T H E PROCESS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAININGAND T H E QUESTION O.docx

T H E PROCESS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND T H E QUESTION OF ITS OBSOLESCENCE
VERNON H. JENSEN
the process of autonomous bargaining.
The parties to collective bargaining
should be competent and willing to do
the whole job themselves.
It must be acknowledged that in some
quarters collective bargaining has suf-
fered abuse or perversion, but limited
failures of this type do not render collec-
tive bargaining obsolete. One should not
scrap an institution having vitality and
great usefulness simply because there are
some abuses. These need to be corrected.
The fact, however, remains that there is
no satisfactory substitute for collective
bargaining if we want freedom of pri-
vate decision making in the employment
relation. It needs to be underscored that
collective bargaining is private two-party
decision making and that no other
method of rule making and rule adminis-
tration can achieve what collective bar-
gaining does in a free democratic society.
Collective bargaining has always had
opponents. For years it had to make its

way in the face of political and economic
antagonisms and legal obstacles. Never-
theless, because bargaining is the essence
of most transactions in our enterprise
system, and because the pursuit of eco-
nomic self-interest is a fundamental
axiom of that system, collective bargain-
ing was bound to develop and had to be
accommodated.
Although collective bargaining still
has its outright enemies, they are not our
primary concern. It also has some un-
bargaining is not obsolete.
Collective bargaining performs a
fundamental and valuable function
which cannot be fulfilled as well in our
society by any other means. Moreover, it
performs that function more compatibly
with our heritage of democracy than any
other device designed to regulate em-
ployment conditions.
THE CURRENT CRITICISM OE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
It is my thesis that current comments
about the inadequacies and failures of
collective bargaining and criticisms that
it distorts the economy are developed
illogically and without factual founda-
tion. By disseminating knowledge about
the nature of the bargaining process and
by underscoring the genuine approval

given by much of industry to the fruits of
its practice, the critics might be silenced
and the meddlers checked. If the public
adequately understands the process of
collective bargaining, it will insist that
collective bargaining be allowed to run
its course generally, without interference
from the government or from third par-
ties, except on limited occasions when
the parties themselves seek technical as-
sistance. Even here there is danger that
experts will make themselves indispens-
able, thus undermining to some extent
Vernon H. Jensen is professor at the New
York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University.—EDITOR
546
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 547
witting enemies. Among them axe those
employers who think collective bargain-
ing is a nuisance and who seek to capture
unions or devise ways of emasculating or
circumventing them.
Other unwitting enemies are those
economists who find collective bargain-
ing disruptive. They see it as an obstruc-
tion to the proper working of the econo-
imy. They viev; it as a monopolistic device
'which causes distortion of the "normal"

:relationships in the economy. They find
it to be a major cause of what they call
"cost-push" inflation. These economists
are not die-hard antagonists, for they
frequently profess to support collective
bargaining when properly structured.
But they proceed from an unrealistic
concept of competition, and their line
of thinking, followed to its logical con-
clusion, leads to the obliteration of col-
lective bargaining.
Collective bargaining may be in dan-
ger from friends as well as foes. Well-
meaning persons sometimes expect too
much and mistakenly make suggestions
for supplementation which cannot pos-
sibly produce constructive results because
the process of bargaining cannot accom-
modate their proposals.
Whenever there is a major sdrike, many
people will say, "We ought to compel
the parties to arbitrate." They argue that
the costs of prolonged work stoppages
could be avoided if the parties are re-
quired to submit their dispute to a
tribunal for adjudication. These people
igiiore the alternative costs of arbitration
which, although not measurable in dol-
lars, are great, inasmuch as the important
freedom of private decision making
would be eroded.
Various assertions have recently been
made that collective bargaining may be

inadequate to solve the problems of the
present day. Some of these assertions
come from supporters of collective bar-
gaining who see major challenges posed
to the free world, such as the sudden
upsurge of the productive and political
power of three continents, the changed
character of international tradej and the
acceleration of technological change. W.
Willard Wirtz has said.
In a world that has shi:unk c^vemight
and a national economy in wliich each
part now depends on every other part
and on the health of the whole] the con-
tinuation of private collective bargaining
as the important force in the future it
has been in the past depend^ on the
decision of the bargainers to exercise, or
not to exercise, responsibility^ for the
concerns that affect the whole economy.
. . . The future of collective bfirgaining
depends on whether its motive power
and its procedures can be adjifsted and
revised to periaadt a larger recognition
and reflection of the common) national
interests.... ̂
Archibald Cox, claiming tphat new
conditions make the public consequences
of wage and price decisions mijich vnder
than in the past, has said that the govern-
ment must have "an opportunity to be
heard as spokesman of tlie wider public
interest" while the decisions are being

made. He says that "the principle must
be recognized sooner or later" and "it is
on its way to general acceptaijice."-' Ar-
thur Goldberg has said, "It is [time that
labor and management and government
embark together for the new wc(rld of the
economic future, and leave behind the
old hostilities and inadequate ^deas and
^W. Willard Wirti, "The Future df Collective
Bargaining." Address delivered at the Interna-
tional Trade Fair, Chicago, 111., AugiisC 3, 1961.
Daily Labor Report, No. 149, AugAst 3, 1961,
p. D-2 (italics added).
^Archibald Cox, "Wages, Prices, tJovernment
and Lawyers." Address before Alundni of Har-
vard Law School and Graduate Scllools. Daily
Labor Report, No. 115, June 13, 1962[ E-1 (italics
added). i
548 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
misconceptions that have so long delayed
a needed mutual effort."^
Some critics deplore the use of eco-
nomic power in collective bargaining and
yearn for the arbitrament of reason.
They look hopefully for signs of the
latter and a reduction of the former. It
has been asserted ruefully that "there has
been much more of an interplay of eco-
nomic power than an exercise of pure

reason."* Again, Arthur Goldberg, speak-
ing of collective bargaining disputes,
says, "we can no longer resolve them on
the old testing grounds of economic
force and the exercise of raw power."^
It is urged that we work out new forms
of "coordinated private and public ad-
ministrative processes" and patterns of
"convergent private and public decision
making," such as those which have
emerged in several European countries,
particularly in Scandinavia. This in-
volves a third-party role on government's
part. Others have suggested that major
bargains be made under a public spot-
light.
The tasks which many of the friends
of collective bargaining believe it must
tackle are largely beyond its scope. There
are problems aifecting labor and manage-
ment relations which collective bargain-
ing cannot solve. The proposal that col-
lective bargaining adjust itself to larger,
even world, horizons is not feasible and
some of the friends of collective bar-
gaining admit this when they say "what
collective bargaining can do to meet
the current problems remains to be
answered."®
The first important question is whether
'Arthur Goldberg, Address to Printers' League
Section of Priming Industries of Metropolitan

New York. Daily Labor Report, No. 85, JVTay 1,
1962, p. E-I (italics added).
nVirtz, op. cit., p. D-2.
"Goldberg, op. cit., p. E-1.
"Wirtz, op. cit., p. D-2.
collective bargaining should be expected
to solve these problems. Can the process
thus be changed without the loss of its
essential values? Perhaps collective bar-
gaining is worth preserving as it is for
what it can do effectively. I suggest that
we should not covet the "pattern of con-
vergent private and public decision mak-
ing" prevalent in some European coun-
tries. These countries have never had the
same degree of freedom that has been
enjoyed in this country. Eurtherniore,
there is a real question whether the basic
freedoms of collective bargaining can
continue in the United States if the
government plays an increasingly active
role. The fact that certain procedures
work in a small country', with its own
institutional arrangements, does not
mean that they would work in a large
country like the United States which has
a different heritage. In addition, the
Scandinavian and some other European
systems function successfully, not because
of collective bargaining, but through the
instrumentalities of labor parties. These
systems entail a cost, and. the question
is whether the cost would be too great
for us. The basic values of t?ie process of

collective bargaining as we know it,
namely private decision making and pai-
ticipation of employers and workers,
may be lost if the process is forced to
change.
We need to recognize that collective
bargaining is not an instrument for re-
solving all problems in the industrial re-
lations universe, let alone society as a
whole. It is not the instrument for solv-
ing problems of the whole society. Nor
should those who engage in bargaining be
expected to give heed to exhortations to
check themselves in their limited domain
in order to conform to a policy promul-
gated for the larger universe. Collective
bargaining is a private approach to
immediate and particular problems. At
the same time, collective bargaining does
function within certain restraints—and
these may be inexorable indeed—which
the bargainers can ignore only at their
peril. The factors in the macrocosm may
be a part of these restraints, but to be
important they must have a direct impact
upon the parties. Otherwise, the parties
cannot be expected to take them into
account.^ The bargainers are entitled to
seek the maximum results obtainable
within the existing effective restraints.

The union, like the corporation, operates
on the basis of enterprise. Both pursue
economic self-interest. To gain the most
for its members in a given situation is the
purpose for the union's existence. But in
doing so, it cannot flout the market and
other restraints without suffering the
consequences.
To provide a test of the criticisms of
collective bargaining and a frame of
reference for consideration of proposals
that may come in the future, it is im-
portant that the process of collective bar-
gaining be fully understood.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO
AND POSTULATES ABOUT
Even though collective bargaining has
gained a fair degree of acceptance as an
institution of our society, the basic na-
ture of the process has not always been
understood. People sometimes fail to see
why no other rule-making process for
employment relations is of equal merit.
^ t does no good to argue that if bargainers
do not give consideration to broad objectives of
society, they will be forced to do so by legislation
or the heavy hand of government, for the remedy
would destroy freedom that is the hallmark of
the system. At the same time, this does not mean
that the parties at the bargaining table might not
profitably join with others in a different forum

to seek solutions of the larger problems.
Whether collective bargaining can
function at all in a society depends upon
the national milieu of institutions, laws,
and the roles played by government,
management, and labor. Fortunately the
requisite conditions have developed in
the United States, although soime of
them had to be fostered ancJ it may be-
come necessary consciously |to preserve
them. The best way to protect collective
bargaining is to make sure that we under-
stand the process and its values.
BASIC POSTULATES
1. A geniiine interdepen4ence exists
between the parties. Each needs the
other. The bitter conflict frequently char-
acterizing the establishment of collective
bargaining at the outset proved in most
situations to be transitory. lioth parties
are dependent upon the ongoing enter-
prise. Even when they ha/e disputes
which lead to work stoppages, neither
party considers the relationship termi-
nated and tJiey strive to £ djust their
differences. Both are limited by the re-
quirement that the enterprise must be
kept going. Otherwise there i:ould be no
bargaining Oiver the fruits oE the enter-
prise. The interdependence is more than
pecuniary. It is also a reflect ion of ideo-
logical compatibility. Bargaining takes
place within the enterprise system and

both parties are committed to the sup-
port of the system.*
2. The parties, however, also have
diverse or conflicting interests. Bargain-
ing takes place over these conflicting
interests. One should never fexpect com-
plete union-management cooperation.
One should not expect the parties to
depart from their roles as adversaries.
One should not expect a uWon leader
^It is doubtful if collective batgaining on a
continuing basis can take place except under a
condition of ideological compatibility.
to ignore his role as an advocate, and he
should not be urged to be a statesman
nor to be concerned primarily with the
public interest.
3. The union appeals to workers with
respect to certain of their interests, such
as job security and economic improve-
ment. These interests attach the workers
to the union. It must be noted, however,
that a union is not a monolithic organiza-
tion. At least three groups in it may be
recognized: the hierarchy or paid staff,
the dedicated or core group, and the
rank and file. Each of these groups has
separate needs. Other internal differences

may be division between seniors and
juniors, or between skilled and unskilled.
Each of these factors may have to be
accommodated.
Management, too, in addition to hav-
ing interests which in part are diverse
from those of the union, is characterized
by subgioups, each of which has separate
interests and needs.
4. The parties to collective bargain-
ing are not completely informed of the
precise nature of the position of the
other. They, of course, know their own
positions, provided there is internal
unity. And if they are sojihisticated, they
will know a great deal about each other,
although their knowledge is not likely
to be complete. It is obvious, however,
that sophisticated bargainers may have
realistic expectations of the terms of
settlement which they will finally achieve.
To some extent, therefore, the formali-
ties of bargaining will have some char-
acteristic of a ritual. This has been
recognized and, in some situations, the
bargaining may be little more. But to
reduce all collective bargaining to a
mere ritual is to distort the process and
miss its importance. Even when each of
the chief negotiators understands the
requirements of settlement, the internal
bargaining in either the union or the
company may be critical. What may

appear to be ritual is a necessary allow-
ance of time to work out serious internal
differences.
5. Both parties operate within certain
internal and external restraints. The
needs and expectations of the various
sections within each organization impose
limits upon the freedom of the agents
who do the bargaining. Bylaws and poli-
cies, as well as the internal politics of the
organizations, set limits for the bar-
gainers.
There are, in addition, external re-
straints. Broadly, these are economic,
political, social, and legal. The parties
must operate within the restrictions and
limits imposed by society, whether in
the form of laws, customs, economics,
politics, or morals.
6. It must be assumed that the parties,
over time, find some balance of poxver.
Any situation in which one party has
power arbitrarily to impose its will on
the other is not a situation in which
bargaining can take place. Power to
paralyze is alien to the collective bar-
gaining process.
If the power concept of collective bar-
gaining is rejected, one will have to
choose from among limited alternatives.
Rejection of power as the moving force
in transactions sacrifices a central feature

of an enterprise society. If it is rejected
there are really only two alternatives to
collective bargaining, both involving the
compulsion of government: (1) compul-
sory arbitration or fact-finding, or (2)
legislative enactment. Either of these
would destroy the values which the col-
lective bargaining process offers.
FACTORS INFLUENCING PRACTICE
The process of collective bargaining
in any given situation^—plant, communi-
ty, or industry—is affected by several
factors, some transitional, others more
permanent.
1. The history of any particular rela-
tionship is often a prominent factor
influencing current collective bargaining.
The origins of a labor and management
relationship frequently leave scars which
may be long remembered. The first col-
lective bargaining experience may have
been preceded by a bitter organizing
campaign and recognition wrung from a
reluctant employer. Even in established
relationships, the bitterness of a strike
may linger on to affect subsequent atti-
tudes. On the other hand, a strike some-
times has a temperii^ effect, making the

parties more condliatory. Recognition
may have been granted freely by the
employer.
2. The collective bargaining relation-
ship is not like an ordinary contractual
relationship in which parties have sought
each other out. As Harry Shulman and
Neil W. Chamberlain have aptly put it:
The labor agreement... is made... be-
tween parties who find themselves al-
ready in a joint enterprise and who have
little or no choice in selecting each
other for the relationship. The union
hardly chooses the employer; and the
employer does not choose the union.^
Of course, emergence of the type of
person who comes to leadership may
sometimes be influenced by the conduct,
program, or philosophy prevailing in one
or both of the organizations. Hence, the
parties may influence in some degree the
kind of people they have to deal with.
But it is important to keep in mind that
the negotiators have to deal with the
people that are on the scene, not neces-
sarily with the kind they would choose if
they had a choice.
°Harry Shulman and Neil W. Chamberlain,
Cases on Labor Relations (Brooklyn: The Foun-
dation Press, Inc., 1949), p. 4.
3. The structure of the collective
bargaining relationship has an important

bearing upon the procedures of collective
bargaining. It is largely dictated by the
type of industry, whether mass-produc-
tion, fabricating, service, mining or ex-
tractive industry, durable or ilon-durable
goods, and so forth; whether its organiza-
tions run to large units or to small ones;
or whether it is a local- or a national-
market industry. These factors have a
direct bearing upon the negotiating ma-
chinery and influence the way collective
bargaining is conducted.
4. Rivalries among unions and union
leaders, and competition among firms
are often highly important. TThe facts of
economic life in the industry and in the
economy as a whole may have great influ-
ence at any particular time.
IMAGES AND CONCEP]rS
There are many prevailii|ig concepts
of collective bargaining, popular or aca-
demic. A variety of things ^eems to be
done under its name. Therp are many
misconceptions about collective bargain-
ing. This is not surprising, ^ost people
see very little of it and whĵ t they hear
about it does not seiire to develop a
clear understanding.
Some people think of it as a "hold-up"
where one paxty, usually the ijinion, holds
a pistol at the other party's Ijead. Others
see it as a sort of poker gamp w t h bluff

and all that goes with it. $ome, more
congenially disposed, tliink of it as a sort
of horse-trading activity.^o gtill others
think of it as a rational procedure where
reasonable men meet arouniji the table,
lay out the facts, and thus arrive at
"For a series of characterization^, see John T.
Dunlop and James J. Healy, Collective Bargain-
ing (Homewood, III.: Richard DI Irwin, Inc.,
1953), p. 53.
reasonable solutions to their problems.
The list could be continued.
The only common thread running
through each of these views is that it is
a process involving people. This it cer-
tainly is. Furthermore, collective bar-
gaining should be carried out solely for
the people directly affected by its results.
It should always be remembered that it
is fundamental in labor relations that the
people who matter in collective bargain-
ing are those who do the work of the
enterprise, the production workers and
the supervisors. Although the personnel,
or labor relations, director of the com-
pany or the national representative of the
union will customarily play key roles,
the bargaining is not for them or for
their convenience. Hence, it would seem

that the more people at the lower levels
of the labor and management organiza-
tions who take part or understand what
is going on, the better.
It should be emphasized that the
process of collective bargaining is not one
in which problems are settled simply by
getting the facts out on the table for
reasonable, dispassionate consideration.
The process cannot work in this fashion.
It may not be important to get the facts
on the table at all, certainly not for the
purpose of study nor for the purpose of
arriving at an informed judgment. If the
parties are prepared before they come to
the bargaining table, they will have all
the necessai-y facts about the issues to be
considered. One only need ask whether
a company like General Motors Corpora-
tion or a union like the United Automo-
bile VV-'orkers ever lacks any of the neces-
sary facts when it begins to bargain.
The truth is that the facts have been
assembled and are used by the parties to
determine their positions of settlement
which neither has revealed to the other.
The parties have laid their strategies and
set their tactics in accordance with the
facts. For this purpose the facts are im-
portant indeed. What the parties do not
know is what the other is going to do as
a result of its prior consideration of the
facts. The bargaining process, conse-

quently, is carried out for the central
purpose of discovering the other's settle-
ment position without prior revelation
of one's own settlement position.
THE PROCESS OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
Hence the process of collective bar-
gaining is basically a very simple matter,
despite the variety of strategies and tac-
tics of the parties, the lengthy arguments
and prolonged meetings, and the ritual-
ism by which it is sometimes enveloped.
During the process of bargaining, each
party tests the position of the other and,
if skillful, finds out where the other will
settle short of striking or taking a strike.
Arguing about the facts may be useful in
this obfuscating method of communica-
tion. Since the parties cannot openly tell
each other in straightforward terms what
their real positions of settlement are,
they must find out step by step, always
evaluating the other's position by reac-
tions to various types of probing.
As they argue back and forth the par-
ties, by observing the demeanor and
sensitivities of the other and by inter-
preting intentional or unintentional sig-
nals, get a sense of what the serious issues
are and what terms might be acceptable.
This is the process of achieving an agree-
ment. Compromises are reached but they

come largely from a realization, that the
other has the power, or is determined, to
stand on a position. Furthermore, as
bargaining is proceeding between the
parties, it may also be going on within
the respective organizations. At times.
this may be more important than the
main facing of the parties.
When each has found the position of
settlement of the other and also the
other's power position, both parties will
commonly be near to agreement. Al-
though the process of collective bargain-
ing usually brings the parties together
in agreement, sometimes their positions
may be too far apart, or they may mis-
judge the power position of the other.
An overt exercise of power may then take
place before compromise is reached.
The collective bargaining process
works because the parties have a program
and power. But collective bargaining is
not a process of reasoning, nor is it pri-
marily a process of economic analysis
and persuasion. It does not work because
the parties can argue economics. It is
based on power which is compounded of
all the factors impinging upon the situa-
tion. It is a veritable "struggle for life,"

a term used so descriptively by Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes in his efforts to demonstrate
that most labor conduct is simply a part
of the free pursuit of economic self
interest," the cornerstone of an enter-
prise economy.
The concept of bargaining power needs
elaboration. Bargaining power is not an
independent element. It is multidimen-
sional and is a function of many vari-
ables. There is hardly such a thing as a
resei'voir of power to be called upon
when needed, a "lump of power" accu-
mulated for use. A union treasury is
hardly tlie measure of power, although
it may be one factor in it. A union or a
company may have great power to do
certain things in the face of some eventu-
alities but, at the same time, no power
to do others. The external restraints
have an important bearing on power. A
company's bargaining power, for ex-
"Vegelahn v. Guntner. 167 Mass. 92 (1896).
ample, may be determined largely by the
roles of suppliers and customers. An
employer's power position ma.y be low
because he is at the mercy of everyone
else. He would like to take a stribe, but
his clients will not let him.
Power is related to the situation at
the time; if. is related to the subject at
issue and to the response of jthe oppo-

nent. To win a wage increp.se of an
amount equal to a prevailing pattern of
settlement may be done with ^ittle or no
power. The workers could not be
counted upon to strike to get it, yet they
get it. Or, put the other way airound, the
employer might have no power to resist
granting the prevailing patteriji of settle-
ment, while his effectiveness to resist pay-
ing more might be very greatj. A union
might have little power to i effectuate
bargaining over a given set oi demands,
but let the employer inject a Remand to
restrict certain working practices and
immediately the union finds power—
which it did not previously hâ ê—to call
a strike. Power is a function oi; the issue,
the circumstances, the time, and the cli-
mate of opinion.
A skillful negotiator knows |iow far to
project his demands and ho'v̂ hard to
push. It does not serve his purpose to
create an opposing power l̂ e cannot
manage. Furthermore, he does |iot always
exploit a momentary advantage, for in
labor relations he must take a lomg view
of the relationship. Today's events cast
their shadows before the:m; today's "vic-
tory" might cause, or contribute to, a
defeat tomorrow. Power to exact a con-
cession today might produce a aetaliation
tomorrow, or next year. Such conduct
might result in a mutually predatory
situation which sophisticated l|argainers,
interested in a continuing reljationship,

do their utmost to avoid.,
The preceding analysis of the collec-
tive bargaining process in the United
States sheds light on those characteristics
which are common to the great variety
of collective bargaining relationships,
such as exorbitant demands, numerous
and marathon-like sessions, talk and ar-
gument often interspersed with emo-
tionalism and perhaps some name-
calling, a deadline, and eleventh-hour
settlements, perhaps consummated in the
corridor rather than at the bargaining
table. It is apparent that no place is
found for tliese characteristics in an
"ideal" model which conceives of collec-
tive bargaining as a process of rational
consideration of the facts, with a reason-
able solution of their differences being
found by reasonable people. This "ideal"
conception is a serious distortion of
reality.
It should be underscored that we are
viewing collective bargaining as a volun-
tary process of agreement making. We are
not discussing arrangements that have
the form but not the substance of collec-
tive bargaining. If the parties in dispute
are appearing before an outsider, a third-
party, as in arbitration, they will rely

wholly on convincing the outsider of the
justifiability of their positions. They will
marshall the facts and lay them before
him and perhaps try to establish the
criteria for considering the facts in order
to convince him of the result that is
desired.
Arbitration is sometimes heralded as
an alternative or substitute for collective
bargaining. Whatever can be said for it
under special circumstances, it is obvious
that it works differently from collective
bargaining. It is not collective bargain-
ing, and when forced upon the parties
will destroy the process. This is not en-
tirely true of voluntary grievance arbi-
tration which may be, in a limited
measure, a supplement to collective bar-
gaining. What has, however, made volun-
tary arbitration acceptable in the United
States as the final step in the grievance
procedure is the fact tliat most arbitrators
do not conceive their roles as merely
sitting in judgment. The best of the arbi-
trators seek to approximate the results of
collective bargaining by finding the an-
swers, within the framework of the agree-
ment, which conform with its terms and
spirit or with the realities of the practices
of the parties, producing answers which
the parties can accept or live with. It
may be dangerous to generalize but
surely the arbitrator is not judging a
debate. As often as he is making an out-

right decision he is seeking a solution
to a problem which will be acceptable to
the parties on the basis of the established
facts of their relationship. The words of
the agreement may be controlling in
many instances but frequently tlie prob-
lem presented to the arbitrator is not
related solely, or even mostly, to the
words of the agreement.
STRATEGIES AND TACTICS IN
In their approaches, the parties have
available varying ranges of strategies and
tactics. The approach to collective bar-
gaining is very much like the approach
to games. The parties have a certain
freedom to decide upon their strategies
and tactics. Furtheimore, collective bar-
gaining involves all tlie standard tactics
which are used in. games, such as ran-
domness of action or surprise, designed
to keep the opponent guessing; advance
analysis of the possible goals and prob-
able moves of the opponent; a sense of
timing of activities so as to make the
most of opportunities. Yet the whole
involves observance of the amenities, a
sportsmanlike attitude, friendliness but
not intimacy, conciliatoriness but not

weakness, graceful retreat and regroup-
ing of forces or devising new tactics.̂ ^ No
less attention is given to the defensive
strategies than to the strategies of offense.
A careful, wise player of any game sets
his program or course of action in such
a way as to minimize possible losses. In
other words, he does not gamble but
rather sets his strategy and adopts his
tactics with one eye to possible losses as
well as to gains. His defense is primarily
against the former, and he does not take
chances, unless desperate, on the latter.^^
Because of its critical importance in
the process of coming to an agreement,
it is important to di-aw special attention
to the "deadline," the specific threat of
a strike or lockout at a designated time
if agreement is not reached. It forces the
parties to come to decisions that other-
wise might never be forced. The costs
of a strike, or the costs of taking a strike,
lead each party to reassess its position,
to crystalize opinion within each organi-
zation, and, perhaps, to make offers of
settlement. The parties are brought more
seriously to the hard core of the issues in
dispute. It is doubtful that collective
barg3.ining would work satisfactorily
without resort to a deadline.
CONCLUSIONS
The essentials of collective bargaining

may be summarized as follows. First, it
is a process of finding out the settlement
position of the other. In this process the
question of power is ever present and
^E. W. Bakke and C. Kerr, Unions and Man-
agement and the Public (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1948), p. 3S3.
•̂ "̂ In serious competition, athletic teams do not
gamble except toward the end of the game when
they must make quick scores in order to stave
off defeat. Under such circumstances, if the
gamble pays off the team may win, but, i£ the
gamble does not pay off, the other team fre-
quently achieves an even vrader margin of victory.
serves to bring the positions of the par-
ties together at a point of agreement.
Second and equally, if not more, im-
portant, collective bargaining is a process
by which acceptance or consent is
achieved on the part of all those who
must live by the terms of the agreement
—a process of achieving consent.
What is done in the process of finding
out the settlement position of| the other
may also aid in achieving acceptance of
the terms of the bargain. Indeed, if the
parties are wise, they will give constant
attention to the need for acceptance. The
importance of this serves furt|ier to ex-
plain many activities and practices that
are common to negotiations, wliich seem
absurd, pointless, futile, even mischiev-

ous, or incomprehensible.
It is quite conceivable that i the chief
representatives of the two parties in a
given situation could reach agreement in
relatively short order provi4ed there
were no other parties to consi^ier. Even
the best agreement, however. Would be
inadequate in practice if th|e parties
living under it were not satisfie(ji ithat the
agreement was the best that jcould be
achieved. The members of the union, in
particular, must be left with |he assur-
ance that their representative^ did the
best that could be done. The siune re-
quirements also exist for the Company.
In the final analysis the precisel terms of
the agreement are not so important as
the attitude toward the agreemjBt.
Another aspect of negotiations, which
frequently appears ridiculous, ii the cus-
tomary show which is staged When the
agreement is finally con.summp.ted. As
farcical as this may seem, it Ijias great
value. The late Professor Selekjman has
described it as the "emotional! launch-
ing" of the agreement, designed to "evoke
the sentiments of cooperation &nd mu-
tuality required for its administration."^*
It should be obvious that what above

all else makes collective bargaining
valuable is that it is a process for achiev-
ing consent of those who will live under
the agreement. This is the test of real
representation and supplies a sense of
participation. Furthermore, consent as-
sures stability because parties who have
accepted an agreement will live by its
terms.
If the process of achieving consent is
taken out of collective bargaining what is
left is no more meritorious than some
other process of rule making. The process
of collective bargaining is valuable be-
cause it is the instrument that best in-
volves the participation of the people
who count in the relationship. The free-
doms inherent in collective bargaining
are part of our total freedoms and to
protect freedom in collective bargaining
is to help protect the whole of our
freedoms.
Policies suggested by friends of collec-
tive bargaining that would give the
government a role in the process or in
determining the results are not well con-
ceived. They are illogical in spite of their
lofty appearance and the good intentions
of the proponents. To bring the govern-
ment to the bargainitig table is injurious,
however well intentioned, because it
prevents the parties from carrying out
their responsibilities. The three-party

process destroys the ability of the two-
party process to work. The most that the
government should do is to set the condi-
tions within which collective bargaining
"B. M. Selckman, Labor Relations and Human
Relation (New York: McGraw Hill, 1947), p. 38.
will be allowed to run its course without
interference or assistance. To exhort the
parties to collective bargaining to be
statesmen and restrain themselves and
take the public interest into account in
their negotiations is futile. If the external
restraints, including the economic re-
straints, are fixed properly through the
democratic process, the parties will have
to respect them.
Let us not, in our anxiety, be carried
away by the size and urgency of problems
facing our society and crush the process
of collective bargaining because it does
not solve these problems. Some problems
transcend the bargaining table and can-
not be solved there. We should not ex-
pect collective bargaining to cope with
them. The parties may have to recognize
these problems as re.straints and adjust
their conduct accordingly, but they will
be checked by them only when it is costly
for them not to do so. Public policy
regarding these problems must be estab-
lished in a different forum. When this is
done, the parties to collective bargaining
will have to give consideration to it if

it has an impact upon them.
Certain decisions have to be made by
the legislature. In arriving at these de-
cisions, unions and companies can play
their democratic public roles. But they
have private roles, too, and if we want
to preserve collective bargaining, the two
processes should be kept distinct, for they
are functionally different. It is in the
long-run interests of democracy that
as many decisions as possible should
be resolved by the people. Collective
bargaining furthers that important
democratic aim.
Compare the genomic aspects of different Plasmodia (Malarial
parasite) and may be correlate them to some phenotypes
(diseases) based on their structure. I would suggest reviewing
some literature.
· Focus on bioinformatics and genomics aspect
· Develop a research question!
Week 5 Discussion
Disease: Malaria
Gene of Interest:
SNPS: (optional)
Accession Number:
Location:
Length:
Exon Count:
Variation:
Research Question:

Background:
Hypothesis:
H0:
Ha:
Aims:
References:

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