This document discusses alternative models of corporate governance beyond traditional public companies. It examines the governance features of family-controlled businesses, venture-backed companies, private equity-owned firms, and nonprofit organizations. For each model, it provides statistics on ownership structure, boards of directors, executive compensation, and impact on firm performance. Overall, the document finds that while alternative models face different issues than public firms regarding ownership and control, they can positively or negatively impact companies depending on specific circumstances.
Presentation by Jemimah Njuki at the FAO-ILRI Workshop on Integrating Gender in Livestock Projects and Programs, ILRI, Addis Ababa, 22-25 November 2011.
There is an ever-increasing pressure for nonprofits to develop revenue models that are sustainable over the long-term. Funding continues to shift in this uncertain economy that, in turn, demands nonprofit leaders to intentionally assess, monitor and adapt their organizations’ revenue models in the changing environment. The goal of the session is to equip nonprofit leaders with the tools to plan, implement and adapt a revenue model that builds on the organization’s existing strengths and capacity.
Bliinx aggregates business interactions between professionals and their contacts so that they can get up to speed on relationships without jumping through a bunch of platforms. They also generate company-wide relationship insights that boost business development initiatives and customer ROI.
Concept and Principles of Community-Based Resource Mobilization is a very in demand topic specially for those who are perusing a career in no profit sector
Self Help Group (SHG) Movement in India has been recognized as an effective strategy for mobilization and empowerment of rural people, particularly poor women and other marginalized groups.
India has predominantly been an agrarian economy which provides a livelihood to 58% of the population in 2019 as per data collected by government agencies.
Presentation by Jemimah Njuki at the FAO-ILRI Workshop on Integrating Gender in Livestock Projects and Programs, ILRI, Addis Ababa, 22-25 November 2011.
There is an ever-increasing pressure for nonprofits to develop revenue models that are sustainable over the long-term. Funding continues to shift in this uncertain economy that, in turn, demands nonprofit leaders to intentionally assess, monitor and adapt their organizations’ revenue models in the changing environment. The goal of the session is to equip nonprofit leaders with the tools to plan, implement and adapt a revenue model that builds on the organization’s existing strengths and capacity.
Bliinx aggregates business interactions between professionals and their contacts so that they can get up to speed on relationships without jumping through a bunch of platforms. They also generate company-wide relationship insights that boost business development initiatives and customer ROI.
Concept and Principles of Community-Based Resource Mobilization is a very in demand topic specially for those who are perusing a career in no profit sector
Self Help Group (SHG) Movement in India has been recognized as an effective strategy for mobilization and empowerment of rural people, particularly poor women and other marginalized groups.
India has predominantly been an agrarian economy which provides a livelihood to 58% of the population in 2019 as per data collected by government agencies.
Investigué sobre la cantante, sus rasgos físicos, psicológicos y su historia, gracias a eso pude sacar conclusiones y puntos importantes que son característicos de ella, con los cuales me guié para realizar el Tipograma.
особенности качественного контроля эффективности онлайн бизнеса с помощью Goo...Adlabsslideshare
Евгений Черный
Старший аналитик в компании ADLABS-Украина
Старший аналитик в компании ADLABS-Украина, одной из лидеров на рынке интернет-маркетинга в Украине.
Сертифицированный специалист в Google Analytics и практик с серьезным опытом. Евгений имеет большой опыт выступлений на профильных конференциях по интернет-маркетингу и веб-аналитике. Ведет обучающие семинары по Google Analytics, дает рекомендации и консультации.
Тема: Особенности качественного контроля эффективности онлайн-бизнеса с помощью Google Analytics
A board of directors requires professionals with a diverse mix of managerial, functional, and other specialized knowledge in order to properly advise and oversee management.
This Quick Guide reviews the process by which companies select, compensate, and evaluate board members.
It answers such questions as:
• How are qualified directors identified?
• What skills and experiences are needed?
• How are directors paid?
• How are directors evaluated?
• How are “bad” directors removed?
For an expanded discussion, see Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and Their Consequences (Second Edition) by David Larcker and Brian Tayan (2015): http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/books/corporate-governance-matters-closer-look-organizational-choices
Buy This Book: http://www.ftpress.com/store/corporate-governance-matters-a-closer-look-at-organizational-9780134031569
For permissions to use this material, please contact: E: corpgovernance@gsb.stanford.edu
Copyright 2015 by David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan. All rights reserved.
Authors: Professor David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan
CGRI Quick Guide Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, November 2017
This Research Spotlight provides a summary of the academic literature on shareholder activism, including:
• The impact of union activism on corporate outcomes.
• The performance of socially responsible investment funds.
• The impact of activist hedge funds on effecting change.
• The impact of activist hedge funds on short- and long-term corporate performance.
This Research Spotlight expands upon issues introduced in the Quick Guide “Investors and Activism”.
Strategy and Reward; why does Business plan for the future but reward for the...Warwick Business School
Paul Williams; Former President of the Smith& Nephew subsidiary company in Japan and member of the Senior Civil Service Pay Review Body (SSRB), presented on "Strategy and Reward; why does Business plan for the future but reward for the past?" at Warwick Business School 25/02/2008
Guide for Executives in Working with Private EquityDavid Johnson
For many executives, the opportunity to work in a private equity backed company requires a mindset shift.
Understanding of both the unique management challenges and heightened expectations that come with managing a private equity backed company are crucial to success.
determinants of corporate dividend policyArfan Afzal
Determinants of Corporate Dividends Policy: Evidence from an Emerging Economy, the attributes of non-financial companies listed on Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX). panel data for the period between 2010 and 2012 were collected from the listed companies annual reports published on ADX website.
Internal and external institutions and influences of corporateGrace Fatima Abelida
Corporate governance refers to the mechanisms, relations, and processes by which a corporation is controlled and is directed. It involves balancing the many interests of the stakeholders of a corporation. Thus, it is important to know and determine what are the internal and external institutions and influences of a corporate governance.
Executive Compensation in Privately Held Companies: Attracting, Motivating an...CBIZ, Inc.
The following presentation was featured at the KC CFO Conference. The presentation details the most effective ways to attract, motivate and retain your top talent. For more information visit: https://www.cbiz.com/insurance-hr/services/human-capital-services
Homework AssignmentCompany ValuationUsing the Internet, rese.docxadampcarr67227
Homework
Assignment
Company Valuation
Using the Internet, research Facebook’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) and subsequent financial performance. Based on your research:
Write a six to seven (6-7) page paper original, and fresh in which you:
1. Evaluate the valuation and method used to determine the Initial Public Offering value of Face book stock, indicating any miscalculations in the valuation that may have mislead potential investors and how these errors may have been minimized. Provide support for your response.
2. Assess the performance of the stock within the first year of the public offering, indicating the drivers of the performance and the resulting impact to the company performance.
3. Suggest an alternative method of valuation for the company valuation indicated and how it may have yielded a different value and the potential resulting impact to investor decision. Provide support for your rationale.
4. Assess the role of the Chief Executive Officer in relationship to the stock performance, suggesting what the person in that role may have done differently to positively influence the performance of the stock and value to investors. Provide support for your suggestions.
5. Evaluate the risk / reward position to an investor when purchasing stock during an initial public offering, indicating under what circumstances you would advise an investor to do so.
6. Predict the stock price of Face book over the next five years, indicating the key drivers of the performance and the resulting impact to the stock price. Provide support for your prediction.
7. Use at least six (6) quality academic resources in this assignment. Note: Wikipedia and other Websites do not quality as academic resources.
The specific course learning outcomes associated with this assignment are:
· Apply risk-assessment tools to expected rates of return and firm valuations.
· Apply valuation models and techniques using cash-flow, earnings-based, and market-based approaches.
· Use technology and information resources to research issues in financial analysis and reporting.
· Write clearly and concisely about financial analysis and reporting using proper writing mechanics.
Your assignment must follow:
1- Thoroughly evaluated the valuation and method used to determine the Initial Public Offering value of Facebook stock, indicating any miscalculations in the valuation that may have mislead potential investors and how these errors may have been minimized. Thoroughly provided support for your response.
2- Thoroughly assessed the performance of the stock within the first year of the public offering, indicating the drivers of the performance and the resulting impact to the company performance.
3-Thoroughly suggested an alternative method of valuation for the company valuation indicated and how it may have yielded a different value and the potential resulting impact to investor decision. Thoroughly provided support for your rationale.
4- Thoroughly assessed the role of the Chief Exe.
Most corporations dedicate significant time and attention to managing their shareholder base. Furthermore, companies overwhelmingly prefer “long-term shareholders” to “short-term shareholders.”
There is little rigorous research, however, that conclusively demonstrates the impact that individual investor groups have on corporate decision making, or that quantifies the premium (or discount) that specific shareholder groups add to corporate value.
We explore this topic in greater detail, and ask:
• Does the composition of a company’s shareholder base really matter?
• What substantive impact do shareholder—including activists—have on strategy, investment, and management?
• How long is long-term? How short is short-term?
• Can short-term market pressures be offset by long-term compensation incentives?
A message to GCC investment banks about trends in long and short term incentive compensation since the 2008 financial crisis. Increased emphasis on incorporating risk factors with financial measures/KPIs and enhanced corprorate governance.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, ROLE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FEATURES OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, SCOPE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FUTURE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, etc.
Authored by: David F. Larcker, Bradford Lynch, Brian Tayan, and Daniel J. Taylor, June 29, 2020
Investors rely on corporate disclosure to make informed decisions about the value of companies they invest in. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique opportunity to examine disclosure practices of companies relative to peers in real time about a somewhat unprecedented shock that impacted practically every publicly listed company in the U.S. We examine how companies respond to such a situation, the choices they make, and how disclosure varies across industries and companies.
We ask:
• What motivates some companies to be forthcoming about what they are experiencing, while others remain silent?
• Do differences in disclosure reflect different degrees of certitude about how the virus would impact businesses, or differences in management perception of its obligations to shareholders?
• What insights will companies learn to prepare for future outlier events?
Authored by: avid F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, CGRI Research Spotlight Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative (CGRI), April 2020
This Research Spotlight provides a summary of the academic literature on board composition, quality, and turnover. It reviews the evidence of:
The appointment of outside CEOs as directors
The importance of industry expertise to performance
The relation between director skills and performance
The stock market reaction to director resignations
Whether directors are penalized for poor oversight
This Research Spotlight expands upon issues introduced in the Quick Guide Board of Directors: Selection, Compensation, and Removal.
David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, April 21, 2020, Stanford Closer Look Series
Little is known about the process by which pre-IPO companies select independent, outside board members—directors unaffiliated with the company or its investors. Private companies are not required to disclose their selection criteria or process, and are not required to satisfy the regulatory requirements for board members set out by public listing exchanges. In this Closer Look, we look at when, why, and how private companies add their first independent, outside director to the board.
We ask:
• Why do pre-IPO companies rely on very different criteria and processes to recruit outside directors than public companies do?
• What does this teach us about governance quality?
• How important are industry knowledge and managerial experience to board oversight?
• How important are independence and monitoring?
• Does a tradeoff exist between engagement and fit on the one hand and independence on the other?
Authored by David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, April 1, 2020, Stanford Closer Look Series
We examine the size, structure, and demographic makeup of the C-suite (the CEO and the direct reports to the CEO) in each of the Fortune 100 companies as of February 2020. We find that women (and, to a lesser extent, racially diverse executives) are underrepresented in C-suite positions that directly feed into future CEO and board roles. What accounts for this distribution?
By John D. Kepler, David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, and Daniel J. Taylor, January 28, 2020
Corporate executives receive a considerable portion of their compensation in the form of equity and, from time to time, sell a portion of their holdings in the open market. Executives nearly always have access to nonpublic information about the company, and routinely have an information advantage over public shareholders. Federal securities laws prohibit executives from trading on material nonpublic information about their company, and companies develop an Insider Trading Policy (ITP) to ensure executives comply with applicable rules. In this Closer Look we examine the potential shortcomings of existing governance practices as illustrated by four examples that suggest significant room for improvement.
We ask:
• Should an ITP go beyond legal requirements to minimize the risk of negative public perception from trades that might otherwise appear suspicious?
• Why don’t all companies make the terms of their ITP public?
• Why don’t more companies require the strictest standards, such as pre-approval by the general counsel and mandatory use of 10b5-1 plans?
• Does the board review trades by insiders on a regular basis? What conversation, if any, takes place between executives and the board around large, single-event sales?
Short summary
We identify potential shortcomings in existing governance practices around the approval of executive equity sales. Why don’t more companies require stricter standards to lessen suspicion around insider equity sales activity? Do boards review trades by insiders on a regular basis?
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan
Core Concepts Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative,
A roadmap to understanding the fundamental concepts of corporate governance based on theory, empirical research, and data. This guide takes an in-depth look at the Principles of Corporate Governance.
Authors: David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, November 25, 2019
Among the controversies in corporate governance, perhaps none is more heated or widely debated across society than that of CEO pay. The views that American citizens have on CEO pay is centrally important because public opinion influences political decisions that shape tax, economic, and regulatory policy, and ultimately determine the standard of living of average Americans. This Closer Look reviews survey data of the American public to understand their views on compensation. We ask:
• How can society’s understanding of pay and value creation be improved and the controversy over CEO pay resolved?
• How should the level of CEO pay rise with complexity and profitability, particularly among America’s largest corporations?
• Should pay be reformed in the boardroom, or should high pay be addressed solely through the tax code?
• Are negative views of CEO pay driven by broad skepticism and lack of esteem for CEOs? Or do high pay levels themselves contribute to low regard for CEOs?
By David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan
CGRI Survey Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance, November 2019.
In fall 2019, the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University conducted a nationwide survey of In October 2019, the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University conducted a nationwide survey of 3,062 individuals—representative by age, race, political affiliation, household income, and state residence—to understand the American population’s views on current and proposed tax policies.
Key findings include:
--Tax rates for high-income earners are about right
--Majority favor a wealth tax … but not if it harms the economy
--Americans do not want to set limits on personal wealth
--Americans do not believe in a right to universal basic income
--Trust in the ability of the U.S. government to spend tax dollars effectively is low
--Americans believe in higher taxes for corporations who pay their CEO large dollar amounts
--Little appetite exists to break up “big tech”
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, Dottie Schindlinger and Anne Kors, CGRI Survey Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance and the Diligent Institute, November 2019
New research from the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University and the Diligent Institute finds that corporate directors are not as shareholder-centric as commonly believed and that companies do not put the needs of shareholders significantly above the needs of their employees or society at large. Instead, directors pay considerable attention to important stakeholders—particularly their workforce—and take the interests of these groups into account as part of their long-term business planning.
• While directors are largely satisfied with their ESG-related efforts, they do not believe the outside world understands or appreciates the work they do.
• Directors recognize that tensions exist between shareholder and stakeholder interests. That said,
most believe their companies successfully balance this tension.
• In general, directors reject the view that their companies have a short-term investment horizon in
running their businesses.
In the summer of 2019, the Diligent Institute and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University surveyed nearly 200 directors of public and private corporations globally to better understand how they balance shareholder and stakeholder needs.
by David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, October 7, 2019
A reliable system of corporate governance is considered to be an important requirement for the long-term success of a company. Unfortunately, after decades of research, we still do not have a clear understanding of the factors that make a governance system effective. Our understanding of governance suffers from 1) a tendency to overgeneralize across companies and 2) a tendency to refer to central concepts without first defining them. In this Closer Look, we examine four central concepts that are widely discussed but poorly understood.
We ask:
• Would the caliber of discussion improve, and consensus on solutions be realized, if the debate on corporate governance were less loosey-goosey?
• Why can we still not answer the question of what makes good governance?
• How can our understanding of board quality improve without betraying the confidential information that a board discusses?
• Why is it difficult to answer the question of how much a CEO should be paid?
• Are U.S. executives really short-term oriented in managing their companies?
David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, Vinay Trivedi, and Owen Wurzbacher, Stanford Closer Look Series, July 2, 2019
Currently, there is much debate about the role that non-investor stakeholder interests play in the governance of public companies. Critics argue that greater attention should be paid to the interest of stakeholders and that by investing in initiatives and programs to promote their interests, companies will create long-term value that is greater, more sustainable, and more equitably shared among investors and society. However, advocacy for a more stakeholder-centric governance model is based on assumptions about managerial behavior that are relatively untested. In this Closer Look, we examine survey data of the CEOs and CFOs of companies in the S&P 1500 Index to understand the extent to which they incorporate stakeholder needs into the business planning and long-term strategy, and their view of the costs and benefits of ESG-related programs.
We ask:
• What are the real costs and benefits of ESG?
• How do companies signal to constituents that they take ESG activities seriously?
• How accurate are the ratings of third-party providers that rate companies on ESG factors?
• Do boards understand the short- and long-term impact of ESG activities?
• Do boards believe this investment is beneficial for the company?
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, Vinay Trivedi and Owen Wurzbacher, CGRI Survey Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance, July 2019
In spring 2019, the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University surveyed 209 CEOs and CFOs of companies included in the S&P 1500 Index to understand the role that stakeholder interests play in long-term corporate planning.
Key Findings
• CEOs Are Divided On Whether Stakeholder Initiatives Are A Cost or Benefit to the Company
• Companies Tout Their Efforts But Believe the Public Doesn’t Understand Them
• Blackrock Advocates … But Has Little Impact
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan
Core Concepts Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, June 2019
A roadmap to understanding the fundamental concepts of corporate governance based on theory, empirical research, and data. This guide will take an in-depth look at Shareholders and Activism.
By Brandon Boze, Margarita Krivitski, David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, and Eva Zlotnicka
Stanford Closer Look Series
May 23, 2019
Recently, there has been debate among corporate managers, board of directors, and institutional investors around how best to incorporate ESG (environmental, social, and governance) factors into strategic and investment decision-making processes. In this Closer Look, we examine a framework informed by the experience of ValueAct Capital and include case examples.
We ask:
• What is the investment horizon prevalent among most companies today?
• Do companies miss long-term opportunities because of a focus on short-term costs?
• How many companies have an opportunity to profitably invest in ESG solutions?
• What factors determine whether a company can profitably invest in ESG solutions?
• Can investors earn competitive risk-adjusted returns through ESG investments?
• If so, how widespread is this opportunity?
This Research Spotlight provides a summary of the academic literature on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities including:
• The relation between ESG activities and firm value
• The impact of environmental and social engagements on firm performance
• The market reaction to ESG events
• The relation between ESG and agency problems
• The performance of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds
This Research Spotlight expands upon issues introduced in the Quick Guide “Investors and Activism”.
This Research Spotlight provides a summary of the academic literature on how dual-class share structures influence firm value and corporate governance quality. It reviews the evidence of:
• The relation between dual-class shares and governance quality
• The relation between dual-class shares and tax avoidance
• The relation between dual-class shares and firm value and performance
This Research Spotlight expands upon issues introduced in the Quick Guide “The Market for Corporate Control.”
By Courtney Hamilton, David F. Larcker, Stephen A. Miles, and Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, February 15, 2019
Two decades ago, McKinsey advanced the idea that large U.S. companies are engaged in a “war for talent” and that to remain competitive they need to make a strategic effort to attract, retain, and develop the highest-performing executives. To understand the contribution of the human resources department to company strategy, we surveyed 85 CEOs and chief human resources officers at Fortune 1000 companies. In this Closer Look, we examine what these senior executives say about the contribution of HR to the strategic efforts and financial performance of their companies.
We ask:
• What role does HR play in the development of corporate strategy?
• Does HR have an equal voice or is it junior to other members of the senior management team?
• Do boards see HR and human capital as critical to corporate performance?
• How do boards ascertain whether management has the right HR strategy?
• How adept are companies at using data from HR systems to learn what programs work and why?
By David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, December 3, 2018
Companies are required to have a reliable system of corporate governance in place at the time of IPO in order to protect the interests of public company investors and stakeholders. Yet, relatively little is known about the process by which they implement one. This Closer Look, based on detailed data from a sample of pre-IPO companies, examines the process by which companies go from essentially having no governance in place at the time of their founding to the fully established systems of governance required of public companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission. We examine the vastly different choices that companies make in deciding when and how to implement these standards.
We ask:
• What factors do CEOs and founders take into account in determining how to implement governance systems?
• Should regulators allow companies greater flexibility to tailor their governance systems to their specific needs?
• Which elements of governance add to business performance and which are done only for regulatory purposes?
• How much value does good governance add to a company’s overall valuation?
• When should small or medium sized companies that intend to remain private implement a governance system?
By David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan, CGRI Survey Series. Corporate Governance Research Initiative, Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance, November 2018
In summer and fall 2018, the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University surveyed 53 founders and CEOs of 47 companies that completed an Initial Public Offering in the U.S. between 2010 and 2018 to understand how corporate governance practices evolve from startup through IPO.
David F. Larcker, Stephen A. Miles, Brian Tayan, and Kim Wright-Violich
Stanford Closer Look Series, November 8, 2018
CEO activism—the practice of CEOs taking public positions on environmental, social, and political issues not directly related to their business—has become a hotly debated topic in corporate governance. To better understand the implications of CEO activism, we examine its prevalence, the range of advocacy positions taken by CEOs, and the public’s reaction to activism.
We ask:
• How widespread is CEO activism?
• How well do boards understand the advocacy positions of their CEOs?
• Are boards involved in decisions to take public stances on controversial issues, or do they leave these to the discretion of the CEO?
• How should boards measure the costs and benefits of CEO activism?
• How accurately can internal and external constituents distinguish between positions taken proactively and reactively by a CEO?
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Enterprise excellence and inclusive excellence are closely linked, and real-world challenges have shown that both are essential to the success of any organization. To achieve enterprise excellence, organizations must focus on improving their operations and processes while creating an inclusive environment that engages everyone. In this interactive session, the facilitator will highlight commonly established business practices and how they limit our ability to engage everyone every day. More importantly, though, participants will likely gain increased awareness of what we can do differently to maximize enterprise excellence through deliberate inclusion.
What is Enterprise Excellence?
Enterprise Excellence is a holistic approach that's aimed at achieving world-class performance across all aspects of the organization.
What might I learn?
A way to engage all in creating Inclusive Excellence. Lessons from the US military and their parallels to the story of Harry Potter. How belt systems and CI teams can destroy inclusive practices. How leadership language invites people to the party. There are three things leaders can do to engage everyone every day: maximizing psychological safety to create environments where folks learn, contribute, and challenge the status quo.
Who might benefit? Anyone and everyone leading folks from the shop floor to top floor.
Dr. William Harvey is a seasoned Operations Leader with extensive experience in chemical processing, manufacturing, and operations management. At Michelman, he currently oversees multiple sites, leading teams in strategic planning and coaching/practicing continuous improvement. William is set to start his eighth year of teaching at the University of Cincinnati where he teaches marketing, finance, and management. William holds various certifications in change management, quality, leadership, operational excellence, team building, and DiSC, among others.
1. David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan
Corporate Governance Research Initiative
Stanford Graduate School of Business
ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF
GOVERNANCE
2. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF GOVERNANCE
• Among public companies, governance features are imposed by regulators,
listing exchanges, and capital-market pressure.
• However, other organizational structures exist:
– Family-controlled businesses
– Venture-backed companies
– Private equity-owned companies
– Nonprofit organizations
• The governance features of these firms will reflect the issues they face
regarding purpose, ownership, and control.
3. 1. FAMILY-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
• Family-controlled businesses are those in which a founder or founding-
family member maintains a presence as shareholder, director, or manager.
(+) Large ownership position aligns interests with minority investors.
(+) Long-term orientation (see the company as their “legacy”).
(+) Vigilant oversight of management, strategy, risk, and compensation.
(-) Might exert disproportionate control relative to ownership stake.
(-) Might extract private benefits at the cost of minority shareholders.
(-) Might be excessively risk-averse.
Percentage of large corporations that are family-controlled:
• Emerging markets: 60%
• Europe: 40%
• United States: 30%
McKinsey & Co. (2014)
4. 1. FAMILY-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
Family-controlled corporations tend to:
• Exhibit superior long-term performance, especially when the founder
serves as CEO.
• Maintain better employee relations, stronger culture.
• Be less prepared for CEO succession, make worse selection choices.
• Demonstrate higher earnings quality.
• Exhibit less transparency, engage in higher levels of insider trading.
Anderson and Reed (2003); Mueller and Philippon (2011); Pérez-Gonzáles (2006); Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007); Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009)
5. 2. VENTURE-BACKED COMPANIES
• Venture capital (VC) firms:
– Provide initial and early-stage capital to small, high-growth companies.
– Focus on rapidly changing industries where potential returns and risk are high.
– Reduce risk by investing in a diversified portfolio (a few highly successful
investments offset a large number of losses).
• Venture capital funds:
– Structured as a limited partnership.
– Capital is committed for 10-years.
– Capital is returned to investors when companies are sold or go public (IPO).
– VC firm receives percent of the profits (“carried interest”).
6. 2. VENTURE-BACKED COMPANIES
VENTURE CAPITAL SUMMARY STATISTICS
1993 2003 2013
NUMBER OF VC FIRMS 370 951 874
NUMBER OF VC FIRMS RAISING $ THIS YEAR 93 160 187
VC CAPITAL RAISED THIS YEAR ($ BN) 4.5 9.1 16.8
VC CAPITAL UNDER MANAGEMENT ($ BN) 29.3 263.9 192.9
AVERAGE VC FUND SIZE TO DATE ($ M) 40.2 94.4 110.3
VC INVESTMENTS BY STAGE
SEED 17.2% 1.9% 3.3%
EARLY STAGE 15.7% 18.3% 33.5%
EXPANSION 51.0% 49.7% 33.2%
LATER STAGE 16.1% 30.1% 30.0%
PERCENTAGE OF IPOs VC-BACKED N/A 37.1% 47.9%
Thomson Reuters (2014)
7. 2. VENTURE-BACKED COMPANIES
• Board of directors
– Tightly controlled: 4 directors, 2 of whom are members of VC firm.
– Low independence (56% of directors); CEO rarely serves as chairman (15%).
– No formal audit, comp, or governance committees until run-up to IPO.
• Executive compensation
– Heavily weighted toward equity-based awards.
– Prior to IPO, CEO holds 15% of equity, top five managers 26%, total directors and
officers 63%.
• Antitakeover protections
– Remain tightly controlled following IPO.
– 77% staggered board, 15% dual-class shares, 69% restrict shareholder rights.
Wongsunwai (2007); Daines and Klausner (2001); Proskauer (2015)
8. 2. VENTURE-BACKED COMPANIES
Venture-capitalists tend to positively impact the firms they invest in:
• Contribute to the “professionalization” of start-ups by replacing founder
with outside CEO, introducing stock options, and influencing HR policies.
• Encourage innovation, investment in research, and deal activity.
• Demonstrate higher earnings quality.
• Positive effects are most pronounced among companies backed by “high-
quality” VC firms.
Hellman and Puri (2002); Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2014); Hochberg (2012); Klausner (2013); Wongsunwai (2007);
Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011)
9. 3. PRIVATE EQUITY-OWNED COMPANIES
• Private equity firms are privately held investment firms that invest in
businesses for the benefit of retail and institutional investors.
• Tend to target mature companies that generate substantial free cash flow
to support a leveraged capital structure.
• Following acquisition, the target undergoes a complete change in
management, board, strategy, and capital structure.
• If successful, the private equity firm sells the company back to the public or
to a strategic or financial buyer.
• The private equity firm earns a carried interest and returns the remaining
proceeds to investors.
10. 3. PRIVATE EQUITY-OWNED COMPANIES
PRIVATE EQUITY SUMMARY STATISTICS
1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2007 1970-2007
COMBINED ENTERPRISE VALUE $257 BN $149 BN $554 BN $1,055 BN $1,563 BN $3,616 BN
NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS 642 1,123 4,348 5,673 5,188 17,171
LBOs BY TYPE
PUBLIC TO PRIVATE 49% 9% 15% 18% 34% 27%
INDEPENDENT PRIVATE 31% 54% 44% 19% 14% 23%
DIVISIONAL 17% 31% 27% 41% 25% 30%
SECONDARY 2% 6% 13% 20% 26% 20%
DISTRESSED 0% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1%
TYPE OF EXIT
BANKRUPTCY 6% 5% 8% 4% 3% 6%
IPO 25% 23% 11% 10% 1% 14%
SOLD TO STRATEGIC BUYER 35% 38% 40% 38% 34% 38%
SOLD TO FINANCIAL BUYER 13% 17% 23% 31% 17% 24%
SOLD TO LBO-BACKED FIRM 3% 3% 5% 7% 19% 5%
SOLD TO MANAGEMENT 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1%
OTHER OR UNKNOWN 18% 12% 11% 8% 24% 11%
Kaplan and Strömberg (2008)
11. 3. PRIVATE EQUITY-OWNED COMPANIES
• Board of directors
– Small: 5 to 7 directors, heavily represented by insiders.
– Closely involved in strategic and operating decisions.
– Require more time than public boards (54 days v. 19 days, per year).
• Executive compensation
– Lower salary but higher total pay opportunity than public company CEOs.
– CEO equity stake in company doubles following sale to PE firm.
– Performance targets shifted from qualitative to profitability measures.
– Equity awards contain a mix of performance and time-vested awards.
• Capital structure
– Debt-to-equity ratio triples following acquisition (25% to 71%).
Acharya, Kehoe, and Reyner (2008); Leslie and Oyer (2009); Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2013);
Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011)
12. 3. PRIVATE EQUITY-OWNED COMPANIES
Private equity owners have an uncertain impact on the firms they invest in:
• Tend to outperform publicly traded companies.
• Are aggressive in redirecting investment from less productive to more
productive activities.
• Still, it is unclear the extent to which returns are driven by operating
improvement, rather than increases in leverage and tax reduction.
• Research is mixed on how private and public equity returns compare on a
risk-adjusted basis.
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009); Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014); Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011); Acharya,
Gottschalg, Hahn, and Kehoe (2013); Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley, Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda (2014)
13. 4. NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
• Nonprofit organizations operate in a wide range of activities, including:
– Education
– Social and legal services
– Arts and culture
– Health services
– Civic, fraternal, and religious organizations.
• Tax-exempt under rule 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.
• Have a stakeholder (rather than shareholder) orientation.
14. 4. NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
NONPROFIT SUMMARY STATISTICS
U.S. TOTALS
2012
REGISTERED NONPROFITS 1.4 M
PUBLIC CHARITIES, 501(c)(3) 1.0 M
FINANCIAL INFORMATION
TOTAL REVENUES $1.65 T
TOTAL ASSETS $2.99 T
BREAKDOWN OF CHARITIES
ARTS, CULTURE, HUMANITIES 9.9%
EDUCATION 17.1%
ENVIRONMENT, ANIMALS 4.5%
HEALTH 13.0%
HUMAN SERVICES 35.5%
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2.1%
PUBLIC, SOCIAL BENEFIT 11.6%
RELIGION-RELATED 6.1%
McKeever and Pettijohn (2014)
15. 4. NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
• Board of directors
– Large: 16 members.
– CEO rarely serves as chairman.
– Directors often have significant
fundraising obligations.
– Audit committee not required.
• Executive compensation
– Significantly lower than for-profit
companies ($130,000 median).
– Comprised of salary and cash
bonus.
BoardSource (2012)
BOARD ATTRIBUTE
U.S. AVERAGE
2012
NUMBER OF DIRECTORS 16
NUMBER OF MEETINGS PER YEAR 7
NUMBER OF COMMITTEES 5.5
AUDIT COMMITTEE 72%
DUAL CHAIR/CEO 3%
CEO NONVOTING DIRECTOR 40%
CEO NOT ON BOARD 46%
DIRECTORS REQUIRED TO DONATE 75%
DIRECTORS REQUIRED TO FUNDRAISE 42%
FEMALE DIRECTORS 45%
ETHNIC MINORITY DIRECTORS 18%
16. 4. NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Governance quality varies significantly across organizations:
• Many board members do not fully understand their obligations as directors.
• Many do not understand strategy, mission, and performance of the
organization.
• Many nonprofits lack formal governance processes (external audit, internal
controls, succession planning, board evaluations).
Nonprofits with weak controls are more likely to exhibit agency
problems (e.g., understate or shift costs to appear more efficient).
Stanford University, BoardSource, and GuideStar (2015); Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman (2006); Krishnan and Yetman (2011)
17. BIBLIOGRAPHY
McKinsey & Co. Perspectives on Founder- and Family-Owned Businesses. October 2014.
Ronald C. Anderson and David M. Reeb. Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. 2003.
Journal of Finance.
Holger M. Mueller and Thomas Philippon. Family Firms and Labor Relations. 2011. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.
Francisco Pérez-González. Inherited Control and Firm Performance. 2006. American Economic Review.
Ashiq Ali, Tai-Yuan Chen, and Suresh Radhakrishnan. Corporate Disclosures by Family Firms. 2007. Journal of Accounting and
Economics.
Ronald C. Anderson, Augustine Duru, and David M. Reeb. Founders, Heirs, and Corporate Opacity in the United States. 2009. Journal
of Financial Economics.
Thomson Reuters. 2014 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook. 2014.
Wan Wongsunwai. Does Venture Capitalist Quality Affect Corporate Governance? 2007. Harvard Business School working paper.
Robert Daines and Michael Klausner. Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs. 2001. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization.
Proskauer LLP. 2015 IPO Study. 2015.
Thomas Hellman and Manju Puri. Venture Capital and Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence. 2002. Journal of
Finance.
18. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ugur Celikyurt, Merih Sevilir, and Anil Shivdasani. Venture Capitalists on Boards of Mature Public Firms. 2014. Review of Financial
Studies.
Yael V. Hochberg. Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public Firm. 2012. Review of Finance.
Michael Klausner. Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance. 2013. Stanford Law Review.
C. N. V. Krishnan, Vladimir I. Ivanov, Ronald W. Masulis, and Ajai K. Singh. Venture Capital Reputation, Post-IPO Performance, and
Corporate Governance. 2011. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Steven N. Kaplan and Per Strömberg. Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity. 2008. Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Viral Acharya, Conor Kehoe, and Michael Reyner. Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity. 2009. McKinsey &
Company.
Phillip Leslie and Paul Oyer. Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity. 2009. EFA 2009 Bergen
Meetings Paper.
Henrik Cronqvist and Rudiger Fahlenbrach. CEO Contract Design: How Do Strong Principals Do It? 2013. Journal of Financial
Economics.
Shourun Guo, Edith S. Hotchkiss, and Weihong Song. Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value? 2011. Journal of Finance.
Ludovic Phalippou and Oliver Gottschalg. The Performance of Private Equity Funds. 2009. Review of Financial Studies.
19. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson, and Steven N. Kaplan. Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know? 2014. Journal of Finance.
Viral V. Acharya, Oliver F. Gottschalg, Moritz Hahn, and Conor Kehoe. Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from
Private Equity. 2013. Review of Financial Studies.
Steven J. Davis, John Haltiwanger, Kyle Handley, Ron Jarmin, Josh Lerner, and Javier Miranda. Private Equity, Jobs, and
Productivity. 2014. American Economic Review.
Brice S. McKeever and Sarah L. Pettijohn. The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2014. October 2014. The Urban Institute.
BoardSource. Nonprofit Governance Index 2012. September 2012.
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, BoardSource, and GuideStar.
2015 Survey on Board of Directors of Nonprofit Organizations. April 2015.
Ranjani Krishnan, Michelle H. Yetman, and Robert J. Yetman. Expense Misreporting in Nonprofit Organizations. 2006. Accounting
Review.
Ranjani Krishnan and Michelle H. Yetman. Institutional Drivers of Reporting Decisions in Nonprofit Hospitals. 2011. Journal of
Accounting Research.