necessarily inexistent; that moral principles are totally conditional upon culture or the individual;
that reasons for moral judgment and action are reducible to local non-moral motivations; that
moral justifications are arbitrary; that moral principles are only social mores; that “moral values”

2. are only “personal preferences”; that moral norms are only local customs; that moral views, like
tastes, are non-disputable. These definitions do not entirely coincide in sense, but they all refer
to the same phenomenon.
Popular formulations of moral relativism are: That’s only your opinion! That may be so
for you but not for me! Different people think in different ways! There is no absolute moral
truth! Different strokes for different folks! Other cultures hold otherwise! Taken in isolation,
these formulae may or may not express moral relativism. They may be only observations on
human variability. But they are common expressions of moral relativism.
At least moral relativism recognizes that human freedom requires guidelines, that is, that
human action may be right or wrong, that the morally good and the morally bad are real. Thus
moral relativism is not the same as moral skepticism and moral cynicism. Skepticism is the
conviction that moral principles are unknowable. The relativist thinks that they are knowable but
are reducible to merely the conventional. The skeptic challenges: Who knows? Already
Aristotle, in the Nichomachean Ethics, answered that question: the spoudaios, the mature mind.
Cynicism is the conviction that the morally good and morally bad are illusory, that human action
is not such as to be evaluated as right or wrong. The cynic reduces moral principle to cynical
justifications, usually of power. The cynic pretends to unmask hypocrisy. Already Plato, in The
Republic (338C-354A), unmasked that pretention. In argumentation over moral relativism, the
advocate will sometimes retreat to the secondary line of defense, skepticism or cynicism.
Here’s an example of moral relativism from a college exam.
There are many different ways to define what is morally good as there is
many different ways to define what is morally wrong.
To be morally good has many different factors. What may be considered
to be morally good by one person can be judged by another person to be morally wrong.
Many different social factors can contribute to a person’s attitude. A person’s
environment can cause a person to believe in a certain way. Also, the attitudes of people
around them may cause them to have certain attitudes.
To be morally good is to act in a certain way that you may feel confortable and
right with.
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3. Other people around you may see your actions and say that you are doing
something that is acceptable in our society.
When a person commits a crime he will be judged to be morally wrong because
he did something that was against society.
To be morally good, a person must decide that he is doing the right and proper
thing to do. Also society sets up moral rules which everyone must follow or else they
will be considered wrong and unacceptable.
The writing is poor, but the point is clear enough.
II. Refutation
It is not difficult to refute moral relativism. Eight reasons obtain to reject it.
First, as a basic moral principle, it is subject to its own claim. The principle itself must
be relative to culture or individual. According to itself, it is not universal; it claims the
universality that it denies.
Second, it implicitly condemns universal principles as morally wrong and thus imputes
goodness to itself; but according to itself, it cannot be universally good.
Third, moral relativism permits anything, which includes its own destruction. Hence, if it
is good, then it is bad because it permits that the good be destroyed by anyone for any reason
whatsoever.
Fourth, if moral relativism were true, then the moral improvement of others would be
impossible. One could, of course, still deem himself to have improved. But no particular moral
condition of anyone else could ever be judged to be better or worse than any other, and therefore
neither an improvement nor a regression. All political advocacy based on a moral ideal, for
example, would be either pointless or a cover for the libido dominandi. It would be impossible
for others to improve by becoming moral relativists.
Fifh, moral relativism requires individual and social confusion. Since moral standards
are, for the relativist, culturally arbitrary or idiosyncratic, they may be changed arbitrarily or
idiosyncratically. Change becomes an insoluble moral problem. Furthermore, as Leo Struass
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4. wrote, everyone either wants to preserve things as they are or wants to change them. When
desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent change to the worse; when desiring to change, we wish
to bring about something better. All action is therefore guided by some idea of better or worse.
In other words, all action is guided by moral principles. But if moral principles are arbitrary,
then both change and preservation, by any agent on any scale, become arbitrary--including
change into or preservation of moral relativism.
Sixth, moral relativism also incurs the same disabilities that epistemic relativism does.
For the relativist also claims that his principle is true. It is, indeed, the only moral truth; for other
moral claims must be only sentiment, or custom, or stratagems to oppress, and so on. Thus
moral relativism must be absolutely true, not conditional upon any culture or other human
variation. By holding at least one principle to be true, the moral relativist must reject cognitive
relativism. But if truth can be absolute, then moral principles, as truth-claims, may well be
absolute. The moral relativist has the problem of justifying his absolutely true moral principle.
But the principle, as a moral principle, must be, according to itself, only an arbitrary cultural
variation. An absolutely true principle of morality that is at once cognitively arbitrary? When a
principle makes itself impossible, implying its own contradiction, intellectual confusion could
hardly be greater.
Seventh, if moral relativism were true, then it would be a matter of moral indifference
whether or not someone believes in moral relativism; in other words, the relativist should not
care whether anyone believes him. If moral relativism is false, then no one should believe it.
Hence, if the moral relativist tries to convince anyone of moral relativism, either he is
contravening his own thesis (and thus does not really believe it), or everyone else should pay no
attention to him. Thus the dilemma: if any anyone argues in favor of moral relativism, he is
either irrational or irrelevant. Hence the morally rational person dismisses moral relativism
immediately.
Eighth, the final problem with moral relativism is that no really believes it, anyway.
Everybody, in multiple roles, thinks, even passionataely declaims, some behavior to be morally
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5. wrong--whether as citizens, parents, customers, and so on. Examples are obvious. Unless we
are total cynics, we, as voters, vote according to some standard of right and wrong--that we think
is obligatory for others. The progressive believes passionately in equality, in social justice, and
in racism in others. The sophisticate believes in his own intellectual and moral superiority and
thus in his moral right to pronounce others reprobate and stupid.
Despite its intellectual deficiency, moral relativism is a popular attitude, sometimes
asserted as a principle. Why would anybody assume this attitude?
III. Motivations
Moral relativism has at least eight motivations.
First, someone could take this attitude because he discovers the plurality of moralities.
There is, indeed, a plurality of moralities. In pre-modern societies, moral codes were
indistinguishable from the social mores and the laws; in modern societies, they co-exist in the
same society and are partially coterminous. But the discovery of the plurality of moralities was
already the work of the ancient Greek historians, playwrights, and philosophers. In fact, this
discovery was precisely the stimulus to search intellectually for universals in morality. The
Greek term nomos meant, compactly, both the normal or customary and the norm or normative.
To differentiate the two was an achievement of considerable proportions. Hence, we can
understand why the relativistic, sophomoric mind would be unable to handle the problem; it is
simply beyond his intellectual resources to do what the Greeks already did.
Second, one could take the relativist attitude because he mistakes sense-variability for
moral variability. That is, he does not understand that the pre-moral meaning of an action may
differ according to culture, and thus the moral sense of the action would differ. Take the simple
issues of gesture, reference to the addressee, leadership styles, invitations, personal space,
appointment time, feedback, or trust.4
Take a profound issue, like homicide: murder is
universally prohibited, but which homicides count as murder may differ according to culture. Or
incest: incest is universally prohibited; but who counts as a relative differs (for some, it is one’s
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6. fifth cousin, which only the Mormons among us know how to figure). Or sharing one’s
resources: it is everywhere prescribed; but with whom, what, and under what circumstances are
variable. The same, mutatis mutandis, goes for divorce, torture, age of sexual consent,
homosexuality, the extent of negligence, aggression, property, cannibalism, the relation between
religion and morality, the relation between public law and morality, or penal sanctions. Different
cultures may well share a (universal) moral principle, but judgments upon a concrete action may
differ because of the pre-moral sense of it. The relativist here is naïve about cultures.
Third, one may take the relativist attitude because as a child and teen he has been
encouraged in school to do so or, negatively, discouraged from absolute standards. The public-
school teacher may well have taught that whatever “values” one chooses for oneself are ipso
facto “right.” Under the title of “values clarification,” this doctrine became a program. Another
title under which such encouragement or discouragement could occur is “critical thinking.” Such
indoctrination would leave the student at the mercy of others, usually the teacher himself and the
idols of popular culture. Here, the young relativist, not yet critical enough, does not even realize
that he is often the target of manipulation and always the recipient of “values” that he did not
invent.
Fourth, one could espouse the relativist attitude because he wants to excuse his own
conduct. He may know of no other way to justify himself. At least he realizes that behavior
requires justification; he is not a sociopath. But he incurs what we call “bad faith.” Commonly,
he just does not want to go through the discomfort of an examination of conscience.
Fifth, one may favor moral relativism because he believes it to be appropriate to his
“autonomy.” In effect, this assertion is his “declaration of independence” from the authorities of
his childhood. He does not understand the role of authority in human maturity: authorities
subserve freedom by offering to us what at the moment is beyond our own competence so that
we may appropriate it, become more autonomous, and thus make the authority superfluous. For
example, everyone was taught to read by an authority; once we mastered the skill and became
autonomous readers, the authority, having fulfilled his function, becomes superfluous. Likewise
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7. with moral principles and practice. Of course, we all remain, to some degree or another, under
some authority; for we are finite. Although we must recognize the legitimacy of a declaration of
independence, we must also recognize that it does not imply moral relativism. Here, beyond the
obvious confusion, the relativist is not humble enough to acknowledge his need for authority in
order to grow.
Sixth, one may mistake the realm of his personal preferences for the realm of possible
moral action. Our “moral preferences” are not analogous to tastes in music, food, colors, and so
on. Our natural tastes we may cultivate, discipline, and refine. We may even, to some extent,
bring these tastes into the scope of our freedom and thus moral judgment; the pop music of our
puberty, for example, may later be subject to our mature judgment as degenerate. But taste and
moral decision remain different. Here, the relativist is ignorant of the extent of his freedom.
Seventh, one may take moral relativism to be strictly analogous to his own aesthetic
relativism. The two are, in an axiological framework, species of the same genus. This analogy is
especially the penchant of pubertals and adolescents. They notice a divergence of musical taste
between themselves and their elders and defend their own taste as indisputably legitimate; they
conclude that aesthetic relativism is true and therefore that moral relativism must also be so.
Here, the relativist does not realize that tastes may be refined and that analogies are only
clarifications and not proofs.
Eighth, one may think moral relativism to be the only choice if he is to be a decent and
tolerant person. The ideal of toleration, especially in matters religious, is a singular achievement
of Western Christian culture; but he believes that the virtue of toleration entails relativism.
However, toleration is not simply indifference or passivity in the face of evil. To tolerate is to
put up with some evil that we would otherwise want to suppress. Everyone recognizes limits to
toleration. But we allow to exist certain evils because the suppresison of them would entail other
evils; and the choice is between a lesser and a greater evil, between a lesser or greater good.
Toleration presupposes a judgment on good and evil. Therefore, it is not the same as relativism.
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8. Toleration is precisely a virtue and not a mere preference. Here, the relativist is not sophisticated
enough to tell the difference and does not expend the energy to do so.
In summary, intellectual deficiency, cultural naïveté, innocent gullibility, bad faith,
confusion and arrogance, ignorance of self, lack of aesthetic refinement and intellectual
sophistication, and intellectual laziness motivate moral relativism. However, even those who do
not suffer from these defects may acquiesce in moral relativism--which then appears to be
regnant.
First, one who professes universal standards may be attacked by the ideologue as
“judgmental.” It is easier to be silent and in effect to allow relativism a passive victory. We
indeed have to pick our battles well, and this one may not be worth the cost to us.
Second, the reflective person simply may not know how to articulate or to defend
universal moral principles. So long as the inability makes little difference in his life, it will not
be worthwhile to expend energy on the project. He will accept an ethos of moral relativism by
default and only tolerate it.
Whatever the motivation and whatever the appearance, moral relativism is intellectually
indefensible.
IV. Social Consequences
As long as a critical mass of a given society lives according to some absolute standards,
even if only coerced by law, that society can tolerate an operative relativism in a small proportion
of its members. Most people, when they take on the responsibilities of parenthood and career,
leave the attitude behind them. Perhaps it brought them more suffering than was necessary in
life. But there is one group in the modern West for whom the pain is acute and thus to whom the
ethos does particular damage.
That group is young male Arabic Muslims, either immigrants or first-generation
Westerners--a small minority of them, to be sure, but enough to cause major trouble. Like young
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9. men everywhere, they need a cause to serve, a direction for their energy, an ideal transcendent to
quotidian life. Suppression and sublimation of this need is too complex for this minority.
The problem arises at the intersection of relativism, Islamic morality, and modernity.
In the Muslim moral tradition, nothing is too trivial to escape the notice of the Omniscent,
Allah, and thus the dictates of his law (sharia). Since the law prohibits, prescribes, permits,
recommends, or discommends every detail of life, the good Muslim has little choice. Such a
complex of moral law is called “legalism.” “It is not fitting for a believer, man or woman, when
Allah and his messenger have decided any affair, to have any choice in the affair. If anyone
disobeys Allah and his messenger, he is indeed on the wrong path” (Qu’ran 33.36-37). Islam is
“the right path.” Submission is everything.
And this is precisely what renders the believer, the submissive, unable to live in the
modern world. For modernity disrupts traditional mentalities, like Submission, without mercy.5
Modernity separates civil structures and religious institutions, kinship trust and economic
transactions, the patron/client hierarchy and security. It frees religion from politics, but also
reversely. It makes economic transactions quasi-autonomous. It demands that males bring their
libido under their own control, not put the burden on women. It allows a plurality of
incommensurable world-views to co-exist without violence. It even allows to relativism a
danger-free zone. Above all, it makes traditional communities no longer automatic; now, each
person plays multiple roles, and who is “one’s own” is not self-evident. Alienation,
disorientation, bewilderment arise. Everywhere, choice abounds.6
But choice generates considerable anxiety. For in the face of an unknowable future, no
algorithm brings relief. Even worse, if one’s own fate is now in his own hands, he has no one
else to blame for his failures. Hence, choice is a burden as much as it is a pleasure.
Without enculturation in resilience, the unmodern soul in the modern world suffers a
terrible dilemma: anger mobilizies him but depression immobilizes him. The tension then
depletes him. Conspiracy theories assuage the intellectual need to account for the gap between
his desert as an innocent and his victimhood. All he needs is a Leader to show him the way out--
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10. a Leader to whom he submits. The relief is then considerable. Enthusiasm and at once calm
descend upon him--the perfect fanatic. The behavior of terrorists before the attack is exactly this.
Now we all need community. We find our own identity through identification with
others. Our communities give us a sense of home, a commonality that moderates our natural
vigilance, and a presumption of care from others and a readiness to care for them. By definition,
a community constitutes itself over against outsiders, whether or not they be hostile. But the
more it feels under threat from outsiders, the more intense the community becomes. For many
men through the ages, the deepest community in his life is his squad of comrades in combat.
Everywhere, the great problem of modernity is community. For the good Muslim, militant Islam
is the solution.
When alienation, disorientation, and bewilderment become intolerable and the soul,
needful of community, fights back, what happens is “the fascist mind.”7
The West is quite
familiar with this. The popular movements in Europe after World War I are paradigmatic. The
Muslims of Europe and America are vulnerable to fascism. The fascist mind needs a Leader to
induce and to direct its latent militancy. Today, the Leader need not write books or assemble
mass rallies; he can reach the receptive soul via Internet propaganda.
Hence a small minority of young Arabic Muslims will engage in terrorism, either
domestic or foreign.
The effect of moral relativism on the fascist mind is thus the opposite of what the
proponent of relativism claims to represent: an open mind, an understanding of others, an
enlightened tolerance.
The social consequences of moral relativism are serious: it weakens the healthy
community and, for a certain demographic, occasions a destructive community. Given the
experience of conscience in the modern West, the attraction of moral relativism is
understandable. Although most people get over it, a small minority overcomes it--with a
vengeance.
All rights reserved November 2017
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1
MartinvanCreveld,Conscience: A Biography (London: ReaktionBooks,2015);ColinMorris,The
Discovery of the Individual, 1050-1200 (London: SPCK, 1972); Larry Siedentop, Inventing the
Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (Cambridge: HarvardUniversityPress,2014);
Marie-DominiqueChenu,L’Éveil de la conscience dans la civilisation médiévale (Paris: Vrin,
1969).
2
Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community [1953} (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies,
1990).
3
In 1914, Franz Kafka portrayed the plight of the isolate soul in The Trial (1925). Thenovelopens:
“SomeonemusthaveslanderedJosefK.,foronemorning,withouthavingdoneanythingwrong,
hewasarrested.” Afterthat,it’salldownhill. Hemustdefendhimselfagainstachargeabout
whichknowsnothing.
4
Guidesforinternationalbusinessentertainwhiletheyinsruct,asin,forexample, ErinMeyer,The
Culture Map: Breaking Through the Invisible Boundaries of Global Business (NewYork: Public
Affairs,2014).
5
MichaelJ.Mazarr,Unmodern Men in the Modern World: Radical Islam, Terrorism, and the War on
Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God:
Islam and Political Power,repr.withanewPreface(NewBrunswick: Transaction,2002);and
FatimaMernissi,Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World,trans.MaryJoLakeland
(Cambridge,MA: PerseusBooks,1992).
6
PeterBerger,Facing Up to Modernity: Excursions in Society, Politics, and Religion (New York: Basic
Books, 1977); Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind:
Modernization and Consciousness (New York: Random house, 1973); and S. N. Eisenstadt,
Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966).
7
Walter Laqueur (ed.), Fascism: A Reader’s Guide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Zeev
Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution [1989],

12. 12
trans.DavidMaisel(Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress,1994);andRogerGriffin,The Nature
of Fascism (London: Pinter, 1991).

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