Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 7


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Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 7

  1. 1. Dr. Tabakian’s Political Science 7 Modern World Governments – Spring/Fall 2014 Supplemental Power Point Material #7
  2. 2. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (1) • Conflict, Violence & War - Causes Of War: 1. Nationalism 2. Ethnicity 3. Religion 4. Culture 5. Natural Resources • “Kin-Country” Syndrome • Redefining Civilization Identity • West Versus The Rest • American Military Power • Unconventional Military Options: – American Biological Weapons Program
  3. 3. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (2) • • • • • • • • • • • • Making Foreign Policy Models Of Decision Making Decision Making As Steering Individual Decision Makers Group Psychology Crisis Management Domestic Politics Bureaucracies Interest Groups Military Industrial Complex Public Opinion Legislatures
  4. 4. CONFLICT, VIOLENCE & WAR (1) Cultural Conflict – The New Cold War? Tensions between civilizations are supplanting the political and ideological rivalries persistent during the Cold War. "As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. Samuel Huntington concludes after reviewing 100 comparative studies of values in different societies to conclude "the values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide." World politics will be directed in the future by conflicts that according to Kishore Mahbubani will be between "the West and the Rest". Samuel P. Huntington adds "...and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values.”
  5. 5. CONFLICT, VIOLENCE & WAR (2) Cultural Conflict – The New Cold War? These responses take on or a combination of three forms: 1. Non-Western civilizations isolate themselves from the Western-dominated global community. 2. "Band-Wagoning" can lead non-Western countries to join with the West and accept its values and institutions. 3. Non-Western countries can attempt to "balance" the West by developing an alternative economic and military power and ally with one another to effective counter Western dominance.
  6. 6. CAUSES OF WAR (1) 1.Nationalism 2.Ethnicity 3.Religion 4.Culture 5.Natural Resources
  7. 7. CAUSES OF WAR (2) Defensive realists claim that war is today seen by the great powers as rarely profitable. War is brought forth from militarism, hypernationalism, or other domestic factors that over exaggerate potential threats or exaggerates their military capacity. Offensive realists believe that great powers are forced into competitive actions for anarchy remains as long as there is no overruling bodies that function over the state. This is why offensive realists believe that the US serves as an overruling body through NATO and that if she were to leave that security competition would soon return to Europe.
  8. 8. NATIONALISM MAY BE GOOD The existence of modern democracies over the last 200 years demonstrates the success of democratic peace theory. Realists have either countered these assertions through claims that liberal democracies were not next to one another or shared a mutual threat that encouraged them to look past differences. Another reason provided is that external forces may force a state to become democratic if it wished to get along with other democracies. This suggests that power relations have always remained a viable factor for non-democratic states may desire good relations with strong democracies like the United States. Nationalist struggles are welcomed as precursors to the solidification process of tolerant and democratic societies. Nationalisms serve to establish unique identities in a world of ever increasing democratic homogenization. It is a process that the United States has been a party as were emerging democracies in Western Europe in the nineteenth century.
  9. 9. PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT “I HATE WAR” On October 6, 1937 in Chicago, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt warns of a steadily-increasing danger of armed conflict menacing the United States. Without naming any nation as responsible, the Chief Executive finds a threat in present attacks from the air on civilians, and ships attacked and sunk by submarines in time of peace and without cause or notice. Gravely, the President asserts that if such things can happen in other parts of the world, America cannot feel secure for long. Universal Newsreel presents the President's speech as a historic document, and gives with it a dramatic view of incidents of aggression which called forth Mr. Roosevelt's impassioned warning." scenes of parade outdoors, sound of FDR speaking outdoors under tent, silent scenes of war inserted into FDR's speech, FDR says, “I Hate War”.
  10. 10. “I HATE WAR”
  11. 11. CAUSES OF WAR – RELIGION RUSSIAN EXAMPLE Religion stimulates ethnic identifications. It also arouses Russian fears over the security of its southern borders. Archie Roosevelt details this concern: "Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between the Slavs and the Turkic peoples on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long confrontation with their eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding not only of Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries.” Kenneth Waltz insists that sovereign states with fixed borders are the best way to maintain the peace domestically. When a state is no longer competent it may fall into a state of disrepair with separate territories breaking apart becoming autonomous, but unable to correlate to transnational developments.
  12. 12. CAUSES OF WAR – CHECHNYA The principle of national self-determination holds that populations have the right to determine their own futures and establish governments of their own making. The right was articulated after World War I, but its implementation has been uneven, and many peoples who desire national selfdetermination have yet to receive it. In Chechnya, ethnic Chechens declared their independence from the Russian Federation after the collapse of communism. Russian intervention, designed to stave off independence, has led to a long-standing war between the Russian military and Chechen separatists, with neither side able to claim total victory.
  14. 14. CAUSES OF WAR – IRAN? Recent developments with respect to Iran’s nuclear program illustrate this tension. Iran maintains that it has the right to develop nuclear power for civilian use without outside interference. The United States, however, contends that Iran’s nuclear program is developing nuclear weapons in violation of the NonProliferation Treaty, creating a security dilemma for countries neighboring Iran and—pending successful development of missile technology—around the world.
  16. 16. “KIN-COUNTRY” SYNDROME States try to rally support from other states belonging to the same culture when they are involved in a war with people from another civilization. This is the "kin-country" syndrome. This terminology replaces political ideology and traditional balance of power as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. Post-Cold War conflicts like those in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia involved elements of civilization rallying. First, the 1991 Persian Gulf War begun as a result of one Arab state invading a neighbor Arab state. Second, Armenian military successes in 1992 and 1993 swayed Turkey to increase its support of Azerbaijan. The Soviet Union originally supported Azerbaijan as the republic was dominated with communist leaders. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a reversal of Russian policy as it shifted support to Armenia due to a change of concern from political considerations to religious ones. Third, Western public may have shown sympathy for the Bosnian Muslims over their suffering from Serbs, but little concern was given to Croatian attacks on Muslims.
  17. 17. REDEFINING CIVILIZATION IDENTITY Samuel P. Huntington lists three requirements a torn country must meet before it can redefine its civilization identity: 1. The country's economic and political elites have to enthusiastically endorse the transition. 2. Second, its public has to endorse whatever new definition is adopted. 3. Third, dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to embrace the convert.
  18. 18. CAUSES OF WAR – CULTURE Culturalist approaches are likely to accept the arguments of rational choice or structural analysis as both are seen as helping to construct societal norms. Culturalism begins with the premise that culture matters in any explanation. It is important to not make grand assumptions when using culture as a variable. For example, statements like “Muslim countries are resistant to democracy,” or “Confucianism helps explain capitalist development in East Asia” are not appropriate. The problem with these claims is that it represents a decontextualized generalization that portrays culture as clear-cut, uniform, and basically static. Most Culturalists would argue today that culture is multi-vocal and multidimensional. Comparativists depend on cultural analysis. It helps them to understand those particular identities that someone identifies with, as it discerns the political behavior that they are likely to pursue. Understanding societal norms for instance would assist in almost any case study, as cultural variables may be identified as having a primary effect on a particular dependent variable.
  19. 19. CULTURE / CIVILIZATION Samuel P. Huntington defines a civilization according to its cultural entity "villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity...A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people." Huntington argues that people can refine their identities, resulting in their identification being redefined and the composition and boundaries of civilization. Civilizations can blend or even overlap. The can also encompass include subcivilizations.
  20. 20. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (1) Cultural commonalities are becoming stronger following the end of the Cold War. Murray Weidenbaum gives an example of this effect on the East Asian economic bloc. "Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and service acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three) and very large endowments of land, resources, and labor (mainland China)...From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network - often based on extensions of the traditional clans - has been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy.
  21. 21. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (2) The European Community continues to resist including nonArab-Muslim countries into its fold, thus encouraging them to create the Economic Cooperation Organization. There are ten countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan. Samuel P. Huntington argues that the clash of civilizations occurs at two levels: at the micro-level and the macro-level. At the micro-level, adjacent groups residing along the fault lines between civilizations battle one another over the control of territory as well as each other. At the macro-level, states possessing different civilizations compete for military and economic superiority as well as fight over control of international institutions and third parties, all while promoting their respective political and religious values.
  22. 22. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (3) Realists view the world as being wrought with anarchy. There is no legitimate authority above the nation-state. One may argue from a realist perspective that even American allies are prone to act according to their own interests, even if it goes against Washington’s. Israel, a nation that has maintained a policy of not openly declaring itself a nuclear power, has begun to openly defy US national security by selling the People’s Republic Of China military hardware and technology, as well as a United States Patriot Missile. As the United States focuses its attention on the prevention of rogue states developing weapons of mass destruction, US allies are willingly selling deadly military hardware and technology. Israel has long cooperated with China, accepting funding for the codevelopment and production of various strategic weapons.
  23. 23. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (4) Students may be interested in reading the 1999 Cox Report that details espionage practices of the People's Republic Of China (PRC) against the United States of America. PRC modernization strategies are discussed throughout the report. Two versions were produced by the select committee with the first citing classified information. A second unclassified report was released that only cites information one can locate in the public domain. The second report was procured from the House Of Representatives database and recompiled by your instructor. Students may download the report from our supplemental course site:
  24. 24. WEST VERSUS THE REST (1) Samuel P. Huntington stresses that civilizationconsciousness is increasing and that global politics will be focused on "the West and the Rest". This applies to conflicts between the Western powers, especially the United States, against "others". However, Huntington stresses that the first conflict(s) will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states. He further argues that the West should strive towards greater cooperation among its members while promoting further incorporating into the West those societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are more adaptable.
  25. 25. WEST VERSUS THE REST (2) The West should also coordinate its relations with Russia and Japan; prevent minor conflicts from developing into major inter-civilization wars; limit the military capacity of Confucian and Islamic states; resist drastic reductions in Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in the East and Southwest Asia; exploit differences and conflicts that exist between Confucian and Islamic states; support those civilizations and their respective groups that admire Western values and interests; bolster those international institutions that reflect and legitimize Western interests and values and encourage non-Western states to participate in these institutions. Many non-Western states have pursued a goal of modernization without becoming Western. Japan is the only country that has succeeded. Samuel P. Huntington infers that the West has to maintain its economic and military strength to protect its interests against any possible threats from alien civilizations. The fact is that the world will consist of various civilizations and each has to find some way to coexist with one another.
  26. 26. AMERICAN MILITARY POWER (1) In 1991, for the United States to overcome Iraqi forces in order to liberate Kuwait with minimum casualties, they in effect spent nearly 7 times the amount that Iraq had spent preparing for the invasion of Kuwait. United States estimates were $6 billion for airlift and sealift; $30 billion for global command control, communications, computers, and intelligence; and nearly $20 billion each for the portion of the expeditionary forces of the three military departments required to proceed with the war.. For the Iraqi estimates, assuming 100 percent of Iraq’s annual defense expenditures leading up to the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s total investment would be some $13 billion per year, concluding the United States spent nearly seven times the amount of the Iraqi regime.
  28. 28. AMERICAN MILITARY POWER (2) The main reasons for the US to maintain such a high military expenditure are: 1. US commitments on a global basis. US military forces must be able to project power to regions located thousands of miles away. 2. US forces require high technology in order to defeat its enemies with limited casualties. 3. US maintains a much more expensive allvolunteer force.
  29. 29. AMERICAN MILITARY POWER (3) In order for the United States to defeat the People’s Republic of China in a conventional invasion, the annual US military budget must be at least 7 times that of the PRC, between $2.65 and $5.30 trillion. Given that the PRC military budget is currently utilized to upgrade a depressingly archaic military, the current United States military budget is acceptable. However, when the PLA has achieved a level that either matches or surpasses that of the United States, then the only possible option available for a future US President would be a nuclear first strike. It is this reason that the People’s Liberation Army has concentrated nearly 50% of their annual budget on their Strategic Rocket Force division.
  30. 30. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (1) Human beings are the ultimate weapon. Biological weapon development is presented in this PBS Special “The Living Weapon. All slides from this point incorporate information from the PBS website dedicated to “The Living Weapon”: Chapter 1: (2:37) "Teaser" introduction for The Living Weapon on American Experience. Chapter 2: (3:15) In December 1942, the U.S. government holds a secret meeting at the National Academy of Sciences to discuss a biological warfare program.
  33. 33. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (2) Chapter 3: (4:16) During the summer of 1942, the British conduct secret anthrax tests on the Scottish island of Gruinard. Chapter 4: (5:11) American scientists begin secret biological warfare research at Camp Detrick in Maryland. Chapter 5: (4:00) New weapons of mass destruction are deployed during World War II. Chapter 6: (10:32) Surprising news of German and Japanese biowarfare research emerge at the end of World War II.
  38. 38. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (3) Chapter 7: (5:59) The U.S. biological weapons program escalates during the Cold War. Chapter 8: (10:05) In 1954, American scientists begin testing biological agents on human subjects. Chapter 9: (5:13) The U.S. biological weapons program comes under public scrutiny. Chapter 10: (1:38) The United States ratifies international agreements leading to the end of the U.S. biological weapons program.
  43. 43. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (4) Title Unknown (Botulism) (9:43) This experiment was conducted to determine whether primates would make suitable research subjects in a study of botulism. Researchers inject a monkey with botulisum toxin to determine if he will exhibit the same effects as human victims. Operation Cover Up (9:04) This film questions how long military personnel would be able to remain in protective suits and gas masks in the event of an operation within a biological or chemical weapons area. Incapacitation by Enterotoxin (5:40) The film shows the effect of enterotoxin, a form of food poisoning, when delivered as an aerosol spray to monkeys.
  47. 47. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (5) SECRET TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES The start of the Cold War brought new foes and new fears for the officials running America's biological weapons program. Determined to anticipate possible Soviet attacks, the U.S. staged more than 200 domestic tests aimed at assessing national vulnerabilities to biological warfare. Ira Baldwin, Camp Detrick's scientific director during World War II, left his position after the Allied victory in 1945 and returned to teaching at the University of Wisconsin. He continued to advise the government on issues concerning biological weapons, however, particularly the threat that might be posed by enemy spies releasing biological agents in American cities.
  48. 48. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (6) In an October 1948 report, Ira Baldwin posited that the U.S. was "particularly vulnerable to this type of attack." But in order to determine the precise nature of these vulnerabilities, secret field tests would have to be done to ascertain the vulnerability of targets of potential interest to the enemy. The Army's Chemical Corps, which ran Camp Detrick, agreed with Baldwin's assessment and set up a Special Operations Division at Camp Detrick to carry out the tests. Its first target was to be the Pentagon. In August 1949, the Special Operations Division operatives infiltrated the world's largest office building and sprayed bacteria into the Pentagon's air handling system, which then spread them throughout the structure.
  49. 49. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (7) The operatives moved to larger scale testing, releasing clouds containing supposedly harmless bacteria from Navy ships off Norfolk, Virginia, in April 1950, and the San Francisco coast in September 1950. The San Francisco experiments showed exposure among almost all of the city's 800,000 residents. Had the bacteria released been anthrax bacteria or some other virulent pathogen, the number of casualties would have been immense.
  50. 50. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (8) The St Jo Program and Large Area Concept The success of the first field tests only increased demand for more experiments. In response to an Air Force request, in 1953 the Chemical Corps created the St Jo Program and operatives staged mock anthrax attacks on St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Winnipeg. The bacteria were released from generators placed on top of cars, and local governments were told that "invisible smokescreen[s]" were being deployed to mask the city on enemy radar. The next stage was to increase dispersal patterns, dispensing particles from airplanes to find out how wide of an area they would affect. The first Large Area Concept experiment, in 1957, involved dispersing microorganisms over a swath from South Dakota to Minnesota; monitoring revealed that some of the particles eventually traveled some 1200 miles away. Further tests covered areas from Ohio to Texas and Michigan to Kansas. In the Army's words, these experiments "proved the feasibility of covering large areas of the country with [biological weapons] agents.”
  51. 51. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (9) Airports and Subways Open-air testing continued through the 1960s, with the Special Operations Division operatives simulating even more audacious assaults. In 1965 they spread bacteria throughout Washington's National Airport; a year later, agents dropped light bulbs filled with organisms onto the tracks in New York's subway system. "I think it spread pretty good," participant Wally Pannier later said, "because you had a natural aerosol developed every few minutes from every train that went past.”
  52. 52. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (10) President Nixon's 1969 termination of the United States offensive biological weapons program brought an end to the open-air testing, but the American public did not learn of this testing until 1977. Relatives of one elderly man Edward Nevin who had died of a nosocomial infection six months after the San Francisco tests sued the government in 1981, arguing that the supposedly harmless Serratia marcescens bacteria used in that test had in fact caused his death. In the event, the courts ruled against them, the main reason being that the plaintiffs could not prove that the bacteria used in the test were the same as those that killed Mr. Nevin.
  53. 53. MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (1) • Foreign policies are the strategies governments use to guide their actions in the international arena. – Spell out the objectives state leaders have decided to pursue in a given relationship or situation. – Foreign policy process: How policies are arrived at and implemented.
  54. 54. MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (2) • Comparative foreign policy. – Study of foreign policy in various states in order to discover whether similar types of societies or governments consistently have similar types of foreign policies. • Foreign policy outcomes result from multiple forces at various levels of analysis.
  55. 55. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (1) • Rational model: – Decision makers set goals, evaluate their relative importance, calculate the costs and benefits of each possible course of action, and then choose the one with the highest benefits and lowest costs. – Role of uncertainty. – Accepting of risk versus averse to risk.
  56. 56. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (2) • Organizational process model: – Foreign policy makers generally skip the laborintensive process of identifying goals and alternative actions, relying instead for most decisions on standardized responses or standard operating procedures (sop). • Government bargaining (bureaucratic) model: – Foreign policy decisions result from the bargaining process among various government agencies with somewhat divergent interests in the outcome.
  58. 58. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (1) • Study of individual decision making revolves around the question of rationality. – To what extent are national leaders (or citizens) able to make rational decisions in the national interest and thus conform to the realist view of IR? • Difficulties of oversimplification – Individual decision makers have differing values and beliefs and have unique personalities. – Idiosyncrasies.
  59. 59. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (2) • Beyond individual idiosyncrasies, individual decision making diverges from the rational model in at least three systematic ways: • Decision makers suffer from misperceptions and selective perceptions when they compile information on the likely consequences of their choices. • The rationality of individual cost-benefit calculations is undermined by emotions that decision makers feel while thinking about the consequences of their actions (affective bias).
  60. 60. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (3) • Cognitive biases are systematic distortions of rational calculations based not on emotional feelings but simply on the limitations of the human brain in making choices. • Cognitive dissonance • Justification of effort • Wishful thinking • Mirror image • Projection • Historical analogies
  61. 61. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (4) • Two specific modifications of the rational model of decision making have been proposed to accommodate psychological realities. – Bounded rationality: • Takes into account the costs of seeking and processing information. – Optimizing. – Satisfying. – Prospect theory: • Decision makes go through two phases: editing phase and the evaluation phase. • Holds that evaluations take place by comparison with a reference point, which is often the status quo but might be some past or expected situation.
  62. 62. GROUP PSYCHOLOGY • Group dynamics can be a promoter of state interests but they can also introduce new sources of irrationality into the decision-making process. • Groupthink – Refers to the tendency for groups to reach decisions without accurately assessing their consequences, because individual members tend to go along with ideas they think the others support – Groups tend to be overly optimistic about the chances of success and are thus more willing to take risks. • Iran-Contra scandal
  63. 63. CRISIS MANAGEMENT • Crises are foreign policy situations in which outcomes are very important and time frames are compressed. –Time constraints –Groupthink –Psychological stress
  64. 64. DOMESTIC POLITICS • Foreign policy is shaped not only by the internal dynamics of individual and group decision making but also by the states and societies within which decision makers operate.
  65. 65. BUREAUCRACIES • Diplomats: – Virtually all states maintain a diplomatic corps, or foreign service, of diplomats in embassies in foreign capitals. – Political appointees. – Career diplomats. – Tension common between state leaders and foreign policy bureaucrats. • Interagency tensions: – Bureaucratic rivalry as an influence on foreign policy challenges the notion of states as unitary actors in the international system.
  66. 66. INTEREST GROUPS • Coalitions of people who share a common interest in the outcome of some political issue and who organize themselves to try to influence the outcome. • Lobbying: – The process of talking with legislators or officials to influence their decisions on some set of issues. – Three important elements: • Ability to gain a hearing with busy officials. • Ability to present cogent arguments for one’s case. • Ability to trade favors in return for positive action on an issue.
  67. 67. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1) • Huge interlocking network of governmental agencies, industrial corporations, and research institutes, working together to supply a nation’s military forces. • Response to the growing importance of technology • Encompasses a variety of constituencies, each of which has an interest in military spending. – Corporations, military officers, universities, and scientific institutes that receive military research contracts. – Revolving door. – PACS from the military industry.
  68. 68. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2) The phrase, “Military Industrial Complex” was first used by President Dwight D. Eisenhower during his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961. He warns against the increasing influence of corporate influence in all areas of government. More significant is the fact that before the presidency, Dwight Eisenhower’s was a five-star general in the United States Army. During the Second World War, he served as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe, with responsibility for planning and supervising the successful invasion of France and Germany in 1944–45. In 1951, he became the first supreme commander of NATO.
  69. 69. PUBLIC OPINION (1) • Range of views on foreign policy issues held by the citizens of a state. • Has a greater influence on foreign policy in democracies than in authoritarian governments. – Legitimacy – Propaganda – Journalists as gatekeepers
  70. 70. PUBLIC OPINION (2) • In democracies, public opinion generally has less effect on foreign policy than on domestic policy. – Attentive public – Foreign policy elite – Rally ’round the flag syndrome – Diversionary foreign policy
  71. 71. LEGISLATURES (1) • Conduit through which interest groups and public opinion can wield influence. – Presidential systems; separate elections. • Legislatures play a direct role in making foreign policy. • Different rules apply, however, to the use of military force. – Rally ’round the flag. – May challenge the president if they have power of the “purse”.
  72. 72. LEGISLATURES (2) – Parliamentary systems; political parties are dominant • Often parliamentary executives do not need to submit treaties or policies for formal approval by the legislature. • Call elections; new executive • Legislatures play a key role in designing and implementing foreign policy.