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A Brief History of
Cryptographic Failures
Brian Mork
CISO
Celanese
2016-10-07
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Who Am I?
• CISO at S&P 500/Fortune 500 company
• Former air-drop hacker, security engineer,
penetration tester, RF simulation engineer,
electronics intelligence expert, optician’s
assistant, newspaper delivery boy, software
pirate, party organizer, and short order cook.
• Also known as “Hermit” within the
information security/hacker community
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 2
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
DISCLAIMERS
• I’m not an expert in cryptography
• While I take cryptography seriously, I don’t
take myself seriously
• I used pictures from the Internet. I’ve listed
the sources I know on the second to last
slide.
• If we can’t have fun with this…
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 3
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Well, then…
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 4
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Agenda
• What is Cryptography?
• Why Cryptography?
• Our Cast
• The Failures
• Honorable Mentions
• Q&A
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 7-8, 2016 5
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
What Is Cryptography?
“The process of writing or reading secret
messages or codes.”
- Miriam Webster Dictionary
“The art of writing or solving codes.”
- Oxford English Dictionary
“The scientific field of study related to
protecting or verifying information.”
- Brian Mork
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 6
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Why Cryptography?
• Because you lack trust in… something…
• Transmission mediums
• Integrity of communications
• Other people
• Governments
• Cigarette smoking men
• Etc.
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 7
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Our Cast
In traditional cryptographic discussions we
would consider the following actors:
• Alice – Someone sending information
• Bob – Someone receiving information
• Eve – Someone eavesdropping
All because Ron Rivest (of RSA fame) used
such terms back in the 1970s.
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 8
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Our REAL Cast
Times have changed, and we need heroes who
reflect those times…
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 9
Alice, as… well… Alice
… Dilbert, as Bob …
… and Catbert, as Eve. Or
evil. Either one/both.
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
And now here’s something
we hope you’ll really like!
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 10
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure One
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 11
REGULAR FAIL
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
The Scenario
Alice and Dilbert set up a secure website. It’s
amazing. It was hacker proof (just trust me on
this one), with an official certificate and
everything.
Unfortunately, their agents used browsers that
still trusted root certificate authorities that
used MD5 for hashing.
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 12
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: MD5 Certificate
So what is MD5?
• Hashing algorithm
• Vulnerable to collisions
• Was still used through 2008 by certificate
authorities
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 13
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: MD5 Collisions
What is a collision?
It’s when two different inputs create the same
output.
Why is that bad?
Because… that’s exactly what it’s not
supposed to do!
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 14
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: MD5 Collisions
How can we make that worse?
By having a condition where two different
inputs share a function or format, such as
documents and executables
Or, I don’t know… cryptographic material
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 15
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: MD5 Collisions
The first MD5 collision was in 2004.
By 2007 colliding executables, documents, and
more were possible and had been
demonstrated, due to chosen-prefix collisions.
Enter the fake certificate authority!
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 16
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: MD5 Collisions
Step 1: Generate a pair of certificates with the
same hash but different characteristics (e.g.
make one a CA that can sign anything).
Step 2: Get the benign certificate signed by a
”real” CA and copy that signature to the
malicious one.
Step 3: Profit
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 17
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: MD5 Collisions
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 18
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: MD5 Collisions
And what does that give you?
A certificate that can sign literally anything, and
which validates back to a trusted root certificate
authority.
I am
Google
Microsoft
Mr. Robot
Whomever I want to be!
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 19
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: MD5 Collisions
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 20
I am Dilbert. You can
trust this because Alice
said I am. Now tell me
all your secrets.
They’re safe with me.
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure Two
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 21
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
The Scenario
• In an alternate dimension, Alice has
ascended to lead a military force against the
evil feline nation of Catbertia.
• Dilbert, her lead general, needs to
communicate securely with her.
• They decide to deploy one of the most
effective physical cryptographic systems ever
made… the enigmatic… er… Enigma.
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 22
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure X: Enigma
This is the Engima. It
was a beauty of
engineering. Multiple
rotors, each input
changed the next
encoding, easy to
operate and fiendishly
difficult to brute force.
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 23
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure X: Engima
How complex was it?
• 3 rotor wheel positions, 5 wheel choices (60
starting combinations)
• 26 starting positions per wheel (17,576
combinations)
• Wheels rotate one another… wiring to
create substitutions… egads!
• 107,458,687,327,250,619,360,000 keys
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 24
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure X: Engima
Oh, and then there was the fact that Engima
operations used key encrypting keys… really!
The day key was a pre-shared secret used to
encrypt one-time keys called message keys.
Message keys were then used to encrypt
actual messages.
Pretty nifty!
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 25
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Catbert Has No Chance!
• It’s true! With that many combinations and
frequency of change there’s no hope for the
empire of evil.
• Then again, people have been known to
make mistakes.
• But I’m sure Alice and Dilbert wouldn’t make
the same ones that their historical
predecessors did. What were those again?
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 26
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure X: Engima
How was Enigma previously defeated?
• Reuse of rotor settings
• Transmission with multiple ciphers
• Operators often reused the same message
key multiple times (e.g. “cillies”)
• Common message formats
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 27
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure X: Enigma
• What’s that? Dilbert has taken to using the
day of the week as the message key?
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 28
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure 2
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 29
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
The Scenario
Alice and Dilbert are joining the modern age.
They visit each other’s houses frequently, and
use each other’s wireless networks.
To be extra safe, they’ve selected Wired
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) to secure their
network. What could possibly go wrong?
Well, since WEP uses a single key that needs
to be protected!
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 30
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: WEP
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 31
They know that Catbert is trying
to intercept their
communications, so they paid a
driver to take the out in the
middle of a mud field in Elbonia.
Once out there, they chose a
super secret password just
between the two of them. This is
now their wireless network
password.
Whew! That was close. Good
thing that sharing the key is the
biggest concern. Right?
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: WEP
Well, maybe not JUST that… there’s also:
• Poor initialization vectors (IV) size
• Weak IVs
• Weak key space
• Poor key entry (ASCII reduces key space)
• Replay/packet stimulation (when you need
more IVs)
• Chop-Chop Attack!
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 32
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Failure: WEP
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 33
The only thing I like more
than weak crypto is my
enemies using it.
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 34
Will this guy ever shut up?
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Honorable Mention
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) –
Electronic Codebook (ECB)
• Same key used over and over
• Block-based encryption
• Known plaintext lookup!
• SmashECB, for example (written by yours truly)
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 35
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Honorable Mention
• Clipper Chip – Law Enforcement Access Field
• Included data necessary to recover key
• Only 16-bit hash protecting it
• Bypass and reuse were possible and
demonstrated
• Use of third party LEAF data was possible too!
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 36
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Honorable Mention
• Microsoft’s ”Golden Key”
• Booting RT/ARM devices check two things: a
policy (must be signed by Microsoft) and the
operating system (also must be signed by
Microsoft)
• The “Golden Key” is a debug mode policy that
was accidentally shipped, and that policy allows
skipping the check for the operating system
• Presto! Any OS on a Surface/WinPhone/etc.
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 37
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Honorable Mentions
And so many, many more…
• WPA - Design
• Dual EC DRBG - Design
• MD4 – Time, mostly
• NIST P- curves (ECC) – Design
• Digital Encryption Standard (DES) – Design
• 3 DES – Design
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 7-8, 2016 38
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Questions
If you’ve got ’em, throw ‘em.
If I know the answer, I’ll give it.
If I don’t, I’ll answer anyways before I disclose
that I have no clue what I’m talking about.
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 39
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
Miscellaneous
• Picture Credits
• Mulder Image: Pascal Wagler
• Dilbert Characters: Scott Adams
• Engima Machine: TheHistoryBlog.com
• Failure Pictures: The Internet Tubes
• Find Me
• Twitter: @hermit_hacker
• LinkedIn: /in/bcmork
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 40
@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4
The Collin College Engineering Department
Collin College Student Chapter of the North Texas ISSA
North Texas ISSA (Information Systems Security Association)
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 7-8, 2016 41
Thank you

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A Brief History of Cryptographic Failures - Mork

  • 1. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 A Brief History of Cryptographic Failures Brian Mork CISO Celanese 2016-10-07
  • 2. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Who Am I? • CISO at S&P 500/Fortune 500 company • Former air-drop hacker, security engineer, penetration tester, RF simulation engineer, electronics intelligence expert, optician’s assistant, newspaper delivery boy, software pirate, party organizer, and short order cook. • Also known as “Hermit” within the information security/hacker community NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 2
  • 3. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 DISCLAIMERS • I’m not an expert in cryptography • While I take cryptography seriously, I don’t take myself seriously • I used pictures from the Internet. I’ve listed the sources I know on the second to last slide. • If we can’t have fun with this… NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 3
  • 4. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Well, then… NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 4
  • 5. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Agenda • What is Cryptography? • Why Cryptography? • Our Cast • The Failures • Honorable Mentions • Q&A NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 7-8, 2016 5
  • 6. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 What Is Cryptography? “The process of writing or reading secret messages or codes.” - Miriam Webster Dictionary “The art of writing or solving codes.” - Oxford English Dictionary “The scientific field of study related to protecting or verifying information.” - Brian Mork NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 6
  • 7. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Why Cryptography? • Because you lack trust in… something… • Transmission mediums • Integrity of communications • Other people • Governments • Cigarette smoking men • Etc. NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 7
  • 8. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Our Cast In traditional cryptographic discussions we would consider the following actors: • Alice – Someone sending information • Bob – Someone receiving information • Eve – Someone eavesdropping All because Ron Rivest (of RSA fame) used such terms back in the 1970s. NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 8
  • 9. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Our REAL Cast Times have changed, and we need heroes who reflect those times… NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 9 Alice, as… well… Alice … Dilbert, as Bob … … and Catbert, as Eve. Or evil. Either one/both.
  • 10. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 And now here’s something we hope you’ll really like! NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 10
  • 11. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure One NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 11 REGULAR FAIL
  • 12. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 The Scenario Alice and Dilbert set up a secure website. It’s amazing. It was hacker proof (just trust me on this one), with an official certificate and everything. Unfortunately, their agents used browsers that still trusted root certificate authorities that used MD5 for hashing. NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 12
  • 13. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: MD5 Certificate So what is MD5? • Hashing algorithm • Vulnerable to collisions • Was still used through 2008 by certificate authorities NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 13
  • 14. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: MD5 Collisions What is a collision? It’s when two different inputs create the same output. Why is that bad? Because… that’s exactly what it’s not supposed to do! NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 14
  • 15. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: MD5 Collisions How can we make that worse? By having a condition where two different inputs share a function or format, such as documents and executables Or, I don’t know… cryptographic material NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 15
  • 16. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: MD5 Collisions The first MD5 collision was in 2004. By 2007 colliding executables, documents, and more were possible and had been demonstrated, due to chosen-prefix collisions. Enter the fake certificate authority! NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 16
  • 17. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: MD5 Collisions Step 1: Generate a pair of certificates with the same hash but different characteristics (e.g. make one a CA that can sign anything). Step 2: Get the benign certificate signed by a ”real” CA and copy that signature to the malicious one. Step 3: Profit NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 17
  • 18. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: MD5 Collisions NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 18
  • 19. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: MD5 Collisions And what does that give you? A certificate that can sign literally anything, and which validates back to a trusted root certificate authority. I am Google Microsoft Mr. Robot Whomever I want to be! NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 19
  • 20. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: MD5 Collisions NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 20 I am Dilbert. You can trust this because Alice said I am. Now tell me all your secrets. They’re safe with me.
  • 21. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure Two NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 21
  • 22. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 The Scenario • In an alternate dimension, Alice has ascended to lead a military force against the evil feline nation of Catbertia. • Dilbert, her lead general, needs to communicate securely with her. • They decide to deploy one of the most effective physical cryptographic systems ever made… the enigmatic… er… Enigma. NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 22
  • 23. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure X: Enigma This is the Engima. It was a beauty of engineering. Multiple rotors, each input changed the next encoding, easy to operate and fiendishly difficult to brute force. NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 23
  • 24. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure X: Engima How complex was it? • 3 rotor wheel positions, 5 wheel choices (60 starting combinations) • 26 starting positions per wheel (17,576 combinations) • Wheels rotate one another… wiring to create substitutions… egads! • 107,458,687,327,250,619,360,000 keys NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 24
  • 25. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure X: Engima Oh, and then there was the fact that Engima operations used key encrypting keys… really! The day key was a pre-shared secret used to encrypt one-time keys called message keys. Message keys were then used to encrypt actual messages. Pretty nifty! NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 25
  • 26. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Catbert Has No Chance! • It’s true! With that many combinations and frequency of change there’s no hope for the empire of evil. • Then again, people have been known to make mistakes. • But I’m sure Alice and Dilbert wouldn’t make the same ones that their historical predecessors did. What were those again? NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 26
  • 27. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure X: Engima How was Enigma previously defeated? • Reuse of rotor settings • Transmission with multiple ciphers • Operators often reused the same message key multiple times (e.g. “cillies”) • Common message formats NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 27
  • 28. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure X: Enigma • What’s that? Dilbert has taken to using the day of the week as the message key? NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 28
  • 29. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure 2 NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 29
  • 30. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 The Scenario Alice and Dilbert are joining the modern age. They visit each other’s houses frequently, and use each other’s wireless networks. To be extra safe, they’ve selected Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) to secure their network. What could possibly go wrong? Well, since WEP uses a single key that needs to be protected! NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 30
  • 31. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: WEP NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 31 They know that Catbert is trying to intercept their communications, so they paid a driver to take the out in the middle of a mud field in Elbonia. Once out there, they chose a super secret password just between the two of them. This is now their wireless network password. Whew! That was close. Good thing that sharing the key is the biggest concern. Right?
  • 32. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: WEP Well, maybe not JUST that… there’s also: • Poor initialization vectors (IV) size • Weak IVs • Weak key space • Poor key entry (ASCII reduces key space) • Replay/packet stimulation (when you need more IVs) • Chop-Chop Attack! NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 32
  • 33. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Failure: WEP NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 33 The only thing I like more than weak crypto is my enemies using it.
  • 34. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 34 Will this guy ever shut up?
  • 35. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Honorable Mention • Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) – Electronic Codebook (ECB) • Same key used over and over • Block-based encryption • Known plaintext lookup! • SmashECB, for example (written by yours truly) NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 35
  • 36. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Honorable Mention • Clipper Chip – Law Enforcement Access Field • Included data necessary to recover key • Only 16-bit hash protecting it • Bypass and reuse were possible and demonstrated • Use of third party LEAF data was possible too! NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 36
  • 37. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Honorable Mention • Microsoft’s ”Golden Key” • Booting RT/ARM devices check two things: a policy (must be signed by Microsoft) and the operating system (also must be signed by Microsoft) • The “Golden Key” is a debug mode policy that was accidentally shipped, and that policy allows skipping the check for the operating system • Presto! Any OS on a Surface/WinPhone/etc. NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 37
  • 38. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Honorable Mentions And so many, many more… • WPA - Design • Dual EC DRBG - Design • MD4 – Time, mostly • NIST P- curves (ECC) – Design • Digital Encryption Standard (DES) – Design • 3 DES – Design NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 7-8, 2016 38
  • 39. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Questions If you’ve got ’em, throw ‘em. If I know the answer, I’ll give it. If I don’t, I’ll answer anyways before I disclose that I have no clue what I’m talking about. NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 39
  • 40. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 Miscellaneous • Picture Credits • Mulder Image: Pascal Wagler • Dilbert Characters: Scott Adams • Engima Machine: TheHistoryBlog.com • Failure Pictures: The Internet Tubes • Find Me • Twitter: @hermit_hacker • LinkedIn: /in/bcmork NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 2-3, 2015 40
  • 41. @NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4@NTXISSA #NTXISSACSC4 The Collin College Engineering Department Collin College Student Chapter of the North Texas ISSA North Texas ISSA (Information Systems Security Association) NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – October 7-8, 2016 41 Thank you