1. Copyright Kurt Callaway, 2015
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Week 5: CLA Application
Future of Russian Relations with Europe
Kurt Callaway, FORE 6397
28 Sep 15
The last couple of years have seen a resurgence of Russian activity on the international scene, especially
in regard to its relationship with the western liberal democracies of Europe. This paper will examine that
issue in terms of Inayatullah’s Causal Layered Analysis (CLA). Using insights from that method, some
plausible alternative futures for the issue will be identified and described.
The framework for CLA is comprised of four distinct, but closely related, layers. Most superficially is the
litany, which represents the common reporting and popular understanding of a given problem. It is the
reality of the issue, as far as most people are concerned. Next lower is the trends & systems layer, which
looks more deeply at the issue to find a systemic cause and possible trends in the direction and nature of
the issue. Below that layer is the worldview, or value set that underlies the system underlying the
superficial events. Finally, there is the metaphors & myths layer where one may identify a very deeply-
held belief that acts as an engine for all the levels above it.
Litany
Although Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 2014 has slipped out of the headlines, a stream of stories
in recent months keeps alive the issue of continued overt and covert Russian activities directed against its
neighbors in Eastern Europe. Some of these articles:
“High Anxiety in the Baltics: Putin’s nervous neighbors”, The Weekly Standard, 5 Oct 2015
“How likely is a Russian intervention in the Baltics?”, DW.com, 22 Sep 2015
“Sweden rethinking neutrality amid fear of Russian aggression”, Los Angeles Times, 2 Sep 2015
“Graube: Russia's actions near Latvia's border "increasingly provocative", The Baltic Course, 22 Sep
2015
“Lithuania issues note to Russia over Baltic Sea conduct”, Baltic Times, 17 Sep 2015
“Russia's Airborne Units Put On Full Alert Amid NATO Tensions, Combat Readiness Inspections”,
International Business Times, 8 Sep 2015
“Brzezinski on Russia: 'We Are Already In a Cold War' “, Der Spiegel, 2 July 2015
“Latvia struggles with restive Russian minority amid regional tensions”, Aljazeera America, 13 June 2015
“Fury as Russian ambassador accuses POLAND of starting the Second World War even though country
suffered millions of casualties during conflict”, DailyMail.com, 26 Sep 2015
“Dialogue With Russia, China Would Help Europe to Overcome Crises”, Sputnik News, 24 Sep 2015
Considering the number of nations involved, and the many types of activities (military, economic,
political) occurring, it seems unlikely that solutions could be found for these issues on such a piecemeal
basis.

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Trends & Systems
Some persistent trends can be seen based on the collection of issues:
 Continued uncertainty about Russian intentions. The political decision making process used by the
Russian leadership is far from transparent.
 Growing preparation by European states. There is increasing interest among most to both rearm for
self-defense and to improve strategic alliances among themselves and with the USA.
 A greater use of ‘cold war’ actions:
o meeting strength with strength (proportional response);
o reduced political dialogue between the sides;
o a division of the region into “us” and “them”;
o the involvement in other regions to distract from the primary contested area.
 Intimidation of Europeans through multiple avenues: first through economic (energy, especially
natural gas), and political (threatening opponents) means; now increasingly including military
(maneuvers near Baltic national borders; use of ‘little green men’ in Ukraine).
 Increased Russian assertiveness as US conducts a shift in strategic focus to the Pacific region.
 Suppression of Russian domestic dissent raised against the state’s activities abroad.
 Russian concern over rising Islamic militarism: both regionally and for its potential impact
domestically.
 Stress on intra-European relations. Unless and until a unified political consensus is formed.
Clearly we can see the state actors – individually and as blocs – already at work on both sides of the issue.
A systemic analysis would note the presence of positive feedback loops in the events to date. So far,
actions by either side in response to the other seem to result in further actions by the other. The Russian
annexation of Crimea led to some previously neutral nations such as Sweden considering joining the
NATO defensive alliance. Many of the nations have increased their defense spending to begin restoring
capabilities atrophied by long years of quiet in the region. As defensive capabilities increase, Russia may
spread its forces to its allies, such as Belarus, to bring European targets closer in range, even as Russia’s
suspicion of a US-led attempt to contain it is strengthened, leading to additional actions. All these
interactions work in support of what seems likely to become a classic arms race in the region.
Worldviews
Assessing the issues by way of worldviews is a non-trivial effort. The view for Russia is certainly not the
same for the European countries; nor do all of the states of Europe share the same worldview. Added to
this is the possibility that it might be necessary to consider the worldview of individual leaders, especially
for those states that are highly authoritarian in nature.
Using Graves’ Spiral Dynamics approach to worldviews, Russia as a whole would seem to fall into a
combination of “Red – Egocentric” and “Blue – Authority” category. While the society remains generally
corrupt and led by someone who exercises near-dictatorial powers, history has given Russia a sense of
meaning, traditionalism, rules, and even of purpose. Its experiences with invasion and total war in the
19th and 20th Centuries edge that “blue” view with the keen desire for its own internal peace, even if it is
at others’ considerable expense. Perhaps it was those experiences which have made it difficult for Russia
to move completely beyond the “red” worldview. It is reflected in the country’s general distrust of
foreigners and high interest in keeping western European (from whence both previous existential threats
originated) as far from its borders as possible.

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Western Europe, befitting its heterogeneous composition, can’t be assigned a single worldview category.
It might be suitable to consider the continent to be a “blue-orange-green” amalgam, with the green
tending to be the northern, more prosperous countries, and the blue tending more toward the less
prosperous states along the Mediterranean coast and the Balkan region.
Using these assignments, we may deduce that the Russian actions, as described in the litany, derive from
a viewpoint of exercising power (economic, political, and now military) in order to achieve its own
national goal; namely, to prevent foreign domination by European (and American) western liberal
ideologies. Whether Russia’s current worldview can be changed is a matter for debate; however, Graves’
Spiral Dynamics does, at least, suggest a way to communicate with an agent acting within the “red”
category. Such an approach would include a pragmatic “what’s in it for me for me?” element and should
appeal to “machismo / strength”, couching any message in simple, unambiguous terms. Considering the
often fragmented nature of “European” politics, it seems unlikely that Russia’s opponent could make such
a communication easily or quickly. The only powerful entity which can speak with a single voice is the
USA, which has, as of yet, simply worked with the Europeans within the positive feedback loops and
made no such unambiguous challenge to the Russian actions.
Archetype / Myth / Metaphor
If we were to look for a deep, emotional aspect to the Russian view, it might be the single image of – the
single word – “Motherland”:
In contrast, Europe seems like too new a construct to command any single, similar image. It is hardly
twenty years since the Maastricht Treaty that formally created the “European Union”. No snapshot of
Europe can compare to the power of the Russian image that offers a context through which all the higher
levels operate for that country. There is no indication at all that Russia’s metaphorical base will be
modified, let alone replaced, in the foreseeable future. The interregnum between the fall of the Soviet
Union and the rise of the current authoritarian government certainly didn’t dent the mythos of
“Motherland”.
Alternate Futures
The above CLA analysis into the various levels – moving deeper with each – can help us formulate some
alternate future scenarios. The expected future is that in which trends remain, the systems continue to
function, and the worldviews of the various players do not change significantly. This future is one of a
continued arms race in Europe, perhaps analogous to the cold war of the 20th century. However, by
questioning the continuity of trends and worldviews we can form some possible alternate scenarios.

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Alternate #1: Fragmentation
Though Europe itself cannot lay claim to a unified worldview, its component nations can. What might
transpire if individual states change in that manner?
As Russian political and military pressure continue to mount on their eastern borders, the support for a
pan-continental policy set by Brussels begins to fracture in some of the countries in Eastern Europe. The
worldview of their governments begins to shift from the Modern value type gained after their freedom
from the Soviet Union in the 1990s back to a more traditional set of values (becoming “red”-“blue” once
again, according to Grave’s Spiral Dynamics category hierarchy). Their societies are stressed and
economies damaged, both by Russia’s threats and by the unabated swarm of hundreds of thousands of
migrants and refugees who are desperate to enter Europe by the shortest route possible. One after
another, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Croatia close their borders, moving politically away from Europe
and seeking comfort and stability in closer relations with Russia – especially those countries in the
Balkans with stronger Slavic cultural and linguistic ties to their eastern neighbor. While this temporarily
relieves the pressure of mass migrants on the richer northern European lands, the actions signal a clear
rejection of European rule and solidarity, fragmenting the alliance between roughly north and south. The
heavy flow of migrants from the ongoing misery in the Middle East (encouraged by Russian entry into the
area in support of the Syrian government) and North Africa, quickly shift to other countries – Greece,
Italy, even France, since sea borders are far more difficult to police and control -- as the Balkans shut
their borders – in every direction – no longer hearing the storm of protests from elsewhere in Europe.
This action results in the isolation of strategic southern members of the alliance, such as Greece and
Turkey. The latter country finds itself especially vulnerable. It is now not only geographically separated
from the bulk of Europe (much as it was during the Cold War), but also faces heightened regional
pressure from Islamic militants in the area, who have been largely deflected from their fight against Syria,
thanks to the Russian assistance to Bashar al-Assad’s government. Frustrated in their efforts in the upper
Middle East, the militants turn against eastern Turkey, which is already in turmoil from the re-kindled
ethic conflict with its cross-border Kurdish population.
Alternate #2: Unintended escalation
The presence of feedback loops in the political and military posturing between Russia and Europe (and
the USA) may be a point of weakness, especially in the event of inadequate safeguards. The following
scenario explores one such possibility.
The Russian overture to the embattled government of Syria represented both a way to reinsert itself into
the political environment of the Middle East as well as present a diversion for US attention away from
Russia’s activities against Eastern Europe. Not content with just providing arms and advice to Syria, soon
Russian aircraft, flying from the new, enormous military airfield they built near the city of Latakia in
2015, are participating in operations against Syrian rebels. Their assets are heavily protected by anti-
aircraft positions, and perhaps it was just a matter of time before a flight of US Navy aircraft, returning
from a strike against Islamic militants in north-central Syria are engaged and damaged by the Russian
defenses. Returning fire in self-defense, they destroy the anti-aircraft site quickly. Russia responds by
harassing US naval assets in the Mediterranean and increasing its bomber flights around the periphery of
Europe, which in turn ratchets up the alert level of European and US forces “training” in the Baltic
nations, already on edge from highly-realistic “snap exercises” by Russian forces just east of the border.
When jittery Lithuanian air-defenses fire on Russian aircraft flying too close to the border with their
transponders switched off, Russian ground forces already positioned in Belarus return artillery fire into
Lithuania. Sweden responds by halting Russian sea-borne supply to its enclave of Kaliningrad, with
multiple NATO air forces imposing a no-fly zone above it. This initiates the well-planned Russian

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operation to open a land corridor to its enclave – which it considers “Russian soil” – and where nuclear
missiles had been recently stationed (in response to earlier US actions to upgrade its theater nuclear depot
in Germany). Russian forces move from Belarus not only into Lithuania across the 40-mile divide north
of the Polish border, but also north into Latvia, which serves also to block the only land route available
for Europe to reinforce any of the Baltic states. It is soon clear to European and US commanders that all
three of the Baltic states will fall quickly, and it can not be prevented by conventional military means.
The decision stands before them: should they exercise the nuclear option?
In summary, the use of CLA has provided us with various levels of insights that can help understand the
litany of events we are constantly presented with, as well as some of the possibilities of how they could
play out in the future.