Policy paper the korena peninsula in 2020 how wmd were finally reversed

Fouad EL KHATIB Emerson FIGUEROA
WMDs counter-proliferation
1
Policy Paper
“The Korean Peninsula in 2020: How WMD was finally reversed. New ideas, policies,
and recommendations.”
By Emerson Figueroa
Presented to: General Herbert McMaster
US President’s Security Advisor
Introduction
Considering the necessity of an integral and flexible strategy towards the DPRK’s WMD
programs, ant the fact that the proposed end state, to reverse the WMDs programs for
2020, is not achievable for this date, this paper proposes another approach. First, it
establishes a realist intermediate end state in 2020 (DPRK accepting the creation of a
commission of verification that registers its WMDs capabilities); second, it identifies as
the essential precondition - “the main effect,” - to achieve China’s real commitment
regarding the coercive measures against North Korea, and the exchange of information
about WMDs proliferation with the US; and third, it states some measures intended to
achieve the required precondition. For doing so, the actual situation of WMDs in the
peninsula is explained, then the challenges for achieving both the end state and the main
effect are summarized, and finally, some recommendations for creating the preconditions
are asserted.
1. What is the status of the WMDs’ programs in North Korea?
First, it is honest to accept that this assessment is based on open sources then, it is also
limited by the secrecy that characterizes WMDs’ programs. Usually, the information
comes by the regime, and experts’ calculations are based on them. Then, the information,
hereby, presented is not intended to describe accurately the North Korean capabilities,
but to offer a general criterion that the policy maker should use together with actualized
information provided by intelligence agencies.
The nuclear program, as is expected, is the less developed of the WMDs’ programs, and
faces limitations like the miniaturization, nuclear material production, and dependence on
the development of missile technology for conducting weaponization. Regarding
plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), many experts affirm that DPRK has all
what is needed to produce Pu-239, and in the meantime, it is still working on the
enrichment of uranium.1 Considering the estimates of the North Korean nuclear material
production, experts assess that the rogue country has enough plutonium for at least six
nuclear weapons, and the capability of producing “one bomb’s worth of plutonium per
1 Nikitin, M. B. (2013). NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS:TECHNICAL ISSUES*. Current Politics and Economics of
Northern and Western Asia, 22(3), 377-421.

2
year” 2. Additionally, the uranium facility in Yongbyon nuclear complex could produce
until 40kgs of 90% HEU.3 In this sense, I agree with John Park4, and I estimate that North
Korea does not have more than thirteen nuclear weapons (NWs), and enough material for
building around 20 more, even when there is not consensus around this estimates.5
Pyongyang announced its intentions of producing HEU in 2013, what summed to the
recent nuclear tests, evidences both the success in incrementing its fissile material
stockpile and its intention of miniaturizing a nuclear warhead. Then, the determination of
the North towards a missile deployable nuclear capability is clear, but as far as I am
concerned, the rhythm of its progress is not significant yet.
Regarding Missile systems, the short and medium-range missile capabilities of North
Korea are well known. Some of their missile development programs are also known - the
Musudan (range of 3500km), Pukguksong-2 (SLBM-range unknown), and KN-086
(range 9000km-untested).7 It seems that Pyongyang’s ambitions are big, but they still face
huge technical challenges. To adapt the WMDs to the delivery systems, the development
of re-entry vehicles (RVs) and advance guidance (which are necessary for deploying
WMDs in ICBM), are all technical challenges in which the North has not shown hints of
great progress. In short, the rogue state possesses enough short and medium-range missile
capabilities for deploying WMDs, nevertheless, this is not the case for ICBM systems.
North Korea seems to have all that it needs for achieving its nuclear aspirations, though
there still are many technological challenges, like the limited production of fissile
material, the miniaturization of the nuclear warheads, and the development of reliable
ICBMs and re-entry vehicles. Additionally, these processes are high consumers of both
time and resources. Consequently, the regime’s deployable nuclear weapons are not the
biggest threat for US interests nowadays, but they have the potential of taking this place
in the next decade.
In addition to its NWs, North Korea possesses a wide and well developed program of
chemical and biological weapons. According to the International Institute for Strategical
Studies the main difficulties to have a comprehensive insight on the chemical and
biological capabilities of the North are both, the isolated and dual use of the equipment,
the infrastructure, and supplies; and the lack of inspections and verification in DPRK.
Nevertheless, there is certain level of consensus between Washington and Seoul, when
affirming that Pyongyang has developed and included chemical weapons (CW) in its
military capabilities.8 Regarding biological weapons, even when main powers coincide
2 Ibid., 381.
3 SiegfriedHecker, Comments at the Korean Economic Institute, November 23, 2010. As mentionedin: Nikitin, M.
B. (2013).
4 Park, John S. (2013). Nuclear ambitionand tension onthe Korean peninsula. Chapter of the book“The Asian
Bureauof AsianResearch. (2013). Asiainthe second nuclear age.”
5 Merrill (2016), for instance, assessesthat DPRKhave enoughmaterialfor 30 nukes, the abilityof producing seven
weapons worthof fissile material, andthat it has alreadydeployednuclear short and medium-range BM.
Merrill, J. (2016). Inside the white house: The future ofUS-DPRKpolicy. Korea Observer, 47(4), 890-891.
6 Accordingto Park (2013), the KN-08 couldbe just a project, or evena mock. More recently, after the
commemorative militaryparade onthe 105th anniversaryof NKfounding father, Reuters (April15, 2017) shares the
idea ofbeinga IBMS inearlystate of its development.
7 The economist’s DATA TEAM. (Feb. 13th, 2017). North Korea is startingto back upits militarybluster.
8 IISS. (2004). North Korea’s Weapons Programs:a net assessment. London. Pag. 49-62.

3
that Pyongyang has the capacity of producing biological agents (BW), there is not clarity
about their weaponization. To sum up, the North Korean CWs are very likely to be already
incorporated in the military capabilities. Its biological capability is limited to the
production of agents which have not been weaponized yet.
To conclude this description of the actual WMD’s situation in the peninsula, I will state
that even when the North Korean NWs program is evolving steadily, it is not yet the
decisive part of the regime’s deterrent. On the other hand, DPRK is believed to have
developed CWs and incorporated them into its military. Consequently, while Pyongyang
have not achieved a credible nuclear deterrent, CWs will remain as the main tangible
threat to the US interests in the region.
2. What are the challenges regarding the DPRK’s WMD programs?
The challenges regarding WMD programs are multiple. First - the trading relationship
between Beijing and Pyongyang, which undermines the effectiveness of the economic
sanctions; second - the low effectiveness of the US deterrent against rogue states; and
third - the reasons behind the North Korean determination to develop WMD. These
reasons relate to their high strategical value, the relationship between the investment
already made and the remaining necessary for achieving the benefits of the WMDs, the
certainty of the regime about being accepted as a nuclear state, and the resilience of the
regime to economic sanctions.
The first challenge to address is the trading relationship between China and DPRK,
which is thought as one of the explanations of the lack of effectiveness of the sanctions
against the regime. China has an economic interest in this relationship, but there are, at
least, two reasons that explain the Chinese resistance to cease the trade from and towards
North Korea; the first one is the impact of the economic sanctions on the North Korean
population. The degradation of the social conditions in the country could cause a massive
migration towards China9, generating economic, social, and humanitarian repercussions.
The second reason is related to the strategic location of North Korea. Basically, North
Korea is a buffer zone than isolates the US foothold in continental Asia, from China10.
China does not want to share a borderer with the US, which is one of its main competitors
and the first military power in the world. Thus, the regime assures million soldiers
between the US and the Chinese border.
The second challenge regarding WMDs programs in the rogue state is toreduce the value
that Pyongyang gives to its WMDs. To do that, it is necessary to understand why the
regime gave national priority to the development and implementation of WMDs, despite
the economic and political costs linked to this decision. Basically, the function of WMDs
is explained in three points. First, they are necessary to assure the survival of the regime
by the employment of the strategic deterrent associated to them; second, to generate
9 Hachigian, Nina. (April 13, 2017). Article inmag. ForeignPolicy:“Trump’s tweets about NorthKorea are making
bad matters worse.”
10 Merrill, J. (2016). Inside the white house: The future of US-DPRKpolicy. Korea Observer, 47(4), 899.

4
revenue through the commercialization of restricted technologies associated to WMDs;
and third, to achieve a reduction in the military expenses.11
a) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has perceived the WMDs, and
mainly, the nuclear weapons, as its only reliable tool against its enemies, the
Republic of Korea and the United States. This vision has been reinforced by the
technologic disadvantage of DPRK’s conventional forces, summed to both the fall
of the regimes in Iraq and Libya, and the role of US and other western countries
in the Syrian war. Consequently, the regime asserted that no one would dare to
retaliate against a nuclear power, and decided to adopt, despite its rhetoric, the
limited reprisal nuclear doctrine12.
b) Pyongyang has been resilient to the economic sanctions, but they have impacted
severely its ability to generate income. For this reason, it is not strange that the
regime had thought about obtaining economic profit from the knowledge and
technologies related to WMDs. As was done before by Pakistan, North Korea is
monetizing its nuclear program, contributing to nuclear proliferation.
c) North Korea has been looking for an equivalent of the Eisenhower’s “New Look
Policy:”13 The regime believes that nuclear weapons could replace the necessity
of the “military first doctrine.” Basically, the regime would rely on the nuclear
deterrence, then they would reduce the expenditures on conventional military. 14
The third challenge is related to the relationship between the investment already made
and the remaining necessary for achieving the benefits of the WMDs. It unravels as
fallows: first, the cost of setback the weapons’ programs increase in proportion with the
investment done; second, the benefit of achieving NWs is huge in comparison with the
remaining cost to pay for the programs. Therefore, the closer the regime is to achieve its
desired NBCR capabilities, the more difficult is to coerce it to abandon its intentions. In
other words, it is more profitable to bear the situation and obtain the whole benefits of
such programs, than to abandon them in the last mile. Therefore, it is not expected that it
gives up its intention of going forward with them.
If a setback of the WMD programs is going to be achieved, the certainty of the regime
about being accepted as a nuclear state must be undermined. This is difficult, given the
precedents of India, Pakistan, and Israel, which were accepted by the international
community, and even by the US15, as nuclear powers. Pyongyang is wondering why it
would be different for them? A more realist view of this problem would imply that the
11 Park, John S. (2013). Nuclear ambitionand tension onthe Korean peninsula. Chapter of the book“The Asian
Bureauof AsianResearch. (2013). Asiainthe second nuclear age.” Kindle edition:location4465 to 4539. These
purposes are statedbythe author specificallyfor nuclear weapons, but this analyst believes it applies to WMD in
general.
12 Ibid. Location4472.
13 Ibid.
14 Dingli, S. (2016). Bringing the DPRKbackto the six-partytalks *. Korea Observer, 47(4), 860.
15 Ibid., 861.

5
international community show a united and categoric stance against the proliferation of
WMDs, and the stock and use of CBs weapons in North Korea.
Another challenge is undermining the regime’s resilience to the US economic sanctions.
According to Suk and Chang (2007)16, the strict control that the government has over the
media and the population, and the fact that people do not know the benefits of living
without economic sanctions, are two factors that explain this resilience. Furthermore,
DPRK has shown no pity regarding the suffering of its own population. Besides, sanctions
have not impacted it vigorously enough because of the trading between North Korea and
China.
At this point, some of the challenges that a strategy towards North Korea’s WMDs must
face, were mentioned. Nevertheless, there are many others, including limitations in the
intelligence, the risk of Japan and Korea going nuclear, and the legality and risks of a
possible use of force. Although, they were not addressed specifically due to constraints
of the relevance to this strategy, they still need to be considered.
3. Recommendations towards WMDs in DPRK
After the analysis of the challenges, I conclude that to achieve the setback of the WMDs
programs by 2020 is not feasible. Instead, I propose an intermediate and realistic end state
for 2020: DPRK accepting the creation of a commission of verification that registers its
WMDs capabilities. This end state would help to create favourable conditions for
achieving the setback of the WMDs. Just to clarify, this end state does not renounce
completely to the idea of use of force, simply it is not part of this initial phase. On the
contrary, this intermediate end state is a good way for obtaining intelligence regarding
conventional and WMDs capabilities.
With the end state already defined, the essential precondition or “main effect” is asserted:
- to achieve China’s real commitment regarding the coercive measures against North
Korea, and the exchange of information about WMDs proliferation with the US.
The first phase is aimed to commit China with the coercive measures against North Korea.
Basically, this phase is aimed to achieve the main effect of our strategy. Therefore, US
and its allies in the region should work together to align interests and efforts with China,
whilst addressing the latter’s concerns about possible mass immigration from DPRK and
the geopolitical consequences of a collapse of the Regime.
a) The first recommendation is to alleviate the Chinese concern about mass
migration by assuring that it will receive help with the attention of the North
Korean immigrants. For doing this, US should first commit South Korea, and
other countries in the region, to accept quotas of migrants. Basically, if China is
16 Suk Him Ki & Chang, Semoon. (2007). Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear NorthKorea. McFarland& Company,
Inc. North Carolina, US.

6
assured that massive migration is going to be attended by the international
community, its posture around North Korea could turn to the US interests.
b) The Chinese concern about US and South Korea’s intentions of overthrowing the
DPRK’s regime, and unifying the peninsula, should be addressed. At this point I
recommend assuring China an important role in any political negotiations about
the future of the peninsula. Probably this sounds too permissive, but it does not
imply that US is renouncing to its interests in the region, just that it is accepting
to preserve the balance.
c) US could announce the withdraw of ABM from the Korean peninsula once the
North Korean threat has disappeared, if the balance or status quo is assured.
d) Negotiations with China for defining the origin and scope of the sanctions on
North Korea should be conducted, and they should include an effective tool for
exchange of information regarding DPRK proliferation.
e) US should improve its deterrent. For reaching this goal, US should show off its
ability for tracking the leaders (they could be targeted also), and for using effective
conventional attacks.
The second phase is aimed to engage with North Korea, and to push them to accept the
creation of a commission of verification that registers its WMDs capabilities.
a) Increase economic sanctions, and maximize the registry to prevent proliferation.
A way of maximizing the effect of sanctions is by letting the population know
how it is to live without sanctions. Then, when the sanctions are resumed, the
population could put pressure on the government for resuming negotiations.
Under the last years of the Sino-Korean cooperation, sanctions could be more
effective because of this.
b) The negotiations should start addressing the chemical and biological capabilities
of DPRK. It is important to create a team of verification. Even inspections related
to chemical and biological capabilities could be decisive for gathering
intelligence. This data could help to design following phases. One of the biggest
limitations of the use of force is the lack of intelligence. US should maximize
efforts to gather intelligence about WMDs, conventional weapons, and the
locations of the leaders.
c) Even after some time of economic pressure, it is not probable that DPRK accepts
great compromises. It is even possible that it refuses to initiate dialogue.
Nevertheless, the most important goal of this strategy is to include China in the
effort, after that, the effects of the sanctions will be potentialized by time.

7
References
Delury, J. (2013). The disappointments of disengagement: Assessing Obama's North
Korea policy. Asian Perspective, 37(2), 149-182. Retrieved from https://acces-
distant.sciences-
po.fr/http/search.proquest.com/polcoll/index/docview/1365271278?accountid=13739
Dingli, S. (2016). Bringing the DPRK back to the six-party talks *. Korea
Observer, 47(4), 857-880. Retrieved from https://acces-distant.sciences-
IISS. (2004). North Korea’s Weapons Programs: a net assessment. London. Pag. 49-62.
Hachigian, Nina. (April 13, 2017). Article in mag. Foreign Policy: “Trump’s tweets
about North Korea are making bad matters worse.” Retrieved from:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/13/trumps-tweets-about-north-korea-are-making-
bad-matters-worse/
Merrill, J. (2016). Inside the white house: The future of US-DPRK policy. Korea
Observer, 47(4), 881-902. Retrieved from https://acces-distant.sciences-
Nikitin, M. B. (2013). NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS: TECHNICAL
ISSUES*. Current Politics and Economics of Northern and Western Asia, 22(3), 377-
421. Retrieved from https://acces-distant.sciences-
Reuters. (April 15, 2017). N. Korea displays apparently new missiles as U.S. carrier
group approaches. Pyongyang-Seoul.
Siegfried Hecker, Comments at the Korean Economic Institute, November 23, 2010. As
mentioned in: Nikitin, M. B. (2013).
Suk Him Ki & Chang, Semoon. (2007). Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear North
Korea. McFarland & Company, Inc. North Carolina, US.
The economist’s DATA TEAM. (Feb. 13th, 2017). North Korea is starting to back up its
military bluster. Retrieved from:
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/02/daily-chart-8
US. Department of State. (March, 2016). Non-proliferation Sanctions. Available on-line
in: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/226423.htm.

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