The International Journal of Organizational Innovation Vol 5.docx

The International Journal of Organizational Innovation Vol 5
Num 4 April 2013 80
The first principle addresses the de-
velopment of a true science in the field of
management. This can be applied to the art
of bricklaying (Myers Jr., 2011). The
process of bricklaying can be significantly
enhanced if scientific principles are em-
ployed. This may be implemented through
the enactment of rules that will govern the
motion of every workman involved in the
process of bricklaying (Bell & Martin,
2012).
Secondly, the bricklaying process
would also be more efficient through the
perfection and standardization of all im-
plements and working conditions (Paxton,
2011). This would ensure that the bricks
are of uniform size and shape. This would
enhance the efficiency of the bricklaying
process. As for the working conditions, it
is necessary to provide a favorable atmos-
phere for employees engaged in the brick-
laying process.
Employees tend to work better if the

management implements various mecha-
nisms to motivate them (Phelps & Parayi-
tam, 2007). Money is one major medium
for motivating employees. Employees
need to feel they are getting value for their
labor and that they are being compensated
adequately. However, there are other fac-
tors that may come into play in the motiva-
tion of employees. This is where science
comes in. An organization may need to
draft appropriate policies and rules that
would spur efficiency in the services ren-
dered by employees.
The development of a true science is
crucial in the management process. A true
managerial science would ensure the effi-
ciency of the workman in various ways.
First, it makes it possible for the standardi-
zation and perfection of the working
equipment. This ensures the uniformity of
goods and services being produced and
may increase the demand for such prod-
ucts as they will be more appealing to cus-
tomers (Giannantonio & Hurley-Hanson,
2011). A true science would also define
appropriate rules and regulations which
should be adopted in the process of creat-
ing goods and services.
The second principle is the scientific
selection and training of the workman. The
success of any business organization de-

pends on the selection of personnel to
work in the organization. Consequently,
many organizations go to great lengths to
ensure that only the best talent is selected
and hired for a given job. Organizations
have sought to develop their human re-
source departments so that they can be
effective in the staffing process. This is a
critical task that may be made easier
through the use of scientific methods in the
selection of the workman.
Organizations, therefore, have drafted
various meticulous ways of selecting the
right man for the job. This includes careful
scrutiny of the professional and academic
qualifications of all prospective employ-
ees. The next stage is a thorough interview
of the shortlisted candidates for the post
before settling on the most qualified indi-
vidual. Scientific methods of selection are,
therefore, quite handy in the recruitment
process.
It is also important to release any
workers who do not live up to the expecta-
tions of the organization. Those employees
who are unable to adapt to the new meth-
ods of production become unnecessary
baggage to the organization and have to be
weeded out. Each employee, therefore,
strives to work harder and more efficiently
in order to avoid being eliminated from the
organization. The basis for determining

which employee is less effective can be
established through scientific methods of
selection and recruitment (Maqbool et al,
2011).
However, Taylor contends that it is
the responsibility of the employer to train
employees and ensure they are fit to
Num 4 April 2013 81
handle the responsibilities assigned to
them. Instead of the management letting
each employee figure out his tasks and
goals, it has to guide the workers in their
daily activities in the organization. Reli-
ance on the old rule of the thumb may be
inefficient in improving the performance
of the employees (Blake & Moseley,
2010).
The third principle calls for the
workman’s scientific education and devel-
opment. It is the responsibility of the or-
ganization to ensure that employees re-
main relevant at their jobs (Wagner-
Tsukamoto, 2007). In order for the organi-
zation to remain profitable, it is crucial
that each employee continue dispensing
their duties in accordance with the princi-

ples laid down for them. The implication
of this principle is that workers have to
constantly undergo training and develop-
ment in order to be more efficient in per-
forming the tasks assigned to them.
It is for this reason that collegiate
education has been put into place. This has
arisen out of the need to constantly refresh
the knowledge and skills of employees,
especially in the fast-changing markets
that characterize modern business. Some
organizations provide in-house training for
their employees, while others allow for
study leaves so that their employees can
gain more knowledge.
There are some cases in which em-
ployees take it upon themselves to upgrade
their education. In such cases, employees
may quit their jobs in order to pursue fur-
ther studies, hoping to land better jobs on
completion of their studies. Such employ-
ees usually have to finance their own edu-
cation and, though it may be expensive,
they find it a worthwhile investment as
they are able to land better paying jobs in
future.
The fourth principle postulates the
cooperation between employees and the
management. Taylor explains that his in-

tention is for a clear division of labor be-
tween the groups, with the management
team responsible for all the planning and
cognitive functions. Taylor warns manag-
ers that they would run into significant risk
if they try to quickly adjust from the old
approaches of doing things to his new sys-
tem. He cautions that the most significant
danger in introducing new methods is de-
vising a way to transform the psychologi-
cal attitudes and habits of the management
team, as well as those of the workers
(Blake & Moseley, 2010, 2011).
Taylor contends that it is possible to
determine the best way to perform a task
to maximize its efficiency. This can be
achieved through a scientific study. Ac-
cording to Taylor, all a manufacturer needs
is a man with a stopwatch and a properly
ruled book. Then, you only need to select
ten to fifteen men who are skilled in a par-
ticular task for a scientific analysis. The
next step is to analyze the exact series of
operations needed while doing the work
under investigation, as well as understand-
ing the tools which are used. A stopwatch
is utilized to measure the required time for
each of these elementary steps to select the
quickest way of doing each step. Finally,
the subsequent tasks are to eliminate all
false, slow, and useless movements, col-
lect the quickest and most efficient move-
ments, and implement them into one series

(Blake & Moseley, 2010, p29).
Division of labor takes a central posi-
tion in Taylor’s fourth principle. This is
because the cooperation between employ-
ees and the management provides a suit-
able working environment for distribution
of tasks among the employees according to
their skills and qualifications. This works
best if there is a common understanding
between the management and the employ-
ees.
Taylor’s theory of scientific manage-
ment revolutionized the management of
Num 4 April 2013 82
organizations locally and internationally.
However, Taylor’s theory faced various
challenges (Peaucelle, 2000). Some of the
challenges included a lack of education
among the lower levels of supervision and
within the ranks of the workers. Another
challenge is the concept of task allocation
in which a task is broken down into
smaller tasks. This allows planners to de-
termine the best approach to go about ac-
complishing tasks. Then, there is the re-
ductionist approach which may dehuman-

ize workers.
Taylor’s legacy contribution to the
field of business management and its vari-
ous disciplines is still thriving today (Myer
Jr., 2011; Wren, 2011). Taylor’s contribu-
tions have survived the management evo-
lution that has progressed from the indus-
trial age into the information age, and is
now poised to enter into what some au-
thors hypothesize as the virtual age. This
possible entry into the virtual age suggests
that many new applications of Taylor’s
principles will be put into practice in the
future (Myer Jr., 2011, p11).
Challenges of Taylorism in Modern
Managerial Practice
Lack of Education
Lack of education presented a major
challenge to the early use and adoption of
scientific management. This was an espe-
cially noteworthy issue with the lower
levels of supervision and laborers. Taylor
noted that most of the factory workers had
insufficient education levels because most
were recent immigrants. In addition, many
workers were not even fluent in English,

which rendered communication to be diffi-
cult (Blake & Moseley, 2010).
Taylor was unconvinced that low
level supervisors and line workers were
sufficiently qualified to handle effective
planning. This was because they had low
levels of education as most had not under-
gone proper training. Although the work-
men were best suited for their jobs, they
were incapable of comprehending the sci-
ence of management. Since they did not
have the relevant educational background,
they lacked the mental capacity to work
(Blake & Moseley, 2010). Lack of educa-
tion was, therefore, a key challenge in the
adoption and use of scientific methods of
management. Since most of the lower
cadre workers lack the necessary education
to enable them to comprehend the scien-
tific aspects of management, it would be
difficult even to train them. This is com-
pounded by the problem of language, con-
sidering that most of them were recent
immigrants.
Nevertheless, Taylor attempted to
meet the challenge of lack of education by
making a proposition. He proposed that
there should be a separation of powers
between planning and execution. To this
end, Taylor suggested the creation of de-
partments for planning, and these depart-

ments would be run by engineers.
These engineers would be tasked with
four basic responsibilities; namely, devel-
oping scientific methods of doing work,
establishing goals for worker productivity,
setting up systems for worker rewards and
teaching and training personnel on how to
use scientific methods of management
(Blake & Moseley, 2010, 2011; Paxton,
2011).
The Concept of Task Allocation
Another challenge facing Taylor’s
scientific management methods lay in the
concept of task allocation. Task allocation
has drawn sharp criticism over the years
and it involves the splitting a huge single
task into several smaller ones that allow
the planner to determine how best the task
can be handled. The implication here is
that a single task will be accomplished by
a series of persons, ranging from top man-
agement to workers.
Num 4 April 2013 83

Task allocation, which leads to divi-
sion of labor, has made Taylorism an ex-
pensive system of management. This is
because it creates redundant positions for
non-value adding workers such as supervi-
sors and other indirect workers (Pruijt,
2002). Taylor subdivided the work meant
for one gang boss among eight men. The
eight men included different categories of
clerks, gang bosses, speed bosses, inspec-
tors and shop disciplinarians.
This means that Taylorism not only
vouches for efficiency but also for the
provision of middle class jobs. This makes
it very expensive to implement and run. It
is for this reason that the US Steel Corpo-
ration laid off 60 specialized foremen
(Pruijt, 2002). This dismayed Taylor but
there was no other choice for the steel cor-
poration as it had too many non-value add-
ing supervisors in its organization. The
emergent high costs of operations due to
unnecessary personnel led companies to
dilute Taylor’s model of scientific man-
agement.
The concept of task allocation has
been criticized for its lack of flexibility. It
is complex or impossible to increase the
time allowed for operations as the time
cycle is clearly stated in the standard
worksheet of operations (Prujit, 2002).
This becomes a major dilemma for older

workers, especially when timelines have
been set to accommodate the more youth-
ful workers in the organization. The older
workers, consequently, may find it diffi-
cult or impossible to keep up with the
company’s expectations, objectives and
goals.
Dehumanization of Workers
Dehumanization of workers is yet an-
other challenge to Taylorism (Blake &
Moseley, 2010). This can be attributed to
Taylor’s reductionist approach to scientific
management. The general perception was
that the individual worker had no chance
to excel or think on his/her own. This
criticism arose from later writings based
on Taylor’s research by other authors as
opposed to Taylor’s own words and theo-
ries (Maqbool et al., 2011).
Actually, Taylor had considered and
discussed worker’s happiness throughout
his monograph. He stressed that the task
was always regulated so that the worker
who is well suited to his job will thrive
while working at this rate during a long
time period. The worker will grow happier
and more prosperous, instead of being
overworked (Taylor, 1911, p15). Taylor’s

concept of human motivation was ex-
tremely limited. Taylor had a strong con-
viction that the only way to motivate
workers was through monetary incentives
(Brogan, 2011). Although the study of
human motivation would not become
popular for several decades to come, it still
seems naïve to contend that money is the
sole motivator for employees (Blake &
Moseley, 2010, p30). Taylor frequently
came under sharp criticism for having his
work being exclusively beneficial to the
management team. This was despite the
fact that he tried to establish a common
ground between management and laborers.
Taylor further indicated that the ma-
jority of these men hold that the funda-
mental interests of employees and employ-
ers are necessarily antagonistic (Zuffo,
2011; Blake & Moseley, 2010). Scientific
management, in contrast, has its basis that
the interests of the employees and employ-
ers should be necessarily the same. The
employer’s prosperity cannot subsist
through a long time period unless it is ac-
companied by the employee’s prosperity
and vice versa. It is possible to give the
worker what they want most, which is high
wages, and the employer what they want,
which is low labor costs—for their manu-
factures (Caldari, 2007).
Nevertheless, Taylor showed concern

for the well-being of the workers through-
Num 4 April 2013 84
out his research despite exhibiting an
attitude that was often biased against
workers (Taylor, 1911; Blake & Moseley,
2010). For instance, he contended that
naturally, man strives to do as little work
as is safely possible in the majority of
cases. The implication of this assertion is
that man has to be given timelines for
them to meet goals and obligations.
His directions were geared toward the
uneducated. As an example, during his
case study explanation at Bethlehem Steel,
he directed a pig iron worker to obey his
supervisor by saying “When he tells you to
pick up a pig and walk, you pick it up and
you walk, and when he tells you to sit
down and rest, you sit down. You do that
right straight through the day. And what’s
more, no back talk” (Blake & Moseley,
2010, p30; Taylor, 1911, p18). This atti-
tude from management would not be ac-
ceptable in modern work environment, but
it was commonplace during Taylor’s time.
Conclusion

Taylor’s principles of scientific man-
agement still remain relevant in modern
times, although they have undergone some
modifications. Some corporations have
made some revisions on the principles and
have been able to experience continued
success in the fast-changing world of busi-
ness. There are three essential principles
that underlie Taylor’s scientific approach
to management. They are the development
of a true science, the scientific selection of
the workman, the workman’s scientific
education and development and the inti-
mate relationship between the manage-
ment and the workers.
However, Taylor’s principles of sci-
entific management have faced various
challenges. The most prominent among
them is lack of education, dehumanization
of workers and the concept of task alloca-
tion. Lack of education cripples the work-
ers’ ability to understand the scientific
methods of management. Dehumanization
of the workers occurs due to Taylor’s as-
sumption that the individual worker cannot
excel or think on his/her own. This is the
implication created when Taylor vouches
for the creation of middle class jobs. The
jobs are for supervisors who guide the
workers in dispensing their duties. The
concept of task allocation pushes the or-

ganizational costs of operation to higher
levels.
Essentially, the principles of scientific
management as presented by Taylor have
withstood the test of time and are poised to
enter the next age, which pundits refer to
as the virtual age. However, some modifi-
cations may be needed in order to make
Taylorism more efficient and profitable to
companies.
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Project Manager
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Mon 1/3/11
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Project Manager and S
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Project Manager and W
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Project Manager and W
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1/3/11 Project Manager and S
21 5 Electrical Permits 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11
22 5.1 Obtain Electrical Permits 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11

Sparks Electrical PM
23 6 Plumbing Permits 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11
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Waterworks Plumbing
25 7 Building Permits 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11
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East Side Framing & D
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Framing & D
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County
31 8.4 Framing-Project Sign-off 1 day Mon 1/3/11 Mon 1/3/11
Project Manager
32 9 Electrical 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11
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34 9.2 Electrical-Install 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11 Sparks
Electrical
35 9.3 Electrical-Inspect 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11 City &
County
36 9.4 Electrical-Project Sign-off 1 day Mon 1/3/11 Mon 1/3/11
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37 10 Plumbing 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11
38 10.1 Plumbing-Order Supplies 3 days Mon 1/3/11 Wed
1/5/11 Waterworks Plumbing
39 10.2 Plumbing-Install 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11
Waterworks Plumbing
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager and Attend

Project Manager
Project Manager and
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager and East S
Project Manager and Spark
Project Manager and Water
Project Manager and Wood
Project Manager and Stude
Sparks Electrical P
Waterworks Plumbi
East Side Framing
East Side Framing & Dryw
East Side Fra
City & County
Project Manager
Sparks Electrical
City & County
Project Manager
Waterworks Plumbing PM
Waterworks Plumbi

2/1 2/2 1/2 1/9 1/16 1/23 1/30 2/6
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Project: District4Move.mpp
Date: Sat 1/8/11
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Resource Names
40 10.3 Plumbing-Inspect 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11 City
& County
41 10.4 Plumbing-Project Sign-off 1 day Mon 1/3/11 Mon

42 11 Drywall 15 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/21/11
43 11.1 Drywall-Order Supplies 3 days Mon 1/3/11 Wed 1/5/11
44 11.2 Drywall-Install 15 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/21/11 East
Side Framing & D
45 11.3 Drywall-Inspect 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11 City &
County
46 11.4 Drywall-Project Sign-off 1 day Mon 1/3/11 Mon 1/3/11
Project Manager
47 12 Finish Work 15 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/21/11
48 12.1 Finish-Order Supplies 3 days Mon 1/3/11 Wed 1/5/11
Woodcraft Carpentry P
49 12.2 Finish-Install 15 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/21/11
Woodcraft Carpentry
50 12.3 Finish-Inspect 10 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/14/11 City &
County
51 12.4 Finish-Project Sign-off 1 day Mon 1/3/11 Mon 1/3/11
Project Manager
52 13 Workbenches 15 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/21/11
53 13.1 Workbenches-Order Supplies 2 days Mon 1/3/11 Tue
1/4/11 Student Workers Mana
54 13.2 Workbenches-Build 15 days Mon 1/3/11 Fri 1/21/11
Student Workers
55 13.3 Workbenches-Quality inspection 2 days Mon 1/3/11 Tue
56 13.4 Workbenches-Project Sign-off 1 day Mon 1/3/11 Mon
57 14 Equipment Packing 2 days Mon 1/3/11 Tue 1/4/11
58 14.1 Pack production equipment 2 days Mon 1/3/11 Tue
1/4/11 City Equipment Mover
59 14.2 Pack non-production equipment 2 days Mon 1/3/11 Tue
1/4/11 City Equipment Mover
60 14.3 Project Sign-off 1 day Mon 1/3/11 Mon 1/3/11 Project
Manager
61 15 Move 3 days Mon 1/3/11 Wed 1/5/11
62 15.1 Move production equipment 3 days Mon 1/3/11 Wed

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Wed 1/5/11 Express Moving Comp
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Manager
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Project Manager
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Project Manager
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70 17.1 Final report 3 days Mon 1/3/11 Wed 1/5/11 Project
Manager
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Project Manager
72 17.3 Lessons Learned 1 day Mon 1/3/11 Mon 1/3/11 Project
Manager
City & County
Project Manager
East Side Framing & Dryw
East Side Fra
City & County
Project Manager
Woodcraft Carpentry PM
Woodcraft Car
City & County
Project Manager
Student Workers Manager

Student Worke
Project Manager
Project Manager
City Equipment Movers PM
City Equipment Movers
Project Manager
Express Moving Company
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager
Project Manager
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Task
Split
Progress
Milestone
Summary

Project Summary
External Tasks
External Milestone
Deadline
Page 2
Project: District4Move.mpp
Date: Sat 1/8/11
Sheet1Work Breakdown StructureProject Name:District 4
Warehouse MoveProject Manager:Date:Work Breakdown
Structure Purpose and LimitationsThe purpose of this worksheet
is to:Identify the work to be doneIdentify the types of resources
required for the workDevelop estimates for each work
elementThis worksheet does not address:When the work will be
completedUse the following table to define the major
deliverables and associated task detail for each deliverable. Use
the example (in red) for help in determining how to break up the
work and identify the Work ID numbers. Expand the table as
needed.Work Package
TaskTasksResource(s) RequiredEstimated Duration
(in days)
TasksEstimated Duration
(in days)
Work PackageID1Project Kick-off41.1Book location for
meetingProject Manager11.2Invite stakeholdersProject
Manager11.3Prepare presentationProject Manager11.4Conduct
the meetingProject Manager and Attendees12Project
Documents132.1Develop Charter/ScopeProject
Manager22.2Develop WBSProject Manager and

Workers72.3Develop Project PlanProject Manager22.4Develop
Communication PlanProject Manager23Status
Reports/Meetings33.1Develop Status ReportProject
Manager13.2Set schedule for team meetingsProject
Manager13.4Set schedule for stakeholder meetingsProject
Manager14Initial Planning Meetings with Vendors54.1Meet
with Framing/DrywallProject Manager and East Side Framing
PM14.2Meet with ElectricalProject Manager and Sparks
Electrical PM14.3Meet with PlumbingProject Manager and
Waterworks Plumbing PM14.4Meet with Finish WorkProject
Manager and Woodcraft Carpentry PM14.5Meet with Student
WorkersProject Manager and Student Workers
Manger15Electrical Permits105.1Obtain Electrical
PermitsSparks Electrical PM106Plumbing Permits106.1Obtain
Plumbing PermitsWaterworks Plumbing PM107Building
Permits107.1Obtain Building PermitsEast Side Framing &
Drywall PM108Framing248.1Framing-Order SuppliesEast Side
Framing & Drywall PM38.2Framing-BuildEast Side Framing &
Drywall158.3Framing-InspectCity & County58.4Framing-
Project Sign-offProject Manager19Electrical199.1Electrical-
Order SuppliesSparks Electrical PM39.2Electrical-InstallSparks
Electrical109.3Electrical-InspectCity & County59.4Electrical-
Project Sign-offProject Manager110Plumbing1910.1Plumbing-
Order SuppliesWaterworks Plumbing PM310.2Plumbing-
InstallWaterworks Plumbing1010.3Plumbing-InspectCity &
County510.4Plumbing-Project Sign-offProject
Manager111Drywall2411.1Drywall-Order SuppliesEast Side
Framing & Drywall PM311.2Drywall-InstallEast Side Framing
& Drywall1511.3Drywall-InspectCity & County511.4Drywall-
Project Sign-offProject Manager112Finish Work2412.1Finish-
Order SuppliesWoodcraft Carpentry PM312.2Finish-
InstallWoodcraft Carpentry1512.3Finish-InspectCity &
County512.4Finish-Project Sign-offProject
Manager113Workbenches2013.1Workbenches-Order
SuppliesStudent Workers Manager213.2Workbenches-
BuildStudent Workers1513.3Workbenches-Quality

inspectionProject Manager213.4Workbenches-Project Sign-
offProject Manager114Equipment Packing514.1Pack production
equipmentCity Equipment Movers PM214.2Pack non-production
equipmentCity Equipment Movers214.3Project Sign-offProject
Manager115Move715.1Move production equipmentExpress
Moving Company PM315.2Move non-production
equipmentExpress Moving Company315.3Project Sign-
offProject Manager116Procurement Closure516.1Review
contract workProject Manager316.2Release contractorsProject
Manager116.3Pay contractorsProject Manager117Project
Closure717.1Final reportProject Manager317.2Archive
documentationProject Manager317.3Lessons LearnedProject
Manager1
Sheet2
Sheet3
Project Management Case
You are working for a large, apparel design and manufacturing
company, Trillo Apparel Company (TAC), headquartered in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. TAC employs around 3000 people
and has remained profitable through tough economic times. The
operations are divided into 4 districts; District 1 – North,
District 2 – South, District 3 – West and District 4 – East. The
company sets strategic goals at the beginning of each year and
operates with priorities to reach those goals.Trillo Apparel
Company Current Year Priorities
· Increase Sales and Distribution in the East
· Improve Product Quality
· Improve Production in District 4
· Increase Brand Recognition
· Increase RevenuesCompany Details
Company Name: Trillo Apparel Company (TAC)
Company Type: Apparel design and production
Company Size: 3000 employees
Position
# Employees
Owner/CEO

1
Vice President
4
Chief Operating Officer
1
Chief Financial Officer
1
Chief Information Officer
1
IT Department
38
District Manager
4
Sales Team
30
Accountant
12
Administrative Assistant
7
Order Fullfilment
45
Customer Service
57
Designer
24
Project Manager
10
Maintenance
25
Operations
2500
Shipping Department
240
Total Employees
3000

Products: Various Apparel
Corporate Location: Albuquerque, New MexicoTAC
Organization Chart
District 4 Production Warehouse Move Project Details
The business has expanded considerably over the past few years
and District 4 in the East has outgrown its current production
facility. Because of this growth the executives want to expand
the current facility, moving the whole facility 10 miles away.
The location selected has enough room for the production and
the shipping department. However, the current warehouse needs
some renovation to accommodate the district’s operational
needs.
The VP of Operations estimates the production and shipping
warehouse move for District 4 will provide room required to
generate the additional $1 million/year product revenues to
meet the current demand due to the expanded production
capacity. Daily production generates $50,000 revenue so a week
of downtime will cost $250,000 in lost revenues.
The move must be completed in 4 months.
Mileage between the old and new facilities is 10 miles.
Bids have been received from contractors to build out the new
office space and production floor and have signed contracts for
work as follows:
Activity
Company Providing Services
Total Contract
Supplies
Time Needed
Pack, move and unpack production equipment
City Equipment Movers
$150,000
n/a

5 Days
Move non-production equipment and materials
$125,000
n/a
5 Days
Framing
East Side Framing & Drywall
$121,000
$125,000
15 Days
Electrical
Sparks Electrical
$18,000
$12,000
10 Days
Plumbing
Waterworks Plumbing
$15,000
$13,000
10 Days
Drywall
East Side Framing & Drywall
$121,000
$18,000
15 Days
Finish Work
Woodcraft Carpentry
$115,000
$15,000
15 Days
Build work benches for production floor
Student Workers Carpentry
$112,000
$110,000
15 Days

Production workdays are Monday through Saturday. The actual
move must be completed in 5 days for as little disruption to
production activities as possible. All contractors are on other
projects but have been booked in advance. The contractors will
gain the necessary permits and schedule city and county
inspections but these tasks need to be identified separately due
to the length of time it can take. Permitting and inspections can
take from one to three weeks, depending upon schedule and the
flexibility of the inspector. The new warehouse is empty and
can be accessed immediately. Framing cannot start until the
permits are received. Electrical and plumbing can begin as soon
as the framing is finished. Drywall cannot start until the
electrical and plumbing inspections are complete. After the
drywall is completed, final inspections will be completed by the
county and city. After both the county and city have passed the
new construction, finish work can begin. Building the product
floor work benches can occur at any time before the move
occurs.
Chief Executive
Officer
Chief Operating
Officer
Chief Financial
Officer
VP Sales &
Marketing
Chief Information
Officer
Executive
Assistant
VP
Operations
VP Customer
Service
Inbound Call

Manager
Outbound Call
Manager
Outbound Call
Team (20)
Inbound Call
Team (35)
IT
Manager
IT Staff
(37)
Sales Team
(30)
Accountants
(12)
District2
Manager
District 3
Manager
District1
Manager
District 4
Manager
D1 Operations
(500)
D1 Operations
(650)
D3 Operations
(450)
D4 Operations
(900)
Administrative
Assistant
Administrative
Assistant
Administrative

Assistant
Administrative
Assistant
Administrative
Assistant
Administrative
Assistant
Order Fulfillment
(45)
Shipping
(50)
Shipping
(50)
Shipping
(50)
Shipping
(90)
Maintenance
(5)
Maintenance
(5)
Maintenance
(5)
Maintenance
(10)
Project Managers
(10)
VP
Design
Design Team
(24)
Trillo Apparel Company
Chief Executive
Officer
Chief Operating

Officer �
Chief Financial
Officer�
VP Sales &
Marketing �
Executive
Assistant�
Chief Information
Officer�
VP
Operations�
VP Customer
Service �
Inbound Call
Manager�
Outbound Call
Team (20)�
Outbound Call
Manager�
Inbound Call
Team (35)�
IT
Manager�
IT Staff
(37)�
Sales Team
(30)
Accountants
(12)�
District2
Manager�
District 3
Manager�
District1
Manager�

District 4
Manager�
D1 Operations
(500)�
D1 Operations
(650)�
D3 Operations
(450)�
D4 Operations
(900)�
Administrative
Assistant �
Administrative
Assistant �
Administrative
Assistant �
Administrative
Assistant �
Administrative
Assistant �
Administrative
Assistant�
Shipping
(50)�
Order Fulfillment
(45)�
Shipping
(50)�
Shipping
(50)�
Shipping
(90)�
Maintenance
(5)�
Maintenance
(5)�

Maintenance
(5)�
Maintenance
(10)�
Project Managers
(10)�
VP
Design�
Design Team
(24)�
Trillo Apparel Company
9
What would Max Weber Say about Public-Sector
Innovation ?1
Rainer Kattel2
Introduction3
When there are 20,000 new apps emerging monthly in the Apple
app store, and
even if only few of them make money or are sold for a fortune,
it is easy to think that
technological development and innovation are driven by the
private sector. It is in-
deed a commonplace to view either behemoths like Apple or
Google or small start-
ups like WhatsApp as highly creative and coveted workplaces.
In the same breath
the government is described by such adjectives as slow, rigid,
expensive. Th is is

one of the key drivers of the currently popular public-sector-
innovation discourse:
public-sector organizations should be more innovative, exciting
places like Apples
and Googles; in a word, they should be less bureaucratic and
hierarchical, less We-
berian (Bason 2010).
Th ere are three objections to this view, all saying in diff erent
versions that the
question as such – why is the government not more like Apple –
is wrong to begin
with. First one argues that the government deals with entirely
diff erent phenomena
than the business sector; second one argues that much of the
business creativity and
innovation is in fact paid by the government in one form or
another; and the third
argument is based on the observation that innovations in the
public and private sec-
tors are quite profoundly diff erent in nature and impact.
Th e fi rst set of arguments is well summarized by Joan
Robinson: “It is a popular
error that bureaucracy is less fl exible than private enterprise. It
may be so in detail,
1 The paper received “The Alena Brunovska Award for
Teaching Excellence in Public Administra-
tion” at the 22nd NISPAcee Annual Conference 2014 held in
Budapest, Hungary, May 22 – 24,
2014.
2 Professor of Innovation Policy and Technology Governance
and Head of the Program at the
Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn

University of Technology, Tallinn,
Estonia.
3 The article is based on my ongoing research within the FP7-
funded project LIPSE, www.lipse.org.
10.1515/nispa-2015-0001
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 11/9/17 2:19 PM
10
The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy,
Vol. VIII, No. 1, Summer 2015
but when large scale adaptations have to be made, central
control is far more fl ex-
ible. It may take two months to get an answer to a letter from a
government depart-
ment, but it takes twenty years for an industry under private
enterprise to readjust
itself to a fall in demand” (1946, 177). Th e second set of
arguments is exemplifi ed by
Mariana Mazzucato’s discussion of what is actually inside
Apple’s products: she lists
13 basic technological solutions inside Apple’s fl agship
products such as the iPod,
the iPad and the iPhone that all were signifi cantly funded and
oft en also developed
by the (US) government and its various agencies. Th ese
technologies include: inter-
net, cellular technology, microprocessor, micro hard drive,
liquid-crystal display,

signal compression, lithium-ion batteries, DRAM cache, click-
wheel, SIRI, multi-
touch screen, NAVSTAR-GPS (2013, Chapter 5, Figure 13).
Mazzucato does not
deny Apple’s ingenuity in designing remarkable products from
existing technologi-
cal solutions; she rather emphasizes the diff erences in mode of
supporting techno-
logical development and innovation: governments are good at
taking on long-term
risks, the private sector excels at driving innovation further by
means of competi-
tion, adaptation, etc. Th e third set of arguments – that public-
and private-sector
innovations are profoundly diff erent – is what concerns us here
in more detail.
To start with, scholarly literature on public-sector innovation
(PSI hereaft er)
has been tormented since its inception by recurring bangs of
consciousness: is there
such a thing as public-sector innovation to begin with ?4 If we
cannot delineate and
defi ne public-sector innovation, then the concept – PSI – will
denote any good idea
or positive change in the public-sector organizations as
innovations and “will lose
credibility because it has no meaning” (Lynn 1997, 98; Pollitt
2011).
Th e aim of this article is to, fi rst, give a brief overview of
prevailing attempts to
conceptualize (defi ne) public-sector innovation and, second,
contrast it with older
literature on innovation (Tocqueville, Weber, Schumpeter); this
inter-generational

discussion shows that the older discussions of PSI have more
profound and nu-
anced views that have all but vanished from today’s
conceptualizations. Th us, while
we cannot know what Max Weber would have said about PSI, it
seems worthwhile
for us to engage in a dialogue with him and his contemporaries.
Public-sector innovation: What is it ?
By and large we can divide scholarly eff orts to delineate and
conceptualize public-
sector innovation into three periods: 1) the Schumpeterian
period: innovations and
the public sector are related to a larger theory of how
evolutionary change takes
place in societies, mainly associated with Schumpeter (1912,
1939); 2) the organi-
zational-theory period: innovations in the public sector are
similar to innovations
in private companies, mostly associated with early
organizational theory and with
4 Lynn (1997) gives an overview of early literature on the topic.
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11
What would Max Weber Say about Public-Sector Innovation ?
Wilson (1989); 3) the autochthonous-theory period: the most
recent trend to disas-

sociate public and private-sector innovations.
Th e Schumpeterian period is characterized by Schumpeter’s
theory of innova-
tion, which in fact is an application in economics and business
of his wider theory
of how evolutionary change takes place in societies. Alas,
Schumpeter never really
developed his wider theory of social change (see also Andersen
2009). In his 1939
Business Cycles, Schumpeter states, in a footnote, that he
“believes, although he can-
not stay to show, that theory [of innovation] here expounded is
but a special case,
adapted to the economic sphere, of a much larger theory which
applies to change in
all spheres of social life, science and art included” (1939, 97).
His 1912 Th eorie der
wirtschaft lichen Entwicklung / Th e Th eory of Economic
Development5 apparently as-
sumes a similar theory, without going into greater detail, either.
We can deduce that
what Schumpeter meant by this larger theory of change in social
life is that change
is driven by entrepreneurial, creative persons, or “new men”, as
he called them in
1939, that look for “new combinations”, that is innovative
solutions, and thus bring
forth evolutionary changes, entirely new ways of doing things
(in business, politics,
art, science, etc.) that will spread, in some cases more than
others, throughout the
given sphere of life.6 Some of these changes will change value
systems and disrupt
incumbent hierarchies.7

In the economic sphere, such individuals drive innovations and,
thus, eco-
nomic growth. Th e role of the public sector in entrepreneurial
innovation is two-
fold: fi rst, the public sector can take on the role of the
entrepreneur (in fact, Schum-
peter argues that in socialism, as there is no private ownership,
the state will be the
sole innovator; 1912, 173); second, innovations in businesses
can also be “called
forth” by governments (1939, 84).
In sum, what we can take from Schumpeter is that ever since
early theories of
innovation, the public sector has had a dual character vis-à-vis
innovation: it itself
can be changed by innovators, and the state can play a crucial
role for business in-
novations, as well (either by directly leading or indirectly
supporting entrepreneur-
ial activity). Interestingly, this foreshadows rather closely the
currently emerging
5 We use the German original fi rst edition here, as in later
editions (that served as the basis for
English translation as well) these discussions were cut by
Schumpeter; so, e.g., the second chap-
ter of the original edition runs to almost 100 pages, the English
translations carries only half as
many. In this chapter, Schumpeter discusses his theory of
innovation.
6 “Das erste Moment, die Freude am Neugestalten, am Schaffen
neuer Formen der wirtschaftli-
chen Dinge ruht auf ganz denselben Grundlagen wie das
schöpferische Tun des Künstlers, des

Denkers oder des Staatsmannes” (1912, 142).
7 “Sie werden Neues schaffen und Altes zerstören, kühne Pläne
irgendwelcher Art konzipieren
und durchführen, deren Originalität aller Erfassung zu spotten
scheint, ihre Mitbürger ihrer
Herrschaft unterwerfen, vielleicht die nationale Politik und
Organisation beinfl ussen, den
‘natürlichen’ Gang der Wirtschaft durch gesetzliche und
ungesetzliche Mittel und jedenfalls an-
ders als durch ‘Tausch’ abändern usw” (1912, 157).
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12
conceptual dichotomy between innovations in the public sector
and innovations
through the public sector (European Commission 2013).
Th e organizational-theory period. Research explicitly dealing
with innovation
in the public sector goes back at least to the 1960s; however, its
inception seems
somewhat accidental in nature. Researchers in organization
theory dealing with in-
novation and how organizational structure supports creative
work and novel ideas
oft en did not diff erentiate between public and private-sector
organizations (this

non-diff erentiation goes, in fact, back to Taylor’s Principles of
Scientifi c Management
as well as to Weber’s bureaucracy as an ideal type for both
public and private orga-
nizations). For instance, Th ompson talks explicitly about
business and government
organizations and their “capacity to innovate” (1965, 1), and
defi nes innovation as
the “generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas,
processes, products
or services. Innovation therefore implies the capacity to change
or adapt” (1965, 2;
see also, e.g., Mohr 1969). Much of the subsequent management
and organization-
theory literature dealing with innovation moves eff ortlessly
from the private to the
public sector and back and deals, in fact, mostly with the
paradox of managers call-
ing for innovative ideas that end up meeting resistance in
implementation, oft en
from the same managers or organizational structures (Lynn
1997). Th is strand of re-
search dealt mostly with diversity of tasks and incentives in an
organization (Becker
and Whisler 1967 is a good overview). One of the key fi gures
in this tradition is
James Q. Wilson, whose defi nition of (public-sector)
organizational innovation re-
mained largely the same from the 1960s to the 1980s: “real
innovations are those
that alter core tasks; most changes add to or alter peripheral
tasks” (1989, 225). Wil-
son, without referring to Schumpeter, understood these
alternations in core tasks to
be evolutionary in nature and in impact: “Government agencies
change all the time,

but the most common changes are add-ons; new program is
added on to existing
tasks without changing the core tasks or altering the
organizational culture” (ibid.).
Th us, there is a rather extensive literature that emerged from
organization theory
that incidentally or purposefully deals with public-sector
innovation, where the lat-
ter is defi ned more or less similarly from the 1960s to the
1990s. Th is literature uses
more or less varied Schumpeterian notion of innovation, but it
almost does not
diff erentiate at all between the private and public sectors, and
thus innovations in
any organization can be defi ned as signifi cant and enduring
changes in core tasks.
Th is way innovation should be diff erent from incremental
changes in organizations
(public or private) and in fact is similar to (technological)
breakthroughs familiar
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13
from the private-sector evolutionary literature (see, e.g., Lynn
1997, who explicitly
uses the concept of breakthrough).8
Th e autochthonous-theory period. In the 2000s, literature
dealing with public-

sector innovation tried to move away both from private-sector
Schumpeterian ap-
proaches emphasizing novelty in action and from
organizational-level changes to-
wards innovation genuinely attributable to the public sector and
towards discussing
innovations in public services and governance (See, e.g.,
Hartley 2005; Moore and
Hartley 2008; also Pollitt 2011). However, while there is a
distinct attempt to discuss
public-sector phenomena (i.e. decentralization of agencies or
regions) and move
away from the private-sector categorization and concepts (such
as product, service
etc. innovations, life cycles and trajectories), there is hardly any
substantial change
in terms of conceptually diff erentiating public-sector
innovations from the private-
sector ones. Th e main tenets are still changes that are new to
the organization and
that are large and durable enough (e.g. Hartley 2005, 27; Moore
and Hartley 2008,
5). Hartley, for instance, delivers a useful discussion of the diff
erence between pub-
lic-sector innovations in traditional, new-public-management-
and network-based
paradigms of public administration (2005, 28 – 30). Yet, her
conceptual framework
is hardly diff erent from Wilson’s. Similarly to organization-
theory literature, also
the most recent literature on public-sector innovation sees
innovations in public
sector in the end as something diff erent from incremental
improvements that can
also fail and not lead to better public service. Th us, e-voting
would constitute a real

innovation for most public-sector researchers, and yet some
would argue that this
innovation did not really bring any improvement or at least that
the jury is still out.
However, in most cases the line between innovation or not,
improvement or not, is
not only tenuous at best, oft en it seems plain arbitrary. Moore
and Hartley (2008),
for instance, use contracting-out and private-public partnerships
as examples; in
other words, public-sector innovation is another term for NPM-
style reform prac-
tices.9
However, in contrast to earlier periods of public-sector
innovation concepts,
and with the exception of Lynn (1997; see also Lynn 2013), the
current period of
scholarship pays much less attention to the evolutionary
character of changes de-
8 Ironically, while this is indeed important for the early
Schumpeterian literature, from the 1970s
and 1980s onwards, evolutionary economics develops complex
theoretical frameworks that show
how routine-based individual skills and company-level behavior
leads towards a higher level of
complexity and helps to explain how Schumpeterian creative
destruction shapes economies and
competitive environments (See Dosi 1984; Nelson and Winter
1982). This leads to learning
economies and national systems of innovation approach that
seek to explain innovations not
only as breakthroughs but indeed as incremental everyday
changes in company routines, learn-
ing and various levels of interactions (e.g. user-producer; see

Freeman 1982 and 1987; Lundvall
1992). Thus, the evolutionary economics dealing with private-
sector innovations moves almost
exactly in the opposite direction as the emerging public-sector
literature during the 1980s.
9 See Drechsler (2005) on the role academic and policy-talk
fashion plays in such relabeling prac-
tices.
Unauthenticated
14
scribed as innovations. Th is is not to say that there is not an
acute awareness that
one has to diff erentiate ordinary change from innovation. For
instance, Osborne
and Brown 2013 argue, “the management of innovation is an
entirely diff erent task
from the management of developmental change” (2013, 3); Lynn
similarly concurs
that all non-transformative change is “‘innovation lite’, which
is indistinguishable
from ordinary change” (2013, 32). Yet, how this transformative
change in fact works
in the public sector – and diff ers from typical private-sector
dynamics – remains
almost always under discussed. Even the most advanced
concepts of public-sector

innovation do not address in detail how selection mechanisms
and other processes
take place that would enable us to distinguish innovations from
ordinary changes.
What makes one reform or new service an innovation, and the
other not ? Oft en
there seem to be normative connotations involved in
distinguishing innovation
from change: as innovation is good, a successful reform must be
innovative.
On the other hand, evolutionary dynamics dominate private-
sector-innova-
tion literature, evident in such concepts as backward and
forward linkages, increas-
ing returns to scale, fi rst-mover advantage, winner-takes-all
markets, imperfect
competition, externalities, etc. (most present already in
Schumpeter, especially in
his 1939 Business Cycles). In fact, innovation research in the
private sector is all
about evolutionary change: how and why certain products,
services, technologies,
technology systems, but also organizational forms and
institutional frameworks be-
come dominant over others that in turn become obsolete or
vanish altogether (Nel-
son and Winter 1982, Perez 2002, etc.). Th e role of technology,
particularly large-
scale shift s following technological revolutions that lead to
whole new paradigms, is
diffi cult to underestimate here.
However, such evolutionary practices and processes are simply
much less evi-
dent or even lacking in the public sector. Moreover, many of

these processes would
also not be desirable in the context of public organizations,
such as monopoly rents
garnered by fi rst movers or undercutting the same fi rst movers
by imitation. Th ere
is hardly any competition within the public sector for such
evolutionary processes
to take place. Th e way innovations diff use in the market
environment, via imperfect
competition and imitation, is hardly a way for public-sector
innovations to emerge
and to diff use. Furthermore, in business innovations, there are
lots of failures at
innovations and lots of losses through innovations or imitations
by competitors.
Again, these phenomena seem not to be present in the public
sector or present
themselves in a diff erent form.
Th at is not to say that there is no evolutionary change in the
public sector. As
we have seen above, almost all literature on public-sector
innovation assumes that
there is evolutionary change, but conceptualizing the
evolutionary changes in the
public sector seems to have been lost in private-sector
terminology. Th e key lesson
from previous literature, accordingly, seems to be that we
should not attempt to
look for similar processes to take place within the public sector;
rather we should
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15
try to focus on evolutionary processes within the public sector
that originate from
the logics of the public sector and pertain to such phenomena as
power, legitimacy
and trust.
Public-Sector Innovation: No theory for old men ?
Th is is arguably exactly the topic of perhaps the earliest
“discussion” on public-sec-
tor innovation, namely between Tocqueville and Weber on the
state-level public
administrations in the US. Tocqueville’s analysis, and
admiration, of state-level ad-
ministration is famous, Weber’s counterarguments are much
more scattered and
less well-known (Tocqueville’s was published in 1835 and
184010; Weber’s remarks
can be found in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft from 1922 and
elsewhere).11
Tocqueville’s main question in looking at the US state and
especially town-
ship-level administration was how diverse townships in New
England, without
central administration, can still provide relatively uniform
public services, espe-
cially under an administrative system where most public
functions are fulfi lled
by elected offi cials (1876, 92). He explained this with judicial
oversight of admin-

istrations, and called both – decentralized administration and
judicial oversight
– innovations (ibid.).12 In Tocqueville’s view, decentralized
administration with
elected offi cials and judicial oversight work better than
centralized administra-
tions (which, he argues, was an innovation of the French
Revolution; 121): cen-
tralized administrations have more resources, are good at
regulating business,
maintaining social order and security but also keep society
equally from improve-
ment and decline (113); centralized administrations are good at
mastering re-
sources to combat problems, but they are poor at rejuvenating
what might be
called socio-political resources for change (109).
When we jump two-thirds of a century forward, we can see that
all the ills of
centralized administration described by Tocqueville become
positives in Weber’s
view: in order to keep the social order, that is to keep authority
and society func-
tioning, centralized bureaucracy is the “technically” better
instrument over elected
10 We refer here to the 1848 French edition, available via
Project Gutenberg, and to the 1876 Eng-
lish translation.
11 In Weber’s case, we use the 2002 German edition. For a
comparative discussion of Tocqueville’s
and Weber’s discussions of America, see Kalberg 1997.
12 “C’est ce qui ne se découvre pas au premier coup d’œil. Les

gouvernants regardent comme
une première concession de rendre les fonctions électives, et
comme une seconde concession
de soumettre le magistrat élu aux arrêts des juges. Ils redoutent
également ces deux innova-
tions.” / “The communities therefore in which the secondary
functionaries of the government are
elected are perforce obliged to make great use of judicial
penalties as a means of administration.
This is not evident at fi rst sight; for those in power are apt to
look upon the institution of elective
functionaries as one concession, and the subjection of the
elected magistrate to the judges of the
land as another. They are equally averse to both these
innovations.”
Unauthenticated
16
offi cials (2002). Elected offi cials and other “‘schöpferische’
Betätigung der Beamten”
leads rather to unpredictability and a politically corrupt system.
While Tocqueville and Weber had diff erent normative goals –
the former
describing the benefi ts of an active civic life, the latter
describing the benefi ts of
a well-functioning and predictable state apparatus – both
discuss eventually how

authority, to use Weber’s term, is maintained in society with
competitive interests
via institutional and administrative innovations (although
Weber does not use the
term). We can paraphrase Weber: the modern state is defi ned
by its authority to
use violence to uphold the very same authority. Above all,
Tocqueville and We-
ber show how such innovations lead to diff ering socio-political
relationships and
networks, institutional and organizational structures and
cultures, in other words:
how these innovations drive diff erent evolutionary change. But
both also show why
evolutionary processes in the public sector are punctured by
political, legal, institu-
tional and administrative constraints. In fact, these very
constraints are part of these
evolutionary processes, forming simultaneously internal factors
that are changed
and external factors limiting changes. Constraints are intrinsic
to the public sector.
Th us, to use Tocqueville’s example, judicial oversight in small
townships acted as a
constraint on elected offi cials, yet this same constraint led to
better service for the
citizens. Weber, on the other hand, writing two-thirds of a
century later, argued that
modern societies have become increasingly more complex and
thus require central-
ized administrations that can act simultaneously as constraints
and enablers.
Consequently, following Tocqueville and Weber, we can argue
that instead
of competition as driver and diff user of evolutionary processes,

as is the case in
the private sector, intrinsic public-sector features act
simultaneously as constraints
and enablers and engender punctured evolutionary processes as
a consequence of
public-sector innovations. Notice that in both cases the
innovations infl uence or-
ganizational-level capacities, institutional interactions and,
eventually, the political
authority of a state. Th eir recommendation, as it were, would
be to look at changes
in the public sector that lead to 1) changes in constraints and
enablers that relate
directly to how authority is obtained / retained and 2) engender
clearly discern-
ible evolutionary trajectories in their respective ecosystem; such
changes could be
termed public-sector innovations.13
Concluding remarks
Summarizing above 150 years of discussion on conceptualizing
public-sector inno-
vations and innovations generally, we can draw the following
conclusions:
13 It can be argued that a recently emerging literature on social
innovation tries to fi ll the gap in
public-sector-innovation literature by looking at values and
social relevance and thus moves the
discussions towards issues of authority, trust, etc; see Bekkers
et al. 2013 for an overview.
Unauthenticated

17
A From the oldest literature discussing public-sector
innovations (Tocqueville,
Weber):
1) Public-sector innovations are in the most abstract sense
related to public au-
thority and legitimacy;
2) Innovations lead to evolutionary changes in constraints and
enablers that are
intrinsic to the public sector (rules, relationships, institutions);
B From recent public-sector-innovation literature:
3) Literature on public-sector innovations rarely deals with
authority (and re-
lated phenomena such as legitimacy, trust, etc.) but rather with
relatively spe-
cifi c features of these changes, e.g. with specifi c modalities
(within public-sec-
tor organizations), agency (reactions to external stimuli such as
technology,
politics, social challenges) and morphology (incremental
changes); most of
these changes are in fact not evolutionary, or their impact
remains diffi cult to
discern;
4) Innovation is too oft en defi ned from a normative viewpoint
(as something
leading to signifi cant improvement in public-service delivery),

rather than a
process that explains how profound changes take place in the
public sector.
5) In defi ning innovation, the literature has focused mostly on
organizational or
policy levels, but in doing so it has neglected the wider, public-
sector-level,
constraints and enablers.
In sum, looking at these two strands of older and recent
literature on PSI, we can
see that disproportionally large areas of public-sector activity in
relations to innova-
tions are under-researched in current PSI research. Max Weber
has given us per-
haps the best possible roadmap for future PSI-related research.
References
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Bason, C. 2010. Leading Public Sector Innovation. Bristol:
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Moore, M. and J. Hartley. 2008. “Innovations in Governance.”
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of Economic Change.
Cambridge, Mass.: Th e Belknap Press of Harvard University
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Osborne, S. P. and K. Brown. 2013. “Introduction: Innovation
in Public Services.” In
S. P. Osborne and K. Brown (eds). Handbook of Innovation in
Public Services.
Cheltenham: Elgar, 1 – 11.
Perez, C. 2002. Technological Revolutions and Financial
Capital: Th e Dynamics of
Bubbles and Golden Ages. Cheltenham: Elgar.
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Pollitt, C. 2011. “Innovation in the Public Sector: An
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Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy
Sager, Fritz;Rosser, Christian
Public Administration Review; Nov/Dec 2009; 69, 6; ProQuest
Central
pg. 1136

Administrative Theory & Praxis, 38: 101–114, 2016
Copyright #�2016 Public Administration Theory Network
ISSN: 1084-1806 print/1949-0461 online
DOI: 10.1080/10841806.2016.1165586
ORIGINAL ARTICLES

Machiavelli’s Lessons for Public Administration
Berry Tholen
Radboud University
On issues concerning the basis and function of political science
and public administration as a
discipline, Max Weber provides answers that are puzzling when
more closely examined. In this
article, it is demonstrated that coherent answers to these issues
can be found in the work of Niccolò
Machiavelli. Moreover, Machiavelli’s perspective can solve the
puzzle that Weber creates. This
perspective explains, more explicitly and elaborately than
Weber, how the practice and the study of
public administration are to be distinguished, but, at the same
time, are connected and similar. We
conclude by showing the implications of Machiavelli’s approach
for public administration
education, research, and advice.
In his Republic, Plato (2007) presented answers to questions
that are basic to public adminis-
tration and political science: (a) Is reliable knowledge for
governance possible? (b) If so, what
type of knowledge can experts in administration and
government offer? (c) What should be the
role of experts to powerholders? According to Plato, some
people, after lengthy study and
contemplation, can develop a rational grip on universal and
unchanging ideas. These ideas
encompass knowledge of the true, the beautiful, and the good
and just. People who have arrived
at this level of understanding should be philosopher-kings
(Plato, 2007). Nowadays, few will

find these three interconnected answers convincing, because of
epistemological reasons (the
problems in Plato’s rationalism were already pointed out by
Aristotle, 1933/1989a, 1926/
1989b, or because of their antidemocratic character (e.g., Mill,
1861/1991, Chap. 3). For many
current scholars in public administration, the evident answers to
these basic issues will likely be
the answers that Max Weber provided. These answers are, in
every way, are opposite to those of
Plato: (a) Reliable knowledge should be built on empirical
methods. We cannot have knowledge
of universal, eternal truths; we can only hope for empirical
theories that last a few decades. (b)
True or scientific knowledge is limited in scope and concerns
causal relations, not aesthetics or
ethics. (c) The scientific advisor should, with a detached
attitude, provide inconvenient facts to
Address correspondence to Berry Tholen, Department of Public
Administration, Institute for Management
Research, Radboud University, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected]
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10841806.2016.1165586
mailto:[email protected]
people in power. Having knowledge does not provide the
legitimacy to rule (Weber, 1961b,
pp. 145–151).
Attractive or evident as Weber’s answers may seem to many of
us, his position is puzzling
for several reasons. Notwithstanding his own advice in the
essay “Science as a Vocation,”

Weber in his political writings goes beyond merely indicating
inconvenient facts. The
comments and advice that he provides in his political writings
clearly express certain ideals con-
cerning the state and politics—for example, on the value of
individual liberty and representative
politics (Beetham, 1985; Lassman, 2000). The claim that expert
advisors should limit them-
selves to expressing facts is also puzzling in the context of
“Science as a Vocation.” In this text,
Weber claims that every scientific discipline encompasses
certain values. Medical science, for
example, contains the presupposition that its responsibility is to
maintain life and diminish suf-
fering (Weber, 1961b, p. 144). However, does that not mean
that every scientific advisor will
(and must) also always be led by his disciplinary valuations and
concerns? Have those values
not inspired scientific advisors to particular lines of research
that will bring them to particular
(inconvenient) facts and not others? Finally, if scientific experts
are completely detached and
value-free, why should they bother to provide advice at all?
Although Plato brought scientific
expertise and governing too close together, Weber seems to do
the opposite. Weber’s strict
distinction appears to be untenable, even in his own work and
actions.
In this article, the focus is on another classic author who
provided answers to the three basic
questions: Niccolò Machiavelli. Machiavelli is often presented
as the first (modern) scientist in
the field of politics and administration (Cassirer, 1950; Olschki,
1945; Parel, 1972; Walker,
1950; Wolin, 1960). However, in public administration, his

work is rarely investigated.
Machiavelli, to be sure, also stood close to the classical era. He
explicitly refers to ancient Greece
and Rome as inspiring examples in the preface to his Discourses
(Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p.
191). Machiavelli can be seen as located between (or in both)
modernity and premodernity (e.g.,
Brenner, 2009; Hariman, 1989; McIntosh, 1984; Parel, 1991;
Yoran, 2010.) I will not investigate
whether and in what sense Machiavelli’s ideas are to be judged
as modern or premodern. His
historical position between the extreme positions of the modern
Weber and the premodern Plato,
however, suggests that we may find a moderate middle position
in Machiavelli. Occasionally,
Weber explicitly refers to the Florentine master. In “Politics as
a Vocation,” for example, he
refers to Machiavelli’s The Prince and History of Florence
(Weber, 1961a, p. 124, p. 126). There
are some clear similarities in Weber’s and Machiavelli’s
outlooks that appear when we compare
these books. They both understand politics as essentially a
matter of conflict and strife over the
power of a state. Weber and Machiavelli both have a particular
interest in the strong political
leader. As one more example, they also both address what
nowadays is called the issue of “dirty
hands” in a fairly similar way. On the issue of dirty hands, some
scholars maintain that Weber’s
understanding exceeds Machiavelli’s (Parel, 1972, p. 14;
Walzer, 1973). However, does Weber’s
understanding exceed Machiavelli’s on other issues?
The central question of this article is: What are Machiavelli’s
answers to the basic questions
of public administration as a discipline, and does his position

help us overcome the puzzlement
that Weber creates?1
Each of the following three sections concentrates on
Machiavelli’s answer to one of the basic
questions. After this elaboration, the concluding section
considers whether Machiavelli can help
us overcome the confusion. The article then addresses what
Machiavelli’s outlook implies for
public administration education, research, and advice.2
102 THOLEN
MACHIAVELLI’S METHOD
Driven by the natural eagerness I have always felt for doing
without any hesitation the things
that I believe will bring benefit common to everybody, I have
determined to enter upon a path
not yet trodden by anyone. (Preface to Discourses, Gilbert,
1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 190)
In discussing this material I depart very far from the methods of
others. But since my purpose is
to write something useful to him who comprehends it, I have
decided that I must concern myself
with the truth of the matter as facts show it rather than with any
fanciful notion. (The Prince,
Chapter XV, Gilbert, 1965/1999, p. 57)
Machiavelli is often presented as the founding father of the
political and administrative sciences. As
evidence for this claim, passages from his works, such as those
above, are often cited. Machiavelli
himself claims to walk a new path, which involves considering

facts, not fancy. Cassirer cites with
appreciation Bacon, who regarded Machiavelli as a kindred
spirit “who had broken away from all
scholastic methods and tried to study politics according to
empirical methods” (Cassirer, 1950,
p. 130). Cassirer also presents Machiavelli as the Galileo of
political science (Cassirer, 1950,
pp. 119, 130; see also Olschki, 1945; Parel, 1972; Walker,
1950; Wolin, 1960).
Machiavelli begins the Discourses in what appears to be a
general Renaissance approach by
emphasizing the importance of considering ancient times and
trying to learn from one’s prede-
cessors; one should follow the example of the physicians and
lawyers of his time. However,
Machiavelli observes, “in setting up states, in maintaining
governments, in ruling kingdoms,
in organizing armies and managing war, in executing laws
among subjects, in expanding an
empire, not a single prince or republic now resorts to the
examples of the ancients” (Preface
to Discourses, Gilbert, 1965/1999, p. 191). States are mistaken
not to employ these lessons,
Machiavelli maintains. He differs from many Renaissance
writers, however, in the way we
should learn from earlier times. Unlike his contemporaries, such
as Erasmus in his mirror
Education of a Christian Prince (1516), Machiavelli hardly ever
cites authoritative statements
of ancient writers (cf. Barlow, 1999; Hariman, 1989; Viroli,
1998, pp. 3–4; Wood, 1965,
p. xxii). His objects, furthermore, are not ancient theories and
philosophical arguments, but
the deeds of great statesmen as recorded by historians
(Fleischer, 1995, p. 331, p. 133).3 Neither

does Machiavelli derive his recommendations from any
comprehensive metaphysical
understanding, whether cosmological, religious, or historicist.
He does occasionally refer to
the influence of celestial bodies, the importance of religious
beliefs, and the periodic rise and
decline of nations (Parel, 1991). Yet these examples are far too
few and too unsystematic to
conclude a metaphysical basis underlying Machiavelli’s claims.
It is not unreasonable to sup-
pose that these references are often used by Machiavelli for
rhetorical reasons. Moreover,
Machiavelli is very clear on the point that human beings can
(and, in fact, should) determine
their own destiny instead of having to follow a predetermined
scheme (Berlin, 1955/2013;
Cassirer, 1950, p. 157; Flanagan, 1972, pp. 149, 154; Fleischer,
1995, pp. 332, 353; Viroli,
1998, pp. 98–99; Wolin, 1960, p. 224; Wood, 1972, p. 56).4
In the fashion of modern science, Machiavelli offers cause-and-
effect-claims. In Chapter
XVI of The Prince, he notes, for example, that seeking the
reputation of liberality will eventu-
ally undermine one’s position as a prince (Gilbert, 1965/1999,
Vol. 1, pp. 59–61). In Book I of
The Art of War, he claims that by employing mercenaries, one
brings thieves and villains into
one’s country (Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 2, pp. 574–575). As a
last example, in the Discourses
(Bk. 1, Chap. 55), Machiavelli indicates that if the populace is
not corrupt, public affairs are
MACHIAVELLI’S LESSONS 103

easily managed (Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 306–311).
Machiavelli does not arrive at claims
such as these by one particular empirical method. He does not
reach general claims by employ-
ing any method of induction from a range of cases (Fleischer,
1995, pp. 333, 342). Moreover, he
does not perform tests or experiments, nor does his work show
any sign of systematical data
collection (Viroli, 1998, pp. 1–2, 63, 81–83). In fact,
Machiavelli never explains what he means
specifically by his “new path” (see also Crick, 1984, pp. 48, 51;
Garver, 1987, pp. 12–22;
Strauss, 1953). If we observe what he actually does, we witness
a series of approaches. Often,
Machiavelli points out examples that illustrate and support his
assertions, especially from the
time of the Roman republic but not exclusively. He sometimes
supplements these supporting
observations with opposite examples that went awry. At other
moments, he simply refers to
his personal experience or suggests that his claim will be
evident to anyone who has had any
experience in the matter. In still other cases, he refers to
evident implications of human nature.
In the passages containing these examples, each of these
approaches can be noted. Berlin seems
to offer a fitting characterization when he writes the following
concerning Machiavelli’s
“approach”: “his method is a mixture of rules of thumb,
observation, historical knowledge
and general sagacity, somewhat like the empirical medicine of
the pre-scientific world” (Berlin,
1955/2013, pp. 41–42; cf. Crick, 1984, p. 48; Wood, 1967).
Berlin certainly is correct in emphasizing the mixed method

used by Machiavelli; yet in this
characterization, he misses—or at least leaves implicit—several
important aspects. First, for
Machiavelli, gathering knowledge is closely related to learning
and individual development.
As to the training of the mind, the prudent prince reads histories
and observes in them the actions
of excellent men, sees how they have conducted themselves in
wars, observes the causes for their
victories and defeats in order to escape the latter and imitate the
former, above all, he does as some
excellent men have done in the past; they selected for imitation
some man earlier than themselves
who was praised and honored. (The Prince, Chap. XIV; Gilbert,
1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 56–57)
Knowledge relevant to government and administration, or “state
craft,” as Machiavelli calls it
(Letter of December 10, 1513, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 3, p.
930) has an empirical basis;
however, there is more to it. It is always knowledge regarding
how to act. This knowledge does
not simply concern causes and effects, but, more precisely, also
involves what one can do.
Knowledge in statecraft must be action-oriented (Parel, 1972, p.
9). Furthermore, this
knowledge considers how one should behave in war, political
strife, and the like. This type
of knowledge is not the type that can be grasped in general laws
and universal rules. In the
sphere of politics and administration, there are always
exceptions. Machiavelli regularly
mentions anomalies to his own guidelines (Viroli, 1998, p. 84).
In this field, predictions are
often off the mark (The Prince, Chapter XXV; Gilbert,

1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 90). Second,
knowledge for Machiavelli is contextual. He presents causal
relationships, but one finds few
general rules in his writings that are not qualified in some way.
His approach to the art of polit-
ical rule is not a “science of social engineering.” His
observations regarding men and their beha-
vior are always understood in terms of the specific context.
(Germino, 1972, p. 74; Walker,
1993, p. 39). Machiavelli emphasizes often that statecraft does
not involve the constant appli-
cation of general rules but requires adapting to changing
circumstances (e.g., Discourses III, 9,
Gilbert, Vol. 1, p. 416; The Prince, Chapter XXV, Gilbert,
1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 89–92).
Having knowledge, for Machiavelli, is closely related to being
prepared for chance, the
104 THOLEN
unpredictable, or fortune (The Prince, Chapter III, Gilbert,
1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 16; also see
Cassirer, 1950, p. 157; Crick, 1984, pp. 53–54; Flanagan, 1972;
Kontos, 1972, p. 84).
Third, this type of action-oriented contextual knowledge can be
learned from the examples of
great practitioners, not from theoretical writers and their
general ideas. Machiavelli’s remarks
regarding the new path or method he is following likely refer to
this attention to the acts of real
political actors (as they are presented by historians) instead of
the books of philosophers
(Fleischer, 1995; Viroli, 1998). To learn the craft of the state,

one must imitate and follow
the lead of actors who were exemplars of excellence in their
fields: the great men and the
successful republics. For Machiavelli, the political activity of
the ancients occasionally exhibited
political wisdom of the highest order (Discourses I, preface;
Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 191;
Discourses III 27, Gilbert, 1965/1999, p. 490; Fleischer, 1995,
p. 331). He also saw virtuosi in
the political arena of his own time, such as Borgia and
Ferdinand of Aragon (The Prince, Chapter
XXI, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 81). By interpreting these
actions of others, one can sharpen
one’s own judgment and develop one’s skills (Viroli, 1998, pp.
71, 94). It is important, therefore,
to know what individuals excelling in statecraft did in particular
circumstances to know what to
imitate in what setting and to have the desire to gather and act
on this knowledge (Fleischer,
1995, p. 336; Plamenatz, 1972, p. 164). Developing statecraft
presupposes that one already
has a particular attitude and a certain level of knowledge and
skill. Machiavelli expresses this
assumption when he writes (in the text cited at the beginning of
this section) that it is his “pur-
pose to write something useful to him who comprehends it”
(The Prince, Chapter XXV, Gilbert,
1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 57). Thus, gathering knowledge, for
Machiavelli, is not a matter of apply-
ing some method that can be expressed in an algorithm and that
leads to empirical laws. Gath-
ering knowledge is closely connected to developing individual
excellence. Becoming a virtuoso
in statecraft demands that one have certain virtues.5 The
knowledge one can acquire in this field
is not the same as in the natural sciences, nor can it be so

precise and put into empirical laws. It
can only be discerned from exemplary actions by experienced
spectators and described in likely
tendencies and precepts and maxims (Crick, 1984, p. 45; Parel,
1972, p. 10).
Machiavelli Versus Weber: Instruments and Aims
Machiavelli presents, for rulers and public officials, guidelines
that are not deduced from
philosophical or religious principles or drawn from classical
authority; they obtain their support
from empirical findings. These guidelines include examples of
best practices (and evident
failures) in ancient times and in his time. Machiavelli does not
follow one particular method.
His “new path” is eclectic and intended to teach the statecraft of
the (ancient) virtuoso rulers
to contemporary officials. This statecraft does not involve
knowledge of general, universal laws
and rules—the sphere of governing, inevitably, is one of
uncertainty. It involves the skill to
judge what actions will most likely bring results in a particular
context. Max Weber makes simi-
lar points. Although he is more explicit on method (especially
on verstehende Soziologie
[interpretative sociology]), Weber, in fact, uses eclectic
approaches in his writings that are simi-
lar to Machiavelli’s. His claims rest on interpretations of
meanings but also on arguments from
structural factors. He also cites historical cases (ancient Egypt
or China) and compares contem-
porary examples (such as the United States, England, and
Germany); all of these examples are
in “Politics as a Vocation” (Weber, 1961a, pp. 77–128). Like
Machiavelli, Weber emphasizes

the limits of law-like knowledge in this field. Therefore, he
formulates his theories and
definitions in terms of chance or likelihood (e.g., his definition
of power). Yet there is also a
clear difference between these writers on the first basic question
of public administration. In
Machiavelli, there is a clear and explicit link between acquiring
knowledge and personal
education or development: One who already has the relevant
epistemic skills and virtues is able
to discern the relevant causal relations and good examples.
MACHIAVELLI’S EXPERT KNOWLEDGE
Therefore nothing makes a republic so firm and solid as to give
her such an organization that the
laws provide a way for the discharge of the partisan hatreds that
agitate her. (Discourses I 7,
Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 211)
The matter to be found here assures to a prudent and able ruler a
chance to introduce a form that
will bring him glory and her people [i.e., the people of Italy]
general happiness. (The Prince,
Chapter XXVI, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 92–93)
In the Discourses, The Prince, and The Art of War, Machiavelli
provides maxims on what a
ruler, a representative, a general, or any other public official
should do to realize certain
ends. Several examples were presented in the last section. Some

scholars have characterized
Machiavelli’s originality by calling him the founder of
instrumental political thinking or of
management expertise. He is said to have shown the way to
considering the most effective
and efficient means to realize the goals a current ruler happens
to have. Cassirer uses a Kantian
term when he calls Machiavelli’s counsels “hypothetical
imperatives”; there is no question of
whether the end is good but only of what one must do to attain
it. Cassirer maintains that
Machiavelli simply gives advice on political actions without
blaming or praising “in the same
way in which a physician describes the symptoms of a certain
illness” (Cassirer, 1950, p. 154).
Machiavelli’s lessons have aroused much criticism. Some
commentators have called him amoral
or even immoral. This harsh judgment is triggered by the
instrumental focus that many perceive in
Machiavelli’s work. These critics are shocked by his
willingness to exercise sheer brute force as an
indispensable feature of good princely government and by his
claim that princes should learn how
to be not good—that is, be ready to abandon conventional
(Christian) ethics if necessary (The
Prince, Chapter XV, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol., p. 58; Skinner,
2002, pp. 144–146). Machiavelli,
moreover, draws religion into the sphere of political
instrumentalism when he notes that certain reli-
gions can be used to realize certain objectives of rulers and
states. He asserts, furthermore, that the
Christian faith poses a threat to a well-ordered society, because
it motivates citizens to be more con-
cerned with the afterlife than with making the best of this state
of being (Discourses I 11, Gilbert,

1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 224; Discourses II 2, Gilbert, 1965/1999,
Vol., p. 331; Skinner, 2002, pp. 156,
172, 180, 183). Ever since the early sixteenth century, these
statements have led to characterizations
of Machiavelli as “a teacher of evil,” “enemy of the human
race,” and “anti-Christian,” and of The
Prince as “satanic” and “the devil’s bible” (Parel, 1972, p. 16;
Strauss, 1958, p. 9).
On closer review, however, the characterization as amoral or
immoral is untenable. First,
Machiavelli does not discard the value and reality of
conventional virtues and religion. He main-
tains, for example, in The Prince, “I am aware that everyone
will admit that it would be most
praiseworthy for a prince to exhibit such of the above-
mentioned qualities as are considered good
106 THOLEN
[i.e., conventional virtues, such as being merciful, truthful,
chaste, reliable]” (The Prince,
Chapter XV, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 58). In the
Discourses, Machiavelli endorses the
value of three of the four cardinal virtues: prudence,
temperance, and courage (Skinner, 2002,
pp. 154, 204, 207).6 He respects religion’s transcendent
understanding that faith lies beyond
the sphere of politics (Parel, 1972, p. 14). Machiavelli
maintains that in the political sphere, these
conventional values are not the only relevant considerations,
and sometimes they must be over-
ruled. However, he is not amoral, because he endorses these
virtues; nor is he immoral, because

he accepts their value (Berlin, 1955/2013; Parel, 1972; Skinner,
2002; Wood, 1972).
Second, it must be emphasized that the political sphere for
Machiavelli is not marked by effec-
tive instruments for the arbitrary aims of rulers. Politics, for
Machiavelli, involves undertaking
actions for the common good. His lessons for rulers,
administrators, and citizens, in fact, are not
“hypothetical imperatives.” All the advice he gives can be
understood as intended to contribute to
particular goods. Even in The Prince, the work that most
examines effective individual leader-
ship, Machiavelli identifies the “general happiness of the
people” as the ultimate end (see the
quotation from The Prince at the beginning of this section). In
the Discourses, we find a more
elaborate concept of the common good. Some commentators
have noted Machiavelli’s concern
for the independence and continuity of the political community
and for internal stability (Berlin,
1955/2013; McIntosh, 1984, pp. 184–185). Others scholars have
focused on his concern for indi-
vidual freedom guaranteed by the rule of law and the civic
virtue of all citizens (Benner, 2009;
Pocock, 1975; Plamenatz, 1972; Skinner, 2002; Viroli, 1998;
Wolin, 1960; Wood, 1972; Yoran,
2010). Still other observers emphasize the democratic motive in
his work (e.g., McCormick,
2011). This article is not the place to investigate Machiavelli’s
understanding of the common
good. In the scope of this article, it suffices to conclude that
Machiavelli’s recommendations
are not hypothetical imperatives on how to attain arbitrary
goals, but are guidelines for realizing
the common good. Machiavelli deviates from traditional advice

books, or mirrors for princes, in
his willingness to override conventional virtues and values. Yet
he firmly belongs to this tradition
because of his concern that rulers and administrators should
focus on proper objectives (Skinner,
2002, p. 143). Returning to Cassirer’s analogy cited at the
beginning of this section, it may be
appropriate to compare statecraft with the art of the physician.
Machiavelli often presents this
analogy (e.g., The Prince, Chapter III; Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol.
1, pp. 16–17). However, Cassirer
misses the point that physicians must know what is the proper
end for which they employ their
medical instruments (the life and well-being of their patients).
On this point, Machiavelli
expresses an analogous orientation for experts on statecraft.
Machiavelli Versus Weber: What the Advisor Should Do
Machiavelli’s many guidelines encompass knowledge of causal
relations and proper objectives.
These recommendations are not “hypothetical imperatives” but
express a specific understanding
of the common good. In presenting these guidelines and the
arguments for them, Machiavelli
offers us knowledge of effective instruments and an
understanding of what we should strive
for. From Machiavelli’s perspective, knowledge and action are
closely related. Knowledge is
meant to be useful. Knowledge helps people decide how to act
and instructs them how to act well.
Each guideline offers its own particular advice; together, they
help one to develop skills and the
proper orientation. These guidelines help one develop into a
virtu, a virtuoso ruler or administrator.

Weber, especially in his political writings, also presents advice
and guidelines that clearly are
inspired by a certain framework of values (Beetham, 1985;
Lassman, 2000). Remarks in
“Science as a Vocation” seem to make it inevitable for a
scientist to work within this structure
(Weber, 1961b, p. 144). However, when explicitly dealing with
the issue of values, Weber
remarkably emphasizes that a scientific advisor should be self-
limited to present only causal
knowledge. According to Weber, scientists as experts should be
“intellectually honest,” and
try to avoid specific values, because they have no authority in
this field (Weber, 1961b,
pp. 146–147. In Machiavelli, however, there is no such puzzling
contradiction. He follows
the tradition of the mirrors of princes: he shows the rulers their
instruments and what their
objectives should be (Skinner, 2002, p. 143).
MACHIAVELLI ON THE ROLE OF EXPERT ADVISORS
I see no other way than for an advisor to be moderate and not to
seize upon any of the plans
brought forward as his own undertaking, and to speak his
opinion without passion, and without
passion modestly to defend it, so that the city or the prince who
follows it does it voluntarily,
and does not seem to enter upon it as pushed by your urgency.
(Discourses III 35, Gilbert,
1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 509)

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