This report summarizes an inspection of the Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam in Corinna, Maine. The dam is classified as low hazard but is in unsatisfactory condition due to vegetation growth, erosion, and potential settling issues. Hydraulic modeling found the spillway can pass a 100-year storm but a breach could overtop a downstream road. Recommendations include removing vegetation, placing riprap, investigating settling, and classifying the dam as low hazard.
Dangers from surface & Underground water Rathin Biswas
Dangers from surface & underground water and precautionary measures including statutory provisions and various conditions suggested by D.G.M.S. from time to time.
Stability Standards and Testing of Commercial Vessels on Inland Waters (ISS)NASBLA
The new Inland Stability Standard that the Westlawn Institute of Marine Technology is developing for NASBLA is discussed and also the cost-effective training program being developed to equip state law-enforcement personnel to inspect and approve such vessels' stability as either safe for operation or unsafe and not approved. Implementation of ISS and the associated training program will serve to close this gap in safety standards, provide firm guidance for state regulators to enhance public safety.
The U.S. Department of Interior will make a decision on whether they plan to lease the North Aleutian Basin (Bristol Bay) for offshore oil and gas drilling that could jeopardize fisheries, wildlife and the communities they support while offering few jobs and benefits to local residents.
Be Involved: Attend a presentation and discussion! Hear the facts, discuss the proposal, and learn how to comment to decision-makers by the September 21st comments deadline. There will be refreshments, information and a chance to sound off! It’s free and open to the public.
Tuesday August 25th: 7pm @ the Sand Point City Council Chambers
If you cannot join in person, call in by teleconference!
Call toll free: 866-469-3239, passcode 56213498.
Questions or need more information? Visit www.protectfishing.wordpress.com
Sponsored by World Wildlife Fund
Designing an API for the Internet of ThingsKevin Swiber
In the near future, everything will be connected: cities, enterprises, human beings, and more. This reality is just over the horizon, and it brings one of the largest challenges in building distributed systems. Today, developers often look to RESTful Web APIs to solve these problems. Are current trends in API design really prepared to handle the demands of the future? What’s missing from the equation? Learn new patterns for modeling Web APIs using state machines, hypermedia, and reactive streams to meet tomorrow’s challenges and make a solid attempt at standing the test of time.
UX Antwerp Meetup, 22nd of November 2016 - Xavier Massaut, Head of Product Experience at Stepstone (Brussels, Belgium)
"Pitfalls & opportunities of UX Design in enterprise"
Nowadays, more and more companies are internalising UX Design activities. While benefits of having a dedicated in-house design team are numerous, there are challenges ahead too. From culture fit to methodology and agility, you'll get insights on surviving and grow as a designer and eventually become successful as a team.
– Xavier is Head of Product Experience at StepStone, one of the most successful online job boards in Europe today. Before this, he was team leader & design partner for 11 years at Tentwelve, working for different companies such as Adobe, Bozar, Eastpak & La Monnaie.
Dangers from surface & Underground water Rathin Biswas
Dangers from surface & underground water and precautionary measures including statutory provisions and various conditions suggested by D.G.M.S. from time to time.
Stability Standards and Testing of Commercial Vessels on Inland Waters (ISS)NASBLA
The new Inland Stability Standard that the Westlawn Institute of Marine Technology is developing for NASBLA is discussed and also the cost-effective training program being developed to equip state law-enforcement personnel to inspect and approve such vessels' stability as either safe for operation or unsafe and not approved. Implementation of ISS and the associated training program will serve to close this gap in safety standards, provide firm guidance for state regulators to enhance public safety.
The U.S. Department of Interior will make a decision on whether they plan to lease the North Aleutian Basin (Bristol Bay) for offshore oil and gas drilling that could jeopardize fisheries, wildlife and the communities they support while offering few jobs and benefits to local residents.
Be Involved: Attend a presentation and discussion! Hear the facts, discuss the proposal, and learn how to comment to decision-makers by the September 21st comments deadline. There will be refreshments, information and a chance to sound off! It’s free and open to the public.
Tuesday August 25th: 7pm @ the Sand Point City Council Chambers
If you cannot join in person, call in by teleconference!
Call toll free: 866-469-3239, passcode 56213498.
Questions or need more information? Visit www.protectfishing.wordpress.com
Sponsored by World Wildlife Fund
Designing an API for the Internet of ThingsKevin Swiber
In the near future, everything will be connected: cities, enterprises, human beings, and more. This reality is just over the horizon, and it brings one of the largest challenges in building distributed systems. Today, developers often look to RESTful Web APIs to solve these problems. Are current trends in API design really prepared to handle the demands of the future? What’s missing from the equation? Learn new patterns for modeling Web APIs using state machines, hypermedia, and reactive streams to meet tomorrow’s challenges and make a solid attempt at standing the test of time.
UX Antwerp Meetup, 22nd of November 2016 - Xavier Massaut, Head of Product Experience at Stepstone (Brussels, Belgium)
"Pitfalls & opportunities of UX Design in enterprise"
Nowadays, more and more companies are internalising UX Design activities. While benefits of having a dedicated in-house design team are numerous, there are challenges ahead too. From culture fit to methodology and agility, you'll get insights on surviving and grow as a designer and eventually become successful as a team.
– Xavier is Head of Product Experience at StepStone, one of the most successful online job boards in Europe today. Before this, he was team leader & design partner for 11 years at Tentwelve, working for different companies such as Adobe, Bozar, Eastpak & La Monnaie.
There are several documentaries about the engineering disasters assoc.pdfanshuanil26
There are several documentaries about the engineering disasters associated with Hurricane
Katrina There are equally as many publications on the topic. Review at least three publications
(not blogs or media reports or public opinion-based sources) to address the following questions
What failed Why it failed Possible corrective actions Who was at fault and why Write a 3-5
page review addressing the afore-mentioned topics and include the following as well Describe in
detail what ethical issues may have been partly/wholly responsible for the failure Be sure to
address lack of professionalism or conscientiousness that may have helped lead to this failure
You must cite references appropriately and there must be at least three credible references.
Solution
Engineering Review of the Disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina
Even though 5 engineering review bodies operated separately, all of them reacted to IPET’s
work, the main and finest funded of the study groups. Volumes 2 through 7 of the IPET “draft
final” report divide the results into six broad sections:
1. Geodetic Vertical and Water Level Datums
2. Hurricane Protection System
3. The Storm
4. The Performance of the Levees and Floodwalls
5. Performance of Interior Drainage and Pumping
6. The Consequences; and Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analyses
The report is more than 6,000 pages extensive so far, and the last section on risk and reliability
has not yet appeared. The NAE/NRC team and the ASCE team both prepared their commentary
to conform to the IPET pattern.
In reviewing a study of this kind, it is significant to keep in mind that critiques may address the
quality of the design and construction for facilities in place at the time of the hurricane or the
adequacy of the post-hurricane investigations described in the report. For example, one might
find that the wind and water levels used for the design calculations were not adequate but that the
hind-casting calculations of the hurricane’s effects described in the report are excellent. The
NAE/NRC team and the ASCE team had similar reactions, with some minor differences of
detail.
The detailed study of the geodetic levels revealed considerable room for confusion and error.
Two different benchmark levels were used in creating the levee system. In some cases, the water
levels were expressed against one benchmark and the height of the levees against another.
Furthermore, there seemed to be no consistent effort to monitor subsidence of the levee system
or its components. The focus was on building the levees to the “authorized” elevations without
considering whether the corresponding water elevations were measured from the same base or
whether subsequent settlement and subsidence might make the authorized levels irrelevant.
Ethical Issues:
All of the review teams found that the hurricane protection system was a system in name only.
Planning and system-wide design were confused by political and short-term economic
considerations over.
On December 20 Donald Trump called for a “federal strategy to ensure secure and reliable supplies of critical minerals.” The move came one day after the U.S. Geological Survey released the first comprehensive update on the subject since 1973, taking a thorough look—nearly 900-pages thorough—at commodities vital to our neighbour’s, and ultimately the West’s, well-being.
This exhibit focuses on the floodplains in Great Seneca Stream Valley Park & North Germantown Greenway Park. Floodplain benefits revealed during peak flood events are captured on April 30 & May 16, 2014. Maps show where proposed M-83 Master Plan Alignment would impact multiple floodplain areas within Great Seneca Creek Watershed. To construct M-83 through these forested ecosystems would accelerate peak storm water discharge downstream.
Write about the following ethics case studies1. Hyatt Regency Walk.pdfarjuntelecom26
Write about the following ethics case studies
1. Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse
2. TV Antenna Collapse
3. Trench Failure
4. Three Mile Island
5. Tacoma Bridge
Solution
(1) Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse :-
On July 17, 1981, the Hyatt Regency Hotel in kansas City, Missouri, held a videotaped tea-dance
party in their atrium lobby. With many party-goers standing and dancing on the suspended
walkways, connections supporting the ceiling rods that held up the second and fourth-floor
walkways across the atrium failed, and both walkways collapsed onto the crowded first-floor
atrium below. The fourth-floor walkway collapsed onto the second-floor walkway, while the
offset third-floor walkway remained intact. As the United states\' most devastating structural
failure, in terms of loss of life and injuries, the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse
left 114 dead and in excess of 200 injured. In addition, millions of dollars in costs resulted from
the collapse, and thousands of lives were adversely affected.
(2) TV Antenna Collapse. :-
Total collapse during installation of a 6-ton FM antenna being placed on a new 1800 ft. tower. 5
technicians killed, 3 on the hoist and 2 on the tower. It was determined that insufficient sized
bolts on a makeshift lifting lug extension failed. The falling debris severed one of the tower\'s
guy wires, causing the tower to collapse.
The following case is based on an actual incident. However, individual actors and company
names have been changed due to possible pending litigation. In addition, although conversations
and memorandums used are based on evidence surrounding the case, they are hypothetical in
nature, and are used to illustrate important issues rather than to attempt an actual reenactment of
what \"really\" happened.
In 1982, a television station video crew was filming the raising of their new television tower. The
antenna was designed and manufactured by Antenna Engineering, Inc., a moderately-sized local
firm. Riggers, Inc., a small local firm, was contracted to raise and assemble the antenna. During
the initial design, Antenna Engineering submitted antenna plans to Riggers for their approval.
Riggers approved the plans which provided for placement of the antenna hoisting lugs. These
lugs provided attachment points for lifting cables which would be used for removing the antenna
sections from the delivery truck, and for hoisting the antenna into the air for final assembly on a
1000 foot tower. A crew of riggers who had constructed such towers for many years was on-site.
The crew used a vertically-climbing crane mounted on the already constructed portion of the
tower to lift each new section of the tower, and finally, the two-section antenna onto the top of
the tower. The design called for a three-legged tower, and as each new section was lifted, it was
positioned and bolted onto the previous tower sections, one piece at a time. The tower legs were
solid steel bars with 8 inch diameters. The tower sections we.
International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) is an open access online peer reviewed international journal that publishes research and review articles in the fields of Computer Science, Neural Networks, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, Information Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Plastic Engineering, Food Technology, Textile Engineering, Nano Technology & science, Power Electronics, Electronics & Communication Engineering, Computational mathematics, Image processing, Civil Engineering, Structural Engineering, Environmental Engineering, VLSI Testing & Low Power VLSI Design etc.
Dec.2017 USGS Critical Minerals report. #Lithium brine (closed basin) check list. Belmont checks all the 7 boxes and advances to test low resistivity (.14 ohms) zone/aquifer with drill program @Kibby Basin, Esmeralda County , #Nevada, #USA
Citizens Vision - Cleveland OH Scranton Peninsula River JewelR Ray Saikus
Proposal for a channel along the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland Ohio at the base of the Scranton Peninsula to improve commercial navigation and free up 1 mile of river for continuous public use and more public access time all along the length of the river. An infrastructure shovel ready project with many short and long term benefits for Cleveland and the region. Reduced dredging benefits the environment.
Caring for your drainage ditch or water way of any sort, before, within, and after the community limits could help prevent flood damage to your community's residents and businesses. Here is a study I completed, to guide you along the way.
390 Chapter 11 Multinational Corporations
INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF
THE MIC LEAK
In the days following the gas leak, there was world-
wide interest in pinning down its precise cause. A
team of reporters from The New York Times inter-
viewed plant workers in Bhopal. Their six-week in-
vestigation concluded that a large volume of water
entered tank 610, causing the accident.f The Times re-
porters thought that water had entered when R. Khan
failed to use a slip blind as he washed out piping.
Water from his hose simply backed up and eventually
flowed about 400 feet into the tank. Their account was
widely circulated and this theory, called the "water
washing theory," gained currency. However, it was
not to be the only theory of the accident's cause.
Immediately after the disaster, Union Carbide also
rushed a team of investigators to Bhopal. But the
team got little cooperation from Indian authorities
operating in a climate of anti-Carbide popular pro-
test. It was denied access to plant records and work-
ers. Yet the investigators got to look at tank 610 and
took core samples from its bottom residue. These
samples went back to the United States, where more
than 500 experimental chemical reactions were un-
dertaken to explain their chemical composition. In
March 1985 Carbide finally released its report. It
stated that entry of water into the tank caused the gas
release, but it rejected the water washing theory.
Instead, Carbide scientists felt the only way that
an amount of water sufficient to cause the observed
reaction could have entered the tank was through ac-
cidental or deliberate connection of a water hose to
piping that led directly into the tank. This was possi-
ble because outlets for compressed air, nitrogen,
steam, and water were stationed throughout the
plant. The investigators rejected the water washing
hypothesis for several reasons. The piping system
was designed to prevent water contamination even
without a slip blind. Valves between the piping being
washed and tank 610 were found closed after the
8 The team wrote a series of articles. SeeStuart Diamond,
"The Bhopal Disaster: How It Happened," The New York
Times, January 28, 1985; Thomas J. Lueck, "Carbide Says
Inquiry Showed Errorsbut IsIncomplete," TheNew York Times,
January 28, 1985; Stuart Diamond, "The Disaster in Bhopal:
Workers Recall Horror," The New York Times,January 3D,
1985; and Robert Reinhold, "Disaster in Bhopal: Where
Does Blame Lie?" The New York Times, January 31, 1985.
accident. And the volume of water required to create
the reaction-l,OOO to 2,000 pounds-was far too
much to be explained by valve leakage.
The Carbide report gave a plausible alternative to
the water washing theory, but within months an in-
vestigation by the Indian government rejected it. This
study, made by Indian scientists and engineers, con-
firmed that the entry of water into the MlC tank
caused the reaction but concluded that the improper
washing procedure was to blame (see Exhibit 3).
Submission provided to the NEB outside of hearing processes simply to relay geological risks to pipeline infrastructure by geological circumstances related to ice melt, scouring, floods and changes to water systems. Submitted out of concern for climate change risks.
1. - 1 -
State of Maine
Department of Defense, Veterans, and Emergency Management
Maine Emergency Management Agency
Office of Dam Safety
Maine Dam Safety Program
Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Draft Hazard & Condition Report
(DRAFT)
Prepared for;
The State Dam Inspector
Prepared by;
David Vitali EI
72 State House Station
45 Commerce Drive
Augusta, Maine 04333
Phone: 207-624-4400
2. #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Hazard & Condition Report
- 2 -
Cover Letter
To: State Dam Inspector
From: MEMA Civil Engineering Intern
Date: September 23, 2016
RE: #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam, Corinna, Penobscot Co.
Sir,
Attached is a copy of my hazard and condition report for this project. The report is based on
visual inspections, field surveys, downstream hazard inspections, and a hydraulic study of the
dam’s overtopping potential and the downstream impact of a theoretical breach.
Based on the findings in the attached report:
My hazard assessment of the project, according to MRSA 37B, Chapter 24, “Dam Safety,” is that
the dam should be registered in MEMA’s files as a “low” hazard dam.
My condition assessment is that the dam is in unsatisfactory condition.
In order to improve the safety of the Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam, I make the following
recommendations:
For the dam owner:
1. Remove all brush and all trees with a diameter of less than 9” from the downstream face
of the dam.
2. Clear the spillway and its channel of vegetation.
3. Establish a maintenance schedule to prevent further vegetation growth on the dam and
in the spillway.
4. Place rip rap along the waterline on the dam to prevent wave erosion.
5. Hire an engineer to investigate the possible settlement within your dam.
For the State Dam Inspector:
I Recommend that the dam be classified as a “low” hazard to the Operations Director of MEMA.
Please do not hesitate to contact me with any further questions or concerns about my
assessments or the contents of this report.
David Vitali
MEMA Civil Engineering Intern
3. #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Hazard & Condition Report
- 3 -
CONTENTS
LETTER TO STATE DAM INSPECTOR...........................................................................................2
CONTENTS..................................................................................................................................3
PREFACE.....................................................................................................................................4
REPORT................................................................................................................................... 5-9
ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................................................................10
FIGURE 1 – DOWNSTREAM AREA MAP....................................................................................11
FIGURE 2 – WATERSHED AND IMPOUNDMENT MAP..............................................................12
FIGURE 3 – LOCATION OF DEFECTS .........................................................................................13
ATTACHMENTS.............................................................................................................................
4. #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Hazard & Condition Report
- 4 -
PREFACE
The WIPD is one among a handful of unregistered dams to have been discovered by MEMA during a
random visual inspection of aerial imagery. The purpose of this report is to implement MDSL, which
ensures all jurisdictional dams in Maine are constructed, maintained and operated in a safe manner.
The law specifies that dams be assessed for both “hazard” and “condition.”
The “hazard” classification of a dam is a measure of its “potential” to cause downstream damage if it
failed, which has nothing to do with its “condition.” “High” hazard dams are a threat to human life,
“significant” hazard dams are a threat to downstream property, and “low” hazard are unlikely to be a
threat to either. The law requires “hazard” assessments every six years. Dams classified “high” and
“significant” hazard must have EAPs and be inspected for condition every two and four years,
respectively. The “hazard” of this dam was assessed by visual inspection of the dam’s basin and
downstream watercourse.
The “condition” of this dam was determined by the visual inspection of the top, upstream and
downstreamfacesof the dam,the abutments, the spillway, the toe and groin areas. Inspection sought
adverse defects which would affect the stability of the structure such as; root penetration, surface s
covered by vegetation, material deterioration, settlement, misalignment, seepage, piping, spillway
blockage, missing control features and mis-operation. The dam’s potential for overtopping was
assessed,butitsdesign,stability, construction, operation, and maintenance was not. No sampling and
testingof materials,foundationinvestigation,installationof instrumentationor the testing of gates and
spillways was done. Figure 3 contains photographs of defects on the dam.
5. #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Hazard & Condition Report
- 5 -
DAM OWNER AND COUNTY EM DIRECTOR
Dam Owner:
Roger Whitney
438 Exeter Road
Corinna, ME 04928
Tel: (207) 745-2747
Penobscot County EM Director:
Michelle Tanguay
97 Hammond Street
Bangor, ME 04401
Tel: (207) 945-4750
DESCRIPTION OF DAM
The WIPD is a 16’ highand 460’ wide earthembankmentdamlocated off of Exeter Road in the Town of
Corinna, ME. The dam is owned by Roger Whitney and it is used for irrigation. There is a 13’ wide road
that runsalong the topof the dam and itis neitherfencednorposted.The damhasone spillwaylocated
on the rightside of the dam.A spillway channel directs water to the downstream as shown in Figure 3.
At NP the WIPD reservoir has an area of 18 acres and a normal storage of 125 acre feet. The watershed
has an area of 1.2 square miles as shown in Figure 2. The fill and foundation of the dam are unknown.
MEMA has no design or construction records on file.
Historyof the dam isbasedon anecdotal evidence from the dam owner and NRCS, as follows. The dam
was constructed in the 1950’s as a farm pond. Originally, a drop inlet pipe served as the primary
spillway.The inletpipe was filled with concrete 15 years ago when it showed signs of failure. The dam
owner worked with the NRCS to install a spillway on the right side of the embankment, as shown in
Figure 3. The NRCS(formallySCS) constructedmanyearthembankmentdamswithadropinletpipe and
an outlet pipe at the toe around the State of Maine. The Whitney Dam fits the description of an SCS
dam.
BREACH IMPACT
A breach of the dam is likely to impact the area shown on the map in Figure 1. The downstream of the
dam intersects with Exeter and West Barker Road. Exeter Road has an adequate culvert to pass a fair
weather breach. The culvert on West Barker Road is totally inadequate to pass a fair weather breach
and will likely wash out.
6. #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Hazard & Condition Report
- 6 -
FIELD INSPECTIONSAND SURVEYS
I made a total of four trips to see the Whitney dam during the summer of 2016. Pertinent inspection
photographs are included in Attachment 1.
06/06/2016 – Reconnaissance
I visitedthe damwiththe ASDI to performa reconnaissance of the dam.We walkedalongthe top of the
dam and onthe downstreamface. Additionally, we observed the culvert at Exeter Road. We made the
following observations:
Dam
A. The downstream face is totally covered in vegetation.
B. The spillway is overgrown with vegetation.
C. “Beaching,” or wave erosion, has occurred on the upstream slope of the dam.
D. There are small holes in the ground along the on the upstream slope just above water level.
E. Two pipes are located on the upstream slope of the dam.
F. A 24 inch diameter pipe is located at the bottom of the dam near the toe.
The small holes in Observation D are likely caused by animal burrowing and are of no immediate
concern. Sinkholes onearthembankmentdamsindicate structural failure within the embankment and
should be monitored if more significant holes appear.
The pipes mentioned in Observation E most likely pump stored water to the adjacent fields.
There was no flow through the outlet pipe during our observation, which supports the anecdotal
evidence describing the past use of an inlet pipe. The absence of flow through the pipe supports the
claimthat the pipe hasbeen filled with concrete. The inlet pipe was not visible during this inspection.
Exeter Road
A. Two properties are located near the culvert: 519 and 532 Exeter Road.
B. A buried cable is posted above the inlet of the culvert.
06/09/2016 – Survey
The survey was conducted on a cloudy, windy afternoon with a temperature of 58°F.
I performedatacheometricsurveyof the dam with the assistance of the SDI and ASDI. We established
three stationswhere there were clearlinesof sighttopointsof interestalongthe dam,labeled “A”, “B,”
and “C.” Station locations can be seen on the drawing in Attachment 2. The survey crew set up a
theodoliteoverthe stationsandsightedanglesanddistancesatvariouspointsusinga level staff. Stadia
linesinthe theodolite wereusedto record distances. Measurements were taken along the road, along
water level, through the spillway, on the bridge, along the spillway channel, and at the outlet pipe.
06/22/2016 – Survey
The survey was conducted on a cloudy afternoon with a temperature of 72°F and a wind speed of 3
mph.
7. #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Hazard & Condition Report
- 7 -
I returned to the dam with the SDI and another EI to take additional measurements of cross section
elevations.The surveycrewestablishedtwomore stations,labeled “D” and “E” in Attachment 2. A total
stationwasused in place of a theodolite to record distances and angles. A reflective prism was placed
each pointinthe place of a level staff. Vegetationthroughthe sectionwasremoved in order to obtain a
clearline of vision forthe reflective prism.Itbegantorainonce we had collected points through a cross
section and we packed up the equipment immediately.
07/12/2016 – Survey
The surveywas conducted ona clearafternoon with a temperature of 81°F and a wind speed of 5 mph.
I realizedthatIwas missingnecessaryinformationafterIbegan modelingthe damforhydraulicanalysis.
I returnedto the dam withthe ASDI usinga total stationto measure points. We reshot the points taken
during the first survey and took three lines through the spillway using a total station. Later, I selected
the best representation of the spillway, as seen on Attachment 2.
Additionally,we visitedthe culvertlocatedat155 WestBarker Road and spoke withthe propertyowner.
Photographsfromthe site visitare includedonpage 3 of Attachment1. We measuredthe dimensionsof
the culvert, but did not conduct a formal survey.
07/21/2016 – Accuracy Check
The surveywas conducted ona cloudyafternoonwithatemperature of 85°F and a windspeedof 7mph.
I had notclosedout the stations duringprevioussurveys andIwasquestioning the accuracy of my data.
I decided to return to the dam to perform an accuracy check with the ASDI and an EI. I set up a total
stationovereachstationand shotall stationsinsight. The accuracy of the survey was determined to be
sufficiently accurate for a hydraulic analysis, but not for foundation or structural analysis. Two
geometriccheckswere usedtodetermine the accuracyof the horizontal angles. The triangle formed by
Stations ABD closed correctly, meaning the sum of its interior angles was 180. Additionally, the
quadrilateral formedbyStationsADCEclosedcorrectly,meaning the sum of its interior angles was 360.
However, the location and elevation of certain points varied between stations and days of
measurement.The most“correct”measurement of locationorelevation wasdeterminedbywhether or
not the measurement was present multiple times in the data.
Initially,the teamestablishedanelevationdatumof 100 feetat StationA. Later,a correctional constant
was applied to bring each elevation to a global scale using an approximation of top water level
elevation.
DAM CONSTRUCTION RECORDS
MEMA has no records for the construction or design of this dam at this time. I contacted the NRCS in
search of any records in their files. I received no records at the time of this report.
SPILLWAY
The dam has one single uncontrolledspillwayonthe rightabutment.The spillwayhasnodebrisrackand
isin a state of neglect.Anecdotalevidence from correspondence with the SCE with the NRCS indicates
that the current spillwaywasdesignedasanauxiliary/emergencyspillwaywhenthe inletpipe wasfilled
with concrete.
8. #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Hazard & Condition Report
- 8 -
HYDRAULIC ESTIMATES
Attachment 3 shows the results of a hydraulic study to determine the ability of the dam’s spillway to
pass a 100 year storm and the effects of a dam breach on the impact zones downstream. The routing
diagramis shownonthe firstpage of Attachment3. AdditionalestimatesandassumptionsforScenarios
1 and 3 are attached. To determine pond storage, NP = 380’ was used based on the most recent aerial
imagery in Google Earth.
DAM STORAGE
Using the above information and a dam height of 16.1’, dam storage at NP =380’ is 125 af. The storage
at the top of the dam is 170 af. The dam is thus jurisdictional.
STORM IMPACT ON THE SPILLWAY
Usinga 100 year,24 hour5.6” storm fallingonanicedwatershed,the spillwayadequately passes water
with a flow of 293 cfs with a freeboard of 0.63’.
BREACH IMPACT ON EXETER ROAD AND WEST BARKER ROAD
The breach used to analyze the downstream impact was 12.8’ high by 20’ wide with a duration of 12
hours under “fair weather” conditions. The starting elevation was set at TWL (379.8’), which gave a
breach flow of 185 cfs.
The breach wasroutedthrough a reach to a 6’ diameter culvert passing under Exeter Road, which then
passed through a second reach to a 4.5’ culvert passing under West Barker.
ExeterRoadsuccessfullypassedthe culvert with a freeboard of 5’ while West Barker Road overtops by
6” with a flow of 79 cfs, which will likely wash out the road.
FINDINGS OF THE HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS
1. The spillway is adequate to pass a 100 year storm falling on an iced watershed (AMC = 3).
2. The dam is a “low” hazard.
DEFECTS IN THE WHITNEY IRRIGATION POND DAM
A. Heavy vegetation growth on the downstream face
B. Vegetation growth in the spillway
C. Beaching on upstream slope
D. Left groin area of the toe is damp
9. #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Hazard & Condition Report
- 9 -
CONCLUSION
DefectsA and B are causedby the neglectof basicmaintenance of the structure.The larger trees on the
upstream face are likely well-rooted into the dam and removal would cause uprooting of the dam
embankment.The vegetation andbrushonthe downstreamface and in the spillway can be maintained
by regular monitoring and removal. These features must be kept clear to ensure the ease of visual
inspection to detect any further defects in the dam.
DefectC iscause bywave erosionanddeterioratesthe structure of the dam.DefectDis an indicationof
waterflowingthroughseepagepathsinthe dam.The extent of seepage flow through the dam must be
assessed to determine the dam’s potential for breaching.
The resultsof my surveydatashowlowerelevationsinthe middle of the dam, which is an indication of
settlement within the structure. My findings indicate that the dam has potentially settled over 2”.
Settlement should be monitored and investigated to prevent a breach.
Despite the factthat the WIPD isa “low” hazard with respect to MDSL does not eliminate the potential
for a dam failure tocause propertydamage orlossof life.The conditionof the damisunsatisfactoryand
proper maintenance and monitoring of the dam is of the utmost importance to ensure public safety.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the hydraulic study of the dam and visual inspection, I present my recommendations as
follows:
For the dam owner:
1. Remove all brushandall treeswitha diameterof lessthan9” from the downstreamface of the
dam.
2. Clearthe spillwayanditschannel of vegetation.
3. Establishamaintenance schedule topreventfurthervegetationgrowthonthe damand inthe
spillway.
4. Place riprap along the waterline onthe damtopreventwave erosion.
5. Hire an engineertoinvestigate the possible settlementwithinyourdam.
For the State Dam Inspector:
I Recommendthatthe dam be classified asa“low”hazard to the OperationsDirectorof MEMA.
10. #1011 Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam
Hazard & Condition Report
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ABBREVIATIONS (Alphabetical)
AF........................................................................................................................................ Acre-Feet
AMC ....................................................................................................AntecedentMoisture Condition
ASDI........................................................................................................AssistantState DamInspector
CFS.................................................................................................................... CubicFeetperSecond
CN .........................................................................................................................CatchmentNumber
EAP...................................................................................................................EmergencyActionPlan
EI............................................................................................................................ EngineeringIntern
EAP...................................................................................................................EmergencyActionPlan
MDSL...........................................................................................MRSA 37B, Chapter24, “Dam Safety”
MDSP......................................................................................................... Maine Dam SafetyProgram
MEMA .....................................................................................Maine EmergencyManagementAgency
NP....................................................................................................................................Normal Pool
NRCS........................................................................................Natural ResourcesConservationService
ODS......................................................................................................................Office of DamSafety
SCE...........................................................................................................State ConservationEngineer
SCS................................................................................................................Soil ConservationService
SDI........................................................................................................................State Dam Inspector
TWL............................................................................................................................Top Water Level
WIPD......................................................................................................Whitney Irrigation Pond Dam