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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
August 21, 1937
G.R. No. L-43361
THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, applicant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee.
CIRIACO CHUNACO and JOSE ARAMBURO, oppositors and appellants.
Vera and Vera and J. E. Blanco for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On February 12, 1930, the Province of Camarines Sur, thru its provincial fiscal, filed with
the Court of First Instance of said province an application for the registration of several
parcels of land comprised in the agricultural school site of the provinc e. The Director of
Lands opposed the registration on the ground that these parcels are public lands. An

opposition was also filed on January 19, 1931, by Ciriaco Chunaco but only with respect to
lot No. 3 of Plan II-12638, Amd., Exhibit A. Jose Aramburo, who had sold this lot to Ciriaco
Chunaco, joined the latter on account of his warranty in case of eviction.
The present controversy relates only to lot No. 3 as the other parcels of land had already
been adjudicated by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur to the applicant and the
Insular Government. The parties appear to have agreed upon the identity of the
controverted lot (t. s. n., pp. 15, 147).
After hearing, His Honor, Judge Eulalio Garcia, on October 29, 1934, denied the application
of the Province of Camarines Sur, overruled the opposition of Ciriaco Chunaco and Jose
Aramburo, and declared lot No. 3 public land which had been reserved by the Governor-
General on October 19, 1933 for use as site of the Camarines Sur Agricultural School. The
oppositors, Ciriaco Chunaco and Jose Aramburo, moved for reconsideration and new trial
which motion was denied. Exception was taken and the case finally elevated to this court by
bill of exceptions.
Oppositors by their counsel assign ten errors all of which, however, – with the exception of
the last one with reference to the alleged error in refusing a new trial – may be reduced to
one single propositions, namely: Whether or not upon the evidence presented, the court
below erred in declaring lot No. 3 public land subject to reservation by the Chief Executive
for the stated public purpose, instead of adjudicating the same and ordering its registration
in the name of the oppositor-claimant Ciriaco Chumaco.
Appellants claim that they and their predecessor in interest have been since time
immemorial in the continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of lot No. 3 under
a bona fide claim of ownership and that, therefore, they are entitled to the registration of the
same under the provisions of Act No. 496, or, in the alternative, under the beneficial
provisions of Act No. 926, section 54, paragraph 6, and Act No. 2874, Chapter VIII, section
45, paragraph (b), respectively.
The appellants called to the witness-stand eight witnesses to substantiate their claim.
Documentary evidence was also presented and admitted (Exhibits 1 to 23). No claim is
made that the lot had been acquired either by purchase from or composition title with the
Government (Royal Decree of June 25, 1880). No step was even taken towards securing
possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1984 and the provisions
of the Spanish Mortgage Law of July 14, 1983. The appellants, therefore, cannot invoke the
provisions of section 19, paragraph 3, of Act No. 496, as amended by sect ion 1 of Act No.
2164, which require that an applicant for registration of title must claim “to own or hold any
land under a possessory information title, acquired under the provisions of the Mortgage
Law of the Philippine Islands and the general regulations for the execution of same.”
(Fernandez Hermanos vs. Directors of Lands, 57 Phil. 929, 933.) The failure of the
appellants’ predecessors in interest to legalize their possession of the land in question by
the institution of possessory information proceedings for the gratuitous grant to file from

the Spanish Government, thereby perfecting and covering their possessory right into one of
ownership, caused the land to revert to the Government. (Fuster vs. Director of Lands, G.
R. No. 40129, 61 Phil. 687; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600.) In
the first cited case, this court said:
No existe en autos prueba alguna que demuestre que Severino Tamayo y Juan de la Cruz,
ni sus compañeros, hayan solicitado la composicion de los terrenos en c ontroversia de
acuerdo con el mencionado Reglamento, cuyo objetivo era precisamente el legitimar la
posesion de los que posein ilegitimamente terrenos del Estado, ni de que sehayan acogido a
los beneficios del Real Estado, ni de que se hayan acogido a los beneficious del Real Decreto
de 13 de febrero de 1894 que tenia por especial fin dar una vez mas oportunidad a dichos
posedores a que pudiesen obtener titulo gratuito previos los tramites de informacion
posesories, ni tampoco a los del Real Decreto de 21 de febrero de 1895. Si fuera cierto,
como la solicitante apelada Antonia C. Fuster ha tratado de probar, que Severino Tamayo y
Juan de la Cruz y compañeros hubieran estado en posesion continua del referido terreno y
lo hubieran estado cultivando por media de inquilinos hasta que traspasaron sus derechos
sobre el mismo a Matias Fuster el 15 de mayo de 1895 (Exh. I), no se comprende como no
se habian acogido ni los beneficios del Real Decreto de 25 de junio de 1880, para lo cual
tenian tiempo hasta el 17 de abril de 1894, ni a los del Real Decreto de 21 de febrero de
1895, para legitimar su posesion y adquirir titulo gratuito de propiedad sobre dicho terreno.
Si hubiesen estado tan empeñados e interesados en cultivar el citado terreno, hasta el
extremo de poner encargados en el, Ã‚Â¿por que no pusieron el mismo empeño e interes en
legitimar su posesion, y adquirir titulo gratuito de propiedad sobre el mismo,
aprovechandose de la oportunidad y de los medios que las leyes les brindaban para ello y
asegurando de este modo el fruto de sus desvelos, trabajo y privaciones? No se pretende
que no habian tenido conocimiento de dichos reales decretos; por consiguiente, es de
presumir que sa cumplido con lo ordenado en el articulo 17 de Reglamento tantas veces
citado de que se diese la mayor publicidad al mismo en las Islas a fin de que se conocieran
las facilidades que por sus disposiciones se daban para legitimar la posesion ilegal de
terrenos del Estado y adquirir la propiedad de los mismos. (Fuster vs. Director of
Lands, supra.)
The appellants, however, also invoke the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No.
926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874 and contend that they and
their predecessors in interest had possessed the land not only “for a period of ten years
next preceding the 26th day of July 1904″ as said Act No. 926 provides, but from the year
1874. They claim that the repeal of Act No. 926 by Act No. 2874 cannot adversely affect
their vested right of ownership under the former Public Land Law because of the
constitutional inhibition against the enactment of ex post facto law or bill of attainder. In the
first place, it should be observed that the constitutional provision that no ex post facto law
or bill of attainder shall be enacted cannot be invoked to protect allegedly vested civil rights,
because it is only applicable to criminal proceedings, and into to civil proceedings which

affect private rights retrospectively (See Mekin vs. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74; Paynaga vs. Wolfe, 2
Phil. 146; U. S. vs. Ang Kan Ko, 6 Phil. 376; Concepcion vs. Garcia, 54 Phil. 81; and U. S.
vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370; 51 Law. ed., 1098; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 11 Ann. Cas.,
688). In the second place, section 54 of Act No. 926 provides that “. . . persons or their
legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been
perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor . . . .” No
application was filed under Act No. 926 by the appellants or their predecessors in interest,
and it is clear that without such application no confirmation of their claims could be had and
much less the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. Under these circumstances, no
vested right could have accrued to them.
The claim that the appellants should, in the alternative, be the recipients of the beneficial
provisions of Act No. 2874 (par. [b], sec. 45) is also without merit. Paragraph (b), section
45 of Act No. 2874 substantially incorporates paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The
possession and occupation under both laws must not only be under a bona fide claim of
ownership but must also be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State.
It has been uniformly held by his court that to justify judicial confirmation of title to a public
agricultural land, the claimant must prove actual and physical occupation of said land, and
that the possession must be continuous, open, exclusive, notorious, adverse and under
a bona fide claim of ownership from July 26, 1894 (Tiglao vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 80
aff’d in 215 U. S., 410; 54 Law. ed., 257; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 129; 40 Phil. 1029; Vaño vs.
Insular Government, 41 Phil. 161; Government of the Philippines Islands vs. Abadejos, G.
R. No. 21184, March 12, 1924; Gallado vs. Director of Lands, G. R. No. 23109; Fernandez
Hermanos vs. Director Lands, supra; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, supra;
Director of Lands vs. Abarca and Enage, G. R. No. 38277, 58 Phil. 950; Director of Lands vs.
Abdul, G. R. No. 36867, 58 Phil. 932; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Agta, G. R.
No. 36479, 57 Phil. 979) up to the date of the filing of the application or at least up to July
1, 1919 when Act No. 2874 was enacted (Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang, 50 Phil. 380; Government
of Philippine Islands vs. Adelantar, 55 Phil,. 703; Government of the Philippine Island vs.
Abadejos,supra; Government of Philippine Island vs. Abad, 56 Phil. 75). If the possessory
right has been enjoyed in the manner set forth in the foregoing cases, it ripens into one of
presumptive ownership. The appellants, to be sure, attempted to prove the element of the
required possession. We find, however, the evidence on his point unsatisfactory. Their
witness Timoteo Velasco, Jose Bantugay, Mariano Berba and Felix Bolayon testified that the
original owner of the land in question was one Juan Garay who, according to the first
witness, had possessed the land since 1874; that during the period of the possession of
Garay the land had been dedicated to the planting and cultivation of abaca, coconuts, rice,
corn, camotes and other plants, as well as to the pasture of cattle and carabaos, and that

Garay employed encargados and day-laborers ( jornaleros) for the purpose. But their own
testimony shows that the possession of Juan Garay did not last long enough as he left the
Philippines before the revolution against Spain and died while away. And while the
possession of Garay might have passed to Ceferino Aramburo, father of the appellant,
Aramburo, who died in 1899, began to occupy the land in question or any portion of it. The
record is notably deficient of proof both of the exact commencement of possession and its
continuity. As a matter of fact, the appellant Jose Aramburo himself admit this lack of
continuity of possession when, upon cross-examination by counsel for the Government, he
testified that when his father died in 1899, the time when he was supposed to have
inherited the land in question he was then in Spain and came to the Philippines only in 1911
or 1912 (t. s. n., p. 162) and actually saw and took possession of the land only in 1913 (t.
s. n., p. 158). Upon the testimonial evidence presented we cannot give weight to their
alleged possession through their encargados. While Timoteo Velasco testified that Ceferino
Aramburo had as encargados Petronilo Guevara, Mariano de las Llagas and Manuel Pelayo
(t. s. n., pp. 5, 6), Mariano Berba who also testified for the appellants declared that
Petronilo Guevara was Garay’s encargado (t. s. n., p. 166). Another of the appellants’
witnesses, Felix Bolayon, contradicted this assertion of Mariano Berba that Petronilo
Guevara served under Garay by stating that Garay’s encargado was his uncle, Estanislao
Gonos (t. s. n., p. 173). Furthermore, the appellant Jose Aramburo who took possession of
the land only in 1913 declared that after the death of Petronilo Guevara, he named Manuel
Pelayo as encargado (t. s. n., p. 152), thus discounting the statement of Timoteo Velasco
who, as stated, expressly included one Mariano de las Llagas among the encargados of Jose
Aramburo. Again, the witness Timoteo Velasco admitted that he lived near the land in
question only up to 1902 (t. s. n., p. 4) and we are at a loss to understand how he could
affirm that he knew Petronilo Guevara and Manuel Pelayo to be encargados of Jose
Aramburo when by the testimony of the latter, Petronilo Guevara and Manuel Pelayo only
became his encargados in 1913. Manuel Pelayo who also took the witness stand for the
appellants positively declared that he only knew the land in question in 1922 and remained
therein for only two years up to 1924
(t. s. n., p. 130).
The appellants’ claim of ownership, therefore, fails for lack of sufficient proof of continuity of
possession on their part or on the part of their predecessors in interest during the time
required by section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No. 2874. (Heirs of Luno vs. Marguez, 48 Phil.
855; Government of the Philippine Island vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374, 380; Fernandez
Hermanos vs. Director of Lands,supra.)
No competent or satisfactory evidence was presented by the appellants to establish the
privity of title or possession between Garay, the alleged successor in interest. Antonio Gaya
and Leopoldo Terran testified that in the year 1900, upon the arrival of the American in the
Philippines, the house of Ceferino Aramburo, deceased father of the appellant Jose
Aramburo, together with several other houses in the town of Daraga, Albay, were set on fire

by other of one General Pawa, a revolutionary leader, thus reducing to ashes the said house
of Ceferino Aramburo and the safe therein kept by the latter to shelter the papers and
documents relating to his property. With respect to the testimony of those two witnesses,
however, the trial court observed:
. . . Estos testigos Antonio Gaya y Leopoldo Terran, tampoco han afirmado que habian visto
y leido el documento o titulo a nobre de Ceferino Aramburo del terreno en cuestion; si fuera
verdad haberse quemado el documento del terreno en cuestion, la existencia del supuesto
titulo que se alega haberse quemado en un incendio que tuvo lugar el año 1900 en el
Municipio de Daraga, Albay, era muy facil comprobarlo por los medios siguientes: 1.Ã‚Âº –
Por una copia de la escritura que indudablemente se podria hallar en el protocolo del notario
publico que intervino en la redaccion y otorgamiento de dicho documento; 2.Ã‚Âº – La
naturaleza y relacion de los documentos de Ceferino Aramburo que se alegan haber sido
destrozados por el incendio; y 3.Ã‚Âº – Por los testigos que intervinieron en la cesion en
pago de una deuda de Juan Garay a favor de Ceferino Aramburo. (B. E., pp. 16, 17.)
After rendition of judgment by the lower court, appellants filed a motion for a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence consisting of documents said to have
been found in the archives of the National Library. The nature and character of these
documents were not even mentioned to apprise the court of their importance and value and
the lower court denied the motion. On appeal to this court, announcement is made by the
appellants in their brief that a motion for a new trial would be filed because of the discovery
of documentary evidence, but up to this time no such motion has been received.
The trial court, in declining to accept the explanation of witnesses for the oppositor
regarding the alleged destruction of papers and documents pertaining to the property in
controversy, contrary to the contention of counsel for the oppositors-appellants, did not
apply the statute of frauds (sec. 335, Code of Civil Procedure) but followed the ruling of this
court in the cases of Director of Lands vs. Abarca and Enage, supra, and Director of Lands
vs. Abdul, supra. In the first case, this court said:
The claimant did not testify, but his attorney presented two witnesses, Estanislao de la Cruz
and Higino Enage, aged 50 and 56, respectively, to show that the lot in question formerly
belonged to Eleno de la Cruz, and that it was purchased from him by Enage, the father of
the claimant, but it is clear from their testimony that this land, or rather a part of it, was in
the possession of Emeterio Enage when they first knew it. No competent evidence was
offered to show that Emeterio Enage acquired this lot from Eleno de la Cruz, nor does the
evidence show with any certainly when Emeterio Enage, who died in 1910, began to occupy
a portion of the land in question. And in the second case, this court held:
There is absolutely no documentary evidence that Gigling himself ever obtained title to the
property, and there is no proof that he had had possession for a time sufficiently long to
justify the court in awarding ownership to him. There is no document crediting that the
interest of Gigling was ever conveyed to Conway. It result that the action of the trial court

in awarding the lots mentioned to James Conway was erroneous. The mere fact, relied upon
by the appellee, that the Province of Lanao, through its division superintendent of
education, offered to buy the claim of Conway to these lots from his administrator is of no
value as proof of title.
Even the evidence respecting the alleged possessory acts exercised by the appellants’
predecessors in interest and their agent is conflicting. Whereas some of their witness
testified that the controverted parcel had been dedicated by the original owner thereof and
his alleged immediate successor in interest to the cultivation of abaca, coconuts, rice, corn,
camotes and other plants, other, more particularly the appellant Jose Aramburo himself,
declared that the land had never been dedicated to anything else except cattle grazing (t. s.
n., p. 152), and that the earth dike ( pilapiles) and irrigation canal did not really exist until
after 1918 when the Government Agricultural School of Camarines Sur actually took the
physical and material occupation and possession of the Land, and began to improve the
same (t. s. n., pp. 10, 99, 106, 110, 111, 113-117, 142), “While grazing live stock over
land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show a possession, the
mere occupancy of land by grazing live stock upon it, without substantial inclosures or other
permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a plea of limitations, and this is
especially true where the claimant used no means to restrain the live stock to any particular
land, or where the live stock of other was not excluded from the land. Such a use, it has
been said is to be deemed merely permissive, whether the lands are public or private, and
may be terminated at any time.” (2 C. J., pp. 67, 68.) And in the case of Director of Lands
vs. Absolo (46 Phil. 282), it was held:
The more fact that during the Spanish regime one had made on public land some inclosures
for his cattle and cottages for his shepherds and said cattle had been pasturing thereon for
a number of years, and said shepherds cultivated a small portion thereof for a like period, is
not a possession under claim of title, when it appears that he did not break up any ground,
or bring the land to a state of cultivation and the cattle of other people grazed thereon, just
as his cattle did, and the cultivation of the land by his shepherds was not permanent but
casual, and stopped as soon as said shepherds ceased to live on the land on account of all
the cattle having perished. (Syllabus. See also Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs.
Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367, 372.)
Counsel for the appellant vigorously assert in their brief that the Province of Camarines Sur
and the Insular Government had recognized the ownership of the appellants of the land in
question by the assessment thereof three times by the provincial assessor of Camarines Sur
in the name of Jose Aramburo. Assessment alone, however, is of little value as proof of title.
Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the property in the declarant (Evangelista
vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Casimiro vs. Fernandez 9 Phil. 562; Elumbaring vs.
Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384). Neither is the alleged offer (Exhibit 7, p. 37, rec.) made by the
provincial governor to buy the claims of the appellant Jose Aramburo any concession or

evidence of ownership (Director of Lands vs. Abdul, supra); nor does the issuance of a
certificate of repurchase by the provincial treasurer of Camarines Sur in favor of Jose
Aramburo upon the redemption payment of the accused taxes on the land up to 1929 vest
in him any title or operate as an estoppel against the Government. The repurchase
certificate was “issued with the understanding that it does not acknowledge a better right to
the properties being redeemed but said Jose Aramburo than that had by their former
owners prior to the forfeiture thereof and without prejudice to the right of the Government
to contest the title thereto, if deemed necessary, in proper proceedings.” (Exhibit 6, p 36,
rec.) Furthermore, the purchaser of land acquires the interest held by the delinquent owner
and the Government is not deemed to have included in the conveyance the title which it
holds over the land. (Government of the Philippine Island vs. Adriano, 41 Phil. 112.).
The decision of the trial court, being on the whole supported by the evidence on record, is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1867 April 8, 1950
CARMEN DE LA PAZ VDA. DE ONGSIAKO, petitioner,
vs.
TEODORICO GAMBOA and PANTALEON GAMBOA ET AL., respondents.
Jose Dacquel and Florencio Florendo for petitioner.
TORRES, J.:
The question raised primarily in this appeal by certiorari is as to whether or not contracts of tenancy,
entered into by petitioner and respondents prior to the date when Republic Act No. 34 became
effective, are governed by the provisions thereof and not by the provisions of Act No. 4054 and
Commonwealth Act No. 178, which were in force when those contracts were signed.
At first blush, it would seem that the above query should be answered in the negative, on the ground
that, as contended by counsel for petitioner, the application of the provisions of Republic Act No. 34
— which amended those of Act No. 4054 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 178 — (a) "clearly
and palpably impair the obligation of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution"; and (b) give
said Republic Act No. 34 a retroactive effect, which would also "be contrary to section 10 of Bill of
Rights of the Constitution."
It appears that during the period of June to July, 1946, pursuant to the provisions of section 8 of Act
No. 4054, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 178, petitioner and respondents entered into
tenancy contracts, which, among other things, provided for a 50-50 division of the crop, under a
stipulation of the effect that the petitioner-land-owner would exclusively shoulder the planting

expenses which shall not be more than ten planters for every hectare, the wages for each planter to
be determined at the prevailing rate generally charged in the community, and that in return, the
tenant shall solely defray the harvesting expenses (Translation of Tenancy Contracts, AnnexB).
A short time thereafter, that is, on September 30, 1946, Republic Act No. 34 was approved by the
Congress of the Philippines, and on November 12, 1946, by Proclamation No. 14, the President of
the Philippines made effective the provisions of said Act No. 4054, known as "The Philippine Rice
Share Tenancy Act," as amended by said Republic Act No. 34, "to be in full force and effect
throughout the Philippines."
During the liquidation of the palay crop for the agricultural year 1946-1947, the herein respondents-
tenants sought the application of the provisions of the new law on the crop division, by filing the
corresponding complaints with the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division, on the ground that in the
harvest of present agricultural year (1946-1947), they could not agree on: (a) the liquidation of the
crop; (b) the division thereof; (c) the apportionment of their expenses; and (d) the settlement of their
accounts.
The Tenancy Law Enforcement Division, after going over the facts and the question involved, found
that, although according to the contracts between respondents and petitioner, it was stipulated that
the division of the crop would be on the 50-50 basis, in the light of the provisions of section 7(a) of
Republic Act No. 34, such stipulations is against public policy, and therefore, the crop division should
be on the 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants, as provided in the amendatory law.
The ruling of the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division was appealed to the Court of Industrial
Relations, which, in its decision (Annex D), sustained the findings and conclusion of the Tenancy
Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice, and ruled that the division of the share of
the tenants and landlord should be on the basis of 55-45, respectively. The court further found that
inasmuch as the stipulation made in paragraph 12 of the tenancy contracts, to the effect that the
respondents herein, not being against public policy, the law or the morals, said division would be
"from the net produce, after deducting the seedlings and threshing expenses."
Unlike the indifferent attitude shown by the Spanish Government in the Philippines towards the fate
of the laboring class — whether they were tillers of the land or earning their wages in a factory —
even prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the Philippine Government, under the American
regime, had, from time to time, shown its deep concern over the well-being of the wage earners. Our
statute books are witness to that fact; they contained legislation enacted and intended to ameliorate
the conditions of the laboring man. The administration, under the leadership of Manuel L. Quezon,
became social justice minded, and implementing his strong advocacy of social justice, the framers of
our Constitution, in section 5 of Article II of our fundamental law, adopted the principle that "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be
the concern of the State." Since then, the government has always been, by fast strides, drawing near
its goal — the amelioration, the well-being of the conditions of the working man.
The legislation which particularly concerns the relations between landowner and tenant, has been
the object of constant attention on the part of the government, as shown in the various laws that
have been successively enacted for that purpose, and which, under those circumstances, may be
considered as having the nature of remedial legislation. That Republic Act No. 34 was enacted on
that basis, is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President for the passage of House Bill No.
582, which became Republic Act No. 34. It says:
This bill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy Act in such a way to make the division of
the crops more equitable to the tenants . . . . The bill embodies the principal

recommendations of the President of the Philippines, as outlined in the message send by His
Excellency to Congress. . . . The principal feature of this bill is to increase the participation of
the tenants in the production of the land that he is cultivating. This participation is further
increased as the productivity of the land decreases.
Contrary to the contention of counsel, Republic Act No. 34 is, therefore, not an ex post facto law, for
it is well-known that the prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to criminal or penal, and not to
civil matters.
It is well established that the constitutional prohibition of the passage of ex post facto laws
applies only to criminal or penal matters, and not to laws which concern civil matters or
proceedings generally, or which affect or regulate civil or private rights. Nor does such
constitutional prohibition apply to laws affecting civil remedies. The prohibition can not be
evaded by giving a civil form to provisions and are in effect criminal as in the guise of
prescribing qualifications for holding office or praticing certain callings. (Ex parte Garland, 4
Wallace 33, 18 Law. ed., 366; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wallace, 277, 18 Law. ed., 356.)
(16 C.J.S., pp. 889-891.)
Neither said Act impairs the obligation of contracts in violation of paragraph 10, section 1 of Article III
of the Constitution. Corpus Juris Secundum, summarizing the interpretations given by the American
courts, says that constitutional provisions against impairing the obligation of contracts do not prevent
the same from being subject to legislation enacted by the State in the proper exercise of its police
power. Thus, at pages 701, 702, Vol. 16, it says:
The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against impairing the obligation of
contracts is not an absolute one and it is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula. Such provision are restricted to contracts which respect property, or
some object or value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have
no application to statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislation powers of the State, and involving the public rights and welfare of the entire
community affected by it. They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police
powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals,
comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts may thereby be affected;
for such matter can not be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and
control them.
Furthermore, it is very manifest that when our lawmaking body was considering House Bill No. 582,
it undoubtedly had in mind the circumstances and conditions surrounding the relations between
landlord and tenant. It therefore, could not have failed to take notice of the existence of contracts
which stipulated a division of the crop on the 50-50 basis, and had the Congress intended to except
those contracts from the operation of the new law (Republic Act No. 34), doubtless, it would have
done so by inserting therein the corresponding provision; but on the contrary, it expressly provided
therein that a stipulation whereby "the tenant shall receive less than 55 per cent of the net produce
...," is against public policy, which is equivalent to a declaration by the Congress that a stipulation in
a contract that the division of the crop shall be on the 50-50 basis, is against public policy.
In People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) and in Philippine National Bank vs. Vda. e Hijos de Angel
Jose (63 Phil., 814), this court, citing article 1255 of the Civil Code, says that the rule in this
jurisdiction is that the contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they
deem advisable, "provided they are not contrary to laws, morals or public policy"; and while we have
searched in vain for a concrete definition of the term "public policy," in its treatise on the law of

contracts, in dealing with agreements against public policy, American Jurisprudence gives a
summary of the doctrines laid down by the American courts on this matter. It says —
x x x x x x x x x
It is a general rule that agreements against public policy are illegal and void. Under the
principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of
justice will not recognize or uphold any transaction which, in its object, operation, or
tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality, or to civic
honesty. The test is whether the parties have stipulated for something inhibited by the law or
inimical to, or inconsistent with, the public welfare. An agreement is against public policy if it
is injurious to the interests of the public, contravenes some established interest of society,
violates some public statute, is against good morals, tends to interfere with the public welfare
or safety, or, as it is sometimes put, if it is at war with the interests of society and is in conflict
with the morals of the time. An agreement either to do anything which, or not to do anything
the omission of which, is in any degree clearly injurious to the public and an agreement of
such nature that it cannot be carried into execution without reaching beyond the parties and
exercising an injurious influence over the community at large are against public policy. There
are many things which the law does not prohibit, in the sense of attaching penalties, but
which are so mischievous in their nature and tendency that on grounds of public policy they
cannot be admitted as the subject of a valid contract. The question whether a contract is
against public policy depends upon its purpose and tendency, and not upon the fact that no
harm results from it. In other words, all agreements the purpose of which is to create a
situation which tends to operate to the detriment of the public interest are against public
policy and void, whether in the particular case the purpose of the agreement is or is not
effectuated. For a particular undertaking to be against public policy actual injury need not be
shown; it is enough if the potentialities for harm are present. Where the precise question as
to whether or not a particular agreement is against public policy has not been determined,
analogous cases involving the same general principle may be looked to by the courts in
arriving at a satisfactory conclusion." (12 Am. Jur., pp. 662-664.)
It would thus appear that, while it is the inherent and inalienable right of every man to have the
utmost liberty of contracting, and agreements voluntarily and fairly made will be held valid and
enforced in the courts, the general right to contract is subject to the limitation that the agreement
must not be in violation of the Constitution, the statute or some rule of law (12 Am. Jur., pp. 641-
642).
Finally, Sutherland, in his well-known Treatise on Statutory Construction, says:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the
purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and
the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and
to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives
life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and
follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with
the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the
legislature. (Vol. II, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 693-695.)
The above disposes of the first error assigned by the petitioner in her brief..

As regards the second error, it appears that counsel for petitioner, in making the corresponding
assignment, admits that the finding of the Court of Industrial Relations, that the sum of P25 should
be the contribution of the petitioner for planting and cultivation expenses for every hectare of land
planted, is based "on the preponderance of evidence." Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, governing the
procedure to be followed in appeals from an award, order of decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations to the Supreme Court, provides that "only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth, may be raised in the petition" for certiorari from an award, order or decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations (section 1 and 2; section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103). This Court is not,
therefore, empowered to look into the correctness of the findings of fact in an award, order or
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations.
With the denial of the petition, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13777 June 30, 1960
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff,
vs.
CORNELIO S. RUPERTO, ET AL., defendants.
Ramon B. de los Reyes and Santos D. Ordiz for appellee.
Cornelio S. Ruperto for appellants.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
On August 1, 1951, the plaintiff, Philippine National Bank, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money allegedly due it from the
defendants, Cornelio S. Ruperto and Juana S. Ruperto, under a promissory note as follows:
Manila, November 24, 1948
P2,500.00
NINETY DAYS ... after date, for value received, I promise to pay the order of the
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK at its Office in ________________________ or
Manila, the sum of two thousand five hundred pesos _____________, Philippine
Currency, with interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum from Maturity until paid.
In case of judicial execution of this obligation or any part of it, the debtor waives all
his rights under the provisions of Rule 39, Section 12 of the Rules of Court.

In case it is necessary to collect this note by or through an attorney-at-law, the
makers and endorsers shall pay 10 per cent of the amount due on the note as
attorney's fees. DEMAND AND DISHONOR WAIVED. Holder may accept partial
payment reserving his right of recourse against each and all indorsers.
(SGD.) CORNELIO S. RUPERTO
(SGD.) JUANA S. RUPERTO
It is averred that after making partial payments in the sums of P200.00 and P50.00 on
March 11, 1949 and May 15, 1950, respectively, defendants failed to make any other
payment despite written demands from the plaintiff for the balance.
Defendants filed answers, admitting the existence of the debt as evidenced by the
promissory note, but alleging, as special defense, that defendant Cornelio Ruperto had
offered to pay and tendered payment of the balance of the note by means of his backpay
certificate in the amount of P7,079.64 issued by the Insular (National) Treasurer on June
23, 1949, which offer and tender plaintiff "was reluctant to accept since November 10,
1951". It is prayed, therefore, that, among other things, plaintiff be required to accept the
tender of payment on the balance of the loan by means of Backpay Certificate No. 139765;
defendants be exempted from the payment of interest from and after the date the plaintiff
refused to honor the tender of payment; and, after such payment, the promissory note be
cancelled.
Because of several postponements "on the ground that the defendants would settle the
case amicably with the plaintiff or on the grounds", the case was finally decided by the court
only on February 21, 1958. Portions of the Court's decision as are pertinent to the present
appeal are stated as follows:
It must be stated at the outset that when Republic Act No. 304 was approved on
June 18, 1948, the loan in question was not yet subsisting, the same having been
contracted on November 24, 1948, and that Republic Act No. 897, approved June
20, 1953, amending Republic Act No. 304, allows the use of certificates of
indebtedness for payment of obligations "subsisting at the time of the approval of this
Act". It must be further noted that on June 16, 1956, Republic Act No. 1576 was
approved amending the charter of plaintiff bank, and prohibiting the acceptance by
the Bank of backpay certificates in payment of outstanding obligations contracted
after the promulgation of the aforesaid Republic Act No. 304. From this, it is seen
that had this case been tried and submitted for decision before the approval of the
aforesaid Republic Act No. 1576, on June 16, 1956, the provisions of Republic Act
No. 897 would unquestionably have been applied, as was done in the
aforementioned Florentino case. But, as already stated above, the trial of this case
did not start until September 16, 1957, and the case is only now submitted for
decision, when the law in force on the matter is the aforesaid Republic Act No. 1576.
In view hereof the question above-propounded is answered in the negative.
It is needless to state that the allegation of defendants that defendant Juana S.
Ruperto merely acted as guarantor is untenable.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,250.00, with interest thereon at 8 per cent
per annum from March 1, 1949, until fully paid, plus 10 per cent of the said sum as
attorney's fees, and the costs.
Not satisfied with the decision, defendants Ruperto appealed directly to this Court on points
of law, insisting in effect that since they had tendered payment through back pay certificate
on November 10, 1951 and on May 22, 1952, their right to have said back pay certificate
applied to their debt could not be barred by R.A. 1576, enacted on June 16, 1956.
We think this appeal is not meritorious.
Since the debt of appellants was contracted on November 24, 1948, they could not validly
seek to discharge it by application of their backpay certificate under Republic Act 304,
passed on June 18, 1948, because that act, in terms, limited any such application to
"obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act" (Sec. 2).
The appellants might have compelled the Bank to consent to the application when Republic
Act No. 897 was approved on June 20, 1953. But the record is barren of any proof that the
debtors demanded any application during the period when Republic Act No. 897 was in
effect, and before it was repealed by Act 1576, enacted June 16, 1956. The only demands
alleged were made in 1951 and 1952, before Republic Act 897 was passed, and such
tender was invalid under the reigning statute (R. A. 304) for the reasons previously
expressed. After Republic Act 1576 was enacted in 1956, the Philippine National Bank was
prohibited from accepting back pay certificates in discharge of pre-existing obligations.
Even if the amended answer were construed as an offer of appellants to apply the backpay
certificate to their debt, it came too late, since the amended answer was filed only on
September 19, 1957, when the prohibitory law (Republic Act 1576) was already in force.
Republic Act No. 1576 may not be condemned as being an ex post facto law, for this
constitutional principle applies only in criminal proceedings or in instances where the law
inflicts criminal punishment, but cannot be invoked to protect allegedly vested civil rights
(Prov. of Camarines Sur vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil., 600 see also Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil., 367). Neither did the amending statute
impair the obligation of contract between the parties herein, since the loan in question was
contracted before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 897, which allowed payments to the
bank by means of mere certificates of indebtedness.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants Ruperto.
UNITED STATES v. ARCEO
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edgar ARCEO, Defendant-
Appellant.
07-3296. No.

Argued April 14, 2008. -- July 28, 2008
Before FLAUM, EVANS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
Thomas D. Shakeshaft (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.Pablo DeCastro (argued), Rascia & DeCastro Chicago, IL for Defendant-Appellant.
After a brief presentation of the facts, we turn to Arceo's arguments. 3C1.1 was not appropriate
and that the district court did not adequately consider his cooperation with the government.
He also challenges his sentence, arguing that the obstruction of justice adjustment under
U.S.S.G. § While he raises three issues, his main argument is that his right to a speedy trial was
violated. The district court sentenced Arceo to 108months' imprisonment followed by a term
of supervised release. Arceo appeals. Arceo then pled guilty to the conspiracy charge,
conditioning his plea on the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. His motion was
denied. He moved to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged violation of his constitutional
right to a speedy trial. More than six years later Arceo was arrested. 846. Edgar Arceo and a
co-defendant were charged with a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to
distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
Background I.
Arceo subsequently was transported to the Palatine, Illinois, Police Department for processing.
The agents accompanied Arceo to a residence in Palatine, resulting in Salazar-Felix's arrest and
eventual prosecution. He identified his source of supply of cocaine, Jose Salazar-Felix, and
agreed to show the agents where he got the cocaine. He waived his Miranda rights and agreed
to cooperate with law enforcement. Immediately after his arrest, Arceo was interviewed by
agents. On August 11, 1999, Arceo was arrested in a parking lot in Aurora, Illinois, after
delivering approximately 5 kilograms of cocaine to a confidential informant who was working
with the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”).
Both at the time of his arrest in the parking lot and again while at the Palatine Police
Department, Arceo was advised by the DEA Task Force Officer Lou Dominguez and other agents
that they did not know when he would be charged, but that he would, in fact, be charged at a
later time after his cooperation ended.1 Law enforcement and Arceo agreed to contact each
other the next day. He identified his source of marijuana, Jesus Rodriguez-Medina, and
arrangements were made for a meeting. Arceo was released from custody in order to continue
his cooperation.
They were As a result the agents went looking for Arceo at his residence. Other agents
likewise tried to contact Arceo but did not succeed. On August 13, however, whenOfficer

Dominguez called Arceo to arrange to meet, he was unable to reach him. Law enforcement and
Arceo agreed to meet the next day. Arceo did meet with Rodriguez-Medina, who was arrested.
He arranged for a marijuana transaction on August 12 with Rodriguez-Medina. For two days
Arceo cooperated with law enforcement. After the usual law-enforcement checks in the
Northern District of Illinois, Arceo still did not turn up. unable to find him and determined he
had moved out.
On July 27, 2000, Arceo's case was reassigned to the fugitive calendar. Between November
1999 and July 2000, there were a number of court proceedings involving Rodriguez-Medina but
no docket entries reflect any activity as to Arceo. The docket does not show that an arrest
warrant was issued for Arceo. An arraignment notice was entered the next day. Enter order.”
A minute order was entered that day, stating: “The government will seek to have the defendant
detained without bond ․ as to Edgar Arceo, granted. On November 4, 1999, Arceo and
Rodriguez-Medina were charged in a one-count indictment with a cocaine and marijuana
conspiracy.
On December 20, that warrant, along with a second warrant issued December 19, were quashed
for reasons not indicated in the record, and a third bench warrant was issued. None was issued
until December 15, 2005, however. The agent who took over this case made two attempts in
2003 to have an arrest warrant issued for Arceo. No warrant was issued, so Officer Dominguez
contacted the AUSA once again in 2001 and still later in 2002, before he stopped working as a
DEA task officer. So on April 4, 2001, he contacted the Assistant United States Attorney
(“AUSA”) assigned to the case in an effort to obtain an arrest warrant. In early 2001, Officer
Dominguez discovered that no arrest warrant had been issued for Arceo.
He was living there under the assumed identity of Rowdy Sepulvida, which he admitted he
purchased from a friend. On April 4, 2006, Arceo was arrested in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania.
She explained that Arceo could not use his own name because of the problem he had in Chicago.
She also said it was about that time that Arceo beganusing the Rowdy Sepulvida name. Maria
said that they returned to the United States in 2002 and lived in Spring Grove, Pennsylvania,
near her family. She testified that she believed her husband knew he was wanted in Chicago.
According to Maria, it was her husband's idea to go to Mexico. She stated that in August 1999
she and her husband left Chicago for Mexico “because of the problem” in Chicago (without any
details about the nature of the problem) and that they lived in Mexico for about three years. A
detention hearing was held on April 5, 2006, in Pennsylvania, at which Arceo's wife of twelve
years, Maria Arceo, testified. 2

The court indicated that the government may not have done “as much as it could have” but
concluded that Arceo's attempt to avoid arrest and prosecution outweighed any negligence by
the government. The court found that Arceo was aware he had been arrested and that criminal
charges would be filed, yet chose to remove himself from the United States, later returning to
another jurisdiction under an assumed name until his arrest. The court considered the
transcript of Maria's testimony at the detention hearing and the testimony of former Task Force
Officer Dominguez about Arceo's arrest, cooperation, and flight, and then denied the motion to
dismiss. The district court held a hearing on the motion. Prior to trial Arceo moved to dismiss
the indictment.
The district court accepted his conditional plea and entered a judgment against him. His plea
was conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. 846. On April 2,
2007, Arceo pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
Arceo appeals. The court sentenced him to 108 months' imprisonment, at the bottom of the
guidelines range. 3553(a) sentencing factors, specifically including Arceo's family history and
circumstances, his lack of criminal history since 1999, and his cooperation with the government
immediately following his arrest. 3C1.1 and acceptance of responsibility, and considered the 18
U.S.C. § At sentencing the district court heard arguments relating to adjustments for
obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. §
Sixth Amendment Right to A Speedy Trial II.
See United States v. King, 338 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir.2003) (stating explicitly the standard of
review for a Speedy Trial Act claim and applying the same standard to a Sixth Amendment
speedy trial claim); see also United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir.2007) (stating
explicitly the standard of review for a constitutional speedy trial claim); United States v. Brown,
498 F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 128S.Ct. 674, 169 L.Ed.2d 528
(2007). We review a speedy trial claim de novo and review the district court's factual findings
for clear error. The government responds that there was no error because Arceo's own conduct
in evading law enforcement outweighs any government conduct contributing to the six-year and
eight-month delay following his initial arrest. Arceo's first and principal argument is that the
district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because he was deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial.
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686; see also White, 443 F.3d at 589. In doing so we assess
“whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal
defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his

right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result.” Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In determining whether a
defendant has been deprived of this speedy trial right, we consider and weigh the conduct of the
government and the defendant. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120
L.Ed.2d 520 (1992); United States v. White, 443 F.3d 582, 589 (7th Cir.2006). The Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial is triggered by an arrest, indictment, or some other official
accusation.
This lengthy delay weighs in favor of Arceo. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686.
This extraordinary delay stretches well beyond the minimum needed to trigger a further speedy
trial analysis. Here, more than six and one-half years passed from the time of Arceo's arrest in
August 1999 to his plea in April 2007. United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 597 (7th
Cir.2007); White, 443 F.3d at 589-90. A delay approaching one year is presumptively
prejudicial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182; White, 443 F.3d at 589. Unless the delay
is presumptively prejudicial, we need not consider the other factors. The length of the delay
acts as a triggering mechanism.
The government argues that the principal reason for the delay was Arceo's intentional attempt
to evade law enforcement. Arceo contends the delay is attributable to the government's
negligence. A more neutral reason such as negligence ․ should be weighted less heavily․”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Different weights should be given to different reasons
for delay: “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be
weighted heavily against the government. The second factor is the reason for the delay, and it is
this factor that is at the heart of Arceo's claim.
This error seems to have contributed to over one year's worth of the delay as it was not until
early 2001 that the fact that no arrest warrant had been issued was first discovered. Nothing in
the record before us suggests that the delay caused by this error is attributable to the
government. Then on July 27, 2000, this case was reassigned to the fugitive calendar, which
implies that someone in the clerk's office and/or court staff believed there was an outstanding
warrant for Arceo's arrest. From the best we can glean from the record, for several months no
one noticed that an arrest warrant had not been issued. For one, when Arceo was indicted on
November 4, 1999, a minute entry reflects that an order for Arceo's arrest and detention would
be issued but, for some inexplicable reason-the government suggests a clerical error in the
clerk's office-none was entered. Here there were a few reasons for the delay.
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Thus, while we consider the reason for this part of
the total delay, we do not weight it heavily against the government. This negligence
contributed to the delay from April 2001 through December 15, 2005, approximately four years

and eight months. However, Arceo has offered nothing to suggest that the government acted
intentionally in causing this delay. The government's apparent inaction in response to
repeated notification that no warrant had been issued seems negligent. That warrant was later
quashed and ultimately a warrant issued on December 19, 2005. In total in the next few years,
the DEA agents made five attempts to have an arrest warrant issued, without success until
December 15, 2005. It was in early 2001 that Officer Dominguez discovered that no arrest
warrant had been issued, so he contacted the AUSA assigned to the case in an effort to obtain an
arrest warrant.
Id. at 652-53, 112 S.Ct. 2686. The Court deferred to the lower court's finding that the delay was
attributable to the government's negligence. Id. at 649-50, 112 S.Ct. 2686. He later was found
pursuant to a mass credit check on several thousand persons subject to outstanding arrest
warrants. Approximately two and one-half years after his indictment, Doggett returned to the
United States, where he lived openly under his own name. The DEA attempted to catch
Doggett on his return to the United States, but these efforts ceased with time. When law
enforcement attempted to arrest him, they learned that he had left the country a few days
before. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 648, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Doggett was indicted with others for a drug
conspiracy. Arceo likens his case to Doggett, in which the Supreme Court held that an eight
and one-half year delay between the defendant's indictment and arrest violated his speedy trial
rights. His actions support the conclusion that he was hiding from authorities in a calculated
effort to avoid arrest and prosecution. He returned instead to another jurisdiction hundreds of
miles away in Pennsylvania, where he lived under an assumed name. Arceo intentionally fled
to Mexico for three years, and returned to the United States, but not to the Chicago area. But
most of the blame for the delay lies with Arceo himself.
Thus, the district court's finding in this regard is not erroneous. Both at the time of his arrest
in the parking lot and again while at the police department, Arceo was advised by Officer
Dominguez and other agents that he would be charged, though they did not know whenthe
charges would be filed. This finding is well-supported by the record. While Arceo may have
been unaware of the indictment against him until his April 2006 arrest, the district court found
that when Arceo fled in August 1999, he was aware that criminal charges were forthcoming. Id.
at 653-54, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Another significant difference is that Doggett had no knowledge of
the charges against him until his arrest. While Arceo was arrested relatively quickly-three and
one-half months-after the December 2005 arrest warrant was issued, this was due in part, no
doubt, to good investigative work and perhaps some good luck. It cannot be said that law
enforcement could have quickly and easily found him within minutes if only they had made an
effort. Here, in contrast, Arceo was living under an assumed name: he was in hiding. Id. at
653, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Thus, the Court observed that for six years, the government investigators
made no serious effort to find Doggett, but had they done so “they could have found him within

minutes.” Id. at 649, 112 S.Ct. 2686. Two facts easily distinguish this case from Doggett: First,
Doggett “lived openly under his own name” upon his return to the United States.
Thus, the reason for the delay weighs in favor of the government. While the government may
have acted negligently, Arceo acted intentionally and he therefore bears more blame for the
delay. Arceo argues that he was using an assumed name simply for employment purposes, but
the district court could reasonably reject this explanation. This testimony does not contradict
the officer's testimony that he and others had discussed with Arceo several times on August 11
that he would be charged following his cooperation. Arceo makes much of testimony by Officer
Dominguez about conversations with Arceo “as to when he would be charged with a crime” and
whether the officer told Arceo on August 12 that he was going to be charged, to which Officer
Dominguez responded “no” and “I don't recall.”
The fact that Arceo moved to dismiss the indictment for a speedy trial violation cuts in his
favor; however, the fact that he knew that charges were certain but fled the jurisdiction to avoid
prosecution cuts against him. Upon fleeing to Mexico, he was no longer cooperating, so he was
on notice that charges would soon follow. But Arceo had been arrested and knew that he would
be charged following his cooperation. And Arceo did move to dismiss the indictment, asserting
his speedy trial rights. See id. at 653-54, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (stating that if defendant knew of his
indictment for years before he was arrested, the third factor “would be weighed heavily against
him,” but where he was not aware of the indictment prior to his arrest, he “is not to be taxed for
invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest”). Arceo was not informed that the
indictment had been returned against him until his arrest. The third factor is somewhat
neutral.
Considering all of the circumstances including the absence of any particularized prejudice to
Arceo, we conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that Arceo had not shown a
deprivation of his constitutional speedy trial right. This conduct weighs heavily against him
and outweighs the government's negligence. He acted intentionally and deliberately in
attempting to avoid arrest and prosecution. Here, in sharp contrast, Arceo is at fault.
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657-58, 112 S.Ct. 2686. But there, Doggett could not be blamed for the
delay; but for the government's egregious negligence, he would have been prosecuted six years
earlier than he was. Again, Arceo likens his case to Doggett where the presumptive prejudice
caused by the delay was sufficient to warrant relief for a speedy trial violation. Oriedo, 498F.3d
at 600. Yet this presumed prejudice is not sufficient to carry a speedy trial claim “absent a
strong showing on the other Barker factors.” Id. at 655-56, 112 S.Ct. 2686; Oriedo, 498F.3d at
600. Proof of particular prejudice is not necessary in every case; in some cases of excessive
delay prejudice may be presumed. He argues that the extraordinary length of the delay suffices

to establish prejudice. Arceo does not claim that he suffered any particularized prejudice
caused by the delay. The fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant.
Obstruction of Justice III.
Porter, 145 F.3d at 903 (quoting Draves, 103 F.3d at 1337). 3C1.1, cmt. n. 5(d); see Porter, 145
F.3d at 903, our cases draw a line between “ ‘panicked, instinctive flight,’ ” which does not
warrant an enhancement, and “ ‘calculated evasion,’ ” which does. 3C1.1 states that “avoiding or
fleeing from arrest” generally will not warrant an obstruction of justice enhancement, U.S.S.G. §
While the application note to § Porter, 145 F.3d at 903 (quoting United States v. Draves, 103
F.3d 1328, 1338(7th Cir.1997)). 3C1.1 is “ ‘whether the defendant's conduct evidences a willful
intent to obstruct justice.’ ” The pertinent question under § United States v. King, 506 F.3d
532, 535 (7th Cir.2007) (per curiam); United States v. Porter, 145 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir.1998).
3C1.1. We review an obstruction of justice finding for clear error, giving deference to the district
court's application of the guidelines to the facts. Arceo's next challenge is to the district court's
application of the obstruction of justice adjustment under U.S.S.G. §
Arceo knew he would be charged with a crime; yet he fled the jurisdiction, living in Mexico for
several years and later returning to the United States, relocating to distant Pennsylvania under
an assumed name. See King, 506 F.3d at 535 (concluding challenge to obstruction of justice
finding would be frivolous where defendant while on pretrial release absconded for two months,
obtained a driver's license using a stolen social security number, and used that false identity to
buy a car); Porter, 145F.3d at 903-04 (concluding obstruction of justice enhancement
warranted where defendant, though not yet arrested, knew anindictment against him was
imminent and nonetheless fled the jurisdiction and changed his identity). Arceo engaged in
conduct that clearly supports the obstruction of justice finding.
We agree that Arceo's conduct was a calculated effort to evade prosecution, and we find no error
in the district court's obstruction of justice finding. But again he offers no evidence to
substantiate this assertion. Arceo also suggests that he left Chicago because of fear of
retaliation from the individuals who were arrested because of his cooperation. Arceo suggests
that he had reason to believe he might not be charged because of his substantial assistance to
law enforcement over two days, but he points to nothing in the record-nothing said by Officer
Dominguez, another DEA agent, or any other law enforcement or government agent-to make
such a belief reasonable. Nothing in the record suggests that these assertions were ever
retracted. While Officer Dominguez did not tell Arceo specifically when he would be charged
and did not discuss with him on August 12 whether he would be charged at all, it is undisputed
that Arceo was told several times on August 11, both when he was arrested and while he was
being processed at the police station, that he would in fact be charged. The record belies this

claim. He claims that he only knew that he might be charged. Arceo argues that it is not clear
that he fled the jurisdiction because he knew he would be charged with a crime.
Substantial Cooperation IV.
United States v. Harvey, 516 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir.2008). 3553(a) factors. But this
presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the sentence is unreasonable when considered
against the § Id. (citing Rita v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2462-63, 168L.Ed.2d
203 (2007)). A properly calculated within-guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable.
United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Gall v. United States, --- U.S. --
--, 128S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). The third issue is whether the within-
guidelines sentence was reasonable given Arceo's substantial cooperation with the government.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
In his view, he should have received a below-guidelines sentence. He contends that his
sentence was unreasonable because it did not adequately account for his substantial cooperation
with law enforcement. Arceo's objection is more pointed. 3553(a) factors. The record also
reflects the district court's consideration of the § The record shows that he did. 3553(a) factors
that might warrant a non-guidelines sentence. Nor does he dispute that he had an opportunity
to identify the § Arceo does not argue that the district court erred in calculating the applicable
guidelines range.
See United States v. Willis, 523 F.3d 762, 770 (7th Cir.2008) ( “[T]he district court has
substantial discretion in choosing a reasonable sentence.”). This case exemplifies what
sentencing discretion is all about. Neither fairness nor the requirement that a sentence be no
greater than necessary compels the conclusion that a sentence at the very bottom of the
guidelines range was unreasonable. The 108-month sentence adequately accounts for Arceo's
cooperation along with the other facts and circumstances of the case. While the court could
have relied on Arceo's cooperation as a basis for going below the guidelines range, it was not
required to do so. We think this effective 14-month reduction adequately accounts for Arceo's
cooperation. Thus, Arceo received 108 months instead of 122. The court sentenced him at the
low end of the guidelines range (108-135 months) instead of the midrange-where the judge said
he typically sentences defendants-based in large measure on Arceo's cooperation. The district
court did account for Arceo's cooperation though. 3
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Arceo's
sentence. Arceo has not shown that his sentence at the very bottom of the guidelines range was
unreasonable.
Conclusion V.

For the foregoing reasons, Arceo's conviction and sentence are Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1 For example, on direct examination Officer Dominguez stated that “we told him [Arceo] that
we didn't know when we would be charging him, but that we would charge him at a later time
after his cooperation was done.” The transcript of that hearing contradicts this claim. Arceo
also claims that Officer Dominguez testified at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that Arceo
was told that he “may” be charged. However, he did not present any testimony, not even his
own, or any other evidence to support his assertion. Arceo argues that he was not told that he
definitely would be indicted, but only that it was a possibility. .
2 We have no basis for concluding that the district court erred in disbelieving this testimony,
which was more favorable to Arceo than Maria's initial testimony. On redirect, however, Maria
claimed that she had no idea what the problem in Chicago was and that Arceo started using
Sepulvida's name just so he could work. .
3 That determination does not appear to be the product of an unconstitutional motive. 5K1.1
motion. From the government's perspective, Arceo's deliberate flight made him unqualified for
a § His flight left him unable to follow through with his initial cooperation by testifying, if
necessary, at Rodriguez-Medina's and Salazar-Felix's trials. Moreover, although Arceo initially
cooperated with law enforcement, providing valuable information which led to the arrest and
convictions of Rodriguez-Medina and Salazar-Felix, a short while later he fled the jurisdiction.
5K1.1 motion was based on an unconstitutional motive. Arceo does not argue that the
government's decision not to make a § United States v. Bosque, 312 F.3d 313, 318 (7th
Cir.2002). “[W]e may review the government's refusal to move for a departure based on
substantial assistance only for unconstitutional motive.” 5K1.1 motion and the government's
explanation for not making the motion-“office policy”-was a “whim.” Arceo also suggests that
his cooperation would justify a U.S.S.G. § .
TINDER, Circuit Judge.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 5, 1904

G.R. No. 1491
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
LORENZO ARCEO ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Crispin Oben for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
The defendants were charged with entering the house of one Alejo Tiongson on the night of
February 20, 1903, armed with deadly weapons, against the will of the said Alejo Tiongson.
The evidence shows that Alejo Tiongson lived in his house in company with his wife,
Alejandra San Andres, and his wife’s sister, Marcela San Andres. On the night of the 20th of
February, 1903, between 8 and 9 o’clock at night, the accused, one of whom was armed
with a gun and the other two each with bolo, entered the house of the said Alejo Tiongson
without first obtaining the permission of any person. It appears from the proof that there
was a light burning in the house at the time the accused entered, which was immediately
put out by one of the accused; that Alejo and his wife had retired for the night; that Marcela
was still sitting up sewing; that as soon as Marcela had discovered the accused in the house
she awoke Alejo and his wife; that immediately after the accused were in the house, one of
them wounded, by means of a bolo, Alejo Tiongson, the owner the house; that the accused
to their own use a certain quantity of money; that the accused took and carried away out of
the said house toward the fields the said Marcela San Andres and illtreated her.
The evidence on the part of the defense tended to prove an alibi. The court below found that
this testimony was not to be believed. We find no occasion, from the proof, to change this
finding of fact.
The court below found that the defendants were each guilty of the crime of entering the
house of another, with violence and intimidation, which crime is punishable under
subsection 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code, and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned
for the term of three years six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and also
imposed upon each a fine of 271 pesos and costs. In reaching this conclusion the court took
into consideration the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and the extenuating
circumstance provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code.
Article 491 of the Penal Code provides that -
He who shall enterthe residence (dwelling house) ofanother against the will of the tenant thereofshall be punished
with the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,259 pesetas.
Subsection 2 provides that -
If the act shall be executed with violence or intimidation the penalty shall be prision correccional in the medium and
maximum grade, and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.

Under the facts presented in this case, was the trial court justified in finding that the
accused were guilty of the crime of entering the residence of another against his will and
with violence or intimidation? We think that it was. We are not of the opinion that the
statute relates simply to the method by which one may pass the threshold of the residence
of another without his consent. We think it relates also to the conduct, immediately after
entrance, of him who enters the house of another without his consent. He who being armed
with deadly weapons enters the residence of another in the nighttime, without consent, and
immediately commits acts of violence and intimidation, is guilty of entering the house of
another with violence and intimidation and is punishable under subsection 2 of article 491 of
the Penal Code. (See Viada, vol. 3, p. 303; Gazette of Spain of the 28th of March, 1883;Viada, vol. 6, p. 363;
Gazette of Spain of the 19th of May, 1892,p. 165.)
The inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights
declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the
house of another without the consent of its owners or occupants.
The privacy of the home – the place of abode, the place where a man with his family may
dwell in peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife and children unmolested by anyone,
even the king, except in rare cases – has always been regarded by civilized nations as one
of the most sacred personal rights to which men are entitled. Both the common and the civil
law guaranteed to man the right of absolute protection to the privacy of his home. The king
was powerful; he was clothed with majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions,
the humblest citizen or subject might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the
monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of
the kingly prerogatives. The poorest and most humble citizen or subject may, in his cottage,
no matter how frail or humble it is, bid defiance to all the powers of the state; the wind, the
storm and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-beaten parts, but the king may
not enter against its owner’s will; none of his forces dare to cross the threshold of even the
humblest tenement without its owner’s consent.
“A man’s house is his castle,” has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the
earth. His protection therein has become a matter of constitutional protection in England,
America, and Spain, as well as in other countries.
However, under the police power of the state the authorities may compel entrance to
dwelling houses against the will of the owners for sanitary purposes. The government has
this right upon grounds of public policy. It has a right to protect the health and lives of all of
its people. A man can not insist upon the privacy of his home when a question of the health
and life of himself, his family, and that of the community is involved. This private right must
be subject to the public welfare.
It may be argued that one who enters the dwelling house of another is not liable unless he
has been forbidden – i.e., the phrase “against the will of the owner” means that there must
have been an express prohibition to enter. In other words, if one enters the dwelling house

of another without the knowledge of the owner he has not entered against his will. This
construction is certainly not tenable, because entrance is forbidden generally under the
spirit of the law unless permission to enter is expressly given. To allow this construction
would destroy the very spirit of the law. Under the law no one has the right to enter the
home of another without the other’s express consent. Therefore, to say that one’s home is
open for the entrance of all who are not expressly forbidden. This is not the rule. The
statute must not be given that construction. No one can enter the dwelling house of
another, in there Islands, without rendering himself liable under the law, unless he has the
express consent of the owner and unless the one seeking entrance comes within some of
the exceptions dictated by the law or by a sound public policy.
So jealously did the people of England regard this right to enjoy, unmolested, the privacy of
their houses, that they might even take the life of the unlawful intruder, if it be nighttime.
This was also the sentiment of the Romans expressed by Tully: “Quid enim sanctius quid omni
religione munitius,quam domus uniuscu jusque civium.”
It may be argued that the offense punishable under article 491 of the Penal Code
corresponds to the crime of burglary at the common law. It is true that the offense of
entering the house of another without the latter’s consent and the common-law crime of
burglary are both offenses against the habitation of individuals. But these crimes are
distinctively different. The punishment for burglary is “to prevent the breaking and entering
of a dwelling house of another in the nighttime for the purpose of committing a felony
therein,” while the object of article 491 is to prevent entrance into the dwelling house of
another at any time, either by day or by night, for any purpose, against the will of its
owner.
In burglary there must have existed an intent to enter for the purpose of committing a
felony, while under article 491 of the Penal Code entrance against the will, simply, of the
owner is punishable. Under the provisions of the Penal Code entrance in the nighttime can
only be regarded as an aggravation of the offense of entering.
We are of the opinion, under all the facts in the case, that the extenuating circumstance
provided for in article 11 of the Penal Code should not be considered in favor of these
defendants.
We find that the defendants are guilty of the crime of entering the house of another with
violence and intimidation, without the consent of the owner, with the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and hereby impose the maximum degree of prision correccional,
and the fine provided for in subsection of 2 article 491 of the Penal Code should be imposed.
The sentence of the court below is therefore modified, and each of the said defendants is
hereby sentenced to be imprisoned for the term of six years of prision correccional, and each to
pay a fine of 271 pesos and the costs of this suit or in default thereof to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment.

Arellano,C. J., Torres, Willard and Mapa,JJ., concur.
Cooper and McDonough, JJ., dissent.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
July 26, 1918
G.R. No. L-12097
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LIPA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TAAL, objector-appellant.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTO TOMAS and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, objectors-appellees.
Hartigan & Welch for petitioner and appellant.
, J.:
This was a proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Batangas had in accordance with the provisions
of the Land Registration Act. The court below refused to register two of the parties of land included in
the petition, and from that part of the decision petitioner has appealed to this court. The municipality
of Taal unsuccessfully opposed the registration of one of the parcels of land included in the petition,
and has appealed from that part of the decision was the owner of the tract claimed by the
municipality.
The appeal of the petitioner relates to two tracts of land, one of which is described in the petition as
parcel, 74, the registration of which was opposed by the municipality of Santo Tomas, and the other is
described in the petition as parcel 71, lot 9, the registration of which was opposed by the Director of
Forestry.
Parcel 74. – This is a tract of land containing 544 square meters, situated between the front wall of
the atrium of the church and the public highway in the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of
Batangas. Concerning this tract of land the trial court, said:
The church applies for the registration of a tract of land containing an area of 12,995 square meters,
as described in the plan Exhibit A-2, to which the acting provincial fiscal and Attorney Modesto
Castillo, in representation of the municipality opposed. The objector maintains that the land applied
for, known as Plaza Malvar and situated in front of the church walls, is a public square under the
control of the municipality of Santo Tomas.

Counsel for the petitioner informed the court that he amended the application for registration so as to
exclude from the land applied for that part thereof included within the walls of the church, inasmuch
as it had already been registered formerly in accordance with a notice in the Official Gazette of April
10, 1912, p. 809, parcel 13, and the court agreed to such amendment and exclusion of the land
already registered, included within the walls, the application being based on the land designated as
Plaza Malvar; in other words, on the area included within numbers, 1, 7, 8, and 9, marked in the plan
with letter (a).
The petitioner presented three witnesses to support its application, and the opposing party, i.e., the
municipality, presented also three witnesses who testified in its favor, and introduced as evidence p.
809 of the Official Gazette of April 10, 1912, referring to parcel 13, lot 1, of the application of land
where the convent and the church with its courtyard are located.
After a careful study of the testimony of the witnesses of both parties, inasmuch as none of them has
presented documents of ownership, we believe that – considering the location of the land, which is
said to be Plaza Malvar and which according to the municipality constitutes a square and according to
the church is its own property – the yard of the church being surrounded by walls, we cannot
understand why if the tract of land in question really belonged to it, the church allowed it to remain
outside its walls. It must be taken into account that it is prevalent custom, as seem in several towns,
to have the yards of churches readily recognized by their surrounding fences of stone or other
materials. In the case at bar, the church inclosed its yard with walls, and the land in litigation is
outside the said walls, forming a square at the side of a public street. Furthermore, if the portion
constituting the subject matter of the controversy known as Plaza Malvar really belonged to the
church, we cannot understand why the church in applying for the inspection of its title to parcel 13, lot
1, p. 809 of the Official Gazette of April 10, 1912, had particularly described as its boundary on the
northeast the Plaza Malvar which it now claims as its own. This amounts to an admission by the
church itself that the parcel of land which it now claims was a public square which, according to law,
comes under the control of the municipality. These facts and the very act of the church itself militate
against its claim.
The oral evidence of both parties contradict each other. The witnesses of the church state that
formerly the parish priests exercised certain acts of ownership over this portion of the land, such as
for example, prohibiting the tying of animals there to avoid filth in the place; while those of the
municipality have shown that this parcel of land was formerly used as a market place during certain
days of the week, and these facts have not been contradicted by the petitioner. The mere fact that a
certain priest had really prohibited the tying of animals in this parcel of land does not, according to our
opinion, constitute an act whereby the church can be considered as the owner of the land, for,
considering that the land in question lies in front of a sacred place, as the church, it seems rather
disrespectful that one should tie animals there, not to say anything of the fact that such practice
would pollute the very place where the public which attends the religious ceremonies would pass.
Hence, it is but natural that the parish priest should prohibit it, their authority at that time under our
former Government being absolute in the towns where all obeyed them either out of respect or of

fear, and for this reason, the said prohibitions and the acts testified to by the witnesses of the
petitioner are insufficient to give the latter a title of ownership. On the other hand, the acts performed
by the municipality and by the church itself, which in its application has admitted that the land in
litigation belonged to the municipality or Plaza Malvar – the parish priests of the towns of the
Philippines took particular pains for here the yard or plazas of the churches, as in this case, for here
the yard of the church was fenced with the walls – constitute clear and sufficient evidence of
ownership performed by the municipality.
Wherefore, the court denies the petitioner’s application for registration, as amended, of that portion of
the land comprised as amended, of that portion of the land comprised with numbers, 1, 7, 8 and 9 of
the plan Exhibit A-2, that is, the land in litigation known as Plaza Malvar, which is outside of the walls
and according to the evidence, a public square.
We have examined the evidence relative to this parcel of land, and are of the opinion that the court
below did not err in refusing to decree its registration as the property of the petitioner. The so -called
acts of dominion mentioned in the decision of the court, and which are invoked by petitioner in its
brief as the sole ground upon which it relies to show its ownership of the land in dispute, are wholly
insufficient for that purpose. The decision must be affirmed as regards the denial of the petition of
applicant for the registration of parcel 74.
Parcel 71. – This is a tract of land in the municipality of Rosario, Province of Batangas. The petition of
the applicant for the registration of this tract was opposed by Benedicto de Villa, with respect to
78,473 square meters, and by the Director of Forestry, with respect to 71 hectares which he contends
are public forest land. The petitioner withdrew its application as regards the land claimed by Benedicto
de Villa, and the trial court excluded from the decree of registration the 71 hectares claimed by the
Director of Forestry as being public forest land. The decision of the trial court, regarding parcel 71, lot
9, is as follows:
Respecting parcel 71, lot 9, of which the Bureau of Forestry and the municipality of Rosario were the
objectors, both being represented by the acting provincial fiscal, the evidence has shown that the land
applied for by the church should be considered as a forest, for there are no signs of cultivation therein,
but on the other hand, there are trees of much importance and some trees of the first group. This
piece of land is approximately 71 hectares, as shown in the plan Exhibit A-1, marked therein with the
letter (a,) and Exhibit 2 of the objectors, and is situated in the southeastern part of the land applied
for. Hence, there should be adjudged to the church that part of the whole area described in the plan
Exhibit F-2 after deducting the 71 hectares claimed by the Bureau of Forestry and the area of 78,473
square meters marked as lot 9 in the name of Benedicto de Villa and should therefore be considered
as the property of the latter – all in accordance with the cession or dismissal prayed for by the
petitioner during the trial.
We have carefully examined the evidence adduced by the petitioner regarding that part of parcel 71,
lot 9, excluded by the court below upon the opposition of the Bureau of Forestry, but are unable to
find the remotest indication that it was the property of the petitioner. There is no suggestion that

there has ever been a grant of this land from the Government, and there is no such proof of
possession as to warrant us in decreeing title in accordance with section 54, paragraph 6, Act No. 926,
as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1908 which reads as follows:
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act
of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as
against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July,
nineteen hundred and four, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received
the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.
The only proof of cultivation of the land in question is that at times part of it has been cultivated by
the caiñgin system. The evidence does not show how long this has been done or what portion of the
land was so cultivated. We take judicial notice of the fact that the caiñgin system of cultivation is
essentially temporary in character. Apart from evidence regarding the occasional cultivation of the
property by the caiñgin system, the only proof of possession is that cattle were occasionally pastured
on part of the land, and that some trees were cut on it under the direction of persons ostensibly acting
on behalf of the petitioner. Obviously, none of these acts constituted compliance with the
requirements of the statute as above quoted. We are of the opinion that the decision of the lower
court concerning this tract must be affirmed.
Parcel 30, Lot No. 13. – This parcel of land is described in the petition as follows:
Parcel 30 (lot No. 13). – Situated in the barrio of Balibago, municipality of Taal. Bounded on the NE.
by the property of Matilde Martinez and Juan Cabrera; on the SE. by the property of Matilde Martinez
and Juan Cabrera; on the SW. by the road; on the NW. by the properties of Andres Collantes and
Hilariona Collantes. Area: 1,706 square meters.
The registration of this parcel of land as the property of the petitioner was opposed by the municipality
of Taal, but the opposition was overruled, and the registration of the land on behalf of the petitioner
was decreed by the trial court. From this part of the decision, the municipality of Taal has appealed.
The decision of the trial court regarding lot 13, parcel 30, is as follows:
On parcel 30, lot 13, to the inscription whereof the municipality of Taal objects, there is a chapel of
mixed materials.
The preponderance of evidence has shown that the land came from one Maria Caibigan, alias Apong,
who then gave it to the Roman Catholic Church, and no one has presented any claim against the
church, according to witness Sebastian Lontok, 86 years of age, who was gobernadorcillo in 1862 and
1867. He stated that as gobernadorcillo he knew that the land was donated to the Catholic church and
that the chapel had been administered by the parish priests of Taal; but these proofs refer only to the
land occupied by the chapel, and there should be excluded from the plan Exhibit X-1 that which upon
by the petitioner and the objector in the hearing of September 8, 1915, and the petitioner stated that

the petitioner be considered as thus amended, excluding said part claimed, that is, the part where the
stone walls stand, which should be considered as belonging to the municipality of Taal.
It is contended in the brief filed on behalf of the municipality of Taal, as appellant, with regard to the
registration of lot 13, parcel 30, that the evidence shows that the land in dispute is the property of the
municipality, but, as there was no application by the municipality for the registration of this land, our
inquiry must be limited to determining whether the evidence does or does not show that it is the
property of the applicant.
With respect to this tract of land, we hold that the clear preponderance of the evidence establishes the
facts that the land in question was originally the property of Juan Collantes and his wife Maria
Kaibigan; that in 1862 or 1863 they gave the land to the people of the town of San Luis, now a barrio
of Taal, so that a building might be erected upon it to serve as a meeting place or tribunal for the
transaction of the public business of the town; that a building was constructed there for that purpose
and so used for many years; that it was also used as a place of public worship; that about the year
1879 the first building erected on the land was destroyed by fire; that the people of the town, with the
assistance of the parish priest, then built the present chapel or visita on the land in which the patron
said of the town is housed; that the cost of maintaining the building is defrayed by the contributions of
the people composing the congregation of the chapel, who elect a person to take charge of the chapel
and act as custodian of the funds collected for its upkeep; that the Catholic parish priest of Taal goes
to the chapel to say mass whenever he is called upon to do so by the congregation of the chapel and
is paid for so doing out of the chapel funds.
The petitioner in this case is the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa, a corporation sole. We are of the
opinion that the title of this corporation to the land in question is not established by the showing that
the Catholic priest of Taal has from time to time said mass in the chapel existing on that land. Even if
we were to assume that the Catholic parish priest of Taal is the agent of the applicant corporation,
there is nothing incompatible with the ownership by the congregation of the chapel and of the lot
occupied by it, in the celebration of mass in the chapel by the priest of the parish.
It is not necessary for us to determine whether the chapel and the lot in dispute are the property of
the municipality of Taal, or of some entity or person. The only applicant for the registration of title is
the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa described in the petition as a “unipersonal corporation duly
organized in accordance with the laws of the Philippine Islands.” We are not justified in permitting the
registration of the title to the land in question in favor of this applicant merely because the proof does
not show that the land belongs to the opponent.
One of the primary and fundamental purposes of the registration of land under the Torrens system is
to secure to the owner an absolute, indefeasible title, free from all encumbrances and claims
whatsoever, except those mentioned in the certificate of title, and, so far as it is possible, to make the
certificate issued to the owner by the court, absolute proof of such title. In order, however, that the
petitioner for registration of his land under the Torrens system shall be permitted to have the same
registered and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title finally issued, the burden is

upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the lands which he is
attempting to have registered. The petitioner is not entitled to have his lands registered under the
Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his
lands. In order that land may be registered under the Torrens system, the petitioner must show, even
though there is no opposition, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple, of the same. Courts are
not justified in registering property under the Torrens system in the name of the petitioner simply
because there is no opposition offered. In view of the fact that the entire revenues of the state under
certain conditions are made subject to the payment of damages for errors in the wrongful registration
of property, courts should insist upon unquestionable proof of absolute ownership in fee simple on the
part of the petitioner. The petitioner may be the owner, as a matter of fact, of the land and yet be
unable to furnish satisfactory proof of the kind and yet be unable to furnish satisfactory proof of the
kind required for registration under the Torrens system at the time of the presentation of his petition
for registration. The denial of the petition for registration is not conclusive proof that the petitioner is
not the owner. The denial of a petition for registration simply indicates that he has not furnished that
kind of proof showing an absolute title in fee simple which is required under the Torrens system. It is
the duty of the courts, even in the absence of any opposition, to require the petitioner to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as it is possible, that he is
the owner in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to have registered. (Maloles vs. Director of
Lands, 25 Phil. Rep., 548.)
As the evidence does not show that lot 13 of parcel 30 is the property of the applicant corporation, the
decision of the lower court concerning this parcel must be reversed.
Costs. – The petition for the registration of the property described therein was filed before the passage
of Act No. 2556, and the costs demandable under the law then in force were paid by the petitioner.
Act No. 2556 provides for the payment of higher costs in land registration proceedings. By the terms
of the Act its provisions are made applicable to land registration proceedings pending at the time it
took effect. The lower court made an order requiring the petitioner to pay the difference between the
costs paid under the former law, in force when the proceeding was commenced, and the amount due
as costs under Act No. 2556. Petitioner appeals from this order and contends that the application of
Act No. 2556 to pending proceedings for the registration of title is void as being ex post facto, as
impairing the obligation of a contract, and as depriving petitioner of property without due process of
law. None of these contentions can be upheld. The Act in question is not an ex post facto law, as it is
not penal in its nature.
It has long been settled that the phrase “ex post facto laws” relate to penal and criminal laws which
punish a party for acts antecedently down which were not punishable at all, or not punishable to the
extent or in the manner prescribed. In short ex post facto laws relate to penal and criminal
proceedings, which impose punishment or forfeitures, and not to civil proceedings, which affect private
rights retrospectively.” (Ency. of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, vol. 4, 517, and cases cited in Note
29.)

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