The document discusses the ongoing unresolved issues between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Key points include:
1) The IAEA Director General's latest reports found that the IAEA could not confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran.
2) Iran and the IAEA disagree on the scope of Iran's obligations. The IAEA has passed several resolutions urging Iran's cooperation, while Iran has dismissed some IAEA allegations.
3) Access to the Parchin military site remains a contentious issue, as Iran has so far declined the IAEA's requests to visit the site in relation to alleged past nuclear weapons testing.
11.dangers of missile race in south asia an india pakistan perspectiveAlexander Decker
- India and Pakistan both have expanding ballistic missile capabilities with improved payloads, ranges, reliability, and accuracy. This poses dangers of pushing the countries into an arms race and bringing their nuclear forces closer to deployment.
- At the regional level, the missile buildup increases tensions between India-Pakistan and India-China. Globally, it undermines non-proliferation efforts and encourages other countries to pursue nuclear weapons.
- The short flight times between cities in India and Pakistan, due to their close proximity, leaves little time for warning or response in the case of a missile attack, increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict.
Aleena Khan - IPI pipeline and its implications on PakistanAleena Khan
The document discusses the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline project which aims to deliver natural gas from Iran's gas fields to Pakistan and India. It provides a history of the project beginning in the 1980s and discusses its implications for the involved countries. However, US sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program have threatened the project. While Pakistan wants to continue to help address its energy crisis, US pressure and China withdrawing investment due to sanctions have created challenges for the pipeline's completion.
Latest india pakistan stand off:Lessons and Way Forwardipipk
This document analyzes the recent military standoff between India and Pakistan following the Pulwama attack in Kashmir. It discusses the background of tensions between the two countries, India's motives for escalating tensions, including domestic political factors, and strategies for crisis management. Key events discussed include India's air strike on Pakistan and Pakistan's subsequent limited retaliation. The document concludes that sustainable peace requires comprehensive dialogue and crisis management mechanisms to prevent future escalations from spiraling out of control.
This document provides an overview of a report by the Federation of American Scientists examining nuclear dynamics and implications of strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) being developed by the US, Russia, China, and India. Each country has different motivations for pursuing strategic BMD, including protecting key areas from limited ballistic missile attacks and ensuring the viability of their nuclear deterrents in response to other countries' BMD developments. However, as multiple nuclear-armed states deploy strategic BMD, it increases complexity and instability in strategic relationships due to security dilemmas and how states may react by further expanding their nuclear forces. The report analyzes the BMD capabilities and motivations of each country and discusses potential arms control measures and dialogues that
Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Assessing Benefits and RisksLeonam Guimarães
The Report of an Independent Task Force
In early 2014, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) convened an independent,
nonpartisan task force of about ten experts in the fields of national security, nuclear
engineering, naval nuclear propulsion, nuclear security, and nonproliferation. The task force
had the objectives to: (1) examine potential options for alternatives to highly enriched uranium
(HEU), a nuclear weapons-usable material, for naval propulsion, and (2) identify possible
effective ways to monitor and safeguard HEU as well as low enriched uranium (LEU) in the naval
sector.
https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/publication/policy-briefs/whither-indias-submarines.html - “Navy seeks amendment to 30-year plan, wants six nuclear boats”, announced a headline last week[1]. Over six years ago, another headline[2] had said, “Govt. approves construction of 7 stealth frigates, 6 nuclear-powered submarines”. The accompanying report informed readers that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had cleared the indigenous construction of seven stealth frigates under the Rs 50,000 crore Project 17A, as well as six nuclear-powered attack submarines. But if the Government had already approved the indigenous construction of six nuclear boats (SSNs) in 2015, why did the Navy still “want” them last week?
The document discusses the strategic implications of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. It argues that the agreement will enable India to pursue its hegemonic ambitions in the region and create an imbalance of power with Pakistan in particular. By providing India access to nuclear technology, it may engage in further nuclear weapons development and an arms race with Pakistan and China. The agreement also risks undermining regional stability and nonproliferation efforts like the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
The document discusses India's strategic partnerships and relations with major powers like Russia, China, and the United States. It provides 31 multiple choice questions about various aspects of these relationships, including high-level dialogues, defense cooperation agreements, joint military exercises, trade relations and more. The questions are intended to test knowledge about India's foreign relations for exams like NET/UPSC.
11.dangers of missile race in south asia an india pakistan perspectiveAlexander Decker
- India and Pakistan both have expanding ballistic missile capabilities with improved payloads, ranges, reliability, and accuracy. This poses dangers of pushing the countries into an arms race and bringing their nuclear forces closer to deployment.
- At the regional level, the missile buildup increases tensions between India-Pakistan and India-China. Globally, it undermines non-proliferation efforts and encourages other countries to pursue nuclear weapons.
- The short flight times between cities in India and Pakistan, due to their close proximity, leaves little time for warning or response in the case of a missile attack, increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict.
Aleena Khan - IPI pipeline and its implications on PakistanAleena Khan
The document discusses the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline project which aims to deliver natural gas from Iran's gas fields to Pakistan and India. It provides a history of the project beginning in the 1980s and discusses its implications for the involved countries. However, US sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program have threatened the project. While Pakistan wants to continue to help address its energy crisis, US pressure and China withdrawing investment due to sanctions have created challenges for the pipeline's completion.
Latest india pakistan stand off:Lessons and Way Forwardipipk
This document analyzes the recent military standoff between India and Pakistan following the Pulwama attack in Kashmir. It discusses the background of tensions between the two countries, India's motives for escalating tensions, including domestic political factors, and strategies for crisis management. Key events discussed include India's air strike on Pakistan and Pakistan's subsequent limited retaliation. The document concludes that sustainable peace requires comprehensive dialogue and crisis management mechanisms to prevent future escalations from spiraling out of control.
This document provides an overview of a report by the Federation of American Scientists examining nuclear dynamics and implications of strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) being developed by the US, Russia, China, and India. Each country has different motivations for pursuing strategic BMD, including protecting key areas from limited ballistic missile attacks and ensuring the viability of their nuclear deterrents in response to other countries' BMD developments. However, as multiple nuclear-armed states deploy strategic BMD, it increases complexity and instability in strategic relationships due to security dilemmas and how states may react by further expanding their nuclear forces. The report analyzes the BMD capabilities and motivations of each country and discusses potential arms control measures and dialogues that
Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Assessing Benefits and RisksLeonam Guimarães
The Report of an Independent Task Force
In early 2014, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) convened an independent,
nonpartisan task force of about ten experts in the fields of national security, nuclear
engineering, naval nuclear propulsion, nuclear security, and nonproliferation. The task force
had the objectives to: (1) examine potential options for alternatives to highly enriched uranium
(HEU), a nuclear weapons-usable material, for naval propulsion, and (2) identify possible
effective ways to monitor and safeguard HEU as well as low enriched uranium (LEU) in the naval
sector.
https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/publication/policy-briefs/whither-indias-submarines.html - “Navy seeks amendment to 30-year plan, wants six nuclear boats”, announced a headline last week[1]. Over six years ago, another headline[2] had said, “Govt. approves construction of 7 stealth frigates, 6 nuclear-powered submarines”. The accompanying report informed readers that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had cleared the indigenous construction of seven stealth frigates under the Rs 50,000 crore Project 17A, as well as six nuclear-powered attack submarines. But if the Government had already approved the indigenous construction of six nuclear boats (SSNs) in 2015, why did the Navy still “want” them last week?
The document discusses the strategic implications of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. It argues that the agreement will enable India to pursue its hegemonic ambitions in the region and create an imbalance of power with Pakistan in particular. By providing India access to nuclear technology, it may engage in further nuclear weapons development and an arms race with Pakistan and China. The agreement also risks undermining regional stability and nonproliferation efforts like the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
The document discusses India's strategic partnerships and relations with major powers like Russia, China, and the United States. It provides 31 multiple choice questions about various aspects of these relationships, including high-level dialogues, defense cooperation agreements, joint military exercises, trade relations and more. The questions are intended to test knowledge about India's foreign relations for exams like NET/UPSC.
Operational Decision Elaboration Method as a Foresight Method: a Corporate Ap...Pierre Memheld
The corporate intelligence field does not have the same characteristics, or the same stakes, than the political or the military intelligence one. But rightly, its characteristics allow to us tactical analysis to forecast what would happen. Competitors, companies, have known technologies, capacities, finances, resources and pre-defined markets. In these conditions, they have a limited number of “options”. “Operational decision elaboration method” uses tactical intelligence to determine what an “adversary” is able to do when confronted to another “party”: what are its equipments, troops, intentions, organizational and operational behaviors. Thus, a military strategist has constraints, imperatives, objectives, limited means and variables that will create an uncertainty for the fulfillment of the mission. This is where intelligence plays a role. The article would stress how this method allow to forecast companies decisions, as their variables and options are less diversified than in the military field. This method would not allow to forecast precisely every decision but limit the number of factors to monitor: the consequence is a better ability to orientate corporate intelligence means, themselves more limited than in the military field. In this case, analysis takes an even more important place.
PME / PMI : prévenir les risques juridiques à l'internationalPierre Memheld
Les PME et PMI peuvent être exposées aux différents risques criminels dans leurs activités à l'international: extorsion de fonds, sollicitation de corruption, blanchiment d'argent, prise de contrôle hostile.
With the world’s maritime transport system at the forefront of globalization, the emergence of a new sea lane would have global consequences. The major trading powers of Europe and Asia, particularly Germany and China, are preparing their strategies and capabilities in anticipation of the possible opening of one such new sea lane, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), to regular commercial transit.
The South China Sea: Disputes, Risks and DiplomacyPierre Memheld
Why is there maritime tension between China and its southeast Asian neighbours, and where is it heading? Lord Michael Williams and Christian Le Mière of International Institute for Strategic Studies discuss at Chatham House on 23 October 2012.
Analysis Methods - IAFIE 2013 - Pierre MemheldPierre Memheld
The document discusses various analysis methods that can be used to help a company called "Cube de Luxe" anticipate competitors and make decisions.
Text mining and mapping helped identify key competitors and their market strategies. Social network analysis revealed influential researchers and executives. Benchmarking compared competitors. PEST-EL and trends analysis provided context on market potentials. SWOT, value chain and financial analysis offered insights into strengths, weaknesses and investment capacities. War games and scenario analysis explored strategic options and competitor reactions. In the end, no single method was sufficient, and adapting multiple methods was necessary to gain the information needed for decision-making under market pressures and time constraints.
This document announces a conference titled "Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon: Insiders’ View and Challenges" to be held on November 20, 2012 at ESSEC Cergy-Pontoise. The conference will include presentations on each country providing an insider's view of the current panorama, challenges, and impact of regional issues like sanctions and conflicts. It will feature presentations from academics, students, diplomats, and military experts from France and the countries being discussed. The goal is to gain perspectives on these countries and explore any continuity between their situations.
Research Paper - Development of nuclear weapons technology in India.pptxmridulavijay16
This document examines the historical development of India's nuclear weapons program from the 1940s to present day. It discusses the geopolitical factors that led India to pursue nuclear weapons, such as the 1962 Sino-Indian War and 1964 Chinese nuclear test. Key events included India's first nuclear test in 1974 and tests in 1998 that confirmed it as a nuclear state. The document also analyzes India's nuclear doctrine of no first use and minimum credible deterrence, as well as the implications for regional security and global non-proliferation efforts.
This document discusses prospects for civil nuclear cooperation between India and Japan. While both countries agree on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, they have different perspectives on nuclear issues due to past experiences. Japan suspended economic aid to India after its 1998 nuclear tests. However, relations have improved in recent years. If Japan recognizes India's 2008 waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it could examine allowing civil nuclear commerce with India, which seeks various energy sources for its growth. Overall, civil nuclear cooperation could deepen bilateral ties but both countries must address non-proliferation safeguards.
This document analyzes the ambivalent policies of Russia, China, and India towards Iran's nuclear program. While generally supporting UN resolutions against Iran's nuclear ambitions, these countries oppose harsh sanctions. Their ambivalence stems from both converging and diverging interests with Iran. Russia and China benefit economically from arms sales and oil imports from Iran. India also relies on Iranian oil and seeks to strengthen economic and strategic ties. However, these countries also want to avoid angering Western powers or destabilizing the Middle East.
Pokhran is a town in India known as the site of India's nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. The 1974 test, code named "Smiling Buddha", was India's first underground nuclear test with a yield of 8-12 kilotons. It caused international outcry and economic sanctions. The 1998 tests, code named "Operation Shakti", demonstrated India's nuclear weapons capability through 5 nuclear devices with yields ranging from 0.2 to 45 kilotons. The tests had significant impact in India as a symbol of emerging power but also drew international condemnation. They also impacted global nuclear nonproliferation efforts and highlighted the need for disarmament.
The nuclear crisis in Iran poses challenges to international peace and security. Iran's secret nuclear activities were revealed in 2002, and since then diplomatic efforts have struggled to develop an adequate response. Iran threatens to destroy Israel while developing nuclear weapons, creating high tensions. If diplomacy fails, Israel may launch a preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran also threatens to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world's oil passes daily, escalating risks of conflict that could disrupt global oil supplies and harm the world economy. While diplomatic negotiations continue, the situation remains precarious.
The Debate Continues: Should We Tolerate a Nuclear Iran?Robert Rosenkranz
On September 27, 2006, Intelligence Squared U.S. (IQ2US) held its inaugural debate, proposing the motion “We must tolerate a nuclear Iran.” Panelists George Perkovich, Karim Sadjadpour, Sanam Vakil, Patrick Clawson, Reuel Marc Gerecht, and William Kristol debated the pros and cons of allowing Iran to continue its nuclear development unrestricted.
This matter continues to be a point of international contention, as Iran recently met with six global powers in Lausanne, Switzerland to discuss the lifting of current sanctions in exchange for newly established limitations on its nuclear programs.
Denial & Deception – Week 7Select one of the ‘Questions to Pon.docxruthannemcmullen
Denial & Deception – Week 7
Select
one
of the ‘Questions to Ponder’ as your topic for this week's Forum posting. Original post must be 250+ words. Student responses must be 150+ words.
Questions to Ponder
Who are the world's leading practitioners of Denial and Deception? How have they developed, or acquired their capabilities? Do they share their capabilities, and if so, with whom?
What is the influence of the twenty-four hour news cycle and the internet in Denial and Deception?
What role are private companies playing in Denial and Deception proliferation and sophistication?
What does the future hold for Denial and Deception operations?
Student Response #1 – Harshul
Who are the world's leading practitioners of Denial and Deception; How have they developed, or acquired their capabilities; Do they share their capabilities, and if so, with whom;
China and Iran are the world's leading practitioners of Denial and Deception. In true Cold War fashion the PRC continues to mislead the international community about its arms build up and its geo-strategic goals in the Far East and South East Asia. Tactically, through the use of conventional forms of deception and “...electronic decoys, infrared decoys, false-target generators and angle reflectors” (Gertz 2008, np) during operations and testing procedures the Chinese have prevented others from gaining insight into their capabilities and intentions. Strategically, as it grows stronger the PRC aims to use all available means to settle territory related disputes with Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan and Japan. Along with their own ingenuity and skill the most important sources for technological tools of deception and denial have come from business transactions with Russia and outright theft from the United States. It has also acquired American technology through our allies such as Israel. China has shared its capabilities with Pakistan, Iran, Syria and North Korea.
Iran has certainly practices both functions in order to hide the progress or lack there of concerning its nuclear ambitions. It has also practiced deception in order to intimidate its neighbors and the United States. In 2006 the Iranians had released a video of an allegedly successful missile test to showcase their military capability but after careful analysis “...U.S. intelligence officers analyzed the plume of smoke from the missile and determined it matched a video of an earlier Chinese test” (Barnes 2006, np). The Iranians have developed much of their capabilities with help from China and North Korea and have shred their capabilities with their allies in the region, mainly Syria and Lebanon.
References
1. Gertz, Bill. 2008. Denial and Deception. Inside the Ring. The Washington Times, March 28, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/mar/28/inside-the-ring-60000234/?page=all (accessed October 24, 2014)
2. Barnes, Julian, E. 2006. Video of Iranian Missile Test Is Fake, Pentagon Says. Los Angeles Times, September 10, http://art.
This document summarizes an academic paper analyzing Iran's rights to civilian nuclear energy under international law. It provides background on Iran's nuclear program and history of cooperation with the NPT. It also discusses Iran's suppliers, some of which have been involved in proliferation. While Iran claims its program is peaceful, some of its behavior like developing long-range missiles and receiving centrifuge designs from A.Q. Khan have concerned the international community. The document aims to determine if Iran has violated any treaty obligations or customary norms regarding its pursuit of nuclear fuel enrichment.
This document provides the syllabus for the National Eligibility Test (NET) examination conducted by the National Testing Agency (NTA) for the subject of Defence and Strategic Studies. The syllabus is divided into 10 units that cover various topics related to defence and strategic studies including theories of national security, strategic thought, the role of war in international relations, weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation, global security concerns, and India's security policies and concerns. The syllabus also includes units on conflict resolution, the role of disaster management in national security, defence economics, and the impact of science and technology on national security.
India has had a nuclear program since 1947 that it pursued for both energy and defense purposes. It conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 and openly declared itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998. Today it is estimated that India possesses around 100 nuclear weapons but is not significantly increasing its stockpile. India's nuclear policy aims to deter China and Pakistan and it maintains a formal no first use policy. Regarding Iran's nuclear program, India supports a diplomatic agreement between Iran and the UN to lift sanctions as this would benefit India's economy by resuming its oil trade with Iran.
Jeremy CastellanosBased on the articles assigned this week, .docxchristiandean12115
Jeremy Castellanos
Based on the articles assigned this week, the current threat of nuclear weapons being acquired and used in a terrorist attack is low for several reasons. The Department of Defense defines a nuclear weapon as “a complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.” (Joint Publication 3-11)
Nuclear weapons and material are very hard to acquire and have intense security. Although more countries around the world continue to develop their own nuclear weapon capabilities, it is very unlikely for a country to give nuclear weapons or materials to a terrorist organization. To give a terrorist organization nuclear capabilities is not only very dangerous because terrorists do not abide by any laws or treaties, but is also likely to force a war with opposing countries. There are signed treaties that prevent nuclear proliferation and testing.
The United States has so many different organizations within the Intelligence Community, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Energy that have dedicated units both home and overseas locking down and securing nuclear materials. The United States has an overall mindset, that if we possess nuclear weapons there is a chance that a terrorist organization can too. This is in large due to the rhetoric of our policy makers and media. Although they are trying to take preventive measures, they make terrorist organizations seem more deadly than what they truly are. If everything is a threat, then nothing is a threat.
I think that terrorist trying to achieve nuclear weapons is too hard and is not cost effective. Take for example DAESH right now. They can barely hold their stronghold of Mosul, Iraq and for them to effectively provide logistics, finances and the manpower needed to acquire and build a nuclear weapon is unlikely. They are going to resort to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), small arms fire and tunnels to continue their operations.
References:
Huessy, P. (2013). Nuclear Zero: World Peace or World Chaos. Family Security Matters, 8.
Wilner, A. S. (2012). Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist. Proxies. Comparative Strategy, 31 (1)
Aaron Baca
For this week’s discussion I chose an article called “Are We Prepared?” from the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This article evolves around an evaluation of four scenarios involving the potential threat of WMDs occurring in the US. The scenarios include the collapse of the Nonproliferation Regime, Failed WMD-armed State, Biological Terror Campaign and a Nuclear Detonation in a US City. The issues regarding these situations combined can create incomparable obstacles, not .
Dangers of missile race in south asia an india pakistan perspectiveAlexander Decker
This document discusses the dangers of the missile race between India and Pakistan from a regional and global perspective. It outlines the types of ballistic missiles each country has developed, including their payloads and ranges. The expanding missile capabilities threaten to push the countries into an arms race and bring their nuclear forces closer to deployment. At a regional level, the missile buildup increases tensions between India-Pakistan and India-China. Globally, it undermines non-proliferation efforts and encourages other countries to pursue nuclear weapons. The mobility and dispersal of missiles during a crisis also poses operational and escalation risks for command and control.
This document summarizes the key recommendations from a task force report on verification requirements for a nuclear agreement with Iran. The task force identified 6 elements that should be included in an effective agreement, as well as 3 actions the U.S. government should take to facilitate implementation. The key elements recommended for the agreement include requiring a comprehensive declaration from Iran on its nuclear program, providing the IAEA access to any sites and information requested, and establishing consequences for non-cooperation with inspectors.
Running head: FOREIGN POLICY
FOREIGN POLICY 2
United States Foreign Policy on Iran Nuclear Program
Student’s Name
Affiliation
United States Foreign Policy on Iran
Introduction
A foreign policy is an action plan that is established by a certain nation in its diplomatic interaction with another nation of interest (Davis, 2011). These policies are meant to stipulate a way forward on any contentious issues that are bound to come up between the two countries. The United States has developed a unique foreign policy for each country depending on economic, social and political needs among others. United States and Iran share an informal diplomatic tie which is indicated through having no ambassadors in their countries. Iran has some interest section within the Pakistan Embassy in Washington D.C while US interest section is via the Swiss embassy in Tehran (Davis, 2011). Increased interests saw the development of a virtual embassy online by the US in 2011. The main interest of the United States is to establish peace in the Gulf Region so as to continue benefiting from international trade, a major foreign exchange earner. By the year 2008, the trade between United States and Iran stood at $623 million (Ilias, 2010). The United States Census Bureau has observed a steady increase in American exports to Iran since the year 2007. The statistics do not include commercial activities through third party countries due to the established trade embargo. The United States Treasury Department issued approximately 11,000 special licenses to American organizations over the past ten years to directly trade with Iran (Ilias, 2010). Subsequent surveys by The United States Census Bureau in 2014 have indicated over $175 billion losses in trade and 279,000 lost job opportunities based on sanctions. This is a major economic concern for the United States and reducing the number of sanctions is a top priority in boosting the economy. This is one area in which the United States is striving to make changes through its foreign policies. Specifically, the nuclear threats posed by Iran are an issue of concern for the United States because of the unstable political environment in the Gulf Region. Increased insecurity in the region would translate to huge economic losses to the United States.
Iran Nuclear Programs
The current United State’s Obama administration has been concerned with nuclear development in Iran. The United States fails to recognize Iran’s right to nuclear power, thus persistence in halting the progress of related programs. Sanctions have been the main mode of controlling the Iran nuclear advancement initiatives, specifically the Iranian economy isolation meant to interrupt the circulation of money (Juneau & Razavi, 2013). The lon.
The document discusses the threat of nuclear terrorism and outlines several key points:
1) Over 100 incidents of theft or unauthorized activities involving nuclear material are reported each year, demonstrating the vulnerability of global security systems.
2) Leaders from the US, IAEA, and other organizations have stated that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing global security.
3) Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda have expressed a desire to acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear materials are vulnerable to theft from civilian sites and military stockpiles around the world.
4) Regions like Pakistan, Afghanistan and countries without strong nuclear security present risks of nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands. International cooperation is needed to strengthen security.
The document provides information about The Israel Project (TIP), an organization that shares facts about Israel with the media and public officials. It then discusses threats facing Israel from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, including their missile capabilities and Iran's nuclear program. The document also outlines Israel's missile defense systems that defend against these threats.
Operational Decision Elaboration Method as a Foresight Method: a Corporate Ap...Pierre Memheld
The corporate intelligence field does not have the same characteristics, or the same stakes, than the political or the military intelligence one. But rightly, its characteristics allow to us tactical analysis to forecast what would happen. Competitors, companies, have known technologies, capacities, finances, resources and pre-defined markets. In these conditions, they have a limited number of “options”. “Operational decision elaboration method” uses tactical intelligence to determine what an “adversary” is able to do when confronted to another “party”: what are its equipments, troops, intentions, organizational and operational behaviors. Thus, a military strategist has constraints, imperatives, objectives, limited means and variables that will create an uncertainty for the fulfillment of the mission. This is where intelligence plays a role. The article would stress how this method allow to forecast companies decisions, as their variables and options are less diversified than in the military field. This method would not allow to forecast precisely every decision but limit the number of factors to monitor: the consequence is a better ability to orientate corporate intelligence means, themselves more limited than in the military field. In this case, analysis takes an even more important place.
PME / PMI : prévenir les risques juridiques à l'internationalPierre Memheld
Les PME et PMI peuvent être exposées aux différents risques criminels dans leurs activités à l'international: extorsion de fonds, sollicitation de corruption, blanchiment d'argent, prise de contrôle hostile.
With the world’s maritime transport system at the forefront of globalization, the emergence of a new sea lane would have global consequences. The major trading powers of Europe and Asia, particularly Germany and China, are preparing their strategies and capabilities in anticipation of the possible opening of one such new sea lane, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), to regular commercial transit.
The South China Sea: Disputes, Risks and DiplomacyPierre Memheld
Why is there maritime tension between China and its southeast Asian neighbours, and where is it heading? Lord Michael Williams and Christian Le Mière of International Institute for Strategic Studies discuss at Chatham House on 23 October 2012.
Analysis Methods - IAFIE 2013 - Pierre MemheldPierre Memheld
The document discusses various analysis methods that can be used to help a company called "Cube de Luxe" anticipate competitors and make decisions.
Text mining and mapping helped identify key competitors and their market strategies. Social network analysis revealed influential researchers and executives. Benchmarking compared competitors. PEST-EL and trends analysis provided context on market potentials. SWOT, value chain and financial analysis offered insights into strengths, weaknesses and investment capacities. War games and scenario analysis explored strategic options and competitor reactions. In the end, no single method was sufficient, and adapting multiple methods was necessary to gain the information needed for decision-making under market pressures and time constraints.
This document announces a conference titled "Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon: Insiders’ View and Challenges" to be held on November 20, 2012 at ESSEC Cergy-Pontoise. The conference will include presentations on each country providing an insider's view of the current panorama, challenges, and impact of regional issues like sanctions and conflicts. It will feature presentations from academics, students, diplomats, and military experts from France and the countries being discussed. The goal is to gain perspectives on these countries and explore any continuity between their situations.
Research Paper - Development of nuclear weapons technology in India.pptxmridulavijay16
This document examines the historical development of India's nuclear weapons program from the 1940s to present day. It discusses the geopolitical factors that led India to pursue nuclear weapons, such as the 1962 Sino-Indian War and 1964 Chinese nuclear test. Key events included India's first nuclear test in 1974 and tests in 1998 that confirmed it as a nuclear state. The document also analyzes India's nuclear doctrine of no first use and minimum credible deterrence, as well as the implications for regional security and global non-proliferation efforts.
This document discusses prospects for civil nuclear cooperation between India and Japan. While both countries agree on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, they have different perspectives on nuclear issues due to past experiences. Japan suspended economic aid to India after its 1998 nuclear tests. However, relations have improved in recent years. If Japan recognizes India's 2008 waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it could examine allowing civil nuclear commerce with India, which seeks various energy sources for its growth. Overall, civil nuclear cooperation could deepen bilateral ties but both countries must address non-proliferation safeguards.
This document analyzes the ambivalent policies of Russia, China, and India towards Iran's nuclear program. While generally supporting UN resolutions against Iran's nuclear ambitions, these countries oppose harsh sanctions. Their ambivalence stems from both converging and diverging interests with Iran. Russia and China benefit economically from arms sales and oil imports from Iran. India also relies on Iranian oil and seeks to strengthen economic and strategic ties. However, these countries also want to avoid angering Western powers or destabilizing the Middle East.
Pokhran is a town in India known as the site of India's nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. The 1974 test, code named "Smiling Buddha", was India's first underground nuclear test with a yield of 8-12 kilotons. It caused international outcry and economic sanctions. The 1998 tests, code named "Operation Shakti", demonstrated India's nuclear weapons capability through 5 nuclear devices with yields ranging from 0.2 to 45 kilotons. The tests had significant impact in India as a symbol of emerging power but also drew international condemnation. They also impacted global nuclear nonproliferation efforts and highlighted the need for disarmament.
The nuclear crisis in Iran poses challenges to international peace and security. Iran's secret nuclear activities were revealed in 2002, and since then diplomatic efforts have struggled to develop an adequate response. Iran threatens to destroy Israel while developing nuclear weapons, creating high tensions. If diplomacy fails, Israel may launch a preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. Iran also threatens to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world's oil passes daily, escalating risks of conflict that could disrupt global oil supplies and harm the world economy. While diplomatic negotiations continue, the situation remains precarious.
The Debate Continues: Should We Tolerate a Nuclear Iran?Robert Rosenkranz
On September 27, 2006, Intelligence Squared U.S. (IQ2US) held its inaugural debate, proposing the motion “We must tolerate a nuclear Iran.” Panelists George Perkovich, Karim Sadjadpour, Sanam Vakil, Patrick Clawson, Reuel Marc Gerecht, and William Kristol debated the pros and cons of allowing Iran to continue its nuclear development unrestricted.
This matter continues to be a point of international contention, as Iran recently met with six global powers in Lausanne, Switzerland to discuss the lifting of current sanctions in exchange for newly established limitations on its nuclear programs.
Denial & Deception – Week 7Select one of the ‘Questions to Pon.docxruthannemcmullen
Denial & Deception – Week 7
Select
one
of the ‘Questions to Ponder’ as your topic for this week's Forum posting. Original post must be 250+ words. Student responses must be 150+ words.
Questions to Ponder
Who are the world's leading practitioners of Denial and Deception? How have they developed, or acquired their capabilities? Do they share their capabilities, and if so, with whom?
What is the influence of the twenty-four hour news cycle and the internet in Denial and Deception?
What role are private companies playing in Denial and Deception proliferation and sophistication?
What does the future hold for Denial and Deception operations?
Student Response #1 – Harshul
Who are the world's leading practitioners of Denial and Deception; How have they developed, or acquired their capabilities; Do they share their capabilities, and if so, with whom;
China and Iran are the world's leading practitioners of Denial and Deception. In true Cold War fashion the PRC continues to mislead the international community about its arms build up and its geo-strategic goals in the Far East and South East Asia. Tactically, through the use of conventional forms of deception and “...electronic decoys, infrared decoys, false-target generators and angle reflectors” (Gertz 2008, np) during operations and testing procedures the Chinese have prevented others from gaining insight into their capabilities and intentions. Strategically, as it grows stronger the PRC aims to use all available means to settle territory related disputes with Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan and Japan. Along with their own ingenuity and skill the most important sources for technological tools of deception and denial have come from business transactions with Russia and outright theft from the United States. It has also acquired American technology through our allies such as Israel. China has shared its capabilities with Pakistan, Iran, Syria and North Korea.
Iran has certainly practices both functions in order to hide the progress or lack there of concerning its nuclear ambitions. It has also practiced deception in order to intimidate its neighbors and the United States. In 2006 the Iranians had released a video of an allegedly successful missile test to showcase their military capability but after careful analysis “...U.S. intelligence officers analyzed the plume of smoke from the missile and determined it matched a video of an earlier Chinese test” (Barnes 2006, np). The Iranians have developed much of their capabilities with help from China and North Korea and have shred their capabilities with their allies in the region, mainly Syria and Lebanon.
References
1. Gertz, Bill. 2008. Denial and Deception. Inside the Ring. The Washington Times, March 28, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/mar/28/inside-the-ring-60000234/?page=all (accessed October 24, 2014)
2. Barnes, Julian, E. 2006. Video of Iranian Missile Test Is Fake, Pentagon Says. Los Angeles Times, September 10, http://art.
This document summarizes an academic paper analyzing Iran's rights to civilian nuclear energy under international law. It provides background on Iran's nuclear program and history of cooperation with the NPT. It also discusses Iran's suppliers, some of which have been involved in proliferation. While Iran claims its program is peaceful, some of its behavior like developing long-range missiles and receiving centrifuge designs from A.Q. Khan have concerned the international community. The document aims to determine if Iran has violated any treaty obligations or customary norms regarding its pursuit of nuclear fuel enrichment.
This document provides the syllabus for the National Eligibility Test (NET) examination conducted by the National Testing Agency (NTA) for the subject of Defence and Strategic Studies. The syllabus is divided into 10 units that cover various topics related to defence and strategic studies including theories of national security, strategic thought, the role of war in international relations, weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation, global security concerns, and India's security policies and concerns. The syllabus also includes units on conflict resolution, the role of disaster management in national security, defence economics, and the impact of science and technology on national security.
India has had a nuclear program since 1947 that it pursued for both energy and defense purposes. It conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 and openly declared itself a nuclear weapons state in 1998. Today it is estimated that India possesses around 100 nuclear weapons but is not significantly increasing its stockpile. India's nuclear policy aims to deter China and Pakistan and it maintains a formal no first use policy. Regarding Iran's nuclear program, India supports a diplomatic agreement between Iran and the UN to lift sanctions as this would benefit India's economy by resuming its oil trade with Iran.
Jeremy CastellanosBased on the articles assigned this week, .docxchristiandean12115
Jeremy Castellanos
Based on the articles assigned this week, the current threat of nuclear weapons being acquired and used in a terrorist attack is low for several reasons. The Department of Defense defines a nuclear weapon as “a complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.” (Joint Publication 3-11)
Nuclear weapons and material are very hard to acquire and have intense security. Although more countries around the world continue to develop their own nuclear weapon capabilities, it is very unlikely for a country to give nuclear weapons or materials to a terrorist organization. To give a terrorist organization nuclear capabilities is not only very dangerous because terrorists do not abide by any laws or treaties, but is also likely to force a war with opposing countries. There are signed treaties that prevent nuclear proliferation and testing.
The United States has so many different organizations within the Intelligence Community, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Energy that have dedicated units both home and overseas locking down and securing nuclear materials. The United States has an overall mindset, that if we possess nuclear weapons there is a chance that a terrorist organization can too. This is in large due to the rhetoric of our policy makers and media. Although they are trying to take preventive measures, they make terrorist organizations seem more deadly than what they truly are. If everything is a threat, then nothing is a threat.
I think that terrorist trying to achieve nuclear weapons is too hard and is not cost effective. Take for example DAESH right now. They can barely hold their stronghold of Mosul, Iraq and for them to effectively provide logistics, finances and the manpower needed to acquire and build a nuclear weapon is unlikely. They are going to resort to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), small arms fire and tunnels to continue their operations.
References:
Huessy, P. (2013). Nuclear Zero: World Peace or World Chaos. Family Security Matters, 8.
Wilner, A. S. (2012). Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist. Proxies. Comparative Strategy, 31 (1)
Aaron Baca
For this week’s discussion I chose an article called “Are We Prepared?” from the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This article evolves around an evaluation of four scenarios involving the potential threat of WMDs occurring in the US. The scenarios include the collapse of the Nonproliferation Regime, Failed WMD-armed State, Biological Terror Campaign and a Nuclear Detonation in a US City. The issues regarding these situations combined can create incomparable obstacles, not .
Dangers of missile race in south asia an india pakistan perspectiveAlexander Decker
This document discusses the dangers of the missile race between India and Pakistan from a regional and global perspective. It outlines the types of ballistic missiles each country has developed, including their payloads and ranges. The expanding missile capabilities threaten to push the countries into an arms race and bring their nuclear forces closer to deployment. At a regional level, the missile buildup increases tensions between India-Pakistan and India-China. Globally, it undermines non-proliferation efforts and encourages other countries to pursue nuclear weapons. The mobility and dispersal of missiles during a crisis also poses operational and escalation risks for command and control.
This document summarizes the key recommendations from a task force report on verification requirements for a nuclear agreement with Iran. The task force identified 6 elements that should be included in an effective agreement, as well as 3 actions the U.S. government should take to facilitate implementation. The key elements recommended for the agreement include requiring a comprehensive declaration from Iran on its nuclear program, providing the IAEA access to any sites and information requested, and establishing consequences for non-cooperation with inspectors.
Running head: FOREIGN POLICY
FOREIGN POLICY 2
United States Foreign Policy on Iran Nuclear Program
Student’s Name
Affiliation
United States Foreign Policy on Iran
Introduction
A foreign policy is an action plan that is established by a certain nation in its diplomatic interaction with another nation of interest (Davis, 2011). These policies are meant to stipulate a way forward on any contentious issues that are bound to come up between the two countries. The United States has developed a unique foreign policy for each country depending on economic, social and political needs among others. United States and Iran share an informal diplomatic tie which is indicated through having no ambassadors in their countries. Iran has some interest section within the Pakistan Embassy in Washington D.C while US interest section is via the Swiss embassy in Tehran (Davis, 2011). Increased interests saw the development of a virtual embassy online by the US in 2011. The main interest of the United States is to establish peace in the Gulf Region so as to continue benefiting from international trade, a major foreign exchange earner. By the year 2008, the trade between United States and Iran stood at $623 million (Ilias, 2010). The United States Census Bureau has observed a steady increase in American exports to Iran since the year 2007. The statistics do not include commercial activities through third party countries due to the established trade embargo. The United States Treasury Department issued approximately 11,000 special licenses to American organizations over the past ten years to directly trade with Iran (Ilias, 2010). Subsequent surveys by The United States Census Bureau in 2014 have indicated over $175 billion losses in trade and 279,000 lost job opportunities based on sanctions. This is a major economic concern for the United States and reducing the number of sanctions is a top priority in boosting the economy. This is one area in which the United States is striving to make changes through its foreign policies. Specifically, the nuclear threats posed by Iran are an issue of concern for the United States because of the unstable political environment in the Gulf Region. Increased insecurity in the region would translate to huge economic losses to the United States.
Iran Nuclear Programs
The current United State’s Obama administration has been concerned with nuclear development in Iran. The United States fails to recognize Iran’s right to nuclear power, thus persistence in halting the progress of related programs. Sanctions have been the main mode of controlling the Iran nuclear advancement initiatives, specifically the Iranian economy isolation meant to interrupt the circulation of money (Juneau & Razavi, 2013). The lon.
The document discusses the threat of nuclear terrorism and outlines several key points:
1) Over 100 incidents of theft or unauthorized activities involving nuclear material are reported each year, demonstrating the vulnerability of global security systems.
2) Leaders from the US, IAEA, and other organizations have stated that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing global security.
3) Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda have expressed a desire to acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear materials are vulnerable to theft from civilian sites and military stockpiles around the world.
4) Regions like Pakistan, Afghanistan and countries without strong nuclear security present risks of nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands. International cooperation is needed to strengthen security.
The document provides information about The Israel Project (TIP), an organization that shares facts about Israel with the media and public officials. It then discusses threats facing Israel from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, including their missile capabilities and Iran's nuclear program. The document also outlines Israel's missile defense systems that defend against these threats.
Review of Iran’s Nuclear Weapons‐ related Conduct by ISJ (In Search of Justi...Ali Reza Assadzadeh
Two years after the implementation of JCPOA and
IAEA report on Possible Military Dimensions of
Iranian nuclear program
Table of contents:
Introduction 3
A Brief Look at the Results of the July 2015 JCPOA 4
Review of Final Assessment of IAEA 7
Tehran’s deception in response to IAEA 8
Deception about high explosives experiments 9
Experiments at Parchin and September 2015 inspections 10
New information on continuation of work by SPND 13
Reports on Iran’s illegal procurements for nuclear weapon 17
Execution of SPND expert Shahram Amiri in 2016 19
Continued ballistic missile tests 21
Responses to IAEA on Nuclear military dimensions 22
Need for a firm policy to prevent nuclear weaponization 23
Practical recommendation 23
The Iranian Bomb; A Cross-Country Comparison with PakistanBranden Ryan
This paper was written in fulfillment of the course requirements for IAF 400 at Mercer University in order to receive my Bachelor of Arts degree in International Affairs. The contents include a comparison of the nuclear programs of Iran and Pakistan.
The IAEA is set to release a report providing evidence that Iran has researched nuclear weapons technology and may be able to produce a nuclear weapon in a short time period if it chooses. The report could strengthen calls for further sanctions against Iran. Israel has taken actions that suggest it may be preparing for a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities despite risks. The US position is that all options remain open but it is unlikely to take military action close to the upcoming presidential election.
The IAEA is set to release a report providing evidence that Iran has researched nuclear weapons technology and may be able to produce a nuclear weapon in a short time period if it chooses. The report could strengthen calls for further sanctions against Iran. Israel has taken actions that suggest it may be preparing for a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities despite risks. The US and UK are considering contingency plans but no decisions have been made on potential military action.
Similar to Idsa opinion paper irans nuclear imbroglio (20)
Intelligence Analysis & Cognitive Biases: an Illustrative Case StudyPierre Memheld
This case study is foremost an educational tool. It involves two European and Asian multinational tires manufacturer for OTR, Off the Road, or “off road” and a problem of price competition. It shows how an initial intelligence effort is led astray. Instead the solution is a combination of approaches, better known as Competitive Intelligence. It is built on the external vision of the company craft, the use of all information sources characteristics of an intelligence field dedicated to the business world. It is not a new discipline but a trans-disciplinary approach for information exploitation which is using elements from financial analysis, SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) matrixes, and value chain analysis. In the above case, the company Eurotires used mostly the following sources: internet, scientific and patent databases; public administrative sources; customers interviews, industrial experts (manufacturing and distribution), and marketing analysis.
Intelligence économique et anticipation des risques: application à la lutte a...Pierre Memheld
Les sociétés souhaitant se développer globalement sont confrontées à différents types de risques : instabilités internes, concurrence abusive, espionnage économiques mais aussi parfois la corruption qui apparait dans les appels d’offres publics ou la réalisation de projets industriels. Or ces risques peuvent parfois s’agencer dans un cas ultime où la société « visée » n’aura pas toujours les mêmes moyens d’action ou d’influence que ses concurrents. Actuellement l’accroissement du risque « corruption » représente un décalage de compétitivité tant les lois varient d’un pays à l’autre. Le développement de ces nouvelles formes de concurrence exacerbée, liées à l’émergence d’acteurs n’ayant pas les mêmes lois à appliquer, crée un nouveau défi. La bonne gouvernance interne, ainsi que l’audit des activités, et les « due diligence », méthodes associées au concept de conformité (compliance en anglais) sont de nouvelles façons de se prémunir contre ces menaces. L’intelligence économique, comme outil de management de l’information et de coordination des actions, peut elle servir dans ce cadre ?
"Our Great and Powerful Friend" - La relation Etats Unis / Australie à l'épre...Pierre Memheld
A l’heure où la Chine s’affirme sur la scène internationale et provoque d’importants bouleversements géostratégiques dans la zone Asie-Pacifique, les Etats-Unis se repositionnent selon une dynamique qui n’est pas sans rappeler celle prescrite par d’illustres théoriciens tels qu’Alfred Mahan.
The Iranian regime has among its strategic objectives expanding its power in the Middle East and rolling back U.S. influence in the region. Iranian leadership considers the Persian Gulf and much of Central Asia to be a “near abroad” where Iranian culture and interests should have significant influence. Recent developments confirm that Iran is committed to this ambition, has a strategy to realize this outcome, and is making significant progress towards it. Iran also clearly has ambitions to be a significant and relevant actor on the global stage, whose capabilities and intentions must be taken into consideration by superpower nations.
China's Naval Strategy: Strategic Evolution and Emerging Concepts of WarfarePierre Memheld
This document analyzes China's growing naval strategy in relation to its rising national interests and global influence. It discusses how China's strategic thinking has increasingly focused on securing its maritime interests and sea lanes, given its long coastline and dependence on international shipping routes. The document outlines how China's naval strategy is aimed at achieving command of the seas near its coast and expanding the defensive depth of its waters. It explores how concepts like "sea rights" in Chinese strategic thinking relate to asserting sovereignty over disputed territories and protecting expanding national economic interests in global waters. The document examines how China's naval development is driven by its shifting priorities from land to sea as its economy has become more globally oriented.
India's industrial sector growth has faltered in recent decades. While services have grown to become over 50% of GDP, industry growth has lagged behind. Several economic reforms in the 1990s aimed to liberalize industry by reducing licensing, opening trade and FDI, but research finds mixed effects. Fully realizing India's growth potential of 9-10% annually may require further reforms to remove barriers to capital investment and land acquisition for industry. However, Indian leadership priorities social equity over growth unlike the more autocratic pro-business model in China.
The document discusses how manufacturing costs in China and the US are converging:
- Rising wages in China of 15-20% per year will significantly reduce China's labor cost advantage over the US from 55% today to 39% by 2015.
- When total costs like transportation, duties, and real estate are considered, the cost difference between manufacturing in China versus some US states will be minimal within 5 years for many goods destined for North America.
- This convergence, along with rising demand in China and elsewhere in Asia, will lead some companies to bring production for North America back to the US, where manufacturing will be competitive for many goods within 5 years.
Organized retailing in India: challenges and opportunitiesPierre Memheld
This document summarizes research on organized retailing in India. It discusses:
1) The evolution of retail in India from traditional formats like markets to more modern organized retailers like supermarkets and department stores with the economic liberalization of the 1990s.
2) The objectives of the research, which are to examine the growth, impact, challenges, and future of modern retailing in India.
3) A literature review on topics like the growth of the Indian retail market, changing consumer preferences, and frameworks for understanding consumer decision-making styles.
PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS WITH INDIA: BEYOND KASHMIR?Pierre Memheld
The document analyzes Pakistan's relations with India, focusing on their economic cooperation and the Kashmir dispute. It finds that Pakistan's democratic government has demonstrated political will to normalize relations by resuming economic talks in 2011 and planning to grant India MFN trade status by end of 2012. However, full normalization depends on sustained Pakistani democracy, reining in anti-India militant groups, and making progress on longstanding issues like Kashmir. India must also respond constructively by addressing Pakistani trade concerns and reducing its military presence in Kashmir. Both countries would benefit from further economic integration, but tensions over Kashmir and water access continue to impede full cooperation and stability in the region.
Regional conflict over water in central asiaPierre Memheld
This policy paper discusses regional conflicts over water management in Central Asia arising from the asymmetric distribution of water resources across countries in the region. It argues that proposals to address this issue through a regional exchange of energy for water will not work due to two key factors: 1) The political regimes in the oil-exporting countries prioritize using their energy resources to generate foreign currency through exports rather than for regional cooperation. 2) There is no agreed upon regional framework to conceptualize cooperation given the unique situation of the newly independent post-Soviet states in Central Asia. A new approach is needed to define the region, regional energy policy, and analytical framework.
Road, Railway & Port projects fall short of investment targets in 11th PlanPierre Memheld
Infrastructure facilities like roads, railways, and ports have under-achieved their investment targets in the Eleventh Plan by -11%, -23%, and -54% respectively. Overall investment targets have only been achieved due to the strong performance of the telecom (34%) and oil & gas (655%) sectors.
Shaping the future: Energy Security in IndiaPierre Memheld
India is the fourth largest energy consumer in the world and relies heavily on coal for electricity generation. By 2035, coal is projected to make up over 47% of India's energy basket. However, over 33% of Indian households still lack access to electricity, with over 90% of those being in rural areas. The conference aims to explore energy security from both a national perspective by augmenting energy supplies, as well as an individual perspective by improving access to quality energy services for all Indians. Experts will discuss options for improving production, transmission, and delivery efficiencies as well as addressing issues of access.
Intelligence économique, déontologie, conformité et anticipation des risquesPierre Memheld
Les groupes présents à l’international sont confrontés à différents enjeux : géopolitiques, économiques et financiers, concurrence exacerbée, compétition déloyale, « pillage » technologique, cadre légal contraignant. L’intelligence économique, permet d’apporter une compréhension et des réponses à ces enjeux suivant ses différents « pôles » : environnement international et compétitivité, intelligence économique dans les organisations, gestion de l’information, protection et défense du patrimoine informationnel, influence et contre influence.
The document analyzes the economic cost of Somali piracy in 2011. It estimates the total cost was between $6.6-6.9 billion. The shipping industry bore over 80% of the costs, or between $5.3-5.5 billion. Costs included ransoms totaling $160 million, insurance costs of $635 million, security equipment and guards of $1.06-1.16 billion, rerouting costs of $486-680 million, increased speed costs for containerships of $2.7 billion, labor costs of $195 million, prosecution and imprisonment costs of $16.4 million, military operation costs of $1.27 billion, and counter-piracy organization costs
Essential Tools for Modern PR Business .pptxPragencyuk
Discover the essential tools and strategies for modern PR business success. Learn how to craft compelling news releases, leverage press release sites and news wires, stay updated with PR news, and integrate effective PR practices to enhance your brand's visibility and credibility. Elevate your PR efforts with our comprehensive guide.
केरल उच्च न्यायालय ने 11 जून, 2024 को मंडला पूजा में भाग लेने की अनुमति मांगने वाली 10 वर्षीय लड़की की रिट याचिका को खारिज कर दिया, जिसमें सर्वोच्च न्यायालय की एक बड़ी पीठ के समक्ष इस मुद्दे की लंबित प्रकृति पर जोर दिया गया। यह आदेश न्यायमूर्ति अनिल के. नरेंद्रन और न्यायमूर्ति हरिशंकर वी. मेनन की खंडपीठ द्वारा पारित किया गया
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Youngest c m in India- Pema Khandu BiographyVoterMood
Pema Khandu, born on August 21, 1979, is an Indian politician and the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh. He is the son of former Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Dorjee Khandu. Pema Khandu assumed office as the Chief Minister in July 2016, making him one of the youngest Chief Ministers in India at that time.
1. IDSA Occasional Paper No. 26
IRAN'S NUCLEAR IMBROGLIO
AT THE CROSSROADS:
POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA
S. Samuel C. Rajiv
2. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 1
IDSA Occasional Paper No. 26
IRAN'S NUCLEAR IMBROGLIO AT
THE CROSSROADS:
POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA
S. Samuel C. Rajiv
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
3. 2 | Sam Rajiv
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in
a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior
permission of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).
ISBN: 978-93-82169-06-278-81-86019-97-9
First Published: July 2012
Price: Rs.
Published by: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg,
Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010
Tel. (91-11) 2671-7983
Fax.(91-11) 2615 4191
E-mail: contactus@idsa.in
Website: http://www.idsa.in
Cover & Layout by: Vaijayanti Patankar
Printed at:
4. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 3
Contents
Introduction
I. International Dynamics
a. The IAEA and Iran: Unresolved Contentions
b. The US: Military Options versus Sanctions
c. The EU: Sanctions and Diplomacy
II. Regional Dynamics
a. Israel's Iran Dilemma
b. The Saudi Lynchpin
c. The Syrian Question
d. Turkey: Key Diplomatic Facilitator
III. Iran: Domestic Political Dynamics
IV. India's Dilemmas in the Evolving Situation
V. Policy Options for India
6. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 5
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Dr. Rajiv Nayan and Dr. S.
Kalyanraman for comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. The
author would like to express his gratitude to two anonymous
reviewers for their positive and constructive feedback. The author
would also like to specially thank Shri Vivek Kaushik, Assistant Editor,
Strategic Analysis for facilitating the publication process. The author
is solely responsible for the final content.
8. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 7
Introduction
On account of pertinent international, regional and domestic
dynamics, the Iranian nuclear imbroglio is at uncertain crossroads.
International dynamics include Iran's continuing unresolved
contentions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and the ramping up of unilateral sanctions by the US and European
Union (EU). Among regional dynamics are the Iran dilemma for
Israeli policy makers, political uncertainties as exemplified by
developments in Syria (Iran's friend in the region), an increasing focus
on the Saudi ability to meet energy requirements of countries in Asia
and Europe amidst impending procurement difficulties as a result of
extant sanctions as well as an imminent oil embargo on Iran, and the
role being played by Turkey as a key diplomatic facilitator on both,
the Iranian nuclear issue and on Syria. Iranian internal political
dynamics and differences between the Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as evident during
the March 2, 2012 elections to the Majlis (Parliament) are also
pertinent. The Paper delineates significant aspects relating to the above
dynamics and notes policy dilemmas being faced by India as a result
of the fluid situation. It ends by exploring possible policy options
for India to maximise its core national interests.
10. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 9
I. International Dynamics
A. The IAEA and Iran: Unresolved Contentions
The Director General (DG) of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in the assessment of the agency to the Board of
Governors (BOG) on February 24, 2012 urged Iran ‘to address the
Agency’s serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s
nuclear programme, including, as a first step, by responding to the
Agency’s questions related to Parchin and the foreign expert, and by
granting early access in that regard’.1 It was the 36th report of the
IAEA DG to the BOG since June 2003 delineating the status of Iranian
compliance with its NPT/IAEA obligations. The IAEA DG’s latest
report to the BOG on May 25, 2012 concludes that ‘the Agency is
unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that
all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities’.2
The nature of interactions between the IAEA and Iran has been
contentious, with each side differing on the nature of those
obligations. The IAEA has passed 11 resolutions from September
1
See ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant
provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of
Iran’, February 24, 2012, at http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/
IAEA_Iran_Report_24February2012.pdf (accessed February 27, 2012).
2
See ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant
provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of
Iran’, May 25, 2012, at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2012/gov2012-23.pdf (accessed June 27, 2012).
11. 10 | Sam Rajiv
2003 to November 2011 urging Iran’s cooperation in ensuring
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme
and expressing increasing concern over its continued uranium
enrichment activities among others. It referred the issue to the UN
Security Council (UNSC) in February 2006 for the first time after
Iran re-started its enrichment activities, which it had agreed to suspend
in the aftermath of the Tehran Agreed Statement of October 2003
entered into with the EU-3 countries (Britain, Germany, and France).3
The UNSC has passed six resolutions on the issue from July 31, 2006
to June 9, 2010, four of them being punitive in nature imposing
sanctions under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The latest reports of the IAEA DG have to be seen in the context of
the November 8, 2011 report of the DG, which contained ‘credible’
information regarding ‘possible military dimensions’ of the Iranian
nuclear programme. These contentions included ‘activities related to
the development of a nuclear payload for a missile; … the acquisition
of nuclear weapons development information and documentation
from a clandestine nuclear supply network; [and] work on the
development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including
the testing of components’.4 Iran had dismissed these contentions as
‘fabricated’.
Specifically on Parchin, the November 2011 report had alleged that
work related to a large explosives containment vessel ‘designed to
contain the detonation of up to 70 kilograms of high explosives’, was
undertaken there and that a foreign expert had assisted in the process.5
3
The text of the Statement is available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/
focus/iaeairan/statement_iran21102003.shtml (accessed January 31, 2012).
4
The text of the report is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf (accessed February 24, 2012).
5
Ibid., Annex, p. 10
12. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 11
Reports identified this ‘expert’ as Vladimir Danilenko, a Russian
scientist who was versed in the creation of Ultra-Dispersed Diamonds
(UDD or nano-diamonds).6 He had earlier worked in his country’s
nuclear weapons complex and had worked in Iran from 1996 to 2002.
However, other analysts have pointed out that the patented design
of Danilenko relates to a containment vessel designed to contain ten
kgs of high explosives.7
Iran had accorded access to the IAEA at the Parchin facility twice
during 2005 when it carried out random checks at five locations. The
IAEA however contended in November 2011 that satellite imagery
shows the construction of infrastructure consistent with a high
explosives testing facility - like an earth berm ‘constructed between
the building containing the cylinder and a neighbouring building,
indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber.’8
In the aftermath of the November 2011 report, two rounds of
inspections were carried out by IAEA teams from January 29 to 31
and February 20 to 21, 2012. Iran turned down the IAEA request to
visit the Parchin site and both sides could not agree on the contours
of a ‘structured approach’ to carry out further cooperation. The
6
Joby Warrick, ‘Russian scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko’s aid to Iran offers
peek at nuclear program’, November 14, 2011, at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-scientist-
vyacheslav-danilenkos-aid-to-iran-offers-peek-at-nuclear-program/2011/
11/12/gIQAeuiCJN_story.html (accessed March 1, 2012)
7
Gareth Porter, ‘Using Access as a Bargaining Chip: Iran, the IAEA and
the Parchin Site’, February 23, 2012, at http://www.counterpunch.org/
2012/02/23/iran-the-iaea-and-the-parchin-site/ (accessed February 24,
2012).
8
See n. 4, Annex, p. 10.
13. 12 | Sam Rajiv
United States held the outcome of these IAEA visits as a ‘failure of
Iran’ to more convincingly explain its nuclear programme.9
Iran’s Foreign Minister insisted that despite ‘disagreements’ with the
IAEA as evident during the January and February visits of IAEA
teams, he was ‘optimistic’ that the ‘upcoming meetings between the
high delegation of the IAEA and the Iranian (side) will be proceeding
hopefully in the right direction’.10 In a sign of stepped up interactions
ahead of the second round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 (UNSC
permanent members along with Germany) in Baghdad on May 23,
IAEA DG Yukiya Amano made an unexpected visit to Tehran on
May 21. His visit followed talks in Vienna on efforts to seek a
mechanism to address contentions relating to Iran’s alleged weapons-
related activities. While admitting that Iran and the IAEA held
different ‘views’ on the issue of contention, Amano described his
talks with the Iranian interlocutors as ‘expansive and intensive’ which
were held ‘in a positive atmosphere’.11
An US think tank has meanwhile stated that Iran was possibly
involved in ‘cleaning up’ the Parchin site ahead of allowing IAEA
9
‘White House: IAEA visit a ‘failure’ for Iran’, BBC, February 22, 2012, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17133879 (accessed
February 27, 2012).
10
‘Iran ‘optimistic’ on future of nuclear talks with UN watchdog’, February
28, 2012, at http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/iran-fm-calls-for-
engagement-over-nuclear-issue-1.415372 (accessed February 28, 2012).
11
Joby Warrick, ‘Iran talks with U.N. watchdog seen as “positive”, but
outcome unclear’, May 22, 2012, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/iran-talks-with-un-watchdog-
seen-as-positive-but-outcome-unclear/2012/05/21/
gIQAzR4YgU_story.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzheads (accessed May 22, 2012).
14. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 13
access to it.12 Analysis critical of Iran’s record insist that this is another
instance of Iranian ‘playing foul’ of its international obligations. Other
observers however discount the suggestion by noting that activities
that are being carried out at Parchin if any as suggested by satellite
images are outside the confines of the facility where the alleged
experiments are slated to have taken place and are instead indicative
of possible construction activities.13 The Iranian Foreign Ministry
on its part has dismissed the contentions about ‘razing’ the site as a
‘joke’.
The May 2012 report meanwhile shows that Iran has made significant
progress in its nuclear efforts despite extant IAEA and UNSC
resolutions requiring it to desist from such activities. These include
production of 6197 kg of UF6 [uranium hexa-flouride] enriched up
to 5 per cent U-235 and 145.6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20 per cent
U-235.14 Analysts however note that Iran continues to encounter
difficulties in running its nuclear enterprise.
While covert efforts by Western and Israeli intelligence agencies (see
later sections for more details) have affected Iran’s nuclear programme
to some extent, it seems to be facing greater technical difficulties.
The February 2012 report for instance notes that Iran had informed
the IAEA on February 1, 2012 that it intended to install three new
types of centrifuges – IR-5, IR-6 and IR-6S, at the Natanz enrichment
12
David Albright and Robert Avagyan, ‘Further Activity at Suspected
Parchin High Explosive Testing Site: Two Small Buildings Razed’, ISIS
Imagery Brief, May 30, 2012, at http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/
pdf/Parchin_site_activity_May_30_2012.pdf (accessed June 18, 2012).
13
See Robert Kelly, ‘Shooting at a Phantom’, June 15, 2012, at http://
lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5388/kelley-on-
parchin#comments%C2%A0 (accessed June 18, 2012).
14
See n. 2, p. 3.
15. 14 | Sam Rajiv
plant. Former IAEA Chief Inspector Olli Heinonen notes that because
Iran is testing so many models simultaneously, ‘it indicates that Iran
has not yet reached a point where it can decide which would be the
next generation centrifuge to be deployed.’15 Iran’s ability to mass-
produce second-generation centrifuge models has also been under
the scanner. Iran has however continued to advertise its efforts like
loading of indigenously produced nuclear fuel rods into the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) on February 14, 2012.
The two sides held on to their respective positions at the third round
of talks at Moscow from June 18 to 19. Iran continued to insist on
‘comprehensive sanctions relief’ and safeguarding its ability to enrich
uranium, which the P5+1 were reluctant to accede in the absence of
concrete Iranian assurances on stopping its current enrichment
activities, shipping its current stockpile and shutting down its
underground enrichment plant at Fordow – termed the ‘stop, ship
and shut’ requirements by Western diplomats.16
The next round of ‘technical’ talks is slated to be held in Istanbul on
July 3. If there is forward movement with Iran’s interlocutors on
some sort of formula to address extant concerns, there is less possibility
of the issue being referred again to the UNSC for another round of
punitive measures or ramped up rhetoric, and pressure for more
muscular measures. If not, Iran could face greater economic hardships,
15
Fredrik Dahl, ‘Iran may be “struggling” with new nuclear machines’,
Reuters, February 28, 2012, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/28/
uk-nuclear-iran-enrichment-idUKTRE81Q0WI20120228 (accessed
February 27, 2012).
16
Yeganeh Torbati and Thomas Grove, ‘Iran, world powers deadlocked at
nuclear talks’, Reuters, June 19, 2012, at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/06/19/us-iran-nuclear-talks-idUSBRE85H0C420120619 (accessed
June 20, 2012).
16. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 15
which could either make it offer concessions (as Western powers
expect) or become more defiant in its positions (as past record
suggests).
B. The US: Military Options versus Sanctions
The US administrations on their part both under President George
Bush and President Barack Obama have insisted that ‘no options are
off the table’ while dealing with Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
Washington has however, proved to be a less than interested party in
actively pursuing a military solution and has even restrained Israel
from doing so. Reports had earlier suggested that the Bush
administration for instance was non-committal on allowing Israeli
fighter planes to fly over Iraqi airspace on their possible bombing
mission and had initially refused to provide Tel Aviv with the necessary
equipment to carry out such a task, like adequate amounts of advanced
bunker-busting bombs.17 Later reports in 2011 however, indicated
that the Obama administration had indeed supplied 55 GBU-28
bombs, even though Israel had developed its own version.18
Despite senior US officials like Gen. James Mattis, Commander of
the US Central Command, stating at the Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 6, 2012 that Iran remains ‘the single greatest
threat to regional stability – and to the security of the United States’,
17
David E. Sanger, ‘US Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear
Site’, January 11, 2009, at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11//
washington11iran.html?adxnnl= 1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx
=1330599633-lzi6hAh2fQ4jhBv42lWomg (accessed March 1, 2012).
18
Thom Shanker, ‘US Quietly Supplies Israel With Bunker-Busting Bombs’,
September 23, 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/world/us-
uietly-supplies-israel-with-bunker-busting-bombs.html (accessed March 1,
2012).
17. 16 | Sam Rajiv
there continues to be a lack of appetite for military strikes in official
Washington circles to address Iranian nuclear concerns.19 The Director
of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper in a testimony before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 31, 2012 stated
that though Iran has the “scientific, technical, and industrial capacity
to eventually produce nuclear weapons … We judge Iran’s nuclear
decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the
international community opportunities to influence Tehran [emphasis
added].’20
Testifying before Senate Armed Services Committee on February
16, 2012, the Director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency Lt.
Gen. Ronald Burgess noted that ‘Tehran poses a threat to US interests
through its regional ambitions, support to terrorist and militant
groups, and improving military and nuclear capabilities.’ Although
acknowledging that Iran has threatened to ‘launch missiles against
the United States and our allies in the region in response to an attack,’
Burgess contended that ‘it is unlikely to initiate or intentionally
provoke a conflict or launch a pre-emptive attack.’21 US military chief
Gen. Martin Dempsey told Fareed Zakaria on CNN that ‘US officials
aren’t convinced Iran has decided to pursue nuclear weapons. … I
19
See ‘Statement of General James N. Mattis, US Marine Corps Commander,
US Central Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
the Posture of US Central Command’, March 6 2012, at http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Mattis%2003-06-12.pdf,
p. 13 (accessed March 12, 2012).
20
The testimony is available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/
20120131_testimony_ata.pdf (accessed February 29, 2012).
21
Ronald L. Burgess, ‘Annual Threat Assessment’, Statement Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Senate, February 16,
2012, at http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2012-02-16.html
(accessed March 1, 2012).
18. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 17
think it would be premature to exclusively decide that the time for a
military option was upon us.’22
President Barack Obama addressing the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) on March 4, 2012, criticised what he termed
‘too much loose talk of war’ and urged that ‘for the sake of Israel’s
security, America’s security, and the peace and security of the world,
now is not the time for bluster’. Obama, though, acknowledged that
‘a nuclear-armed Iran is completely counter to Israel’s security
interests’ as well as the ‘national security interests of the United
States’.23
During his meeting with the visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu on March 5, 2012, Obama asserted that the US does not
‘want a regime that has been a state sponsor of terrorism being able
to feel that it can act even more aggressively or with impunity as a
consequence of its nuclear power’. Pointing out that his administration
has ‘worked so diligently to set up the most crippling sanctions ever
with respect to Iran’; he added that ‘we do believe that there is still a
window that allows for a diplomatic resolution to this issue …’24
22
‘Talk of strike on Iran “premature”, top US general says’, February 19,
2012, at http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-19/middleeast/world_meast_iran-
nuclear_1_nuclear-watchdog-existential-threat-nuclear-
program?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST (accessed March 1, 2012).
23
See ‘Remarks by the President at AIPAC Policy Conference’, March 4,
2012, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/04/
remarks-president-aipac-policy-conference-0 (accessed March 5, 2012).
24
See ‘Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of
Israel’, March 5, 2012, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2012/03/05/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-netanyahu-
israel (accessed March 12, 2012).
19. 18 | Sam Rajiv
The Obama administration meanwhile has further tightened unilateral
sanctions measures against Iran in December 2011, targeting the central
bank with provisions penalising foreign financial institutions that do
business with it. The sanctions against the bank came into effect on
February 29, 2012. Earlier in November 2011, in the aftermath of
the report of the IAEA DG, the US Treasury Department identified
Iran as a ‘jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern’ under
Section 311 of the Patriot Act. Secretary Clinton stated that the
measure was the ‘strongest official warning we can give that any
transaction with Iran poses serious risks of deception or diversion’.25
These were over and above the provisions of the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, signed into law
by Obama in July 2010. CISADA restricted investments in Iran’s
petro-chemical sector (limited to $20 million over a 12-month period),
imposed restrictions on provision of loans by US financial institutions
($10 million in any 12-month period), among other requirements.26
The 2012 National Defence Authorisation Act, under Section 1245,
passed by the US Senate in December 2011 and signed by President
Obama into law on December 31, requires countries importing
Iranian oil to ‘significantly’ reduce their imports within 180 days,
i.e. by June 28, 2012.27 Secretary Clinton announced on March 20,
2012 that the administration had made the assessment that 11 nations
which were importing Iranian crude (Belgium, the Czech Republic,
25
See ‘Measures to Increase Pressure on Iran’, November 21, 2011, at http:/
/www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/177610.htm (accessed January 25, 2012).
26
CISADA Fact Sheet, May 23, 2011, at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/esc/
iransanctions/docs/160710.htm (accessed January 21, 2012).
27
‘Sec. 1245. Imposition of Sanctions with respect to the financial Sector of
Iran’, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, at http:/
/www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1540enr/pdf/BILLS-
112hr1540enr.pdf (accessed April 26, 2012).
20. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 19
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland,
Spain, and the United Kingdom) have ‘significantly’ reduced their
imports. She noted that Japan’s reductions were ‘especially
noteworthy considering the extraordinary energy and other
challenges it has faced over the past year’.28 Japan has been held to
reduce its imports by as much as 15 to 22 per cent.29 The second
round of exemptions was given to India, Malaysia, South Korea, South
Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Taiwan on June 11. Countries that
are still under the scanner include China, Indonesia, Singapore,
Philippines and even Pakistan.30
Even as Washington exercises military caution officially, while
inflicting economic pain on Iran through a series of multi-lateral and
unilateral punitive measures, there continues to exist a plethora of
views domestically on how to deal with the Iranian nuclear imbroglio.
The Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney participating
in a debate with his rival contenders in Arizona on February 22,
2012 stated that Obama should communicate to the Iranians that a
military solution ‘is not just on the table, [it is] in our hand’.31 It is
28
‘Statement on Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases’,
March 20, 2012, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/
186086.htm (accessed April 26, 2012).
29
‘Implementation of Section 1245 of the 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA)’, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/
03/186122.htm (accessed April 26, 2012).
30
‘Pakistan included in list of countries that could face sanctions’, March
22, 2012, at http://dawn.com/2012/03/22/pakistan-included-in-list-of-
countries-that-could-face-sanctions/ (accessed May 10, 2012).
31
Natasha Mosgovaya, ‘Romney: Obama should tell Iran military option
not on table, but in our ha nd’, February 23, 2012, at http://
www.haaretz.com/ news/international/romney-obama-should-tell-iran-
military-option-not-on-table-but-in-our-hand-1.414287 (accessed March 1, 2012).
21. 20 | Sam Rajiv
pertinent to note that some US analysts have pointed out that Israel
currently has a military window of opportunity over Jordan and
Iraq into Iran (given that the US is withdrawing from Iraq) and a
political opportunity, due to the political vulnerability of the Obama
administration, till at least November 2012 in the run-up to the
presidential elections.32
Public opinion polls also show divergent indications. A February
15, 2012 poll by the Pew Research Centre for instance indicated that
58 per cent of those surveyed in the US were in favour of military
action to prevent a nuclear Iran while 39 per cent would want the US
to support an Israeli military action. Over 64 per cent in the Pew
poll believed that tougher economic sanctions would not succeed in
forcing Iran to give up its nuclear weapon option.33 In a November
2011 as well as February 2012 CNN-ORC poll, however, over 60
per cent favoured economic and diplomatic efforts to find a solution
to the problem compared to 16 per cent who advocated military
action.34
32
‘Is Israel fuelling fear not facts over Iran?’ February 22, 2012, at http://
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestoryamericas/2012/02/
201222272434144338.html (accessed February 22, 2012).
33
‘Public Takes Strong Stance Against Iran’s Nuclear Program’, February
15, 2012, The Pew Research Centre, at http://www.people-press.org/files/
legacy-pdf/02-15-12%20Foreign%20Policy%20release.pdf (accessed
February 29, 2012).
34
Results of survey are available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2011/
images/11/22/rel19c.pdf (accessed February 29, 2012); See also
PollingReport.Com, ‘Iran’, at http://pollingreport.com/iran.htm
(accessed February 29, 2012).
22. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 21
C. The EU: Sanctions and Diplomacy
The EU and its important member states like Germany, Britain and
France have been actively involved in efforts to find a solution to the
Iranian nuclear imbroglio. The October 2003 Tehran Agreed
Statement (when Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and
pledged to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, which it did in
December 2003) and the Paris Agreement of November 2004 are
pertinent in this regard. However, these agreements collapsed on
account of increasingly tougher stance by the international community
– including the referral of the issue to the UNSC, and Iran’s refusal
to follow through on the requirements of subsequent IAEA/UNSC
resolutions.
The EU in recent times has complemented the US’ unilateral approach
to force Iran to come to the negotiating table. In its Foreign Affairs
Council meeting in Brussels on January 23, 2012, it imposed an oil
embargo (to be effective from July 1, 2012), restrictions on the Iranian
central bank, export restrictions on gold and sensitive dual-use items,
a freeze on the assets of eight companies controlled by the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and visa bans on three
individuals.35 Prime Minister David Cameron, Chancellor Angela
Merkel, and President Nicholas Sarkozy stated that the ‘full ban on
Iranian oil exports’ was because ‘the Iranian leadership has failed to
35
See ‘Council Conclusions on Iran’, January 23, 2012, at http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/
127446.pdf (accessed March 1, 2012); See also Raymond Karam, ‘EU Oil
Embargo and Sanctions Against Iran’, January 30, 2012, at http://
www.ewi.info/eu-oil-embargo-and-sanctions-against-iran (accessed March
10, 2012).
23. 22 | Sam Rajiv
restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
its nuclear programme’.36
The EU also urged ‘Iran to reply positively to the offer for substantial
negotiations, as set out in the High Representative’s letter of October
21, 2011, by clearly demonstrating its readiness to engage in confidence
building measures and, without preconditions, in meaningful talks
to seriously address existing concerns on the nuclear issue’.37 EU
Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton insisted that the tough
measure (which Iran termed as a ‘dangerous innovation’), was ‘to put
pressure on Iran to come back to the negotiating table’.38
Given that Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili did respond to
Ashton with a 200-word letter on February 15, 2012, it would seem
the pressure did work. Jalili welcomed the P5+1’s willingness to
resume talks with Iran as well as Ashton’s view that Iran’s legitimate
rights to make use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be
respected.39 Ashton on her part stated that Jalili’s letter held a
36
‘PM, Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy statement on Iran
sanctions’, January 23, 2012, at http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/iran-
sanctions/ (accessed March 1, 2012)
37
See n. 35.
38
James Blitz, Tom Burgis, Joshua Chaffin, and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, ‘Iran
warns EU of oil embargo “consequences”’, January 24, 2012, at http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7836e51c-45a4-11e1-93f1-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kLlbyVQw (accessed January 24, 2012); ‘EU Iran
sanctions: Ministers adopt Iran oil imports ban’, January 23, 2012, at http:/
/www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16674660 (accessed March 1, 2012).
39
‘Iran Sends Response to Ashton’s letter’, February 15, 2012, at http://
english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9010174948 (accessed March 1,
2012).
24. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 23
‘potential possibility that Iran may be ready to start talks’.40 The last
time negotiations were held with Iran by the P5+1 under the
leadership of Ashton was in January 2011, when three rounds of
talks took place in Istanbul.
The two sides eventually met on April 14 in Istanbul, though the
possibility of the talks being held in other venues like Baghdad, Beijing
or Beirut was also publicly aired by such figures as Iran’s Foreign
Minister Ali Akbar Salehi and former IRGC Commander Mohsen
Rezaei. Reports noted that the Iranians were unhappy with the Turks
for hosting the US missile defence system radar (which it had agreed
to in September 2011) as well as for its role in the ongoing
developments vis-à-vis Syria, which was held to be inimical to Iranian
interests.41 While Ashton called the April Istanbul talks ‘constructive
and useful’, the White House termed them as a ‘positive first step’.42
It is pertinent to note that the senior foreign policy advisor to Mr.
Khamenei Ali Akbar Velayati used similar language to describe the
Istanbul talks, terming them as a ‘positive step’.43
40
Joby Warrick, ‘US, Europeans welcome Iranian proposal for new nuclear
talks’, February 18, 2012, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-europeans-welcome-possible-iranian-peace-overture/
2012/02/17/gIQAzP77JR_story.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzheads (accessed
February 18, 2012).
41
George Jahn, ‘Iran proposes Iraq, China as nuke talks venue’, Associated
Press, April 4, 2012, at http://news.yahoo.com/iran-proposes-iraq-china-
nuke-talks-venue-102045723.html (accessed April 27, 2012).
42
Fredrik Dahl and Justyna Pawlak, ‘Iran, big powers agree - to keep talking’,
Reuters, April 15, 2012, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/14/
us-nuclear-iran-idUSBRE83C1G620120414 (accessed April 15, 2012).
43
‘Iranian leader assesses nuclear talks as positive’, April 18, 2012, at http:/
/radiozamaneh.com/english/content/iranian-leader-assesses-nuclear-
talks-positive (accessed April 27, 2012)
25. 24 | Sam Rajiv
Both sides met for the second time in Baghdad on May 23. Ahead of
the talks, the P5+1 made it clear that there will not be a possible
lifting/easing of sanctions in the absence of some forward movement
by Iran regarding the stopping of its enrichment activities among
other steps. Iranian officials including its envoy to Moscow have
indicated that Iran was considering Russia’s ‘step-by-step’ approach,
which refers to the gradual easing of sanctions in return for Iran
agreeing to abide by the obligations of the IAEA/UNSC resolutions.
The US State Department spokesperson however discounted the view
of the Iranian Envoy, noting that he was ‘not a central player, …
what’s most important is what Iran says and does at the negotiating
table’.44
At Baghdad and the subsequent talks at Moscow, the issue of ‘sanctions
relief’ almost scuttled the negotiations with Iranian diplomats accusing
the US of ‘creating a difficult atmosphere’.45 Iran apparently wanted
an almost immediate relief, including such issues as the sourcing of
parts for its civilian aircraft fleet. The EU spokesperson on his part
insisted that sanctions were a ‘matter of the law and they will come
into force when they come into force’.46
44
Stepan Kravchenko and Henry Meyer, ‘Iran Says It May Halt Nuclear
Program Over Sanctions’, April 25, 2012, at http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-04-25/iran-considers-halting-nuclear-expansion-to-avert-eu-oil-
embargo.html (accessed April 26, 2012).
45
Andreww Quinn and Justyna Pawlak, ‘Iran talks hit snag over sanctions’,
May 24, 2012, at http://reuters.com/article/2012/05/24/us-iran-nuclear-
idUSBRE84NO1Z20120524 (accessed May 24, 2012).
46
‘Iran nuclear talks snag over dueling demands’, May 24, 2012, at http://
www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-05-23/iran-nuclear-talks/
55165418/1 (accessed May 24, 2012).
26. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 25
Reports meanwhile indicated that the sanctions in place were having
their intended effect. Global shipping companies for instance were
reported to have become wary of carrying out oil trade with Iran
and some of them announced their intent to stop calling on Iranian
ports. This was because of difficulties in securing insurance coverage
from London-based companies, which fund close to 90 per cent of
insurance cover for total global oil tonnage.47 Iran’s Finance Minister
also admitted to the difficulties during a visit to the UN in May 2012
when he stated, “…sanctions have created a lot of disturbances for
us.”48
Not just for Iran, but also for the countries of EU a solution to the
crisis will be important. Before the decision was taken to impose an
oil embargo, EU accounted for 20 per cent of Iran’s oil exports, with
member countries facing serious economic problems like Greece
securing 22 per cent of its requirements (others like Italy 13 per cent)
from Iran. Reports noted that the six-month delay for EU sanctions
to be operative (from July 2012 onwards) was precisely to let countries
like Greece find alternative suppliers.49 Though they have been held
to have reduced their imports from Iran by the US, the 180-day
sanctions waiver to 10 European countries given on March 20 (which
is renewable for another similar period) is dependant on these
countries continuing to reduce their imports from Iran while making
up for these reductions from other sources.
47
Benoît Faucon, ‘EU Sanctions Impede Iran Oil Shipments to Asia’,
February 29, 2012, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970
204653604577251210049651108.html (accessed March 1, 2012).
48
‘Western sanctions posing difficulties to Iran’, ANI, May 20, 2012, at http:/
/in.news.yahoo.com/western-sanctions-posing-difficulties-iran-
082506505.html (accessed May 22, 2012).
49
See n. 38.
27. 26 | Sam Rajiv
Signalling resolve to sustain the current approach of increasing pressure
on Iran through sanctions, important EU countries like Germany,
UK and France which are also members of the G8 during their May
19, 2012 Summit at Camp David at Maryland urged the International
Energy Agency (IEA) to take ‘appropriate action to ensure that the
market is fully and timely supplied’ due to the ‘likelihood of further
disruptions in oil sales and the expected increased demand over the
coming months’.50 A lot though will depend on the outcome of the
future interactions between Iran and its interlocutors given that the
coming months will see EU oil embargo becoming effective (from
July 1) and as noted above, US sanctions regime targeting foreign
financial institutions including their central banks for carrying out
business transactions with Tehran become operative from June 28.
50
Jeff Mason, ‘G8, raising pressure on Iran, puts oil stocks on standby’, May
20, 2012, at http://in.news.yahoo.com/g8-raising-pressure-iran-puts-oil-
stocks-standby-045741760—sector.html (accessed May 22, 2012).
28. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 27
II. Regional Dynamics
A. Israel’s Iran Dilemma
Israel has been at the forefront of efforts urging more muscular efforts
including military strikes to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue. Israeli
policy makers have long maintained that a nuclear capable Iran, coupled
with its help to groups like the Hezbollah and Hamas, the rhetoric
against Israel emanating from Tehran, and the ‘denial’ of extremely
sensitive issues like the Holocaust constitutes an existential threat.
The efficacy of such an action, however, has been the subject of much
debate, with estimates of the period within which Iran will be able to
get back to its pre-raid capabilities ranging from six months to three
years at the most. Analysts have suggested that a military strike could
in fact drive the programme underground and accelerate efforts to
attain nuclear weapons capability, as happened in the case of Iraq
after the 1981 Osiraq raid.51
Operational difficulties that have been pointed out include the possible
loss of Israeli fighter pilots and planes over enemy territory, the issue
of flying over Egyptian, Saudi/Jordanian and Iraqi airspace in order
to reach targets 1000 miles away, the imperative of aerial re-fuelling
to sustain the long flight time and limited Israeli capabilities in this
regard, the issue of negotiating through Iranian air defences, possible
repercussions of such an action on the 25,000 or more Jews living in
51
See Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, ‘Attacks on Nuclear Infrastructure:
Opening Pandora’s Box?, Belfer Centre for Science and International
Affairs, Policy Brief, October 2011, at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/braut-hegghammer-policy-brief-oct-2011.pdf (accessed October 31, 2011).
29. 28 | Sam Rajiv
Iran, among others. Senior US analyst Michael Hayden, former
Director of CIA, has plainly stated that a successful operation was
‘beyond the capacity’ of Israel.52
Israeli insistence on military strikes has however been contingent on
its estimates of the period within which Iran could achieve nuclear
weapons capability. These estimates have however, varied widely.
For instance, the then Israeli chief of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen.
Yamos Yadlin told the Knesset on March 8, 2009 that Iran has ‘crossed
the technological threshold’ and that it will have the capability to
make a bomb within a year.53 More recently, the outgoing Mossad
chief estimated in early January 2011 that Iran would not develop a
nuclear capability before 2015.54
Some reports indicate that covert tactics have been employed by Tel
Aviv (and Washington) aimed at sabotaging Iran’s nuclear efforts
including its procurement networks. The apparently successful use
of computer worms like Stuxnet to damage Iranian centrifuges has
been one such effort. The Israeli secret service Mossad has also been
speculated as being responsible for the ‘untimely’ deaths of members
of the Iranian nuclear energy programme. The killing of Mostafa
52
Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘Iran Raid Seen as a Huge Task for Israeli Jets’,
February 19, 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/world/
middleeast/iran-raid-seen-as-complex-task-for-israeli-
military.html?pagewanted=all (accessed February 28, 2012).
53
Barak Ravid, ‘MI chief: Iran has crossed “technological threshold” in quest
for nukes’, March 8, 2009, at http://www.haaretz.com/news/mi-chief-iran-
has-crossed-technological-threshold-in-quest-for-nukes-1.271681 (accessed
April 7, 2009).
54
Isabel Kershner, ‘Israeli Ex-Spy Predicts Delay for Iran’s Nuclear
Ambitions’, New York Times , January 7, 2011, at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/world/middleeast/
08israel.html?ref=todayspaper (accessed February 15, 2011).
30. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 29
Ahmadi Roshan in January 2012 in Tehran is the latest such instance
of alleged covert efforts.55 The Chief of the Israeli Defence Forces
(IDF) Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz informed the Knesset Foreign Affairs
and Defence Committee in early January that ‘2012 will be a critical
year in the connection between Iran gaining nuclear power, changes
in leadership, continuing pressure from the international community
and events that happen unnaturally [emphasis added]’.56
Major powers including US, Russia, Britain and Japan among others
have cautioned Israel against carrying out military strikes. While
British Foreign Secretary William Hague termed the option as ‘not
wise’, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov warned
on February 22, 2012 that ‘any possible military scenario against Iran
will be catastrophic for the region and for the whole system of
international relations’.57 Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
in a meeting with Defence Minister Barak warned that military action
could be ‘extremely dangerous’.58
55
Saeed Kamali Dehghan, ‘Iran nuclear scientist killed in Tehran motorbike
bomb attack’, The Guardian, January 11, 2012, at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/11/iran-nuclear-scientist-killed
(accessed February 29, 2012).
56
Lahav Harkov, ‘Gantz: 2012 will be a critical year regarding Iran’, January
10, 2012, at http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=252974
(accessed February 29, 2012).
57
Phoebe Greenwood, ‘William Hague: Israel attack on Iran “would not be
wise”’, February 19, 2012, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/middleeast/iran/9091729/William-Hague-Israel-attack-on-
Iran-would-not-be-wise.html (accessed February 28, 2012); ‘Russia: Israeli
strike on Iran would be “catastrophic”’, February 22, 2012, at http://
www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/russia-israeli-strike-on-iran-would-
be-catastrophic-1.414156 (accessed February 28, 2012).
58
‘Israel seeks tighter sanctions against Iran’, AFP, February 18, 2012, at http://
www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/18/195459.html (accessed March 1, 2012).
31. 30 | Sam Rajiv
There has been a steady stream of high-level US officials including
Gen. Dempsey, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and Defence
Secretary Leon Panetta visiting Jerusalem in January-February 2012
for greater consultations on Israeli thinking on the subject as well as
to ostensibly urge Israel to let sanctions do their work.59 An Israeli
official was cited as stating that after the three-day visit of NSA
Donilon, which ended on February 20, 2012, ‘they became convinced
the Americans would neither take military action, nor go along with
unilateral action by Israel against Iran’.60
It is pertinent to note that despite the tough talk on military option,
Israeli policy makers including Prime Minister Netanyahu and
Defence Minister Ehud Barak have not ruled out the importance of
tougher economic sanctions forcing Iran to offer concessions at the
negotiating table. Barak, for instance, told reporters in Tokyo on
February 18, 2012 that there was scope for ‘tight, ratcheted’ sanctions
before military option is considered. He, however, insisted that a
military strike would become inevitable before Iran enters the ‘zone
of immunity’ like North Korea.61 This has been described by analysts
as a point where ‘it will not matter so much when Iran achieves a
bomb; what will matter is that Israel will not be able to stop it’.62
59
Yaacov Katz, ‘Dempsey to push Israel to give sanctions time’, Jerusalem
Post , January 19, 2012, at http://www.jpost.com/Defense/
Article.aspx?id=254241 (accessed January 26, 2012).
60
‘Israel wouldn’t warn US before Iran strike, says intelligence source’, AP,
February 28, 2012, at http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/
israel-wouldn-t-warn-u-s-before-iran-strike-says-intelligence-source-
1.415313 (accessed February 28, 2012).
61
‘Barak: More sanctions on Iran before military option’, February 18, 2012,
at http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=258361
(accessed March 1, 2012).
62
Peter Jones, ‘Is an Israeli attack inevitable?’, February 27, 2012, at http://
www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/Israeli+attack+inevitable/6216005/
story.html (accessed March 1, 2012).
32. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 31
Netanyhau, in an interview to an Israeli news channel on March 9,
2012 in the aftermath of his US visit, insisted that a military attack
was not imminent, adding, ‘I am not standing with a stopwatch in
hand. It is not a matter of days or weeks, but also not a matter of
years’.63 In his remarks made at his meeting with Obama on March 5,
Netanyahu insisted that ‘when it comes to Israel’s security, Israel has
the right, the sovereign right to make its own decisions. … Israel
must reserve the right to defend itself’.64
The dominant Israeli contention vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear
programme has been that Iran’s leaders cannot be trusted with nuclear
weapons. The oft-quoted statement (or mis-quoted depending on
which side of the divide one is) of President Ahmadinejad in October
2005 threatening to “wipe Israel off the map” is pertinent in this
regard.65 In recent times, the chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces
was quoted as stating on May 20, 2012 that Iran was ‘committed to
the full annihilation of the Zionist regime of Israel to the end’.66
63
‘Israel won’t strike Iran in coming weeks, Benjamin Netanyahu says’,
March 9, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
middleeast/israel/9132629/Israel-wont-strike-Iran-in-coming-weeks-
Benjamin-Netanyahu-says.html (accessed March 10, 2012).
64
See n. 24.
65
Nazila Fathi, ‘Wipe Israel off the map, Iranian says’, October 27, 2005, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-
iran.html?_r=1 (accessed May 22, 2012); See also Glenn Kessler, ‘Did
Ahmadinejad really say Israel should be ‘wiped off the map’?, October 5,
2011, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/did-
ahmadinejad-really-say-israel-should-be-wiped-off-the-map/2011/10/04/
gIQABJIKML_blog.html (accessed May 22, 2012).
66
Reza Kahlili, ‘Iran committed to “full annihilation of Israel”, says top
Iranian military commander’, May 20, 2012, at http://news.yahoo.com/
iran-committed-full-annihilation-israel-says-top-iranian-033409439.html
(accessed May 22, 2012).
33. 32 | Sam Rajiv
Recent statements by serving as well as former senior Israeli officials
over the issue of ‘rationality’ of Iranian leaders bring to light the
continuing complexities for the Israeli government in responding to
the ‘existential’ threat.67 The Chief of IDF Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz in
an interview to Haaretz stated ‘I think the Iranian leadership is
composed of very rational people’. However, he added that a nuclear
capability ‘in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists who at particular
moments could make different calculations, is dangerous’.68 Gantz’s
views have to be seen in the context of opposition to muscular Israeli
approaches as expressed by former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and
former Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin. The latter has termed Netanyahu
and Barak as ‘messianic’ in their approach towards Iran.69
Analysts opposed to the exercise of the military option point out to
such public opinion polls as that conducted by the University of
Maryland in November 2011 in Israel. These showed that 41 per
cent of those surveyed were opposed to a military strike (as against
43 per cent which supported a strike) even though 62 per cent believed
that it was very likely that Iran would eventually get a nuclear
weapon.70 A poll by the same institute in February 2012 indicated
67
See Jodi Rudoren, ‘Remarks by Former Official Fuel Israeli Discord on
Iran’, April 28, 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/world/
middleeast/yuval-diskin-criticizes-israel-government-on-iran-nuclear-
threat.html?_r=1 (accessed April 30, 2012).
68
Amos Harel, ‘IDF chief to Haaretz: I do not believe Iran will decide to
develop nuclear weapons’, April 25, 2012, at http://www.haaretz.com/
news/diplomacy-defense/idf-chief-to-haaretz-i-do-not-believe-iran-will-
decide-to-develop-nuclear-weapons-1.426389 (accessed May 4, 2012).
69
Dan Williams, ‘Could domestic flak shoot down Netanyahu over Iran?’,
Reuters, April 30, 2012, at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/04/30/iran-
nuclear-israel-idINDEE83T0EX20120430 (accessed May 1, 2012).
70
Results of the survey are available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/
pipa/pdf/dec11/IsraeliMENFZ_Dec11_quaire.pdf (accessed February 29, 2012).
34. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 33
that only 19 per cent of Israelis would support a military strike
without the backing of the US. 42 per cent on the other hand indicated
that they would support such a strike if there were US backing.71
The Netanyahu coalition government made up of right-wing elements
meanwhile was strengthened on May 8, 2012 with the addition of
the centrist Kadima (Forward) party of former Defence Minister
Shaul Mofaz. Some analysts have contended that the move gives much
needed political stability in case of a possible action against Iran.
However, others note that Mofaz has been much more circumspect
as regards a military strike against Iran while in opposition.72 Prior
to the addition of the party founded by the former prime minister
Ariel Sharon, Netanyahu had also talked about the possibility of
holding general elections ahead of the October 2013 scheduled
timetable to impart greater domestic and political stability in the
light of a fluid regional situation. Israel meanwhile continues to be
sceptical of Iranian concessions as a result of the renewed P5+1
diplomatic engagement.
B. The Saudi Lynchpin
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries led by Saudi Arabia
have been wary of the Iranian nuclear efforts and have urged that a
solution be found to address their concerns. In February 2010, Saudi
Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal had expressed apprehensions
about the effectiveness of sanctions, stating ‘sanctions are a long-term
71
’19% of Israelis support non-US-backed Iran strike’, Jerusalem Post,
February 29, 2012, at http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/
Article.aspx?id=259889 (accessed March 1, 2012).
72
Allyn Fisher-Ilan, ‘Netanyahu surprise gives Israel grand coalition’,
Reuters, May 8, 2012, at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/israel-
politics-idINDEE8470AI20120508 (accessed May 8, 2012).
35. 34 | Sam Rajiv
solution (but) ... we see the issue in the shorter term because we are
closer to the threat’.73 During a meeting of the GCC in November
2011, al-Faisal warned that ‘Tehran’s work to develop nuclear
capabilities, which would allow it in the future to have nuclear
weapons, would represent a clear threat to the security and stability
of the region’.74 Saudi officials and analysts continue to insist that
‘Iran’s leaders should give up their goal of acquiring nuclear weapons
and support, by deed, the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction in the Middle East. … We fully support the tightening of
sanctions, assertive diplomacy, and concerted action via the United
Nations’.75
Saudi Arabia is also important for a very obvious reason – that of
being the world’s biggest oil exporter. As Western sanctions begin to
bite and curtail Iranian supply, there is greater pressure on Riyadh
to help meet world demand, especially from countries like India,
China, Japan, and South Korea. India for instance is slated to import
32 million tonnes of crude from Saudi Arabia during 2012-13, as
against 27 million tones during 2011-12.76 India is also seeking four
73
Lachlan Carmichael and Paul Handley, ‘Saudi asks Clinton for
“immediate resolution” on Iran’, AFP, February 14, 2010, at http://
www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ibzR-
moGamRRLqNJYavSp3YLRUBA (accessed March 2, 2012).
74
‘Saudi FM: Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat to the Gulf’, November
24, 2011, at http://www.yalibnan.com/2011/11/24/saudi-fm-irans-nuclear-
program-poses-a-threat-to-the-gulf/ (accessed March 2, 2012).
75
These views were expressed by former Saudi intelligence chief Prince
Turki Al- Faisal during the course of a speech at the IDSA on December
15, 2011. Transcript of the speech is available at http://idsa.in/keyspeeches/
ATourdHorizonoftheSaudiPoliticalSeas (accessed March 2, 2012).
76
Sujay Mehdudia, ‘More crude sought from Saudi Arabia’, February 23,
2012, at http://www.thehindu.com/business/article2924943.ece (accessed
March 2, 2012).
36. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 35
million tonnes of additional crude from Iraq during 2012-13, its third
biggest supplier. Riyadh has also pledged to Seoul during the visit of
President Lee Myung-Bak to the region in early February 2012 that
it will compensate for any loss of Iranian crude.
Saudi ability to meet world demand will therefore be critical given
that the country is already pumping at its highest levels in nearly
three decades. Saudi output in January 2012 was 9.9 million barrels
per day (mbpd) and according to the IEA, the maximum pumping
capacity of Riyadh was 11.9 mbpd.77 Analysts note that the two mbpd
spare capacity (which in itself will be under the scanner given that
Saudis never pumped at these high levels before) will be under pressure
given increasing domestic demand during summer and lack of spare
capacity from countries like Kuwait and United Arab Emirates.78
Riyadh has however been successful in stepping up production with
its May 2012 output being 10.1 mbpd.
C. The Syrian Question
Apart from the complications arising out of the Iranian nuclear issue,
the West Asian region continues to be in the grip of political turmoil
that began with the ‘Arab Spring’. After popular revolutions rocked
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, political uncertainties continue
in these countries. Post-Mubarak Egypt has seen the rise of Muslim
Brotherhood and questioning of the country’s policies towards Israel.
There has also been talk of restoring ties with Iran, cut after the 1979
Islamic revolution. Analysts note that though Iran is a rival, Egypt is
77
Javier Blas and Jack Farchy, ‘Iran sanctions put Saudi oil output capacity
to the test’, February 29, 2012, at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
66031696-62ef-11e1-b837-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ntjSBzct (accessed March
2, 2012).
78
Ibid
37. 36 | Sam Rajiv
more worried about Israel’s capabilities rather than Iran’s nuclear
ambitions.79
Syria is currently plunged into a serious political and humanitarian
crisis. The regime of Bashar al-Assad continues to use its larger military
assets to crackdown on the opposition groups almost a year into the
crisis. The UN Security Council was told by the Under-Secretary
General for Political Affairs in February 2012 that over 7,500 people
have lost their lives in continuing violence.80 Reports note that Syrian
rebels are being supported by sources as varied as Libya (with Russia
accusing Tripoli of establishing a ‘training centre’ inside Libya) and
the US (supplying anti-aircraft missiles among other arms).81
Amidst calls by prominent Republicans like Senator John McCain
for the US to intervene militarily, Defence Secretary Panetta and
President Obama have insisted that the situation in Syria was much
more ‘complicated’ than Libya for instance and that a unilateral
military action would be a ‘mistake’.82 Among Western powers, while
France has denied reports that its soldiers have been captured near
79
See Alireza Nader, ‘Iran and a Nuclear Weapon Free Middle East’, Arms
Control Today , September 2011, at http://www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/
Iran_and_a_Nuclear-Weapon-Free_Middle_East (accessed March 2, 2012).
80
‘More than 7,500 killed in Syria, UN says, as new resolution tried’,
February 29, 2012, at http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/
RestOfAsia/More-than-7-500-killed-in-Syria-UN-says-as-new-resolution-
tried/Article1-818719.aspx (accessed March 2, 2012).
81
Edith M. Lederer, ‘Russia Accuses Libya of Supporting Syrian Rebels’,
AP, March 7, 2012, at http://www.myfoxdfw.com/dpps/news/russia-
accuses-libya-of-supporting-syrian-rebels-dpgapx-20120307-kh_18425661
(accessed March 10, 2012).
82
‘Leon Panetta pushes back on calls for military intervention in Syria’,
March 7, 2012, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/07/leon-
panetta-pushes-back-syria-strike (accessed March 10, 2012).
38. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 37
Homs, British Foreign Secretary has stated that his country would
provide ‘non-lethal’ aid to the rebels. Reports have also noted that
British Special Forces would help establish and enforce ‘safe zones’
for fleeing refugees. Apart from Syria’s long-term ally Russia, China
has warned that continuing Western support to rebels might result
in a ‘large-scale civil war’. Russia meanwhile has been accused of going
ahead with the supply of lethal equipment like attack helicopters to
the Assad government by Secretary Clinton. The insurance cover
for a ship carrying these refurbished helicopters has reportedly been
withdrawn in the aftermath of Clinton’s comments.83
The ‘Sunni’ countries of the region including Egypt and Saudi Arabia
and the Arab League have criticised the Assad regime and pitched
their support to the Syrian rebels. Saudi Foreign Minister asked
rhetorically, ‘Is there something greater than the right to defend
oneself’ and added that ‘the regime is not wanted by the people’.84
Reports noting Hamas support to the Syrian rebels cited worshipers
at Al Azhar in Cairo shouting ‘No Hezbollah and no Iran. … The
Syrian revolution is an Arab revolution’.85 Even groups like the Al
Qaeda have pledged their support to the rebels.86
83
Jonathan Saul and Thomas Grove, ‘Syria faces ire over fresh Russia arms
shipment’, Reuters, June 19, 2012, at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/06/
19/syria-weapons-ship-idINL5E8HJ9FS20120619 (accessed June 20, 2012).
84
Ben Hubbard, ‘Saudi Arabia supports Syrian rebels’, at http://
www.usatoday.com/USCP/PNI/Nation/World/2012-03-05-PNI0305wir-
syria_ST_U.htm (accessed March 10, 2012).
85
See Omar Fahmy and Nidal al-Mughrabi, ‘Hamas ditches Assad, backs
Syrian revolt’, Reuters, February 24, 2012, at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/02/24/us-syria-palestinians-idUSTRE81N1CC20120224
(accessed March 10, 2012).
86
Jason Burke, ‘Al-Qaida leader Zawahiri urges Muslim support for Syrian
uprising’, February 12, 2012, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
feb/12/alqaida-zawahiri-support-syrian-uprising (accessed March 10, 2012).
39. 38 | Sam Rajiv
The UN-mediated ceasefire, meanwhile, came into effect on April 12
and the UNSC Resolution 2043 authorised the constitution of the
United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to oversee
the implementation of ceasefire. Intermittent violence, however, has
continued with UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan terming suicide
bombings among other incidents by government as well as the
opposition forces as ‘really worrying’.87 In the midst of these
uncertainties and instabilities, the Assad regime went ahead with
conducting parliamentary elections on May 7, which were boycotted
by the opposition. The UN, the Arab League and the Red Cross on
their part have warned that continuing instances of violence like that
witnessed at Houla where over 100 civilians were massacred on May
25 could lead to a civil war in Syria.
In the above context of the difficulties being faced by the Assad
regime, the Iran-Syria equation assumes significance. Two Iranian
warships docked in the Syrian port of Tartus on February 19, 2012
in a show of support and to provide ‘maritime training’ to Syrian
forces.88 It is pertinent to note that Tartus is the only operating overseas
naval base for Russia. Iran is also reportedly supplying arms to the
regime, including eavesdropping equipment that the regime is using
to target opposition groups. Iran on its part has criticised Western
support to the Syrian rebels as serving ‘the best interests of Israel’.89
87
Michelle Nichols and Erika Solomon, ‘Fears of Syrian civil war deepen;
U.S. aids opposition’, Reuters, May 9, 2012, at http://in.reuters.com/article/
2012/05/08/syria-civil-war-kofi-annan-arab-league-
idlNDEE847OHX20120508 (accessed May 24, 2012).
88
Khaled Yacoub Oweis and Angus MacSwan, ‘Iranian ships reach Syria,
Assad allies show support’, Reuters , February 20, 2012, at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/20/us-syria-
idUSL5E8DB0BH20120220 (accessed March 10, 2012).
89
‘Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson: What is Happening in Syria Serves
Israel’s Interests, Weakens Resistance’, February 21, 2012, at http://
www.sana.sy/eng/22/2012/02/21/401777.htm (accessed March 10, 2012).
40. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 39
The possible loss of the Assad regime could be a big regional blow
affecting Iran’s strategic calculations. Gen. James N. Mattis, head of
the US Central Command, told a Senate hearing on March 6, 2012
that the loss of the regime would be ‘the biggest strategic setback for
Iran in 25 years.’90 However, senior US intelligence officials were
cited as stating ‘off-the-record’ in early March that ‘though the odds
are against’ the militarily-superior Assad regime, it was firmly in
control and ‘going to fight very hard’.91
D. Turkey: Key Diplomatic Facilitator
Turkey has been active diplomatically in a bid to restart the stalled
negotiation process. After Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met
his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Salehi in January 2012, prospects
of re-starting negotiations brightened with Salehi expressing optimism
about the outcome of such an effort.92 This was especially pertinent
in the backdrop of the ramping up of unilateral sanctions measures
by the US and the EU. In the aftermath of Jalili’s letter of February
14 to Ashton, Davutoglu after a telephonic conversation with Salehi
90
Karen De Young, ‘Talk of military aid rises as hopes fade for peaceful
Syria solution’, March 11, 2012, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/talk-of-military-aid-rises-as-hopes-fade-for-
peaceful-syria-solution/2012/03/10/gIQAzis83R_print.html (accessed
March 12, 2012).
91
Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, ‘Syria’s Bashar al-Assad firmly in control,
US intelligence officials say’, The Washington Post, March 10, 2012, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrias-bashar-
al-assad-firmly-in-control-us-intelligence-officials-say/2012/03/09/
gIQAv7r71R_story.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzheads (accessed March 10, 2012).
92
‘Iran optimistic about next P5+1 talks’, January 29, 2012, at ttp://
www.presstv.ir/detail/223693.html (accessed January 30, 2012).
41. 40 | Sam Rajiv
on March 1, 2012 stated that ‘negotiations could take place in a month’s
time, in April at the latest’.93
The Turkish engagement on the issue goes beyond just being a host
to negotiations involving Iran and its key interlocutors in the P5+1
process. Its most prominent involvement was the May 2010 nuclear
swap deal that Iran entered into with Turkey along with Brazil. Iran
was to have transferred 1200 kg of low enriched uranium to Turkey
and then on to Russia for enrichment which would then pass it onto
France for converting it to uranium fuel rods for use in the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR). The deal was similar to the terms of the
October 2009 deal that Iran entered into with the Vienna Group
(US, Russia, France and the IAEA). However, Western powers
rejected the deal because Iran was in possession of greater amounts of
LEU (2500 kgs) as compared to October 2009 (about 1500 kg).94
The Iran-Brazil-Turkey deal was described as a ‘missed opportunity’
by Davutoglu. However, that deal had led to concerns in US-Turkey
relations, given the important role that Turkey plays as a crucial
NATO member state (since 1952) and US ally.95 Turkey was also one
of the two countries (the other being Brazil) that voted against the
UNSC Resolution 1929 in June 2010. The US Undersecretary for
93
‘Nuke talks may begin in April: Davutoðlu’, March 2, 2012, at http://
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/nuke-talks-may-begin-in-april-
davutoglu.aspx?pageID=238&nID=14978&NewsCatID=338 (accessed
March 2, 2012).
94
See S. Samuel C. Rajiv, ‘Iran-Turkey Nuclear Swap Deal’, IDSA Strategic
Comments, May 19, 2010, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
IranTurkeyNuclearSwapDeal_sscrajiv_190510 (accessed January 28, 2012).
95
Sabrina Tavernise and Michael Slackman, ‘Turkey Goes From Pliable
Ally to Thorn for US’, New York Times, June 8, 2010, at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/world/middleeast/
09turkey.html?ref=todayspaper (accessed June 10, 2010).
42. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 41
Political Affairs William Burns admitted that the US was
‘disappointed’ with Turkey’s vote.96 Lebanon had abstained during
that vote. It is pertinent to note that the only other country to have
voted against the UNSC resolutions on Iran was Qatar, during the
first vote on Resolution 1696 in July 2006.
Analysts note that Turkey’s willingness to host the P5+1 negotiations
is based on two premises – Iran should guarantee that its nuclear
programme does not have a military dimension while the P5+1 agrees
that Iran has the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy.97 Despite
supporting Iran’s peaceful uses of nuclear energy, playing a critical
role as a diplomatic facilitator on the issue, and rising economic ties
($16 billion bilateral trade during 2011, with plans to increase it to
$30 billion by 2015), relations between the two neighbours are far
from cosy. This was most apparent when Turkey in September 2011
agreed to host a radar station in Kurecik, 700 kms from the Iranian
border that will be part of the NATO and the US ballistic missile
defence system. While the US officials hailed the move as the ‘biggest
strategic decision between the United States and Turkey in the past
15 or 20 years’, President Ahmadinejad stated that it was not a ‘correct’
decision and that ‘such shields can’t prevent the collapse of the Zionist
regime’.98
96
Erol Izmirli, ‘Unease over Turkey’s stance’, Southeast European Times
June 11, 2010, at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/
features/setimes/features/2010/06/11/feature-01 (accessed March 12, 2012).
97
‘Turkey to host nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1’, February 20,
2012, at http://www.businessturkeytoday.com/turkey-to-host-nuclear-
talks-between-iran-and-the-p51/ (accessed March 2, 2012).
98
Thom Shanker , ‘US Hails Deal With Turkey on Missile Shield’, New
York Times, September 15, 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/
16/world/europe/turkey-accepts-missile-radar-for-nato-defense-against-
iran.html (accessed March 12, 2012); ‘Iran criticizes Turkey over missile
defence shield’, October 5, 2011, at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/
2011/10/05/170229.html (accessed March 12, 2012).
43. 42 | Sam Rajiv
Turkey has also repeatedly pointed out Western ‘double-standards’
regarding penalising Iran for its nuclear programme under IAEA
safeguards and extant Israeli nuclear capability. For instance, Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in October 2009 characterised
sanctions on Iran as ‘arrogant’ and added that ‘... those who criticise
Iran’s nuclear program continue to possess the same weapons’.99
Turkey on its part had signed the NPT in 1969 and ratified it in
April 1980. It also signed and ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol
in July 2000.
The Turkish role in the unfolding Syrian issue will also be crucial,
given that it shares a 500 km border with the country. The success of
a ‘no fly zone’, a ‘humanitarian corridor’ to refugees or arming the
rebels would depend crucially on Ankara’s support. Turkey also
played the role of a key facilitator by hosting the ‘Friends of Syria’
group meeting in Istanbul. President Abdulah Gul on his part has
stated that Turkey is opposed to military intervention in Syria ‘from
outside the region’.100
99
‘Turkey PM: If you don’t want Iran to have nukes, give yours up’, October
31, 2009, at http://www.haaretz.com/news/turkey-pm-if-you-don-t-want-
iran-to-have-nukes-give-yours-up-1.5055 (accessed March 12, 2012).
100
See n. 90.
44. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 43
III. Iran: Domestic Political
Dynamics
The future contours of the developments regarding the Iranian nuclear
issue are also dependent on Iranian domestic political dynamics, which
are in a state of flux. Elections for the 290 member parliament (Majlis)
were held on March 2, 2012. Over 3400 candidates were in the fray.
These elections were the first test of the popularity of Mr.
Ahmadinejad after having won the June 2009 presidential elections
(his second and final four-year term) in a controversial manner which
saw large-scale violence and political unrest. The main fight was
between Ahmadinejad’s supporters who formed the Resistance Front
(Paidari) and conservative supporters of Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei who organised themselves into the United Front
(Motahed).101 Other conservative supporters of Khamenei represented
in the elections include the Resistance Front (led by former IRGC
Commander Mohsen Rezaei) and ‘The Peoples Voice’.
It is pertinent to note that there was no representation from the
‘Green’ movement, which was at the forefront of protests during
and after the June 2009 elections. This was because of the crackdown
on supporters of the movement – including the continuing house
arrest of prominent opposition figures like Mehdi Karroubi and Mir
Hossein Moussavi. Reports noted that the movement had in fact
asked its supporters not to exercise their franchise and thereby register
101
Nasser Karimi, ‘Iranians begin parliamentary election campaign’, February
23, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iranians-begin-
parliamentary-election-campaign-15777034#.T0zMbVLkXGg (accessed
February 28, 2012).
45. 44 | Sam Rajiv
their protest and seek to de-legitimise the result through the ensuing
low turnout.102 The constellation of candidates in the fray for the
parliamentary elections was also an indication that one of the
important outcomes of the tough approach of the Western countries
in enforcing punitive multi-lateral and unilateral sanctions against
Iran could be the strengthening of the radical and conservative forces
domestically.
The political divisions evident in the run-up to the elections were a
continuation of the contentious relationship that Ahmadinejad has
shared with Khamenei in the recent past. In October 2011 for instance,
Khamenei had floated a proposal for the abolition of the post of
president, which was not taken lightly by Ahmadinejad and others
like former president Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani.103 The last time a major
change in the political structure was effected was in 1989 when the
office of prime minister had been abolished. It is pertinent to note
that the person who held that position was Mousavi, the ‘Green’
politician currently under house arrest.104
Given that his supporters got the upper hand in the elections winning
close to 75 per cent of the seats, Khamenei, who is the ultimate decision-
102
James Reynolds, ‘Iran’s opposition: Gagged by years of intimidation’,
February 8, 2012, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
17177726 (accessed February 28, 2012).
103
Thomas Erdbrink, ‘Iran’s supreme leader floats proposal to abolish
presidency’, October 26, 2011, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
middle_east/irans-supreme-leader-floats-proposal-to-abolish-presidency/
2011/10/25/gIQAsOUKGM_story.html (accessed February 28, 2012).
104
Robert F. Worth, ‘Iran’s Power Struggle Goes Beyond Personalities to
Future of Presidency Itself’, October 26, 2011, at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/world/middleeast/in-iran-rivalry-
khamenei-takes-on-presidency-itself.html (accessed February 28, 2012).
46. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 45
making authority on all matters of state including the nuclear issue,
could seek to tune down the looming confrontation with the West
in contrast to the defiant and confrontationist approach adopted by
Ahmadinejad. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad and his supporters
could ramp up the nuclear rhetoric in order to reclaim lost political
space. However, given that they will be in a weak political position,
there could be greater opportunities to reduce the ‘temperature’ and
rhetoric regarding Iran’s nuclear quest.
In this context, it is pertinent to note the Supreme Leader’s views on
nuclear weapons. Since issuing an oral ‘fatwa’ against nuclear weapons
possession in October 2003, Khamenei has been re-iterating his
position while at the same time supporting Iran’s peaceful pursuit of
nuclear energy and his country’s current nature of interaction with
the IAEA. Khamenei for instance in an address on state television on
February 22, 2012 insisted that Iran was ‘not seeking nuclear weapons
because the Islamic Republic of Iran considers possession of nuclear
weapons a sin ... and believes that holding such weapons is useless,
harmful and dangerous’.105 Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, echoing
Khamenei’s remarks, insisted that Iran does ‘not see any glory, pride
or power in the nuclear weapons, quite the opposite’.106
Secretary Clinton was quoted as stating that if Khamenei’s fatwa ‘is
indeed a statement of principle … it serves as the entryway into a
105
‘Iran’s supreme leader denies Tehran is seeking nuclear weapons’,
February 22, 2012, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/22/iran-
supreme-leader-nuclear-weapons-denial (accessed February 28, 2012).
106
Nick Cumming-Bruce, ‘Iran Calls Nuclear Arms Production a ‘Great
Sin’’, February 28, 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/world/
middleeast/iran-calls-for-negotiations-on-treaty-banning-nuclear-
weapons.html (accessed February 28, 2012).
47. 46 | Sam Rajiv
negotiation’.107 Analysts like Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji
however, note that ‘nothing would prevent Khamenei from modifying
or supplanting his nuclear fatwa should circumstances dictate a change
in policy’.108 Others also note that despite Ahmadinejad’s poor
showing in the elections, there would not be any change in Iran’s
policies, given that ‘the force spearheading Iran’s anti-American policy
… was first and foremost Khamenei’.109
107
Reza Kahlili, ‘Iran talks in Baghdad: Western naiveté’, May 22, 2012, at
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0522/Iran-
talks-in-Baghdad-Western-naivete (accessed May 23, 2012).
108
Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji, ‘Nuclear Fatwa: Religion and
Politics in Iran’s Proliferation Strategy’, Policy Focus No. 115, September
2011, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, at http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus115.pdf (accessed
February 28, 2012).
109
Oren Kessler, ‘Iran elections wont affect nuclear derive’, Jerusalem Post,
March 5, 2012, at http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/
Article.aspx?id=260471 (accessed March 5, 2012).
48. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 47
IV. India’s Dilemmas in the
Evolving Situation
India’s continuing dilemmas in the rapidly evolving situation vis-à-
vis the Iranian nuclear issue, are evident across three sets of important
bilateral interactions. These include India-US, India-Israel and India-
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Each of these relationships is
important for India in their own right. India shares one of its most
important strategic relationships with the US. While annual trade
exceeds $100 billion, India has also bought defence equipment worth
over $8 billion from the US in recent times. Israel is a valuable ally in
India’s defence modernisation and developmental needs. Annual trade
between the two countries is currently worth over $5 billion, and
both sides expect to double/even treble it in the near future after the
free trade agreement (FTA), currently being negotiated, is finalised
before December 2012. India has also bought defence equipment
estimated to be over $9 billion from Israel. Bilateral trade with GCC
countries during 2011-12 was $119 billion, coupled with massive
presence of Indian citizens in these countries, numbering nearly 6
million and their substantial remittances into the country.
However, each of these important ‘strategic partners’ share mutually
antagonistic relationship with Iran. While US-Iran and Iran-Israel
relationship is non-existent since the 1979 Islamic revolution (even
though Iran never formally recognised Israel, they shared a robust
relationship prior to 1979), Iran is locked in a geo-political struggle
for regional dominance with countries of the GCC led by Saudi
Arabia. It is pertinent to note that the GCC was in fact formed in
1981 as a direct response to the Iranian revolution and its stated goal
of exporting its brand of Islam to other countries.
49. 48 | Sam Rajiv
India has tried to maintain a ‘pragmatic balance’ its relations with the
above sets of actors as regards the Iranian nuclear issue in efforts to
safeguard its core national interests, including its energy requirements,
defence modernisation needs and safety and security of its citizens.
India voted against Iran thrice at the IAEA (September 2005, February
2006 and November 2009) despite critics labeling such a policy as
acting as a ‘surrogate’s surrogate’.110 India justified its decisions against
Iran (for instance its Explanation of Vote after the third vote) stating
that the conclusions drawn by the IAEA DG in his report of
November 16, 2009 were ‘difficult to ignore’.111 Despite these votes,
India hosted Ahmadinejad in New Delhi during April 2008, in a visit
that was looked down on by Washington. A Wikileaks cable quotes
the then US Ambassador David Mulford as stating that Ahmadinejad’s
visit was an effort by India ‘to prove that it has an independent foreign
policy …’112
India has also not stopped its defence engagement with Israel despite
expressing vigorous opposition to such Israeli policies as ‘Operation
Cast Lead’ during December 2008-January 2009, which led to the
death of 1400 Palestinians. India has on the other hand balanced its
burgeoning defence and economic engagement with Israel with limited
110
Hamid Ansari, ‘Et EU, India?’ Outlook, October 10, 2005, at http://
www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?228846 (accessed February 7, 2011).
This was in response to India supporting the EU-sponsored resolution at
the IAEA in September.
111
Rajya Sabha, ‘Vote against Iran’, Unstarred Question No. 3122, December
17, 2009, at http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/291324 (accessed
February 14, 2011).
112
US Embassy Delhi, ‘Menon says Ahmadinejad Played to Masses during
India Visit’, WikiLeaks, May 1, 2008, released 16 December 2010, at http:/
/213.251.145.96/cable/2008/05/08NEWDELHI1194.html (accessed
February 13, 2011).
50. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 49
high-level political contacts with Jerusalem in contrast to more
frequent contacts with the Palestinians, coupled with diplomatic,
moral and economic support.113 India has also vehemently opposed
the Israeli policy preference pertaining to military strikes as an answer
to address concerns generated by the Iranian nuclear programme.
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had termed the exercise of
such an option as ‘unacceptable international behaviour’ with
‘disastrous consequences for the entire region, affecting the lives and
livelihood of five million Indians resident in the Gulf, and the world
economy’.114
India has in the past expressed its support for negotiations, opposition
to unilateral sanctions while being part of multi-lateral UNSC-
mandated sanctions regime, opposition to military strikes, and insisted
on the important role of the IAEA as the lead technical agency to
address concerns emanating from the Iranian nuclear programme. In
the rapidly evolving situation, India’s policy determinants of strategic
autonomy, regional strategic stability and national security will
continue to be operative.115
Evidence of these policy determinants ‘in action’ in recent times
include India continuing its energy and trade cooperation with Iran
despite rising roadblocks to such interaction. India for instance did
not desist from sending a trade delegation to Tehran on March 9,
2012, despite US Congressmen viewing the move as hurting the
113
See S. Samuel C. Rajiv, ‘The Delicate Balance: Israel and India’s Foreign
Policy Practice’, Strategic Analysis, 36(1), 2012, pp. 128-144.
114
‘In Response to Questions About Reports that Suggest the Imminent Use
of Military Force Against Iran’, July 14, 2008, at http://meaindia.nic.in/
mystart.php?id=530314072 (accessed February 14, 2011).
115
See S. Samuel C. Rajiv, ‘India and Iran’s Nuclear Issue: The Three Policy
Determinants’, Strategic Analysis, 35(5), 2011, pp. 818–834.
51. 50 | Sam Rajiv
international sanctions regime and aimed at thwarting the regime’s
finances.116 In the light of ramping up of unilateral sanctions by the
US and the EU in January 2012 and the targeting of the Central
Bank of Iran, India’s Finance and Oil Ministers insisted that ‘it is not
possible for India to take any decision to reduce the import from
Iran drastically …’117
Such trade cooperation also seems not to be affected by the ongoing
investigations into the February 13, 2012 attack on an Israeli Embassy
vehicle in New Delhi, which purportedly show an Iranian hand.118
Israeli policy makers were quick to blame Iranian agencies and
organisations supported by it, like the Hezbollah, for the ‘coordinated’
attacks on Israeli targets in Georgia, India and Thailand. President
Peres and Netanyahu charged that Iran was the ‘headquarters of
terrorism, of hatred and of war’ and ‘the largest exporter of terrorism
in the world’.119
India obviously cannot be immune to the antagonistic nature of affairs
between countries with each of which it shares important bilateral
relationships. However, it is important to note that the political
116
‘Braving US frowns, India sends trade team to Iran’, March 9, 2012, at
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/233313/braving-us-frowns-india-
sends.html (accessed March 10, 2012).
117
Erika Kinetz, ‘India defies sanctions, won’t cut Iran oil imports’, January
31, 2012, at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2012/01/31/
india_defies_sanctions_wont_cut_iran_oil_imports/ (accessed January 31,
2012).
118
See Devesh K. Pandey, ‘Freelancer arrested for attack on Israeli diplomat’,
March 8, 2012, at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/
article2972088.ece (accessed March 8, 2012).
119
See ‘Response to terror attacks in Delhi and Tbilisi’, February 13, 2012, at
http://embassies.gov.il/delhi/NewsAndEvents/Pages/
Response%20to%20terror%20attacks%20in%20Delhi%20and%20Tbilisi.aspx
(accessed February 14, 2012).
52. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 51
problems that these countries face in their relationships are not of
India’s making, though India is affected by them. It is therefore crucial
for India not to let itself or its territory be used for proxy wars
between these countries. Cutting down on the nature of its
interactions with either of these sets of countries in order to ‘please’
the other will neither help matters nor secure its core national interests.
India’s positions on regional uncertainties have also evolved based on
dominant regional opinion, as is evident in the case of Syria. In August
2011 for instance, India abstained from voting against Syria at the
UN Human Rights Council, as it held that ‘spotlighting and finger-
pointing at a country for human right violations’ was not helpful.120
However, in the light of rising violence and mounting regional
criticism of the actions of the Assad regime by regional players like
the Arab League and the GCC, India voted in favour of the February
4, 2012 UNSC vote (vetoed by Russia and China) and the February
17 General Assembly vote condemning Syria for the violence.
The rising prices of oil in part due to the Iranian nuclear imbroglio
continue to impact Indian economic considerations negatively. Finance
Minister Mukherjee during his April 2012 visit to the US to attend
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank spring
meetings indicated as such when he stated that the quantum of
government subsidies have increased substantially as a result of the
average oil price increasing from about $90 a barrel to about $110-
115 a barrel.121
120
P.R. Kumaraswamy, ‘Silence on Syria no longer an option’, IDSA Strategic
Comments, February 21, 2012, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
SilenceonSyriaisnooption_PRKumaraswamy_210212 (accessed March 10, 2012).
121
Arun Kumar, ‘India has substantially reduced oil imports from Iran’,
April 22, 2012, at http://in.news.yahoo.com/india-substantially-reduced-
oil-imports-iran-170935089.html (accessed April 23, 2012).
53. 52 | Sam Rajiv
Despite facing difficulties for its economic well-being as well as on its
energy security considerations in the aftermath of the scrapping of
the Asian Clearing Union (ACU) mechanism in December 2010, India
has made efforts to reduce its imports of Iranian crude. The Rajya
Sabha was informed by the Minister of State (MoS) for Petroleum
and Natural Gas on March 20, 2012 that while India imported 21.81
million metric tonnes (MMT) during 2008-09, its imports during
2011-12 (April 2011-January 2012) were 14.78 MMT.122 Further on
May 15, the MoS told the Rajya Sabha that ‘the target fixed for
import of crude oil from Iran for the year 2012-13 is approximately
15.5 MMT subject to techno-commercial and other considerations’.123
Rueters citing tanker discharge data noted that India’s imports from
Iran were about 279,000 barrels per day (bpd) in April 2012 as
compared to about 410,000 bpd in March and 450,000 bpd in April
2011.124
Secretary Clinton during her visit to Kolkata and Delhi in May 2012
urged her interlocutors to continue to support measures to constrict
Iran’s oil revenues. The US contends that Iran uses its oil revenues to
fund its proliferation activities as well as the buying of dual-use
equipment.125 As noted above, India was included in the list of
122
Rajya Sabha, ‘Decrease in oil import from Iran’, Question No. 746, March
20, 2012, at http://164.100.47.4/newrsquestion/ShowQn.aspx (accessed
May 24, 2012).
123
Rajya Sabha, ‘Cut in oil import from Iran’, Question No. 4295, May 15,
2012, at http://164.100.47.4/newrsquestion/ShowQn.aspx (accessed May
24, 2012).
124
Nidhi Verma, ‘India’s April Iran oil imports plunge 34 pct vs March’,
Reuters, May 9, 2012, at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/india-
oil-imports-idlND8E8ETO1020120508 (accessed May 24, 2012).
125
See Iran Sanctions Act Announcement’, March 29, 2011, at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/03/159309.htm (accessed December 20, 2011).
54. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 53
countries that were given the sanctions exemption on June 11. The
US pressure on India to cut back on its oil imports from Iran is in
tune with its ‘dual-track’ policy of ‘sanctions in pursuit of constructive
engagement’, as stated by Clinton while announcing a new set of
sanctions against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC)-
owned companies and other entities like Iran Air on June 23, 2011.126
Clinton affirmed in New Delhi during her press conference with
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna that the April 2012 Istanbul
talks held after a gap of 15 months and the Baghdad talks scheduled
for May 23 were a result of sanctions pressure. She insisted that Iran
would not have come back to the negotiating table ‘unless there had
been the unrelenting pressure of the international sanctions. And
this pressure must stay on if we want to see progress toward a peaceful
resolution’.127
It is however, pertinent to note that the past record indicates that
such pressure has not elicited the required cooperation from Iran.This
can be seen in Iran’s suspension of its implementation of the IAEA
Additional Protocol (which it had signed in December 2003) on
February 6, 2006 after its referral to the UNSC in the February 4
resolution of IAEA DG. It also went back on its decision to abide by
the provisions of revised Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangement in
March 2007, in the immediate aftermath of UNSC Resolution 1747.
126
See ‘Joint Statement on Iran Sanctions’, June 23, 2011, at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166814.htm (accessed January 24,
2012).
127
‘Transcript of the Joint Media Conference by External Affairs Minister
and US Secretary of State’, May 8, 2012, at http://meaindia.nic.in/
mystart.php?id=190019345 (accessed May 9, 2012).
55. 54 | Sam Rajiv
V. Policy Options for India
The Iranian nuclear issue is at crucial crossroads because of the
domestic, regional and international dynamics delineated above. The
policy paper does show however, that there are reasons for optimism.
This is on account of strong opposition from major powers to a
military solution, Iran’s willingness to continue its engagement with
the IAEA and P5+1, and international and even Israeli opinion in
favour of giving sanctions more time to work. In the light of the
above, the following section explores possible policy options for India.
Greater diplomatic role? The above-flagged ‘optimistic’ trends
are in tune with India’s policy preferences. It should be the effort
of Indian diplomacy to strengthen these trends and expand the
space for the application of ‘satisfactory strategies’ and reduce
the range of ‘unsatisfactory strategies’ (National Security Advisor
Shiv Shankar Menon’s term describing US policy options vis-à-
vis the issue as cited in a US Embassy cable released by
Wikileaks).128 India will have to do this currently without being
a part of such efforts like P5+1. While there are no efforts on
the table to expand the process to include regional heavyweights
like India or Turkey (which is hosting the talks without being
formally part of the structure), opinion from the region is in
favour of India being part of such negotiations. India, in fact, is
128
US Embassy Delhi, ‘NSA Menon Discusses Regional Security and Trade’,
WikiLeaks, February 25, 2010, released on December 16, 2010, at http://
213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10NEWDELHI355.html (accessed February
14, 2011)
56. Iran's Nuclear Imbroglio at the Crossroads: Policy Options for India | 55
held to be better placed than Turkey (by some regional observers)
to be involved, given the stakes it has in the resolution of the
issue, its growing strategic profile coupled with its strategic
restraint, among other positives.129 While a greater role by India
to find a solution to the issue could naturally be expected to flow
from the above facts – including as a mediator/interlocutor/host
as being done by Turkey for instance, India cannot possibly take
on such a role until expressly requested by the key interlocutors.
Maintain ‘pragmatic balance’: India will have to continue follow
a ‘pragmatic balance’ to manage its important relationships with
the diverse range of actors involved in order to secure its core
national interests. This calls for pro-active diplomacy and greater
high-level engagement with the P5+1 countries, Tehran,
Jerusalem, Riyadh, Dubai, Qatar and Istanbul to better know
the strategic pulse in these countries regarding the issue, convey
its concerns as well as safeguard its strategic and energy interests.
Special Envoy/Policy Coordinator? A case could also be made
for instituting the position of Special Envoy/Policy Coordinator
on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. India has in the recent past instituted
similar positions for crucial national interest issues like climate
change and the Indo-US nuclear deal. India has been/is being
affected by ramifications of the Iranian nuclear issue with
important implications for its energy security, financial well-
being, as well as regional strategic stability. Given the high stakes
involved in the outcome of the Iranian nuclear imbroglio, such a
position (possibly under the NSA) could be a useful addition to
the policy making process to help coordinate various strands
129
See ‘Interaction with Dr. Sami Al Faraj, Head of Kuwait Centre for
Strategic Studies’, November 29, 2011, at http://www.idsa.in/event/
ReportofInteractionwithDrSamiAlFaraj (accessed January 31, 2012).