114337404 land-titles

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G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL,
ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this
petition to set aside the Decision 1
promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2
promulgated on
November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3
in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the
challenged Decision reads: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a
new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of
Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered
under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want
of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for
the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over
648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5
The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental

Mindoro. 6
However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction."
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD
1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G").
Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the
instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of
initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:8
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose;
the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official
Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same
paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the
Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume
jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial
hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of
procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally
infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside
the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that
the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45
because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for
review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10
in holding —
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette
is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply
with the notice requirement of due process." 11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13

. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation
is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and
present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise: 14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way.
Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and
posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any
party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing
reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all
whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain
date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette
suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent
any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the
title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due
process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the
latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15
While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the
present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,16
the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by
means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons
named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of

the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17
Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly
be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be
barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner
seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not
only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an
action for recovery of realty. 18
He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the
applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or
interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the
application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is
taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and
opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have
already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette
is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners
of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassingin rem nature
of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did
not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.
Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and
its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. 19
There is
no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
-versus-
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ,
ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R.
DELA PAZ,and GLICERIO R.
DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R.
DELA PAZ,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 171631
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES,*
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
November 15, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15,
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents’ application
for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R.
dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of
Pasig City an application for registration of land[3]
under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD
1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel
of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot
Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their
application for registration, respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power

of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2)
Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral
Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623
Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon
City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic
Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng
Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga
Pagaari ng Namataydated March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not
covered by any land patent or any public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of
the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for the
year 2003 has been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land,
by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob[4]
dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo
dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from
their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a“Sinumpaang Pahayag sa
Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay[5]
dated March 10, 1979. In their application,
respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of
owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of
possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before
June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of
registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents
presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of
the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among
others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a

period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax
declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the
land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain
belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there
was no other oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default[6]
against the whole
world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in
support of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for
registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby
rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R.
dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal
address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and
bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D,
Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five
(25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all
taxes and other charges due on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration
shall be accordingly undertaken.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.[8]
The CA, in its Decision
dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA
ruled that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-
interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were
able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable

and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition raising the following
grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT
LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE
SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS
FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.[9]
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the
concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated.
Respondents failed to show actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject
land in the concept of an owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is
within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property remained
to be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of
specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated
1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the
Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real
property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the
subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the petitioner
are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings
complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts.[10]
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion.[11]
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the
subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.[12]
These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing
evidence.[13]
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable
public domain.[14]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the

lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the landsubject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[15]
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-000084[16]
(Conversion Consolidated plan
of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,[17]
the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic
engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that “this survey is inside
the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3,
1968 by the Bureau of Forestry,” is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public
domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,[18]
the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as
required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said
properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by
law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar,
while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of
the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the
said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to
prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,[19]
the Court held that the
applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has
held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that
it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO.
Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts
must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof
required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable
zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to
establish that the subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already
classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public
domain.[20]
Anent respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the
records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the
subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant
of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents’ predecessors-in-
interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who
was born on March 19, 1939,[21]
testified that since he attained the age of reason he already knew
that the land subject of this case belonged to them.[22]
Amado testified that he was a tenant of the
land adjacent to the subject property since 1950,[23]
and on about the same year, he knew that the
respondents were occupying the subject land.[24]
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific
details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land

subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their
parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no
clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he
had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required
by law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof
of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.[25]
An applicant in a land registration case cannot
just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the
facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.[26]
Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name
of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only
prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[27]
Respondents failed to explain why, despite their
claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of
an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest
started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations
and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared
for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-
interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
[28]
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as
part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier,

their application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should
be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino
R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by
Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred
twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
HEIRS OF EVARISTO TIOTIOEN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 167215
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
AZCUNA,
REYES,* and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 8, 2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), seeking to set aside a part of the Decision[1]
dated February 15, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. SP No. 71358 insofar as it sustained the denial of
the Notice of Appeal[2]
filed on January 11, 2002 by the petitioner from the Decision[3]
dated

August 30, 2001 of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, in
Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 93-LRC-0008.
LRC No. 93-LRC-0008 involves the second application filed by Evaristo Tiotioen
on September 6, 1993 for judicial confirmation and registration under the Torrens System of
two parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan PSU-230646, situated in Pico, La
Trinidad, Benguet, with an aggregate area of 180,488 square meters. Evaristo Tiotioen was
substituted by his heirs in the case when he died on June 21, 1997. Santiago A. Santiago,
the Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet, and the petitioner opposed the aforesaid application.
In a Notice of Appearance[4]
dated October 20, 1994, the OSG formally requested that its
appearance be entered as counsel for the petitioner and that all notices of hearings, orders,
resolutions and decision be served to the OSG at its given address. The said notice of
appearance informed the court that the OSG authorized the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet to
appear in the case, subject to the conditions quoted hereunder:
The Provincial Prosecutor, La Trinidad, Benguet, is authorized to appear in this
case, and therefore, should also be furnished notices of hearing, orders, resolutions,
decisions and other processes. However, as the Solicitor General retains supervision
and control of the representation in this case and has to approve withdrawal of the
case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the interest of the
Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will
bind the party represented.
The petitioner filed its Opposition[5]
dated October 20, 1994 and Supplemental
Opposition[6]
dated June 20, 1995 on the ground that the parcels of land, applied for registration
by the respondents, belong to the communal forest of La Trinidad, Benguet, and are therefore
inalienable land of the public domain, which have not been classified and considered as
disposable and alienable.
After trial, the land registration court rendered its Decision dated August 30, 2001 which
granted the application. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding that the Applicants have
shown their adverse, continuous and notorious possession and in the
concept of owners of the land applied for since time immemorial, and
thus their title thereto is proper to be confirmed, and is hereby
confirmed.
The applicants, namely: NICOLAS TIOTIOEN, single;
ILDEFONSO TIOTIOEN, married to Adelaida Tiotioen;
CONCEPCION TIOTIOEN-DIAZ, married; NANCY TIOTIOEN-

OGOY, married and FILOMENA TIOTIOEN-DULNUAN, married; all
of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet are
hereby declared owners pro indiviso of a parcel of land situated at Pico,
La Trinidad, Benguet containing an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY
THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE (123,935)
SQUARE METERS for Lot 1 and FIFTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (56,553) SQUARE METERS for Lot
2. The subject land is particularly described in the Original Tracing
Cloth Plan (Exh. “AA-1”), Survey Plan (Exh. “A”), and in the Technical
Description (Exhs. “B” & “B-2), subject to the claim of oppositor
Santiago A. Santiago as per agreement with the applicants and when the
decision becomes final and executory, let a final decree be issued for the
issuance of title accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner and the municipality received their respective notices of the above-
mentioned decision on September 6 and 7, 2001. The municipality filed its Motion for
Reconsideration thereto on September 20, 2001. The petitioner, on the other hand, filed
a Motion and Manifestation[7]
on October 5, 2001 adopting the said motion of the municipality.
In the Resolution[8]
dated December 6, 2001, the land registration court denied for lack of
merit the motion for reconsideration of the municipality and declared the same aspro
forma because the issues cited were already passed upon in the decision sought for
reconsideration. The municipality filed its notice of appeal on the following day it received its
notice of the said resolution. The OSG was not furnished by the land registration court with a
copy of this resolution but it was informed of the said resolution only by the provincial
prosecutor on January 4, 2002[9]
, through a Letter[10]
dated December 19, 2001. Consequently,
the OSG filed its subject notice of appeal for the petitioner on January 11, 2002.
The land registration court denied the notice of appeal of the municipality on the ground
that the latter’s pro forma motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the reglementary period
to appeal. The petitioner’s notice of appeal was also denied supposedly for having been filed
out of time[11]
.
The petitioner sought the reconsideration of the denial of its notice of appeal which was
again denied by the land registration court in an Order[12]
dated April 23, 2002, quoted
hereunder:
ORDER

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) of the Order of the Court dated January 29, 2002 denying
their Notice of Appeal having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Be it noted that the OSG received the Decision dated August 30, 2001 on
September 06, 2001 and filed its Notice of Appeal on January 11,
2002. Conformably with Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
prescribing a 15-day appeal period, the last day for the perfection of an appeal
by OSG should have been on the 21st
day of September 2001. Per se, it was filed
beyond the reglementary period for which to perfect an appeal.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right
and a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules. These rules,
particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary
period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of
judicial business (Ben Sta. Rita v. C.A., et al., G.R. No. 119891, August 21, 1995).
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no convincing and logical reasons to
reconsider its Order dated January 29, 2002 and hereby denies the Motion for
Reconsideration. [Emphasis supplied]
The municipality and petitioner separately assailed before the CA the orders of the land
registration court denying their respective notices of appeal. The CA granted the petition filed
by the municipality and gave due course to its appeal but denied the one filed by the
petitioner. The CA pointed out that the petitioner filed its motion and manifestation adopting
the adverted motion for reconsideration of the municipality beyond the reglementary period to
file an appeal and, thus, the decision of the land registration court already attained finality
insofar as the petitioner was concerned. The “strong grounds” alleged by the petitioner were
likewise rejected by the CA which explained and ruled as follows:
The merit impressed in petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ position is,
however, more apparent than real. Notwithstanding the studied avoidance of
direct references thereto, the fact remains that the Solicitor General received its
copy of the 30 August 2001 decision rendered in the case on 6 September 2001
and thus only had until the 21st
of the same month to either move for a
reconsideration of said decision or perfect an appeal therefrom. There is,
therefore, no gainsaying the ineluctable fact that the selfsame decision had
already attained finality as against petitioner Republic of the Philippines by the
time the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet filed the 4 October 2001
manifestation adopting petitioner municipality’s motion for reconsideration.
It thus matters little that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet
appears to have been duly furnished with a copy of the aforesaid 6 December 2001

resolution on December 10, 2001 or that it only informed the Office of the Solicitor
General of said adverse ruling through the 19 December 2001 missive the latter
received on January 4, 2002. The rule that copies or orders and decisions served
on the deputized counsel, acting as agent or representative of the Office of the
Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually received by the latter
has little application where, as in the case at bench, said office had been duly
furnished a copy of the decision in the main case which, for reasons it alone can
explain, it allowed to attain finality. Under the factual and legal milieu of the case,
public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
of or excess of jurisdiction for denying the 10 January 2002 Notice of Appeal filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General way beyond the reglementary period for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines’ appeal.
Neither are we, finally, swayed by the strong
grounds petitioner Republic of the Philippines purportedly has to pursue an
appeal from public respondent’s 30 August 2001 decision. Except on
jurisdictional grounds, correction of a lower court’s decision could, for one, only
be done by regular appeal within the period allowed by law. Our perusal of the
grounds cited bypetitioner Republic of the Philippines, for another, yielded
nothing which had not yet been raised and will once again be raised by petitioner
municipality.
WHEREFORE, the petition filed by petitioner Municipality of La Trinidad,
Benguet is GRANTED and the assailed 23 January 2002 order and 30 April
2002 resolution are, acoordingly, NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
another is entered GIVING DUE COURSE to said petitioner’s appeal.
The petition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General for and in behalf
of petitioner Republic of the Philippines is, however, DENIED for lack of
merit. [Emphasis supplied]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner claims that the OSG, as its principal counsel in the subject land registration
case, is entitled to be furnished with copies of orders, notices, and decision of the trial court,
and that the date of service of such copies to the OSG is the reckoning period in counting the
timeliness of its appeal[13]
. The petitioner contends that the OSG was not furnished with a
notice of the Order [Resolution] dated December 6, 2001 of the land registration court which
denied the adverted motion for reconsideration of the municipality. The prescribed period
within which to file petitioner’s appeal did not commence to run and, therefore, its notice of
appeal should not be treated as filed out of time.

The petitioner prays in the alternative that issues of procedure should be set aside and its
appeal should be given due course alleging again the “strong grounds” that it has adduced
against the decision of the land registration court.
In their Comment[14]
and Memorandum[15]
, the respondents contend that the appellate
court correctly denied the notice of appeal of the petitioner for having been filed out of
time. They stress the fact that the petitioner received the adverted decision of the trial court
on September 6, 2001 and that the petitioner filed its notice of appeal thereto only on January
11, 2002 which is way beyond the prescribed period under the Rules of Court.
We find merit in the petition.
The relevant facts involving the procedural issues in this case are undisputed. The
petitioner and the municipality received a notice of the adverted decision of the land registration
court on September 6 and 7, 2001, respectively. The municipality timely filed its motion for
reconsideration of the said judgment on September 20, 2001. The provincial prosecutor
adopted this motion for reconsideration of the municipality on October 5, 2001 which was
beyond the fifteen-day period counted from receipt of the petitioner of a copy of the
decision. The land registration court denied the said motion for reconsideration of the
municipality in its Resolution dated December 6, 2001. The OSGwas not furnished with a
notice of such resolution. The OSG was informed by the provincial prosecutor of such denial
on January 4, 2002 when it received the Letter datedDecember 19, 2001 of the Provincial
Prosecutor. The OSG filed the subject notice of appeal for the petitioner only on January 11,
2002 which the land registration court denied for having been filed way beyond the fifteen-day
reglementary period to appeal which the said court reckoned from September 6, 2001. The CA
affirmed the land registration court’s denial of the subject notice of appeal of the petitioner but
gave due course to the appeal of the municipality.
In deciding this case, this Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the belated filing of
an appeal by the State, or even its failure to file an opposition, in a land registration case
because of the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the
government of its right to appeal from a judgment of the court. In Director of Lands v.
Medina[16]
, we said:
Considering the foregoing, the lower court gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the appeal of the government on the basis of what it perceived as a
procedural lapse. The lower court should be reminded that the ends of substantial
justice should be the paramount consideration in any litigation or proceeding. As this
Court ruled in Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu, "to dismiss the Republic's
appeal merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper considering the
merits of the case" and to ignore the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in
behalf of the Director of Forestry which constituted the crux of the government's case

"would defeat the time-honored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.”
In Heirs of Marina C. Regalado v. Republic[17]
, we ruled:
The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the
application for registration, despite receipt of notice thereof, did not deprive its
right to appeal the RTC decision.
Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did
not oppose the application of herein respondent, as in fact on December 26, 1969 an
order of general default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to
say that as stated by this court in Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769, 'it is a well
known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is
usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.'
And, in an earlier case, Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211,
'there was an enunciation of such a principle in this wise: 'Thus did the lower court, as
pointed out by the then Solicitor General, conclude that the government was bound by
the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor general.'
It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie.
[Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, we have advised the lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be
“cautious about not depriving of a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause
free from the constraints of technicalities.”[18]
In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, et al.,[19]
we recognized
the importance of the facts and issues involved and gave due course to an appeal despite that it
was the wrong mode of appeal and that it was even filed beyond the reglementary period to do
so, thus:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that
merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to
set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we
dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and
effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently
apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the
commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always
tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural
laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the
just and proper disposition of his cause.
xxx xxx xxx

In Sebastian v. Morales, we ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure, thus:
[C]onsidering that the petitioner has presented a good cause for
the proper and just determination of his case, the appellate court should
have relaxed the stringent application of technical rules of procedure and
yielded to consideration of substantial justice.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent
procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that
strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is
a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice,
rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
The vast tracts of land involved in this case are claimed by the petitioner to be a protected
watershed area, which allegedly preserves the main source of water of theMunicipality of La
Trinidad. Relative thereto, the petitioner raises substantial factual and legal issues which should
be decided on their merit instead of being summarily disposed of based on a technicality.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is hereby PARTIALLY
MODIFIED so as to give due course to the Notice of Appeal filed on January 11, 2002 by the
petitioner from the Decision dated August 30, 2001 of Branch 63 of the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 93-LRC-0008.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 77770 December 15, 1988
ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA, ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ
GARLITOS, REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO GOMEZ, ERLINDA GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ
CALICDAN, AZUCENA GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. GOMEZ (now deceased)
represented by his wife, LETICIA Y. GOMEZ, and children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, JACINTO Y.
GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Y. GOMEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro Manila,

and SILVERIO G. PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission, Quezon
City, Metro Manila, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The present case originated with the filing by petitioners on 30 August 1968 in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, of an application for registration of several lots situated in
Bayambang, Pangasinan.
The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0, 11 and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2. The lots were
among those involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran,1
wherein this Court declared
Consolacion M. Gomez owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. Petitioners are the heirs of
Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of Consolacion) who, together with Consolacion's son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her
parcels of land when Consolacion Gomez died intestate. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro Y.
Gomez, they became the absolute owners of the subject lots by virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis
Lopez. The lots (formerly portions of Lots 15,16, 34 and 41 covered by Plan Ipd-92) were subdivided into twelve lots
—Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The subdivision plan was duly approved by the Bureau of Lands
on 30 November 1963. Petitioners agreed to allocate the lots among themselves.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issued an order of
general default. On 5 August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners' favor. 2
On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order 3
expressly stating that the decision of 5 August 1981 had
become final and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of
registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision of 5 August 1981.
On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration
Commission (now known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration), submitted a report to
the court a quo stating that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already covered by homestead patents issued in
1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of 5 August
1981, and the order of 6 October 1981 be set aside. Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition
was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration proceedings and that the decision of 5 August 1981
should be implemented because it had long become final and executory.
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25 March 1985 setting aside the decision dated 5
August 1981 and the order dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of decrees. 4
Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent judge on 6 August 1985 for lack of merit. 5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court which in turn referred the petition to the Court
of Appeals. 6
On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered judgment, 7
dismissing the petition and stating, among others,
thus—
In resumé, prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the respondent Judge has still the
power and control over the decision he rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a
registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one-year period after entry
of the final decree of registration (Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622; Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil. 256;
Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil. 113). When the respondent Judge amended his decision after the report of
the respondent officials of the Land Registration office had shown that homestead patents had
already been issued on some of the lots, respondents cannot be faulted because land already
granted by homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another registration (Manalo vs.
Lukban, et al., 48 Phil. 973).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We resolve to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 10 March
1987. 8
Hence, this recourse.
Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The more important issues before the Court are: (a) whether
or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision of 25 March 1985 which set aside the lower court's
earlier decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981; (b) whether or not the respondents Acting Land
Registration Commissioner and Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land Registration
Commission, have no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981
and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their duty to do so being purely ministerial; (c) whether
or not "the law of the case" is the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abran,supra, which held that
the lands adjudicated to Consolacion Gomez were not public lands, and therefore they could not have been
acquired by holders of homestead titles as against petitioners herein.
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously
maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside.
They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after
judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land
Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30
should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory under
section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners assert, when
respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order of 6
October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1)
year after the entry of the final decree of registration. 9
This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a
final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1)
year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. 10
Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to the court a
quobefore its decision became final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would be pressuring respondent land
registration officials to submit a report or study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary deadline
for the finality of the court decision. As said by this Court in De los Reyes vs. de Villa: 11
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for
transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the
land. This requires technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land
included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be
roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and
sometimes additional surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can
hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyor of the General
Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).
Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the period before the court's
decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry
of the decree.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It
is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if
they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the
matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act
is the act of the court. 12
They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral
land registration proceedings ." 13

The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues raised by petitioners.
Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, et al.,
supra, where it was decided by this Court that the lands of Consolacion M. Gomez, from whom petitioners derive
their ownership over the lots in question, were not public lands. A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of
the aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earlier covered by homestead patents were not included
among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez. The decision states:
With respect to the portions of land covered by homestead certificates of title, we are of opinion
thatsuch certificates are sufficient to prevent the title to such portion from going to appellants
aforesaid, for they carry with them preponderating evidence that the respective homesteaders held
adverse possession of such portions, dating back to 1919 or 1920, accordingly to the evidence, and
the said appellants failed to object to that possession in time. (Emphasis supplied)
Wherefore modifying the judgment appealed from, it is hereby ordered that the lots respectively claimed
by Agustin V. Gomez, Consolacion M. Gomez, and Julian Macaraeg, be registered in their name, with the
exclusion of the portions covered by the homestead certificates ... . (Emphasis supplied.) 14
The report of respondent land registration officials states that the holders of the homestead patents registered the
lots in question in the years 1928 and 1929. The decision in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was
promulgated on 31 December 1931. Hence, the subject lots are specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the
aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez.
It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible
and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigation for determination or
judgment in cadastral proceeding. 15
The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not "the law of the case", for the lots in question were
not private lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were issued over them in 1928-1929. There is
sufficient proof to show that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already titled lands way back in 1928 and 1929
as shown by Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D" of respondents' Memorandum. 16
Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981 of the lower court is sustained, the homestead title
holders may still vindicate their rights by filing a separate civil action for cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in
a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. Conversely, the same recourse may be resorted to by petitioners. "(T)he true
owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to land judicially settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff
that he is the true owner of the parcel of land granted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and that the
defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff
and his predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the
defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true
owner thereof." 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioners-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159595 January 23, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:

The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a
judgment in a land registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and instead affirm the
assailed rulings of the courts below.
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for
Revival of Judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July
1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente
Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros.1
In the decision, the CFI,
acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named
oppositors who had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time
immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue
the corresponding decree of registration.2
Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was
adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental.3
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its
entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one-
half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2)
share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through various purchases
they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three
separate Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra.4
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite
these multiple transfers, and the fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous possession of the
subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the
rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The records do not precisely reveal why the decree was not
issued by the Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a few
months before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941.
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), although it entered its appearance on
13 May 1997 and simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the case
was set for hearing and in all subsequent proceedings.5
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her documentary evidence. No
evidence was apparently presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision6
finding merit in
the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the
Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and
registration based on the 1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that the right of action to revive
judgment had already prescribed. The OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas should have established that
a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The
appeal was denied by the appellate court in its Decision7
dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals
reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for
enforcement of judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land
registration cases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to
first request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had been established that the original
records in the 1941 case had already been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of
prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code
establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues.8
Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may
be enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations.9
It bears noting that the Republic does not

challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original awardees. Neither
does it seek to establish that the property is inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State.
The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals10
and Heirs of Lopez v. De
Castro.11
Shipside was cited since in that case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking
the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void because the judgment sought to be revived had become
final more than 25 years before the action for revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of the
Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did
lie. On the other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of land, and the
subsequent action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7)
years after the judgment had become final. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set
in, it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years.
Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general but definite jurisprudential rule
that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of
limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case."12
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla,13
decided in 1961, wherein the Court
refuted an argument that a decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of registration remained
unissued after 26 years was already "final and enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [of error], except insofar as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this
theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion,
and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil
actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party,
and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no
further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had
been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of
a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes
final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. x x x
x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree.
The reason is xxx that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or
enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the
judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for
the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the
land is ordered to be registered.14
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land registration case was
reiterated five (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al.15
In that case, it
was similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938
decision was, among others, barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was content in
restating with approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some
years later in Rodil v. Benedicto.16
These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and
Poras17
and Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente,18
respectively, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent
purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never prescribes.19
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on prescription and laches to land
registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta.

Anadoctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20
Cacho v.
Court of Appeals,21
and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22
The doctrine of stare decisis compels respect for settled
jurisprudence, especially absent any compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed
by the Republic in its present petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never
existed at all. Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for
execution of judgments, is applicable to land registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.23
The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has
no provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
should apply to land registration proceedings.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principle enunciated therein offers a
convincing refutation of the current arguments of the Republic.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings
not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as
land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land
registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of
such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a
decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty
exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of
registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on
execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory
fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of
judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for the
prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is not applicable to land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment directing the registration of title to land
has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send,
within fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that
the decision has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the
Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate of the
corresponding original certificate of title. The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of
registration. The decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land
Registration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and
shall be sent, together with the owner’s duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or province where
the property is situated for entry in his registration book.
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of
the certificate of title. No obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor
even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land
court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the corresponding
decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the
Commissioner), and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of
registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers
charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration
cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with
said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive
determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the owner
after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.

Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land
registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective,
the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for Nillas, or others
under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure
derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The
primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of
registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or
order from a land registration court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the
issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse
if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or
order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of
registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order
sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude the
issuance of the decree of registration.
What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even though the Court applied the
doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, it should be observed that neither case was intended to overturn
the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were
governed by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situation that marked both Sta. Ana and the
present case.
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an original action for land registration,
but from a successful motion by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a private
landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose in a land registration case, we note that the
pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was made in the course of
dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipsidedealing
with the issue of prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure
relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 years
earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as the significantly more
extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longer
held interest in the subject property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior
to the filing of the action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the applicability of the rules of
prescription.
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still another point, relating to its
pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In
contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court to employ the rules on prescription and laches on final
decisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the Court
has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even more unconventional than that
in Shipside. The property involved therein was the subject of two separate applications for registration, one filed by
petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a
decree of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968.24
On the other hand, the petitioners were able to obtain a
final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the property had already been registered in the name of the
other claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of prescription and
laches arose because the petitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the
competing title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for the
execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that score.
Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the
same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail x x x," and indeed even if the petitioners therein were
somehow able to obtain a certificate of title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have
stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of the petitioners with their pattern of

behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect their interests over the property, marked by their inability to
oppose the other application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5) -year
reglementary period.
Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates its application as precedent to
the case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter. The execution of the judgment sought
for belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would have entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which
had already been executed and which was shielded by the legal protection afforded by a Torrens title. In light of
those circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to
effectuate the judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their right of
ownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration
over the same property accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that
the final judgment, with which the corresponding decree of registration is homologous by legal design, has not been
disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption obtains in this case as well.
Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the continued application of Sta. Ana as
precedent.25
We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of Shipside or Heirs of Lopezconcerning
the applicability of the rules of prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those cases do not
operate to detract from the continued good standing of Sta. Ana as a general precedent that neither prescription nor
laches bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a land registration case, especially when the said judgment has
not been reversed or modified, whether deliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier
stands not so much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in stating the obvious.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted res judicatathat
barred subsequent attacks to the adjudicates’ title over the subject property. The Republic submits that said
decision would operate as res judicata only after the decree of registration was issued, which did not happen in this
case. We doubt that a final decision’s status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very own execution; and
indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still,
this faulty terminology aside, the Republic’s arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding that
the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay
incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the reasons for such delay,
following the prostracted failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In
this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates – her
predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in the names of the original
prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not offer any compelling argument
to dispute such proof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25660 February 23, 1990
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
TEODORO VANO,
respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of these three cases, considering that they involve the
same parties and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L-25660---this is an appeal from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol (now Regional Trial Court) 1
dated May 12,1964 dismissing the cases of some of the plaintiffs-

appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration and the motion to declare the
defendants- appellees in default; (2) G.R. No. L32065---this is a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Bohol dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of its prior order dated May 6, 1969 finding
petitioners guilty of contempt; (3) G.R. No. L-33677--- this is a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition
of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol dated June 2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of the
petitioners.
On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to manifest whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting these cases, or supervening events have transpired which render these cases moot and academic or
otherwise substantially affect the same. On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filed an ex parte manifestation that they
are still very much interested in the just prosecution of these cases.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
G.R. No. 25660
On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the parcels of land allegedly
inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration Case No. 76, L.R.C. Record No. N-4251. On July 26,1951,
administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended application for registration. After hearing, the land was
registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-85, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).
On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real properties with damages and preliminary injunction, Civil
Case No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record n Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) was filed by plaintiffs-appellants before the Court of First
Instance of Bohol. It was alleged that they are the lawful owners of their respective parcels of land including the
improvements thereon either by purchase or inheritance and have been in possession publicly, continuously,
peacefully and adversely under the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years tacked with the possession of
their predecessors-in-interest. However, those parcels of land were included in the parcels of land applied for
registration by the heirs of Juan Reyes, either by mistake or fraud and with the intention of depriving them of their
rights of ownership and possession without their knowledge, not until the last part of 1960 when the defendants-
appellees, through their agents, attempted to enter those parcels of land claiming that they now belong to the heirs
of Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22, Record on
Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of cause of action and (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss (pp. 29-30,
Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to set aside such order (pp. 31-32, Record on
Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12, 1964, the same court issued another order reversing itself partially (p. 56, Record
on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs Alejandro Renoblas, Fausto Cabaisan, Fabian
Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc, Fortunato Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas,
Fermin Haganas, Victorians Haganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Roberto Matela, Procopio
Cabañas and Vicente Amosora are hereby dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata with these
plaintiffs paying proportionately eighteenth forty one (18/41) of the costs, but the petition to dismiss
the case of the rest of the plaintiffs is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
On May 28,1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were dismissed filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 57-
58, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were not dismissed filed
a motion to declare the defendants-appellees in default for failure to file their answer with the time prescribed by law
(pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On the other hand, defendants-appellees filed their opposition to the
motion for reconsideration praying that the complaint as regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be likewise
dismissed (pp. 75-80, Record on Appeal; p. 7 Rollo).
On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in connection therewith (pp. 82-98, Record on Appeal; p. 7,
Rollo) denying all motions.

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