Gestión Pública.

1. Boguslawa Dobek-Ostrowska
University of Wroclaw
Poland
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF POLISH PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS
- COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In a slow but visible way, the process of election campaigns professionalisation began
after 1989 in Poland, similarly as it happened in the other countries of Central and Western
Europe. The methods and techniques of political marketing drawn from election campaigns
organised in Western Europe and the United States become an inherent component of election
campaigns. Analysis of subsequent presidential election campaigns run in 1990, 1995 and
2000 clearly reveals that they underwent metamorphosis from being chaotic and amateur
events into professionally organised election campaigns which was accompanied by the
evolution of political marketing.
Presidential election campaign - 1990 r.
Background. In 1990 Poland was in the initial phase of transition to democracy. After
parliamentary elections in June 1989 fundamental political changes took place. Serious
economic transformation was launched aiming at market economy. Wojciech Jaruzelski was
elected President by the newly chosen Parliament. In the autumn of 1989 the first non-
communist government, lead by a non-communist Prime Minister- T. Mazowiecki was
formed in this region of Europe. Snowballing effect1 reached one by one soviet-dependant
countries – Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria,
where difficult and long-lasting democratisation processes was initiated. 2
Along with implementation of the new political system, governing post-Solidarity elite
began to demand from General Jaruzelski- the ancient regime symbol- resigning of his post.
In September 1990 the Seym decided to shorten the tenure of contemporary President and to
elect a new one in general, direct elections. The elections were run in two rounds. Six
candidates participated in the first round of the elections (on 25th of November 1990) and
achieved the following results:
1. Lech Walesa 39,66 % of the votes
2. S. Tyminski 23,10 %
3. T. Mazowiecki 18,08 %
4. W. Cimoszewicz 9, 21 %
5. R. Bartoszcze 7,15 %
1
S. Huntington (1991). The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman &London:
University of Oklahoma Press, pp.100-106.
2
B. Dobek-Ostrowska (1997) Proces demokratyzacji Europy Srodowo-Wschodniej – przeslanki i przebieg. [in]
A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut (eds) Demokracje Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej.
Wroclaw: University of Wroclaw Press, pp.15-17.
1

2. 6. L. Moczulski 2,50 %.
Two candidates, Lech Walesa and S. Tyminski managed to make it to the second round that
took place on the 9th of December 1990. They received respectively 74,25 % and 25,75 % per
cent of the votes. Voting attendance was poor –only 53,39 % of the electorate took part in the
elections.
In this period Polish political market was characterised by chaos. Huge number of small
parties, devoid of social roots and supporters existed on the political market. There were
plenty of leaders that had huge political ambitions but serious social force was standing
behind them. The political system and the parties were in the initial phase of development. In
the Parliament intensive rotation of club members took place. The political stability and
security were lacking, which is typical of transition period and new political structures
building phase.
Market research. In 1990 only a narrow part of Polish political market was researched
for the sake of the campaign. Only two election teams of Lech Walesa and Tadeusz.
Mazowiecki ordered professional market research. The other candidates did not organise any
research. Private PBS agency was entrusted with preparing market analysis for Walesa
election team. Polls were comprehensive and provided exhaustive information. They
measured support for the candidate and his main rival – Mazowiecki3 in various regions and
the way voters’ preferences changed. Election team of Mazowiecki ordered two types of
research. Private agency SMG/KRC Poland conducted qualitative sociological polls using
focus group method that concentrated on general situation in Poland and approaching
presidential campaign. Members of promotion team (which was a part of election team)
prepared another type of polls, and its practical implementation was entrusted to
DEMOSKOP agency. Research results were immediately sent to Election Committee. The
results suggested univocally that candidate’s popularity was decreasing in almost every social
group. The election team underestimated the conclusions and did not make any use of them.
The members of election team were certain of Mazowiecki victory. The internal conflict
between two election team structures- management and promotion team- made the situation
even worse. In consequence, the promotion team was dismissed. The results of market
research influenced both candidates’ election strategy and neither candidates nor their
advisors made any professional use of them. Hence the polls did not fulfil their basic function.
Apart from opinion polls prepared for election teams of Walesa and Mazowiecki,
research of political scene and public opinion polls were conducted by two state-owned
institutions: OBOP- belonging to Radiokomitet structures and CBOS- a state owned agency.
Results of their research had enormous importance during the election campaign. The results
of opinion polls were published in the media. The polls were subject to wide public discussion
and both the electorate and election teams had access to them.
Electoral market opinion polls conducted in 1990 must be described as having a narrow
scope. No polling packages, tracking polls or direct response polls were run. Only in one case
focus group method was used. Out of six candidates only two incorporated scheduled research
of political market in their campaigns. Numerous studies, containing precious information
were prepared, yet their content was hardly exploited. The results did not become the basis of
preparing election strategies or organising election team activities. The polls had merely
prognostic function in spite of their reliability. The election teams were not able to utilise
these polls which resulted from the fact that they did not comprehend the importance of
market analysis and necessity of their influencing candidates and election teams behaviour.
This aspect of all candidates’ activities must be evaluated as amateur and remote from
professionalism.
3
Until the I round it was assumed that Mazowiecki will be his main rival
2

3. Segmentation and targeting. A candidate, who did not focus on any particular social
group, in other words on any specific electorate segment but addressed his appeal to general
public, won the elections. Analysing his tour and marketing communication in the media
reveals that he was unaware of geographical distribution of his electorate and did not make
any conscious effort to reach them. The behaviour of post-communist party candidate was an
exception since he was trying to select target segments of the electorate and address a suitable
message to them. Generally, the candidates did not execute political market segmentation,
which was later confirmed by characteristics of specific candidates’ electorate. Basic mistakes
were made in targeting activities, which is illustrated by tour plans (or lack of them), and
candidates’ meetings with general public.
Candidates positioning and image shaping. Candidates were trying to create images of
themselves that they perceived as appropriate. But this process was not executed correctly.
The opinion polls results concerning candidate and his opponents were not taken into
consideration. If any effects such as displaying fundamental differences on the basis of which
the voters should support a specific candidate were achieved, it was due to intuitional actions
of campaign organisers rather than to knowledge accompanied by marker research.
Candidates positioning consisted mainly in displaying opponents’ disadvantages. Mazowiecki
run negative campaign attacking Lech Walesa. Similar situation took place in case of
Walesa’s campaign who in the first round turned against Mazowiecki and in the second
against Tyminski. The candidates were not aware of the fact that attacking other candidates
influenced their own image and not necessarily in a way desired by them. Fundamentally,
professional activities and strategies used for shaping of candidates’ image were lacking in
this campaign. It was Walesa’s election team that paid most attention to candidate’s image.
Nevertheless the specialists’ impact was significantly limited. Their advice was not able to
change Walesa’s behaviour who was convinced of his infallibility.
Election strategy and campaign management. Generally, all candidates were lacking
election strategies. Each of the candidates possessed an election team, but their organisation
and content-related knowledge awoke many doubts. Election teams were poorly prepared.
The politicians organised their campaigns in amateur way, lacking skills, qualifications and
experience. It should be reminded that these were the first direct presidential elections in the
history of Poland. 4 The election team of Walesa was organised in the best way. Still, the
position of experts and consultants was weak in all election teams. People managing the
campaign ignored their conclusions and suggestions. Limited role of political managers and
consultants was not contributing to campaign’s professionalisation. A new element of
presidential campaign in 1990 was hiring advertising agencies (by S. Tyminski) and founding
the campaign upon paid staff.
Mass –media in campaign. For the first time mass media were incorporated into
campaign on such a big scale. Public radio and television transmitted party political
broadcasts whose rank was increased by banning paid commercials. For the first time the
press was free to report and comment on the campaign. This was accompanied by profound
changes of the press market, which on the one hand experienced a press boom, since many
independent newspapers appeared and on the other witnessed privatising of many state-owned
titles. It was the first time that results of public opinion polls were published. Mass media
became participator of election campaign having impact both on the candidates and on the
electorate. Even though formally independent, media were in fact biased and in the ruthless
way attacked one of the candidates (Tyminski). These practices were unethical. The media
were not able to report on campaign course in a reliable way and to supply sufficient
4
Before the President was chosen by Parliament .
3

4. information allowing voters to make a decision. For this reason they did not fulfil the function
which is ascribed to mass media in democracy. 5
Conclusions from 1990 campaign. Analysis of presidential campaign of 1990 exposes
its amateurish character expressed in several ways: in candidates’ lack of knowledge
concerning mechanisms of election process, in politicians and members of election teams
lacking subject-matter knowledge; in ignoring or absence of the experts, consultants,
specialised agencies and institutions. Media bias and lack of political culture of electorate did
not promote processes of political communication. Nevertheless, it should be reminded that
this was the first free and general election on a national scale in Poland, just at the beginning
of political system democratisation that took place after more than fifty years of communism
rule in Poland (a year after bringing down the communism). From a theoretical perspective
presidential campaign of 1990 may be described as pre-modern campaign of the type that D.
M. Farrell describes as labour intensive campaign, 6 and which he considers typical of western
democracies in the sixties and seventies. As inherent features of these campaigns he
enumerates: spontaneity, lack of preparations and strategy, poor conducting, high level of
decentralisation, low level of control possessed by party central structures and concentration
on candidate’s contact with voter.7 Most of these features might be spotted in elections of
1990.
Presidential election campaign - 5. 11. 1995 and 19. 11.1995
Background. The campaign that was run five years later took place in different
political, social and legal circumstances. In 1992 the Parliament adopted so called ‘Small
constitution’, a legal act specifying relations between executive and legislative, President’s
authority included. Two Parliamentary election campaigns were run in 1991 and 1993 prior to
presidential elections. In comparison to the situation of five years earlier certain dose of
consolidation of political market took place and some balance of political powers was shaped.
Political parties though still being weak, which was especially true of right-wing parties were
slowly finding their place on the political scene. It could be called it a relative stabilisation of
the political system. As a result of 1993 elections the coalition of left wing, post-communist
parties took over the rule. The right wing parties were divided and conflicted. In most cases
they were unable to get into Parliament and these that managed to do so were divided and
could not reach a compromise. Such political situation lasted unchanged until 1995. The
presidency of Lech Walesa was evaluated negatively by public opinion. He was blamed for
being a conflictive person; not keeping the promises made during election campaign and
criticised for lacking skills necessary to the President. In spite o his indisputable successes on
f
the international scene low percentage of respondents declared the intention to vote for him in
approaching elections.
Electoral committee registered 17 candidates, 4 of which resigned before election date.
Consequently, in the first round (on the 11th of November 1995) at voting attendance of 64,69
% of citizens entitled to vote, 13 candidates fought for the votes. Most votes were won by:
1. A. Kwasniewski 35,11 %
2. Lech Walesa 33,11 %
3. J. Kuron 9,22 %
4. J. Olszewski 6,86 %
5
B. McNair (1995). An Introduction to Political Communication. London: Routledge, pp21-22.
6
D.M. Farrell (1996). Campaigns Strategies and Tactics. [in] L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris (eds). Comparing
Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage, pp.169.
7
Ibidem, p. 169.
4

5. The rest of the candidates did not pass the threshold of 5 % of the votes. Their participation in
campaign was marginal. Two candidates took part in the second round (on the 19th of
November 1995) Kwasniewski, that received 51,72 % of the votes and fought previous
President, Walesa (48,28 % of the votes), at voting attendance of 68,23 %,
Market research. Election teams definitely paid more attention to political market
research. Apart from the polls ordered at professional, private companies, many of which
appeared after 1990, the teams were conducting their own surveys and polls. This research
started to be important already at the stage of nominating the candidates by political parties.
L. Kolarska-Bobinska believes that the polls were „a substitute of internal party
mechanisms”.8 Opinion polls conducted in 1995 had different functions: they allowed to
foresee election results, influenced the process of candidates image building, determined
campaigns appeal by specifying position of the candidate and his opponents on the political
scene. For the first time the election teams were collecting information about other candidates,
often in order to use it against them. Still, the primary effect of the research was that it
influenced making strategic decisions. The polls were widely present in the campaign. They
were organised and used on a very broad scale, which never happened before. The polls
became an effective marketing tool providing reliable and precise information. Many
researchers believe that surveys and public opinion polls that were published and therefore
available to the general public influenced the final result of the elections in a profound way.
Firstly, they were shaping public opinion and influenced citizens’ preferences, secondly they
determined the decisions of election teams.
Segmentation and targeting. Effective segmentation and targeting done by election teams
of two candidates Walesa and Kwasniewski, allowed them to reach target segments of
potential voters and allowed them to achieve positive elections result on the election day.
(More than 30 % of votes). Other candidates who were trying to win the support of one
strictly specified electorate segment, like farmers or citizens possessing a degree were
defeated. The concept that turned out to be successful was choosing wide segment of so
called middle class which already is, or is becoming a dominant social group in stable and
democratic societies. Effective positioning and targeting strategy combined with
communication strategy played an important role in this campaign. The candidates were
combining mass communication with interpersonal and interactive communication. They
were travelling around Poland and meeting the electorate. According to dominant opinion this
was a best channel to reach the voting public, especially in case when media were hostile
towards the candidate (which happened in case of A. Kwasniewski ).
High level of professionalism of Kwasniewski campaign must be mentioned in this
regard. He took part in biggest amount of meetings out of all candidates. He travelled 23 000
kilometres far, visited more than 120 towns and villages. The meetings had various character-
starting with cameral meetings up to public rallies. The scenery of rallies was modelled on
American campaigns: artistic setting, mixing with the crowd, shaking by-passers hands, and
visiting popular clubs and pubs. Similarly as it was in case of Clinton’s campaign
Kwasniewski was travelling by bus, which was an element of outdoor publicity. This choice
allowed the candidate to reach even the most remote places and made his figure outstanding
in comparison to other candidates travelling by posh limousines. Before the second round of
elections the strategy consisted in retaining the support in these regions of the country where
the candidate won the first round. It was definitely the campaign in American style with pop
music, balloons, gadgets and snacks. Kwasniewski turned out to be a born rally politician.
During his tour a hired film crew accompanied him and the recorded material was later used
for production of political broadcasts. Election results show that thanks to using this technique
8
L. Kolarska – Bobinska (1997). Polityczna rola sondazy w kampanii wyborczej 1995 r. [in] L. Kolarska-
Bobinska, R. Markowski (eds). Prognozy i wybory. Polska Demokracja `95. Warszawa, p. 167.
5

6. Kwasniewski won the biggest share of young people’s votes (aged 18-49), coming from small
towns and villages.
L. Walesa campaign was prepared worse in comparison to the campaign of
Kwasniewski and was lacking professionalism. It was not orchestrated according to any
marketing plan. The candidate addressed his appeal to wide range of voters that were
characterised by anticommunist attitude. Walesa had no tour schedule and simply visited
places that he was invited to. He attended 80 meetings in 30 different cities, most of which
was of the same type (rally, the Holy mass, laying flowers at monuments etc.
Candidates positioning and image shaping. Two main opponents - Walesa and
Kwasniewski represented extreme personalities, had contrasting appearance, ideology and
program conceptions. In contrast to the previous elections in 1995 election campaign
candidates’ images were consciously shaped. To achieve positive effects the results of opinion
polls and surveys were analysed in the respect of candidates’ perception by the public. The
candidates were positioned against their opponents, their advantages were exposed and
disadvantages concealed. Other candidates’ faults were eagerly brought to light.
Kwasniewski’s image was shaped in a very professional way. He was presented as an
educated, competent and dynamic person having good leadership qualities and the man of
success. His negotiation skills were underlined along with the ability to compromise, lack of
prejudices and being open to new phenomena and situations. Unlike Walesa he was able to
speak exquisite Polish. His young age and good appearance were emphasised (for campaign’s
sake he lost several kilograms, wore contact lenses and dressed in elegant manner), which
contrasted sharply with the image of his main rival. Walesa was perceived as a person
creating conflicts, possessing no education, speaking bad Polish and devoid of elegance. The
campaign of Walesa focused on changing negative perception of contemporary president and
reshaping his image. The role of candidates’ image was enormous in this campaign. A winner
became this politician who conducted positioning on the political market process in a
professional, consequent and skilful way according to marketing rules. He was able to present
the program and image better fitted to the social expectations.
Election strategy and campaign managing. At this stage of analysis attention must be
brought again to Kwasniewski’s campaign. As far as the marketing strategy is concerned his
election team was best aware of the rules and requirements of political marketing and their
content- related knowledge necessary to orchestrate the election campaign was the greatest.
His managers intended this campaign to be a modern and professional campaign dissimilar to
other candidates’ actions. Therefore it resembled advertising campaign. In the course of
campaign managers made use of experts’ advice, distributed competence and met strategic
assumptions. Generally, election campaign of 1995 was characterised by much better
organisation level than it was in 1990. The teams were better prepared thanks to their
experience stemming from organising previous presidential and parliamentary election
campaigns. Experts and consultants- including foreign ones- became a common element of
the election scene. They were of great importance since they were supplying advice and
creating the concepts of election campaigns. Their presence was a source of inspiration for
new ideas and evidently influenced campaign professionalisation process. Election team of
Kwasniewski hired French advertising agency EuroRSCG from Paris and Jacques Séguel,
political consultant who previously was responsible for F. Mitterrand presidential campaign.
Other candidates also had their consultants. Compared to the year 1990 great progress in the
field of using advertising techniques was made.
Mass media in campaign. Public relations and media relations were organised in a more
conscious mode. Organising media events grew on importance. These activities were yet not
fully professional due to insufficient supply of PR experts in election teams. Candidates had
unpaid airtime at their disposal. For the first time paid political broadcasts were transmitted
6

7. but they were used by few candidates and in the marginal way. Apart from unpaid parties’
political broadcasts public television9 transmitted its own programmes. It was the first time
that television debates appeared in the course of campaign and were received with interest by
the audience. The opinion polls conducted by OBOP show that A Kwasniewski’s
performance was evaluated as a better one by 70 % of the respondents. Left-wing candidate’s
elegance, eloquence and intelligence were juxtaposed with impulsiveness, lack of manners
and coarse language of Walesa, and his tendency to provoke conflicts. Some analysts believe
that increase of support for Kwasniewski in the last days before second round of the elections
was the result of positive impression that he made in television debate.
In comparison with the previous elections mass media were much better prepared to report
on the campaign course and to fulfil their informational mission. Media were guilty of getting
involved in competition between the candidates and lacking impartiality, which was revealed
by their negative attitude towards left-wing representative.
Campaign of 1995 –conclusions. Analysis of election campaign of 1995 clearly reveals
that Polish political market underwent professionalisation, which resulted in transformation of
organisation and course of presidential campaign. From marketing point of view presidential
campaign of 1995 was totally different to the campaign that took place five years ago.
Presidential campaign of A. Kwasniewski received a lot of attention in Polish literature
discussing this subject. The experts univocally classify it as the first Polish professionally
organised and orchestrated campaign that brought Poland closer to Western marketing model
of organising political campaigns. The style of the campaign was americanised. According to
Farrell’s typology this campaign could be classified as modern capital intensive campaign. 10
The attention should be drawn to the following characteristics of this campaign:
centralisation of parties’ activities on the national level; growing importance of full-time party
staff; hiring external experts and consultants; increasing role of mass- media, in particular of
television and high costs of the campaign (Kwasniewski spend 3,4 million of zloties, Walesa
– 2,7 million of zloties). 11 Other candidates’ campaigns did not meet the requirements set by
marketing strategy. They may be classified as labour intensive campaigns.
Presidential election campaign - 2000
Background. P. Mancini and D. Swanson list several elements that have impact on
the context of political campaigns, such as: election system, structure of party competition,
regulation of campaigning, national political culture and national media system.12 All these
factors have undergone serious, if not fundamental change in ten year period since the first
presidential campaign that took place in 1990. In the first place it must be noted that Poland
in the year 2000 was in the phase of democracy consolidation, and adopted democratic
constitution in 1997. Poland was already a NATO member and started to negotiate its
membership in the European Union. Political system underwent stabilisation and
consolidation. Previous elections gave legitimisation to the government and were a testimony
to the fact that society fully accepted democratic rules. Election system, the structure of party
competition and regulation of campaigning were clearly stated and did not differ from the
norms valid in other stable Western European democracies. New rules regulating financing of
9
Public media has exist in Poland from 1994. The radio and television act in 1992 has opened the market for
private broadcasters
10
M. D. Farell, op.cit., p. 168.
11
M Mazur (2002). Marketing polityczny. Warszawa: PWN, p.231.
12
P. Mancini, D. Swanson (1996). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: Introduction. [in] D. Swanson, P.
Mancicni (eds). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. London: Praeger, pp. 17-20
7

8. campaigns were introduced which strengthened social control of expenses. Also Polish
political culture was a subject to serious, if not fundamental changes. The Poles became
familiar with democratic rules and internalised them. They also gained voting experience
while taking part in nine election campaigns: two presidential campaigns, four legislative
campaigns and three local election campaigns. All these factors had enormous impact on
professionalisation of election campaigns
12 candidates took part in the election campaign in 2000,yet only five of them played
substantial role in this race. The rest of them was characterised as political folklore and were
th
only of marginal importance. The candidates gained the following support (on the 8 October
2000):
1. A. Kwasniewski 53,90 %
2. A. Olechowski 17,30 %
3. M. Krzaklewski 15,57 %
4. J. Kalinowski 5,95 %
5. A. Lepper 3,05 %13
The elections of 2000 differed from all previous ones in this regard that their result was
decided in the first round already. As opinion polls correctly predicted left wing
representative and contemporary President A. Kwasniewski became a winner. It was no
surprise for any participant of the political market.
Political market research. Analysis of the political market became a natural introduction
to campaign. The surveys were conducted by hired professional public opinion research
institutions. The election team of M. Krzaklewski, right wing candidate ordered sociological
survey. They were expected to find the reason for such an extensive popularity of
Kwasniewski (opinion polls conducted during his first presidency were showing that he had
support of 70 % of the society) and to discover his weak points. Still, some of the opinion
polls ordered by the candidates did not supply them with all necessary information and
sometimes their results were incorrectly interpreted. A good example of it may be the case of
Krzaklewski. The opinion polls conducted even before the election campaign was launched
revealed that this candidate had a big negative electorate and was lacking sympathy among
society. This fact already at the start of the campaign gave him no chance to win the elections.
In spite of that his candidacy was put up in the elections. Yet generally, election teams made
strategic decisions concerning segmentation, targeting and positioning on the basis of market
research and information about political market.
Election strategy and campaign management. If we compare this campaign with the
previous ones greater maturity of marketing strategies may be observed. The campaigns of M.
Krzaklewski and A. Kwasniewski distinguished themselves in this regard. They had clearly
defined strategic assumptions that specified the actions aiming at choosing target groups,
positioning and the choice of communication techniques. The campaign of A. Olechowski
was less successful in this aspect.
The campaign of A. Kwasniewski was efficiently organised and carefully orchestrated
using many correct marketing techniques. His team included many experienced consultants
with internships completed and higher education degree and job experience acquired in the
United States and Western Europe. The strategy of President consisted in maintaining the
existing image and high social support. The candidate run an active campaign characterised
by lack of aggression both in the form and in content. There were 2 general objectives that
underlined M. Krzaklewski campaign – it was changing his image and violent attack on the
left-wing candidate. Conducting negative campaign aimed at Kwasniewski turned out to be an
incorrect objective that resulted in more losses than gains. A. Olechowski campaign failed as
13
The situation of one of them – A. Lepper, radically changed. In the parliamentary elections of 2001 his
political party became the third most powerful party in Poland.
8

9. far as marketing strategy is concerned. It was lacking clearly defined objectives, direction and
activities.
Form and content of political communicating with electorate definitely improved in
comparison to previous campaigns. Co-operation of election teams with professional
advertising or marketing agencies became a common phenomenon. Many managers,
consultants and specialists took active part in the campaign. It could be classified as emerging
of specialised professions and professional Polish staff that could deal with preparing, staging
and organising of election campaigns. Substantial development of political advertisement, in
particular of political advertisement, took place. Direct forms of communication such as
rallies, election conventions, active participation of candidates’ wives in the campaign and
using music and election songs emerged.
Mass media in campaign. Media system and the way Polish media reported on the
campaign had only limited influence on its course and results, according to some Polish
researchers.14 Some opinions criticising attitude of public broadcaster were heard. Public
media were accused of granting largest coverage to A. Kwasniewski. Yet it did not have any
greater meaning in general evaluation of mass media behaviour since the candidate holding
office is always privileged in this respect. Mass media, in particular public television, reported
on the course of the campaign in an increasingly reliable way, aiming at objectivity, even
though they had several slips. For this reason when comparing three campaigns of 1990,
1995 and 2000, it could be stated that definitely the process of mass media professionalisation
took place and complementarily of roles in a political communication system such as the
function of watchdog, moderator, editorial guide and entertainer developed.15 After having
practised democratic procedures for ten years Polish mass media started gradually to fulfil the
functions typical of the media in stable political culture, such as: informing and educating the
society; being a platform for public political discourse, that enables shaping of public opinion;
giving publicity to governmental and political institutions; being a channel for the advocacy
of political viewpoints. 16
In contrast to previous election campaign the candidates were fully aware of the media
importance for shaping voters choices and preferences. The most significant medium was of
course television. Radio was a complementary medium. Each of the candidates had about two
hours of unpaid coverage in public radio and television. Additionally election teams of four
prominent candidates bought paid commercial coverage in private and public broadcast
media. The Internet, besides official sites of the candidates was practically not used. The
exception was the election team of A. Kwasniewski that placed advertisement on
„Rzeczpospolita On Line” daily web site and bought e-mailing service from Onet.pl portal.
Campaign of 2000- conclusions . In the aspect of professionalism the campaign of 2000
was very unequal. On the one hand it witnessed professionally organised and correctly run
from the marketing point of view campaign of A. Kwasniewski that did not differ from
analogous campaigns in Western Europe. On the other hand the campaigns of Krzaklewski
and Olechowski even though often clumsy and burdened with serious mistakes were pointing
to great progress in the field of adapting political marketing. Finally, there were also amateur
campaigns of the rest of the candidates, lacking content-related preparation of candidates a nd
their political base, if they had any. Using Farell’s classification it could be stated that the
campaign of 2000 brought Poland to the phase of modern capital intensive campaigns.
Summary
14
M. Mazur, op.cit., p. 248.
15
J. Blumler, M. Gurevitch (1995). The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge, p.15.
16
B. McNair, op.cit., pp.21-22.
9

10. Summing it up, Polish presidential election campaigns underwent serious
transformation – from totally amateurish campaigns of 1990, through the stage of premordern
campaigns (possessing some elements of capital intensive campaign in case of A.
Kwasniewski) in 1995, to capital intensive campaign of 2000. Analysing the pace of changes
of the political scene, the way of treating politics by the candidates and political parties and
the evolution of Polish national political culture, as well as dynamic development of mass
media, private broadcasters in particular, the thesis that next election campaign in 2005 will
have features of post-modern campaign seems quite probable.
In the period from 1990 to 2000 a deep evolution of Polish election campaigns towards
the western model took place which was best observed in case of presidential election but
which concerned all types of campaigns. Such features of modern campaigns that are
mentioned by Mancini and Swanson,17 as personalization of politics, „scientificization” of
politics, detachment of parties from citizens, autonomous structures of communication and the
evolution of citizens role from citizens` participation to spectatorship are also noticed in
Polish election campaigns.
NOTES
1
S. Huntington (1991). The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman &London:
University of Oklahoma Press, pp.100-106.
2
B. Dobek-Ostrowska (1997) Proces demokratyzacji Europy Srodowo-Wschodniej – przeslanki i przebieg. [in]
A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut (eds) Demokracje Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej.
Wroclaw: University of Wroclaw Press, pp.15-17.
3
Until the I round it was assumed that Mazowiecki will be his main rival.
4
Before the President was chosen by Parliament.
5
B. McNair (1995). An Introduction to Political Communication. London: Routledge, pp21-22.
6
D.M. Farrell (1996). Campaigns Strategies and Tactics. [in] L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris (eds). Comparing
Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage, pp.169.
7 Ibidem, p. 169.
8
L. Kolarska – Bobinska (1997). Polityczna rola sondazy w kampanii wyborczej 1995 r. [in] L. Kolarska-
Bobinska, R. Markowski (eds). Prognozy i wybory. Polska Demokracja `95. Warszawa, p. 167.
9
Public media has exist in Poland from 1994. The radio and television act in 1992 has opened the market for
private broadcasters
10
M. D. Farell, op.cit., p. 168.
11
M Mazur (2002). Marketing polityczny. Warszawa: PWN, p.231.
12
P. Mancini, D. Swanson (1996). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: Introduction. [in] D. Swanson, P.
Mancicni (eds). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. London: Praeger, pp. 17-20
13
The situation of one of them – A. Lepper, radically changed. In the parliamentary elections of 2001 his
political party became the third most powerful party in Poland.
14
M. Mazur, op.cit., p. 248.
15
J. Blumler, M. Gurevitch (1995). The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge, p.15.
16 B. McNair, op.cit., pp.21-22.
17 P. Mancini, D. Swanson, op.cit., pp.14-17.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Blumler, J., Gurevitch, M. (1995). The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge.
Denton, R., Woodward, G. (1998). Political Communication in America. London: Praeger.
17
P. Mancini, D. Swanson, op.cit., pp.14-17.
10

11. Dobek-Ostrowska, B. (1997). Proces demokratyzacji Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej –
przeslanki i przebieg. [in] A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut (eds). Demokracje Europy Srodkowo-
Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej. Wroclaw: University of Wroclaw Press.
Huntington, S. (1991). The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman & London: University of Oklahoma Press.
Farrell, D.M. (1996). Campaigns Strategies and Tactics. [in] L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris
(eds). Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: Sage.
Kolarska-Bobinska, R. Markowski (eds) (1997). Prognozy i wybory. Polska Demokracja `95.
Warszawa.
Mazur, M. (2002). Marketing polityczny. Warszawa: PWN.
McNair, B. (1995). An Introduction to Political Communication. London: Routledge.
Swanson, D., Mancini, P. (eds) (1996). Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. London:
Praeger.
11