Euro weekly market report - 10th November 2017moneycorpbank1
After the pound’s anti-climactic response to the Bank of England’s slight rise in interest rates last week, it is mostly keeping its head above somewhat choppy waters
Following Presentation deals with brief outline over what is known as "Global Recession". It has novice friendly language and attention seeking approach.
Euro weekly market report - 10th November 2017moneycorpbank1
After the pound’s anti-climactic response to the Bank of England’s slight rise in interest rates last week, it is mostly keeping its head above somewhat choppy waters
Following Presentation deals with brief outline over what is known as "Global Recession". It has novice friendly language and attention seeking approach.
The recession that began in the late 2000s was, to date, the worst economic downturn in the United States since the Great Depression. They didn't call it the "Great Recession" for nothing.
« Market Perspectives » est notre revue mensuelle des marchés. Elle présente de la façon la plus synthétique possible :
- notre analyse des principaux faits marquants et indicateurs macro susceptibles de dessiner les marchés sur le mois.
- notre vision sur les différentes classes d’actifs
Cette revue sera continument enrichie avec nos indicateurs quantitatifs.
La plupart de nos analyses sont disponibles sur www.finlightresearch.com
Our monthly publication “Market Perspectives” presents a synthetic view of all the asset classes we cover.
The report is composed of six sections covering Macro, Equities, FI & credit, FX, Commodities and Alternatives.
Each section is preceded by a summary of our views on the related asset class.
Most of our publications are available on our web site www.finlightresearch.com
A controversial paper on what created the next potential depression of 2008. Many hours was conducted researching the causes of the economic collapse in 2008. The question might be asked, could we see this happen again?
Search Becomes the Display OS
Search Engine Strategies Conference London
18 February 2010
Presented by Dax Hamman, Vice President, Display Media, iCrossing
Twitter: @daxhamman
The recession that began in the late 2000s was, to date, the worst economic downturn in the United States since the Great Depression. They didn't call it the "Great Recession" for nothing.
« Market Perspectives » est notre revue mensuelle des marchés. Elle présente de la façon la plus synthétique possible :
- notre analyse des principaux faits marquants et indicateurs macro susceptibles de dessiner les marchés sur le mois.
- notre vision sur les différentes classes d’actifs
Cette revue sera continument enrichie avec nos indicateurs quantitatifs.
La plupart de nos analyses sont disponibles sur www.finlightresearch.com
Our monthly publication “Market Perspectives” presents a synthetic view of all the asset classes we cover.
The report is composed of six sections covering Macro, Equities, FI & credit, FX, Commodities and Alternatives.
Each section is preceded by a summary of our views on the related asset class.
Most of our publications are available on our web site www.finlightresearch.com
A controversial paper on what created the next potential depression of 2008. Many hours was conducted researching the causes of the economic collapse in 2008. The question might be asked, could we see this happen again?
Search Becomes the Display OS
Search Engine Strategies Conference London
18 February 2010
Presented by Dax Hamman, Vice President, Display Media, iCrossing
Twitter: @daxhamman
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and subsequent Great Recession constituted the worst shocks to the United States economy in generations. Books have been and will be written about the housing bubble and bust, the financial panic that followed, the economic devastation that resulted, and the steps that various arms of the U.S. and foreign governments took to prevent the Great Depression 2.0. But the story can also be told graphically, as these charts aim to do.
What comes quickly into focus is that as the crisis intensified, so did the government’s response. Although the seeds of the harrowing events of 2007-2009 were sown over decades, and the U.S. government was initially slow to act, the combined efforts of the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and other agencies were ultimately forceful, flexible, and effective. Federal regulators greatly expanded their crisis management toolkit as the damage unfolded, moving from traditional and domestic measures to actions that were innovative and sometimes even international in reach. As panic spread, so too did their efforts broaden to quell it. In the end, the government was able to stabilize the system, re-start key financial markets, and limit the extent of the harm to the economy.
No collection of charts, even as extensive as this, can convey all the complexities and details of the crisis and the government’s interventions. But these figures capture the essential features of one of the worst episodes in American economic history and the ultimately successful, even if politically unpopular, government response.
Charting the Financial Crisis: A Narrative eBookShavondaBrandon
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and subsequent Great Recession constituted the worst shocks to the United States economy in generations. Books have been and will be written about the housing bubble and bust, the financial panic that followed, the economic devastation that resulted, and the steps that various arms of the U.S. and foreign governments took to prevent the Great Depression 2.0. But the story can also be told graphically, as these charts aim to do.
What comes quickly into focus is that as the crisis intensified, so did the government’s response. Although the seeds of the harrowing events of 2007-2009 were sown over decades, and the U.S. government was initially slow to act, the combined efforts of the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and other agencies were ultimately forceful, flexible, and effective. Federal regulators greatly expanded their crisis management toolkit as the damage unfolded, moving from traditional and domestic measures to actions that were innovative and sometimes even international in reach. As panic spread, so too did their efforts broaden to quell it. In the end, the government was able to stabilize the system, re-start key financial markets, and limit the extent of the harm to the economy.
No collection of charts, even as extensive as this, can convey all the complexities and details of the crisis and the government’s interventions. But these figures capture the essential features of one of the worst episodes in American economic history and the ultimately successful, even if politically unpopular, government response.
1. Antecedents of the Panic of 2007-2008 Roger G. Powell Managing Director Investment Banking Financial Institutions Group Phone: 215-665-6687 Janney Montgomery Scott LLC February 2009
5. Bank Stock History January 1973 NASDAQ Bank = 120 July 1980 NASDAQ Bank = 120 Source: SNL Financial.
6. October 1974 Franklin National P&A August 1998 Russia Default January 1994 Metallgesellschaft AG CP Default June 1974 Herstatt Bank Insolvency Liquidity/Credit Episodes January 1997 Mercury Finance CP Default July 1986 1 st National OK P&A May 1984 Continental Illinois P&A April 1980 First Pennsylvania Bank NA Open Bank Assistance October 2008 UK to invest in bank equity Source: SNL Financial. Wall Street Journal. New York Times, etc. 1974 REITs / Atlanta Real Estate June 1970 Penn Central Railroad CP Default October 1983 1 st National Midland (TX) P&A September 1988 American Savings P&A April 1988 First City (TX) P&A July 1988 First RepublicBank P&A March 1989 MCorp (TX) P&A July 1989 TexasAmerican P&A January 1991 Bank of New England P&A June 1991 Columbia Gas System CP Default August 1989 Wang Labs and Wang Credit CP Default September 1989 Lomas Financial Lomas Life Leasing CP Default March 1990 Mortgage & Realty Trust CP Default May 1991 Goldome FSB P&A March 2002 Adelphia Funding Crisis September 1991 Southeast Banks (FL) P&A January 1992 Crossland Savings P&A July 1997 Thai Baht Devaluation September 1998 LTCM Insolvency March 2008 BearStearns Assisted Transaction September 2008 Lehman Bros Insolvency September 2008 Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac Conservatorship September 2008 Wachovia Change in Control April 2007 New Century Financial Insolvency August 2007 American Home Mortgage Insolvency September 2007 Northern Rock Bank Run November 2007 Money Market Funds SIV losses / Sponsor support July 2008 IndyMac Conservatorship September 2008 Ireland Deposit Guarantee October 2008 Fed to invest in CP October 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) authorizes Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) FDIC (temporarily) raises Deposit Insurance to $250,000 FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program - Deposit Insurance to total of non-interest bearing transaction accounts - Principal guarantee on certain bank and BHC debt obligations Capital Purchase Program – Treasury issues Standard Term Sheets for Senior Preferred Stock in banks - Additional investments in large banks and broker-dealers
7. 3Q:06 What is Different? 4Q:06 1Q:07 2Q:07 3Q:07 4Q:07 1Q:08 2Q:08 3Q:08 4Q:08 Credit Crisis Recession Accounting Change Liquidity Crisis And global! Government Interventions Source: New York Times.
18. Accounting Changes Hierarchy of Assets (FAS 157) An input that is “unobservable” in the market, that is, one that reflects assumptions about what the “market participants” would assume in pricing the asset or liability. Models should be based on “the best information available” including the risk inherent in the valuation technique used, as well as the risk inherent in the inputs into the valuation technique. Level III “ inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability either directly or indirectly through corroboration with observable market data.” Level II “ quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the reporting entity has the ability to access as of the measurement date.” Level I
21. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 Government Interventions 29 EESA rejected by House of Representatives 16 Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces loan to AIG 15 Bank of America announces acquisition of Merrill Lynch 15 Lehman Brothers files for protection under the bankruptcy code 7 Conservatorship of Federal National Mortgage and Federal Home Loan Mortgage September 14 Announcement of Capital Purchase Program with participation by 9 major financial institutions 3 EESA passes House; signed by President 1 EESA passes Senate October
22. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 16 Treasury announces additional support for Bank of America ? 16 Treasury extends loan to Chrysler Financial February January 23 Additional commitment of support for Citigroup 10 Restructure of AIG support November 19 Treasury approves loans to General Motors and Chrysler ; Ford does not take support December
25. Carroll Allen Glenlake One, Ste. 610 4140 Parklake Ave. Raleigh, NC 27612 [email_address] 919-791-3820 Stuart Singer 2 Morrocroft Centre, Ste. 100 4064 Colony Rd. Charlotte, NC 28211 [email_address] 704-367-4501 Investment Banking 1801 Market St. 11 th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 215-665-6081 Roger Powell 1801 Market St. 11 th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 [email_address] 215-665-6687
Editor's Notes
Thank you, Chad, for this opportunity to visit Wilmington – my wife’s home and one of the best places to live in the world – since I am from Fayetteville I have seen the growth of Wilmington since the 1960’s – when I became conscious of the world outside Cumberland Co – and to share my perspective on some of the economic situations we find ourselves in today. I want to recognize two important people here today: 1 st , Carl Roark, your member and Landfall resident, who was my colleague at Deutsche Bank and is a keen observer of the economic landscape himself – in fact, you should ask him to speak and get the benefit of his years of credit market experience. Next, Carroll Allen, the manager of Janney Montgomery Scott’s Raleigh office who was kind enough to sponsor my visit with our Compliance Department and who directs our planned growth in E. North Carolina. I recommend both of these gentlemen to you. This talk originated in a conversation with some financial friends of mine while we drove from Baltimore to the trout streams on Central Pennsylvania. They invited me to speak at several sessions in Maryland and, as I attempted to confirm my thoughts, I found several others with similar view. One of these is Gary Gorton. I was pleased to find that he agreed with me, but my ego aside, I think that I agree with him. His paper presented to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Jackson Hole Seminar is listed as “interesting reading” at the end of your handout. Dr. Gorton has provided academic support for his fine paper and you will get more from it than from me.